


*Indo-
Nepalese
Relations*



RAMAKANT

INDO-NEPALESE RELATIONS

1816 TO 1877

By

RAMAKANT

*Department of Political Science,
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JAIPUR*

1968

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To the loving memory of my brother
Harikant

PREFACE

The northern frontier of India is increasingly coming into prominence. Nepal, with a common boundary of more than five hundred miles, occupies an important strategic position along the Gangetic Valley. She is the heart of the Himalayas and is also a link between the two great countries of Asia—India and China. From time immemorial, the relations between Nepal and India have been very close and intimate. The racial, religious, social, cultural, linguistic and political bonds have assisted in bringing the two countries nearer to each other. In recent times, when our belief in the impregnability of the Himalayas has been so rudely shattered by the Chinese invasion, Nepal has assumed an added importance.

Unfortunately, the study of this mountainous kingdom has been grossly neglected. During the British regime in India, the policy of the Nepalese rulers and the acquiescence of the British therein had rendered her almost an unknown and mysterious country. Till recently, Nepal, with her primitive and feudal structure, was treated as a client state—a mere recruiting ground of the British army. Few works give a comprehensive and unbiased account of her socio-political institutions and history. After the independence of our country and emancipation of Nepal from the clutches of the Rana oligarchy, it has become obligatory for us to have an appraisal of the relations between the two countries in an objective way and with a proper historical perspective. The Indo-Nepalese relations provide an interesting study of the working of the European imperialism in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. In Asia, Nepal was one of the few countries that could preserve her political independence against the great stride of the British imperialism.

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In this work an attempt has been made towards a comprehensive survey of the Indo-Nepalese relations from 1816 to 1877. Not only new facts have been brought to light, a new interpretation has also been given to them by emphasizing the importance of the economic, strategic and socio-political factors which had governed the relations between the two countries.

It has generally been contended by the European writers that the British policy towards Nepal was not influenced by any ulterior motive and that it was determined solely by a desire of the East India Company to live in peace with its martial and aggressive neighbour. Such a view not only overlooks the facts of history, but is also against the basic economic, strategic and imperialistic considerations, which governed the British policy not only towards Nepal but the entire northern frontier of India and Central Asia. The governing interests of the British in the eighteenth century were commercial; but by the turn of the century, as Nepal became a powerful state, the strategic and imperial considerations became more important. The Anglo-Gorkha War of 1814-16 became inevitable not merely on account of the Nepalese policy of expansion and encroachment, the British imperial interests also hastened it. After the war, despite the declared policy of non-interference, the British Government had become such a great influence in the domestic politics of Nepal, that no Nepalese Prime Minister could stay in power without direct or indirect British support. In this context an effort has been made in this work to emphasize the importance of the geographical situation of Nepal—a land-locked state surrounded by the Indian territories on three sides.

An attempt has also been made to show that the Nepalese policy of splendid isolation was justified in the face of the British imperialism. It was mainly due to this policy that the Gorkhas could preserve their independence. After 1816 their martial policy had become out-of-date, and Jung Bahadur—the founder of the Rana regime—was justified in going all out to win the British friendship. The legal and the actual international status of Nepal, which is an issue of some controversy, has also been discussed at length in the concluding chapter.

It may be added that in this work the Anglo-Nepalese political relations are the focus of study, and only brief reference has been made to the related relevant issues, viz., the border disputes, the problem of border crime and extradition, the trade relations and the Nepalese relations with Tibet, China and other states.

* * * *

I have tried to find out and examine all the available original material, published as well as unpublished. This work is mainly based on the Foreign Secret and Political Proceedings and Consultations of the Government of India, the letters to and from the Court of Directors and the Secretary of States, the various reports and private diaries and biographies of the British Residents. The National Archives of India possesses a plethora of material, and I am grateful to the authorities for the permission and fullest freedom granted to me to make use of it. Use has also been made of the documents and secondary material preserved in the State Archives of Uttar Pradesh, the National Library of Calcutta, University Library and Public Library of Allahabad, the Libraries of the National Archives and the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi and the personal library of General Kaiser Shamsheer and the Darbar Library of Kathmandu.

In Nepal my efforts to study documents and other original material largely went in vain. Since the fall of the Ranas in 1950, only feeble attempts have been made to publish documents kept so far in personal libraries. A few Nepalese scholars have also expressed their views in periodicals and books, but these are only of limited value. Talks and discussions with the Nepalese writers, historians and leaders proved extremely useful for my own clarity of the subject.

* * * *

I fail to find words to express my deepest gratitude to my teacher Dr. A. D. Pant of the Department of Political Science, University of Allahabad, who supervised this work with great zeal and interest. Without his guidance and

inspiration this work would have been impossible. I am also heavily indebted to Professor A. B. Lal and other members of the Department of Political Science, University of Allahabad, for their ready help throughout the progress of this work. My thanks are due to Dr. K. P. Misra and Sri R. N. Mukherji of the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, who helped me so much in preparing this work for publication. While working in New Delhi, I received great help from Shri S. Roy, Sri S. N. Sharma and Dr. Y. B. Mathur of the National Archives of India and Shri L. S. Baral and Dr. Satish Kumar of the Indian School of International Studies. In Nepal I was greatly benefited by help, comments and criticism of General Kaiser, Shamsheer, Yogi, Narhari Nath Ji, Dr. D. R. Regmi, Sri Tanka Prasad Acharya, Sri Babu Ram Acharya, Sri Nairaj Pant, Sri Chitranjan Nepali, Sri Bhagwan Sahai (the Indian Ambassador to Nepal in 1958) and Sri Shiv Mangal Singh "Suman" (the Cultural and Press Attache to the Indian Embassy in 1958).

Finally, a word of thanks to my wife, who made the publication of this work possible.

RAMAKANT

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ABBREVIATIONS

PT	Principal Transactions.
P.C.	Foreign Political Consultation.
NWP	Papers respecting Nepaul War.
S.C.	Foreign Secret Consultation
HRRK	Historical Records Relating Kumaon.
NEN	Narrative of Events in Nepal.
MPR	Memorandum of the Political Relations.
SRGB	Selections from the Records of the Government of Bengal.

INTRODUCTORY

NEPAL is a country with an antiquity as old as that of India and China. In the course of her long history various tribes attained political ascendancy and several dynasties changed. The Kirats, the Lichchhavis, the Thakuris, the Mallas ruled over Nepal at different periods of history. It was impossible for her to remain untouched by the influence of her two great neighbours, India and China. Routes from north being more difficult to cross, the impact from south had been greater. The earliest authentic evidence of contact between the two countries—India and Nepal—is found in the 6th century B.C. After Buddha attained enlightenment he returned to Kapilvastu and that marked the advent of Buddhism in Nepal. The teacher himself, his great disciples Ananda, Nagarjun and other Buddhist monks visited the Valley several times. In the twentieth year of his reign Ashoka the Great made a pilgrimage to the sacred place of Lumbini. He recorded his visit on a pillar and married his daughter Charumati to the Nepalese Prince Devapala.

Apart from these religious contacts, there were numerous attacks on Nepal from the south. It has been recorded on a pillar at Allahabad that Samudra Gupta, the great conqueror of the Gupta dynasty, had conquered it.¹ His successor Chandra Gupta Vikramaditya visited the Valley and introduced his famous era (Vikram Samvat). Harsh also made a swift incursion into Nepal. During the Rajput period numerous attacks were made on this Himalayan Kingdom.

I. S. Levi, *Le Nepal* (3 Vols.), Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1905, 1905, 1908 (references of this book have been given from a typed copy of its English translation, which is available in the Library of the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi), Vol. II, p. 67.

With the coming of Muslims to India, Nepal came to acquire a special importance. As the Muslim rule extended many families and tribes of India took shelter in Nepal. In 1322 Hari Singh Deo, a Sarju Bansi Prince of Oudh, took refuge in Nepal and conquered the Valley. His descendants, called the Mallas, ruled over this country till their defeat at the hands of the Gorkhas (1767-68). Similarly, big exodus of refugees took place from Rajputana in the beginning of the fourteenth century. In 1303 Allauddin Khilji attacked Chittor. Freedom loving Rajputs refused to remain in slavery and moved towards the Himalayan hills. They settled down in Palpa and gradually organised their little principality around a village called Gorkha, from which they also drew the title of their race. By 1750 the Gorkhas had organised their strength sufficiently to challenge the Rajas of the Malla dynasty and extirpated them completely by the 1760s.

Besides these contacts, a brisk trade had always flourished between the inhabitants of the Indian plains and hills. As Nepal occupied a central position in the Himalayas, it was the main channel of trade between India and the trans-Himalayan states of Tibet and China since the ancient times.

However, Nepal was not a part of India as Bihar or Oudh had been. At times, no doubt, it was a portion of the great Hindu empires, but only as Afghanistan had been. During the whole of the Muslim period, except a very brief occupation by a Tughlak prince, Nepal remained entirely a separate entity and an independent state.

II

The earliest British relations with Nepal began with the ascendancy of the East India Company in Bengal, because then for the first time it came in contact with the Newar traders.² By the mid-eighteenth century when the British were establishing their hold on Bengal, Bihar and Oudh, the Valley of Nepal was divided into three main states of Kathmandu,

2. Newars are supposed to be the aboriginals of Nepal. They are the main section of the population that is engaged in trade and commerce.

Bhadgaon and Patan, all of which were ruled by the Malla kings. There was also the kingdom of Gorkha, which was gradually coming into prominence, but the Gorkhas had not yet gained a foothold in the Valley. It was, however, only with Kathmandu that some British relations existed and its Raja was regarded by the East India Company as the Raja of Nepal.³ The contacts were confined to commercial transactions between the Indian merchants of Bengal and Bihar and the Newars of the Valley with occasional correspondence between the British agent at Bettiah and the Newar Raja of Kathmandu.

All the bordering districts of India carried on brisk trade with Nepal. The belief that Nepal had rich gold mines, which later on proved to be wrong, naturally attracted British attention towards their hilly neighbour. "Indeed the economic potentialities of Nepal were responsible for drawing the excluded land of mystery into the arena of Indian politics in the second half of eighteenth century". The East India Company, in fact, started its trade promisingly with Nepal during the regime of the Newar Rajas. Apart from indigenous products of India, the Company sent English merchandise to the bordering districts from where it was sent to Nepal and beyond. The most important articles of export from India were the English and India made cloth, yarn, sugar, salt, blankets, tobacco, spices, etc., in exchange of which Nepal sent gold ingots and gold dust, rice, grain, ghee, hides, copper, sheep, turmeric, timber, brass utensils, etc.⁴

3. Principal Transactions, para 1.

Principal Transactions and Early Intercourse and General Observations are two important documents, which give a narration of British relations with Nepal from their commencement down to 1834.

Political Consultation (P.C.), 23rd January 1835—No. 50 (henceforth this document is quoted as PT).

4. The English interest in Nepalese fir timber was no less important a consideration. Col. Barker wrote to the Court of Directors on the 21st July 1767, "Bettiah will, I think, be of considerable consequence to the Company. Its firs will afford masts for all ships in India which must produce a new and considerable trade with other nations in India as well as advantageous to our own shipping. Gold and cinnamon are also found here.... Timber as large as never I have seen, musk, and elephants' teeth besides many other commodities I have not yet got knowledge of". Quoted by K. C. Chaudhari, *Anglo-Nepalese Relations*, Calcutta 1960, p. 8.

The Nepalese trade had also an added importance as the British had ambitions of linking it with Tibet and China.

The Nepalese never desired closer relations; they were, rather, indifferent towards the plains and in no way directly or indirectly helped or interfered in stemming the tide of European conquest in Bengal. At that time this attitude was not entirely a matter of policy. It was mainly due to the geographical factors. The Terai formed an insuperable barrier against any convenient communication or transport. For eight months in the year it was almost closed for any traffic. Even during the remaining four months the mountain routes and passes were too difficult to induce an ordinary man to cross them. Naturally, their attitude was expression of a feeling that they were so much shut up by the natural barriers from the rest of the world that they could take no interest in what happened in the plains.

During 1767-69 the British got the first opportunity of an actual political contact. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Gorkhas, who were a martial race, started subduing the Newars. Since their first foothold in the hills they had led a military career and had waged aggressive wars against the peaceful aboriginals. During 1740s they had a dynamic leader in Prithvi Narayan Sah. He was an able commander and a most unscrupulous man. His ambition was to conquer the Valley of Nepal. He realised the value of discipline and raised a small trained army. His initial attempts to conquer the Valley were badly beaten back by the defenders. Prithvi Narayan Sah now changed his strategy. Instead of direct frontal attack, he first gradually occupied the strategic points around the Valley and made maximum out of the prevailing dissensions among the three main principalities. He took recourse to every act of bribery and treachery. The Brahmans of the Valley secretly co-operated with him. In 1765 he again attacked Kirtipur, which was a part of Patan, and after repeated attempts captured it in 1767. All other Newar Rajas now tried to form a joint front against him, but it was too late and one by one the Gorkhas conquered the whole Valley.

In the early part of 1767, during the last siege of Kirtipur, Raja of Kathmandu, Jai Prakash Malla, solicited

British aid against the Gorkha invaders.⁵ The British Government had natural sympathies with the peace loving Newars. Its provinces of Bengal and Bihar had been carrying on a rich trade with the Newar merchants of the Valley.⁶ These merchants brought considerable quantity of gold and Tibeto-Chinese curiosities to Calcutta. Beyond Nepal in Tibet and China British interests were growing, which subsequently became apparent when after a few years Warren Hastings despatched the famous missions of Bogle and Turner. The Company feared that the occupation of the Nepal Valley by the martial Gorkhas would destroy its trade.⁷ Motivated by these apprehensions, Capt. G. Kinloch was sent with a small force during the rainy season of 1767. He, however, could not penetrate deep, was defeated in August 1767 and was forced to retreat due to sickness and want of provisions. By September 1768 Prithvi Narayan Sah defeated the remaining Newar Rajas, completed the conquest of the Valley and set himself to organise Nepal as a nation. With that started a new era in the history of Nepal.

The seriousness of Kinloch's failure could not be anticipated immediately. It led to so many direct and indirect consequences. It resulted in a steep decline in the English

5. H.A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nipal* (2 Vols.), London, 1818, Vol. I, pp. 267-268.

6. Mr. Golding, the Resident at Bettiah, wrote to the Chief of Patan pointing out the advantages British derived from the trade, all of which would have been lost if the Gorkhas had succeeded. PT, para 1.

7. On the 25th September, 1767, British Indian authorities wrote to Home Government: "We need not inform you that from many years an advantageous trade has been carried on between the Provinces of Bihar and the rich country of Nepal by which a considerable quantity of gold and other valuable commodities were imported. Now after the Rajah has been deposed by Gorkhalis, the usual channel of commerce has been obstructed and these provinces are deprived of the former benefit arising from frontier intercourse". PT, para 3.

Mr. Golding, the British Agent at Bettiah, pointed out that the Gorkhas had already encroached upon the British and if they conquered the Valley the Fir Scheme would have to be given up and Gorkhas would encroach more. If the Gorkhas could be defeated the British have good chance of reviving the trans-Himalayan trade. K. C. Chaudhari, n. 4, p. 14.

trade via Nepal, which was quite considerable. After gaining ascendancy one of the first acts of Prithvi Narayan was to expel the Gosains—the Kashmiri traders. The Gorkhas also distrusted their own subjects as much as they did the strangers. 'The Newars were compelled to remain unarmed and crushing taxes and fines were levied on the merchants or they were expelled.' The very fact that the Gorkhas had annexed the Valley after subduing the Newars, who were the only merchant class, and the victors were a martial race, proves that trade must have declined. The Company could not regain its trade through Nepal for more than a century. But soon Prithvi Narayan Sah realised that by suppressing trade he had deprived the state of a lucrative source of revenue. To maintain his army he had to search for alternative means of income. He wrote to the Dalai Lama of Tibet to co-operate in establishing markets on the Tibeto-Nepalese border to encourage northern trade of Nepal. He was even prepared to allow the Indian goods to enter Nepal, but was determined to prohibit European goods. He asked Tibetans to decline all relations with the British and refuse them admission to their country.⁸

The British interference also laid the foundation of the policy of jealousy and exclusiveness, which had ever since distinguished the Court of Nepal. This feeling found its immediate expression in the expulsion of Capuchin missionaries in 1769.⁹ For the last few years these missionaries were living in Nepal and Prithvi Narayan Sah was on good terms with them. But the intervention of Kinloch changed his disposition entirely.

Kinloch's failure made the British realize that by supporting the Newars they had backed the wrong horse.

8. S. Levi, n. 1, Vol. II, p. 215.

9. ".....in a letter to Dalai Lama he (Prithvi Narayan Sah) implored that, in return for full access of Indian goods to Tibet, the Lamic Government should join with him in forbidding the entrance of anything and everything that was associated with now gravely suspected ambitions of East India Company in Bengal." P. Landon, Nepal, Vol. I, London, 1928, p. 67.

Also see S. Levi, n. 1, Vol. II, p. 310.

10. S. Levi, n. 1, p. 132.

Having failed to achieve anything by war, they now decided to appease the Gorkha Raja. Pressed by the necessity of finding more and more markets for their finished goods, British eyes were set on their northern neighbours and the areas beyond. In India English cotton fabric had not yet become popular. This led the Court of Directors to inquire on the 11th February 1768 whether "trade can be opened with Nepaul, and whether cloth or other European commodities may not find their way from thence to Tibet, Lhasa and the Western parts of China".¹¹ The financial condition of the East India Company in Bengal was also deteriorating steadily due to disastrous effects of the dual system of Government. The Bengal famine of 1770 had further aggravated the situation. Under these circumstances the Court of Directors again instructed the Governor of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal on the 10th April 1771 to enquire into the possibilities of increasing the "vend of the Companies staples and other European commodities by sending proper persons to reside at Rangpore and to explore the interior parts of Bhutan, Assam and other countries....".¹²

Motivated by this desire to search the unexplored hilly states, James Logan was sent to Nepal in June 1770 to convince Prithvi Narayan Sah of the friendly attitude of the Company and induce him to open the old trade relations between the two countries.¹³ With the same consideration the Mackwanpur Terai, which had been captured by Kinloch, was restored to the Gorkhas.¹⁴ In January 1784 again a mission under Foxcroft was sent to Nepal with presents and Governor General's letter to the Maharaja of Nepal.¹⁵ The suspicious policy of the Gorkhas, however, could not be overcome and the trade between the two countries went on declining. The border disputes had also started cropping up since 1770s. Yet, it was remarkable, that in spite of

11. Alistair Lamb, "Tibet in Anglo-Chinese Relations 1767-1842". *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, October 1957, Parts III & IV, p. 162.

12. Public Cons. 9th December 1771-No. 1.

13. K. C. Chaudhari, n. 4, pp. 37-38.

14. Oldfield, n. 5, p. 265.

15. K. C. Chaudhari, n. 4, pp. 59-60.

these misunderstandings the two Governments always tried to follow a policy of avoiding hostilities.¹⁶

III

Subjugation of the Valley by no means satisfied the Gorkha lust for conquest. On all sides, east, west, south and north they continued their expansion. During 1770-71 Prithvi Narayan Sah crossed the Dudh river, overran the territories of the Kirats and the Limbus of the eastern Nepal and extended his frontier up to the river Mechi. His successors Pratap Singh attacked Sikkim and Bahadur Sah either annexed or subdued all the states between Kashki and Srinagar.

The policy of expansion brought the Gorkhas in a serious clash with the Chinese. Prithvi Narayan Sah always believed in the policy of keeping on good terms with his northern neighbours. For him India and China were the two big countries between which Nepal was situated.¹⁷ But he considered the British more dangerous than the Chinese. Bahadur Sah was a man of an entirely different disposition and he began extending Nepalese territory towards Tibet. It might be remarked that on the accession of Pratap Singh in 1775, he had been sent out of Nepal towards Bettiah where he had cultivated good relations with the Christian missionaries.¹⁸

The causes of the Tibeto-Nepalese war are, however, still disputed. Chinese historian Wein Yuan holds the view that the Gorkhas taking the plea of "the increase of taxes on merchandise and the admixture of dust in the table salt", sent troops and invaded the frontier area.¹⁹ On the other

16. Ibid., p. 51.

17. Chitranjan Nepali, *General Bhim Sen Thapar Tat Kaleen Nepal*, Kathmandu, 1956, p. 70.

18. Bahadur Sah presented a bell to Patan Church and always sent presents to the Bishops of Bettiah when he came to power. Chitranjan Nepali, "Chautriya Bahadur Sah Ko Nayaki Kal". *Sharda*, issue No. 1. Year 22 Baisakh 2014 (Vikram Samvat).

19. Quoted by F. Toker, *Gorkha—The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal*, London, 1957, p. 58.

hand, Nepalese sources allege that the real cause of the dispute was currency problem. By a very old custom the Nepalese coin was considered legal tender in Tibet. During the reign of the last Malla King, this currency had become too debased. Prithvi Narayan Sah wanted to issue pure currency with a view to improve trade in that direction. But the Tibetans insisted that the exchange ratio of the new pure currency and the old debased coins must be at par, which the Gorkhas refused.²⁰ The real reason, however, seems to be that the Gorkhas found the quarrel over currency a good pretext to expand their kingdom and to raid the rich monasteries of Tibet.²¹

In 1788 the Nepalese occupied some Tibetan districts, which they evacuated on the promise of the payment of 50,000 rupees annually. The Chinese had not interfered in the dispute by this time. Their indifference emboldened the Gorkhas, who again attacked Tibet on her failure to pay the annual amount in 1791 and also on the pretext of ill-treatment of the Nepalese traders by the Tibetans. They occupied the famous Kuti pass and looted the rich temples of Digarchy. It aroused the wrath of the Celestial Emperor and immediately a big force of 70,000 Chinese was despatched to punish the invaders.

It was under these circumstances and anticipating trou-

20. Col. W. Kirkpatrick gave the following version of the cases from the Nepalese viewpoint: From ancient times Tibet and Nepal had close union. Pure Mahendra Mulli (name of Nepal's coin) coinage of Nepal was current money in Tibet. During the reign of Jai Prakash Malla, the Mahendra Mulli became much debased. So when Nepal passed into Gorkha hands Tibet was full of debased money. Prithvi Narayan Sah at once put to stop this practice and sent a deputation to Tibet to urge them to issue pure currency. To this Tibetans replied that the amount of Mahendra Mulli was considerable in Tibet and the suppression would be great loss and desired Gorkhas to supply them with adulterated coins. Nine or ten years elapsed without any settlement, and there was no transaction for few years. So many conferences were proposed by Gorkhas, but Tibetans turned a deaf ear, nor the Nepalese were allowed to proceed for China to put their case before the Chinese Emperor. Thereupon the hostilities began. *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, London, 1811, p. 339.

21. See F. Toker, n. 19, p. 57; K. C. Chaudhari, n. 4, p. 65 and Schuyler' Camman, *Trade through Himalayas*. Princeton University Press, 1951, p. 113.

bles with China that the Gorkhas made overtures to win the British friendship. The immediate result was conclusion of a commercial treaty between the two countries on 1st March 1792.²² The treaty was solely for commercial purposes. It regulated the transit of goods, stipulated 2½% ad valorem invoice duty and arranged for the security of the traders. It is quite obvious that the Gorkhas were not motivated by any sincere desire to improve trade. Their motive was to deter the Chinese by the British alliance and also to secure the British neutrality in the coming contest. It may be noted that border disputes between India and Nepal were a constant source of irritation for the last few years. The British on their part readily grasped the opportunity to regain their lost trade in that direction and improve it by a clear understanding with the Nepalese Government.

Soon after the conclusion of the commercial treaty the Gorkhas appealed to the British for armed aid against the Chinese threat.²³ The Panchan Lama of Tibet also appealed to Lord Cornwallis for help.²⁴ This put the Governor General in a dilemma. He thought of the prospects of the Chinese influence permanently established in Nepal, which would have made the Chinese territory contiguous to the richest British provinces of the Gangetic Valley. This contiguity with the Chinese Empire would have given rise to border disputes and misunderstandings leading ultimately to the disturbance of valuable trade at Canton. The problem was how to prevent such a situation from arising. The military aid solicited by Nepal, if given, would have led to an immediate suspension, if not the total stoppage, of the British trade with China and would have defeated its own purpose. Such aid was, therefore, outright refused. As a way out, British mediation was offered to both the contending parties to bring about peace.

The offer of mediation having been accepted by the

22. C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Calcutta, 1906, Vol. II, pp. 103-5. Also see Appendix No. 1.

23. Report of 1837: (Cursory notice of the connections and transactions between the British Indian Government and Nepal from 1793 to 1812). P. C. 18th Sept. 1837—No. 71, dated 20th July 1837.

24. Schuyler Camman, n. 21, p. 115.

Nepalese, Col. W. Kirkpatrick was asked to proceed to Kathmandu. But before he had even left Patna, the Chinese army had better of the Gorkhas and Bahadur Sah sued for peace. The Chinese readily accepted the lenient terms with an imperial yellow around it. According to the treaty the Nepalese evacuated the Tibetan territories, secured certain trade privileges in Tibet and agreed to send a mission with presents to the Chinese Emperor every fifth year.²⁵

After the conclusion of peace, it was most important for the Gorkhas to get rid of the British mediators. Mediation was now needless as the treaty had already been concluded. They were so anxious to prevent Kirkpatrick from coming over to Nepal that the conclusion of the treaty was announced even before he had left Patna.²⁵ Lord Cornwallis, however, was anxious that he should proceed to Nepal for settling sundry matters between the two states and to know more about that country. Kirkpatrick was asked to induce the Nepalese Government to act up to the commercial treaty of 1792. The Company wanted Nepal to encourage Indo-

25. There is no authentic text of the Sino-Nepalese treaty available. Gen. Pudma Jung has given a version which is as follows:

“1. That China should henceforth be considered as father to both Nepal and Tibet, who should regard each other as brothers.

2. That, after due investigation by the Chinese Government the full value of the articles plundered at Lhasa, would be paid to the Nepalese sufferers by the Tibetan authorities.

3. That all Nepalese subjects with the exception of armed soldiers would ever be permitted to travel, to establish factories, and to carry on trade within the jurisdiction of Tibet and China.

4. That if either of the two brotherly states should commence an unprovoked dispute with the intention of possessing the territories of the other, the representatives of the two Governments would report all particulars to the Court of Peking which would finally decide the dispute.

5. That if Nepal be ever invaded by a foreign power, China would not fail to help her.

6. That the two brotherly States would send to China some produce of their country every five years in token of their filial love.

7. That the Chinese Government would in return, send to Nepal a friendly present, and would make every necessary arrangement for the comfort of the mission to and from Peking”.

Gen. Pudma Jung, *Life of Jung Bahadur*, Allahabad, 1909, pp. 7-8.

26. Report of 1837.

Nepalese trade and to establish permanent mutual legations in order to protect trade and promote friendship.²⁷

On his arrival Kirkpatrick was courteously treated, but as soon as his purpose was known he was confronted with most determined objections and evasions.²⁸ After all, the Chinese threat, which had induced the Gorkhas to court the British friendship, had passed away. Ultimately, Kirkpatrick was compelled to return with nothing more than a treaty, which was reduced to a dead letter without a British agent on the spot to watch its proper implementation. Since then the treaty was only unilaterally observed by the Company. The Nepalese always levied more than 2½% duties. Thus ended one more British attempt to open the gates of Nepal for trade and political relations.

The results of the Gorkha-Tibetan war of 1792 can hardly be exaggerated. It brought the Nepalese in a closer contact with the Chinese. But it was not the usual vassal-lord relationship involving a restriction on the independence of Nepal. The Chinese had no *locus standi* in the internal affairs of Nepal in which she remained as free as ever. Even in the foreign affairs China never effectively controlled Nepal. For the British the episode had a definite significance. The process of the Chinese imperialism in Tibet was underway much before the British took any interest in it. The year 1792 marked a definite mile-stone in that process. Tibet was now firmly in the Chinese hold, which could not be shaken off for more than a century, except for the brief periods when the Manchus had fallen and the Republic was too weak to control it. The year 1792 shut Tibet to the British till Younghusband actually proceeded with his mission in 1901.

IV

From 1793 to 1800 relations between Nepal and the Company were merely of formal nature. After the failure of Kirkpatrick, the British sent a trade mission in 1795 under

27. PT, para 6.

28. Report of 1837.

Maulvi Qadir Ali to Nepal.²⁹ He, however, could not induce the Darbar to either observe the commercial treaty of 1792 or to modify its policy of isolation. In the external affairs of Nepal it was remarkable that, despite the disastrous Chinese intervention, the military activity towards the east and west continued unabated. The annexation of Kumaon and Garhwal in 1794 extended their empire from Sikkim to Jamuna.

Since 1795 the Darbar was mostly busy in its internal politics. Bahadur Sah, the Regent, was deposed by his nephew Maharaja Ran Bahadur Sah in 1795. The Maharaja, generally known as Swami Maharaja, manifested strange signs of royal eccentricity and was highly unpopular with the Brahman faction in the court. Ultimately he abdicated in March 1799 and his infant son, Girwan Juddha Vikram Sah, was enthroned with the Junior Queen as the Regent.³⁰ Eccentricities of Ran Bahadur Sah further increased and he was forced to retire to Banaras on May 27, 1800. He was accompanied by his first Queen Rajrajeshwari Devi³¹ and many influential chiefs including Bhim Sen Thapa.

Presence of the ex-Maharaja offered the Indian Government its long awaited opportunity of bringing Nepal under some sort of political influence with a view to promote the trans-Himalayan trade. It advanced lot of money to Ran Bahadur and appointed Capt. W. D. Knox to attend to the royal guest. It had the desired effect. The rival factions became apprehensive that the British Government might

29. A full and authoritative account of Maulvi Qadir Ali's mission is given by K. C. Chaudhari, n. 4, pp. 76-97.

30. It is said that Ran Bahadur Sah had married a Brahman widow of bewitching beauty and gave her the status of the First Queen much against the traditions and sentiments of the chiefs. The new Queen, having mortally fallen ill, expressed her deep concern about the security of her new born son. Thereupon the Maharaja decided to abdicate. See K. C. Chaudhari, n. 4, pp. 101-105.

31. There is lot of confusion about the Maharani who had accompanied Ran Bahadur Sah to Banaras. In English books the name of Tripura Sundari Devi has been mentioned but I have accepted the views of Chitranjan Nepali and Balchandra Sharma (the modern Nepalese writers) as more authentic in writing the name of Rajrajeshwari Devi.

help the ex-Maharaja to regain his throne. Negotiations were held between the two Governments and a treaty of "Commerce and alliance" was concluded on the 26th October 1801.³² The treaty was, however, purely of political nature. According to it, in exchange of the honourable custody of the former Maharaja by the British, the two Governments agreed for the mutual reception of the representatives, for the mutual extradition of the criminals taking refuge in each other's territories, for the annulment of the arrangement concluded in 1772, by which Nepal gave an elephant to the Indian Government annually for the cultivation of Mackwanpur lowlands, and for the amicable settlement of the future border disputes. Besides, a separate article was added to the treaty at Dinapur on the 26th October 1801 about the settlement of financial provisions for the maintenance of Swami Maharaj.³³

Capt. Knox was appointed British representative at the Court of Nepal. Accompanied by Dr. B. Hamilton, he arrived at Kathmandu in April 1802. The Nepalese Government sent three chiefs of the highest order to India as hostages for the proper treatment of the British mission. The instructions given to Knox correctly reflected the views of the British Government towards Nepal and its northern frontier.³⁴ Apart from the general expediency of cultivating friendship with a neighbouring state, Nepal had now become a strong nation with a disciplined army. Its kingdom extended eight hundred miles on the Indian frontier along the richest provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Oudh. Its territories afforded a safe shelter to dacoits. Finally, British trade interests were becoming more and more significant through Nepal in Tibet and China. Knox was asked to give full effect to the treaty of 1792 and to try to encourage the Darbar to

32. Aitchison, n. 22, pp. 105-108. Also see Appendix No. 2.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

34. Capt. Knox was instructed to keep it in mind that:

"Independently of these considerations which suggest the general policy of forming a close connection with the neighbouring and contiguous states, the local situation of the territories of Nepal skirting a considerable part of the Northern portion of Bengal and Bihar... and Oudh renders an intimate alliance with that State a subject of peculiar importance to the political interests of the Company....". PT, para 11.

revive British trade with Tibet and beyond, which had been blocked since the times of Prithvi Narayan Sah.

For a short time after his arrival Knox was treated with consideration. He was a man of talent, firmness and moderation and had an influence over the Regent Maharani. To enhance the British influence he even wanted to bribe three main pro-British Chiefs, Bum Sah Chautria, Guru Gajraj Missur and Damodar Pande.³⁵ But they were all men of high character and set the independence of their country beyond any temptation. Moreover, the popular opinion in Nepal, particularly of the Thapa faction, was against any closer relations with the British which they regarded as preliminary to the loss of their independence. This opposition was gaining strength on account of dissensions among the chiefs and due to secret urges from Ran Bahadur Sah that the Darbar should not keep any close connection with the English.

Meanwhile the political setting of Nepal was taking a dramatic turn. The administration was in the weak hands of a woman—the Junior Maharani, which gave an opportunity to all the contending factions to conspire against each other. Amidst such confusion came the news that Maharani Rajrajeshwari Devi, fed up with utter neglect and cruel treatment given by Ran Bahadur Sah, was coming over to Nepal. Her first attempt to cross the border could not succeed and the Regent Maharani compelled her to camp at a border village.

The relations between the Prime Minister Damodar Pande and the Regent were also not satisfactory. The situation became worse when a number of chiefs including one of her favourites Kazi Kirrtiman were assassinated and the Pande was suspected for it. She even deposed the Prime Minister soon afterwards. Damodar Pande also did not sit quietly and to counteract his opponents he started conspiring to bring back Rajrajeshwari Devi. In February 1803 finding her party strong enough she again tried to cross the frontier. This time the troops, sent to oppose her, went over to her side. The Regent Maharani fled from the Capital, and without any bloodshed Maharani Rajrajeshwari Devi

35. Oldfield, n. 5, p. 287.

assumed the regency and Damodar Pande was appointed prime minister.

The new Regent expressed friendly feelings towards the British Government and promised to adhere to the recently concluded treaty.³⁶ She ordered to pay off all the arrears due to the Company for the allowance of the ex-Maharaja. The attitude of most of the Gorkha chiefs was, however, not at all favourable towards the British, and only on the threat of Capt. Knox to retire to India the amount due to the Company was paid. This attitude of the Darbar soon became so pronounced that even the new Regent could not control it.³⁷ In fact, the recently concluded treaty and the arrival of the British agent were the main causes of disaffection in the Darbar. It led Knox to conclude that he was "persona non grata" and he should better leave Nepal. Consequently, after twelve months of fruitless efforts for establishing closer connections, he left Kathmandu in March 1803.

In January 1804 Lord Wellesley addressed a letter to the Maharaja expressing his regret over the ill-treatment meted out to the Resident while the Nepal's hostages were well treated. He formally renounced the treaties of 1792 and 1801 with Nepal, but expressed the wish to remain on friendly terms with her. At the same time, he stated that Maharaja Ran Bahadur Sah could not be kept in India against his wishes. Prime Minister Damodar Pande, anticipating this move, wrote to influential persons at Banaras to prevent Swamiji from returning to Nepal. This letter is said to have fallen in the hands of Swamiji. He immediately repaired for Kathmandu. Damodar Pande went to prevent his entry to Nepal by force. On encountering each other Swamiji asked the soldiers whether they would take "Sah or Pande". Troops raised their voice for Ran Bahadur Sah, and Damodar was arrested at the spot.

Thus ended another attempt by the British for establishing closer relations with Nepal. While concluding the treaty of 1803 the Nepalese were motivated by a temporary expedient and certainly not by any desire to improve relations with the British. It might also be said that the Indian Gov-

36. K. C. Chaudhari, n. 4, p. 133.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

ernment put its saddle on a wrong horse. Power of Ran Bahadur was much more than it anticipated. It also underestimated the Gorkha sentiments against the British and in vain tried to impose their terms on the unwilling people by taking advantage of a political contingency. Consequently, after Knox's retirement Anglo-Nepalese relations were again relegated to the same negative state as in 1792.

On his return from Banaras Swamiji got his chief opponent Damodar Pande executed. The regency was taken away from Maharani Rajrajeshwari Devi and was assumed by Swamiji himself. The minor King Girwan Juddh Vikram Sah could not be deposed as the army still considered the abdication of Ran Bahadur Sah as final. Power now rested in the hands of the Thapa faction headed by Bhim Sen Thapa who had been appointed Prime Minister. Swamiji's regency for the next few years was a reign of terror. The Pandes were simply extirpated. Every one was dissatisfied with his strange innovations in administration and he became extremely unpopular with his people as well as relatives. Conspiracies were organised against him. During April 1805 his half brother Sher Bahadur was also trying to oust him. Bhim Sen came to know of it. Sher Bahadur was summoned to the Darbar and was ordered to be arrested. Thence ensued a scuffle in which he mortally wounded Swamiji and in turn was himself killed. While dying Ran Bahadur asked Bhim Sen to take care of his son King Girwan Juddh Vikram Sah, which the Prime Minister did most faithfully.

Bhim Sen understood the nature of the Nepalese politics and took every step to make his position secure. He forced Maharani Rajrajeshwari Devi to immolate herself on the funeral pyre of her husband and raised a third queen Rani Tripura Sundari Devi as the regent. To wipe off his opposition he put to sword every enemy of the Thapa family including fifty army officers.³⁸ He was now master of the situation with a minor on the throne and a Regent whose paramour he was.

38. B. P. Saxena, Ed., *Historical Records Relating to Kumaon 1809-1842*, Allahabad, 1956. See Introduction, p. 6. (henceforth quoted in abbreviated form as HRRK.

V

With the rise of Bhim Sen Thapa to power started another era in the history of the Indo-Nepalese relations. It was during his prime ministership that the relations between the two countries were at the lowest ebb and the war of 1814-16 was fought. Origins of the Nepalese policy, which brought them in clash with the British, can be traced as early as 1787, but he was the man who followed it systematically.

Right from 1768 Nepalese Kingdom had been expanding in all directions. By 1803 Gorkhas had completed their western conquest up to Sutlej; later they even crossed that river under General Amar Singh Thapa to attack Kangara, but could not succeed due to Ranjit Singh's intervention. Towards the east they had subdued the small state of Sikkim and reached up to the river Teesa. On the northern side their expansion was only checked by drastic intervention of the Chinese in 1792. Thus, being blocked on three sides, south remained the only direction for their expansion. Incidentally the Terai, which formed the southern frontier of Nepal, was a rich tract of marshy land. It was a natural tendency in the Nepalese to establish their control over this fertile area.

It is important to understand that the Gorkhas, who were the ruling section at this time, had led a continuous career of fighting ever since their advent in the central Himalayas in the fourteenth century. Military became their profession and a cherished social value. It became necessary for every Government to appease the army so as to stay in power. Moreover, it should also be understood that for the last few generations kings had been infant and the real power came to be vested in the office of the prime minister. Each contending faction tried to secure this esteemed post and control the army, which necessitated keeping the army in good humour.

Passive policy of Sir J. Barlow (1805-6) and Sir John Shore (1806-13) after Lord Wellesley and the prevailing condition in India further encouraged Bhim Sen to pursue his policy of expansion towards south with greater vigour. In Central India Peshwa was impatiently waiting for his

chance to break the shackles of the subsidiary alliance with the British. The Pindaries were continuously revolting against the British authority and ravaging their provinces, and Sindhia and Holkar were persecuting the Rajput States. The condition in the north-west was in no way better. Ranjit Singh was trying to get his hold on Cis-Sutlej States. The atmosphere in the Kingdom of Oudh was of confusion and perpetual intrigues and there was hardly an organised authority.³⁹

These internal imperatives and external temptations were surely driving Bhim Sen towards a martial expansionist foreign policy. At the same time, he was also apprehensive of the British imperial power. During the exile of Maharaja Ran Bahadur Sah, he got the opportunity of observing how the British power and diplomacy worked in India. He understood the way the Indian States lost their independence due to trade and subsidiary alliances with the British. Thrice the Company had attempted to gain commercial rights and a foothold in Nepal by war as well as by diplomacy. The chief aim of his foreign policy was to save Nepal from the clutches of the British imperialism. And yet, he had to provide employment to the military races of Nepal. This dilemma of Bhim Sen has been masterly expressed by Sir W. W. Hunter: "...he thoroughly understood both the fears and the aspirations of the military tribes of Nepal. The fear of these brave mountaineers was the establishment of British ascendancy; their aspiration was to extend their conquest at the expense of our Indian frontiers.... Bhim Sen was the first Nepalese Statesman who grasped the meaning of the system of protectorates.... He saw one Native State after another come within the net of British subsidiary alliances and his policy was steadily directed to save Nepal from a similar fate. He also perceived that the Gorkha race, having conquered Nepal and the hill valleys eastward and westward at the foot of the great Himalayan wall on the north, had no further outlet for its warlike energy except

39. "The kingdom of Oudh for which, of course, the Company was in no way responsible... but it formed a centre for perpetual intrigues, and its influence in the policy which Nepal adopted at this time has never been sufficiently considered". P. Landon. n. 9, p. 75.

south-wards on the Indian plains. How to meet these two conditions, to steadily encroach upon the British territory and yet to prevent British reprisals which might bring Nepal under the British ascendancy, were the almost irreconcilable tasks which Bhim Sen set before him".⁴⁰

To resolve this dilemma Bhim Sen adopted a policy of slow but steady encroachment along the Indian boundary so as to keep the soldiery busy and yet avoid provoking hostilities with the East India Company. For several years a systematic expansion of the Nepalese territory continued towards the south. For instance, the Magistrate of Tirhut reported that between 1787 and 1812 more than two hundred villages had, at different times, been appropriated by the Gorkhas.⁴¹ In Bareilly, they had occupied five out of eight divisions of the Pergana of Khyrapur. They claimed an extensive tract in the district of Moradabad. In 1813 they tried to occupy several villages in the territory of the protected Sikh chiefs.⁴² Then there were extensive encroachments on Sarun and Gorakhpur districts which led to war in 1814. The Indian Government was aware of these encroachments right from their beginning, but due to the necessity of employing all its resources against the French in the Deccan, Tipoo in Mysore and Marathas in Central India it could not take any effective step against the Gorkhas. Its policy was to remonstrate against these encroachments but avoid hostilities till it clearly realised that the Nepalese attitude formed part of a determined and steady policy of expansion.

It has generally been argued by the English writers that the Indo-Nepalese War of 1814-16 was solely brought about due to aggressive character of the Gorkhas and their policy of encroachment. But an objective study of the British activities in a broader perspective of Eastern Asia, and particular-

40. Sir W. W. Hunter, *Life of B. H. Hodgson*, London, 1896, pp. 98-99.

41. T. H. Prinsep, "Nepal War". In *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813-1823*, (2 Vols.), London, 1825, Vol. I, p. 60.

42. *Papers respecting Nepaul War*, London, 1824, p. 677. (hereafter quoted as NWP)

ly in China, would reveal that they were also trying to bring the Himalayan States under some sort of their influence. The industrial revolution had created problems of its own. It gave rise to tremendous production of cheap goods and consequently to a mad search for markets. East and particularly China was Eldorado of adventures and a cherished dream of the British imperialists. Every attempt was made to get a foothold there. Warren Hastings sent two missions of Bogle and Turner precisely for this purpose. In 1792-93 Lord George Macartney went to seek a commercial treaty with the Chinese Emperor. But he was most politely dismissed without the least concession except some trade privileges at Canton. A strict vigilance was kept to isolate the foreigners by the Chinese. Failure at Canton turned the British eyes towards the northern frontier of India. The Nepalese territory skirting from Sutlej to Teesa naturally attracted their attention. That was why the expeditions of Kinloch, Kirkpatrick and Knox were sent. All means of diplomacy had already been tried and war remained the only means to open the doors of Nepal.

There was another temptation which induced the British to go to war against Nepal. Kumaon and Garhwal were famous for their mineral resources and through Kumaon direct communication could have also been established with Tibet.⁴³ In both these territories anti-Gorkha movements were in offing and it is on records that various schemes were made by the British in concert with the disaffected element to overthrow the Nepalese rule.⁴⁴ One of the main objectives of the war given by Lord Hastings was the expulsion of Gorkha power from Kumaon and its immediate occupation by the British.

Finally, absence of any political relationship between an imperialistic Government and a growing frontier power refusing any closer connections was a very important consideration with the British. As we have already seen, Nepal

43. Praising the resources of Garhwal Capt. Hearsay wrote to the Secretary, Foreign Political Department, on August 24, 1814 that, "In Garhwal are rich copper mines, iron in great abundance, tar, hemp...and yards of fir innumerable, sufficient to provide all the navy of England". NWP, p. 50. Also see p. 246.

44. HRRK, p. 7.

had within fifty years grown into a strong kingdom, with martial races, a disciplined army and expanding territory. Lord Hastings when assumed governor generalship in 1813 found the Nepalese unyielding and refusing to deal with the British power. In fighting the war of 1814-16 he did not so much like to get redress of British grievances but was motivated by a desire to cripple the Gorkha power.⁴⁵ The condition of British subjects, who were subjected to Gorkha depredations, was also a serious concern for the British Government. Lord Hastings wrote: "What estimate they will have of British Government which allowed a foreign power to dispoil and oppress them without notice; they will not fail to regard us inferior power and could be impelled to seek their protection."⁴⁶

These were the attitudes, policies and views of the two countries which made the war inevitable. The immediate cause which led to the outbreak of hostilities was border disputes on the Gorakhpur and Sarun frontier. From the ancient times the tract of the Terai and its surroundings had been divided among the small Hindu Rajas. The forests of Terai were the real bone of contention among them. These Rajas had been tributary to the Mughals. After the decline of the Mughal power there was no effective authority in that region. The Nawab Vazier of Oudh, the nominal representative of the Mughal Emperor, ceded the district of Gorakhpur and other contiguous areas to the East India

45. Lord Hastings wrote: "...We are not through a point of honour of demanding atonement for the wanton invasion of our territories, the brutal massacre of our policemen, and the studied cruelty of tying to a tree and shooting to death with arrows the native officer whom we had appointed to preside over the district; though the helplessness of obtaining from the Government any disavowal of such a complicated outrage, must have made us look to war, even on that ground. But we were at issue with a nation so extravagantly presumptuous in representing its own strength; and so ignorant of our superior means, that the Gorkha Commissioner had on a former occasion remarked to ours, the futility of debating about a few square miles of territory, since there never could be a real peace between two states, until we should yield to the Gorkhas our provinces north of Ganges, making the river boundary between us; as Heaven had evidently designed it to be". Marquess of Hastings, *Summary of the Administration of the Indian Government From October 1813 to January 1823, 1824*, p. 11.

46. Prinsep. n. 41, pp. 60-61.

Company in lieu of large sums of money." Following the precedence of its predecessors the Company did not interfere in the affairs of those Rajas and was content merely with annual money tributes. On the contrary, the Gorkhas in the wake of their policy of expansion towards the south exterminated these Rajas and assumed their titles. This brought the Nepalese in contact with the Indian Zamindars, who in turn also gradually came to be subjected to Bhim Sen's policy of expansion. It would, of course, be wrong to say that the Indian Zamindars were entirely blameless. They also encroached on the Nepalese territory and often made exaggerated complaints when their own territories were encroached upon.⁴⁷ The Indian Government, however, could not take any stiff attitude due to the reason given above.⁴⁸

In 1812, however, both the Governments agreed to enquire into all the disputes.⁴⁹ Lt. F. Young and Major Paris Bradshaw along with the Nepalese representatives conducted two consecutive investigations, but the disputes could not be resolved. Both the sides claimed the results as favourable to their respective claims.

By this time Lord Hastings had assumed the office of the Governor General. He had his own ideas about the growing power of Nepal in the Himalayas. He did not give much thought to the propriety of the claim and the traditions of amicable settlement between the two Governments. The considerations that weighed with him were the immense frontier of Nepal, which had a strong government, a well disciplined army and a peculiar geographical advantage, while the British provinces were in exposed situation with no natural

47. Ross-of-Blandenburg, *The Marquess of Hastings* (Rulers of India series), Oxford, 1893, p. 57.

48. K. C. Chaudhari, n. 4, p. 150.

49. Prinsep noted that, "...unless when the encroachment was gross and easy of proof, it was vain to hope to interest the British Government in their favour. That Government (British) was, in the first place, no loser by the usurpation, for the public revenue was fully secured by the perpetual settlement and by the increased value of the entire estate against any loss for a partial aggression. Moreover, it was on principle, distrustful of the pretensions of its own subjects, which were generally exaggerated....". Prinsep, n. 41, p. 64.

50. For the details of border disputes see Prinsep, n. 41, pp. 70-80, and K. C. Chaudhari, n. 4, pp. 150-163.

or artificial barriers. What worried him more was that such a power had no understanding with British Government. He had determined to cripple the power of Nepal, and, therefore, on the issue of border disputes he assumed a very rigid attitude. He addressed a letter to the Maharaja of Nepal in April 1814 demanding a peremptory evacuation of both the disputed territories on Gorakhpur and Sarun frontier within twenty five days and ordered the Magistrate of Gorakhpur to occupy them if the order of the Maharaja did not arrive in time.⁵¹ In the face of force the Nepalese evacuated the disputed lands and the British lost no time in occupying them.

The letter of Lord Hastings produced a consternation in the Nepalese Darbar. The question of war and peace was fully debated in a grand council. The chiefs of elder generation Bum Sah Chautria, Raj Guro Rang Nath Pandit, Kazi Dalbhanjan Pande and even Gen. Amar Singh Thapa advocated the policy of peace and moderation to avoid war and doubted the validity of the Gorkha claims.⁵² But the younger generation, headed by the Prime Minister, did not want to yield to the British demands and preferred to go for a war. It is really difficult to understand how a man of Bhim Sen's understanding and wisdom, who knew the reality of British power, could not realise the hopelessness of a contest with the East India Company. It seems that he "could not bring himself to believe in the change" of the British attitude, which had not been forceful for the last few years.⁵³ Or, may be he thought that the two powers were bound to come in clash sooner or later and he considered the present occasion best to give a fight when the British had not fully recovered from the Napoleonic Wars and the condition of India was far from being satisfactory.⁵⁴ His speech in the grand council also reflected that he had overestimated the strength of

51. Prinsep, n. 41, p. 75.

52. The views of the chiefs are recorded in the Appendix I of Prinsep's *Political and Military Transactions*, n. 41.

53. W. W. Hunter, n. 40, p. 99.

54. Chitranjan Nepali, n. 17, p. 116.

It was also alleged by Gen. Amar Singh Thapa that Bhim Sen's father Amar Singh, was personally interested in the income from the disputed lands and therefore the Prime Minister wanted to involve Nepal in war with the British. See Prinsep, n. 41, p. 80.

the mountains that protected Nepal.⁵⁵ After a long debate the younger generation carried the day and the die was cast in favour of war. The most significant point that emerged from the debates in the grand council of the Darbar was that the sense of grievance against the British Government on the border issue did not figure prominently. The chiefs who were against war pointed out that "there was no injury done to Nepal that called for an appeal to arms", and those in favour of war advocated it on grounds other than the protection of their just territorial claims.⁵⁶

The Nepalese did not give indication of their bellicose attitude immediately. In the letter of reply they asserted their peaceful intentions but made no reference to the disputed territories. Nor did they take any step to recover the lands from the British for a month. On the morning of 29th May 1814, an armed Gorkha party headed by Munraj Faujdar made a sudden attack on the police post at Butwal and after some bloodshed overpowered the local police. Due to unhealthy season the Indian Government could not take any counter step and withdrew its police from the remaining posts. The first shot having been fired, Lord Hastings made elaborate plans for war, which could not, however, be declared from the British side till November 1814.

It will not be out of place here to discuss whether the Nepalese war was inevitable? If we only examine the policy of Bhim Sen, the military and social organisation of the Gorkhas on the one hand, and on the other the great imperialistic power of Britain, its interest in Nepal as an important frontier state and through it beyond the Himalayas in Tibet and China, the conclusion is logical that the Indo-

55. In his statement addressed to the Maharaja in the grand council Bhim Sen said, "Through the influence of your good fortune and that of your ancestors no one has yet been able to cope with the State of Nepal. The Chinese once made war, but were reduced to seek peace. How then will the English be able to penetrate into our hills?... The small fortress of Bharatpur (which Gen. Lake had failed to take in 1805) was the work of man, yet the English being worsted before it, desisted from the attempt to conquer it. Our hills and fortress are formed by the hands of God and are impregnable". PT, Para 20.

56. See Prinsep, n. 41, Appendix 'A', pp. 457-61.

Nepalese war could not have been avoided.⁵⁷ In 1814-15, however, it could possibly have been avoided if Lord Hastings or General Bhim Sen had so desired. There can be no denying that Nepal was an expanding nation at the cost of the Indian territory and Indian Zamindars also occasionally encroached upon the Nepalese territory. But neither with Lord Hastings nor with Bhim Sen it was a very important consideration. The Governor General had remarked that, "we are not through a point of honour of demanding atonement for the wanton invasion of our territories, the brutal massacre of our policemen.... But we were at issue with a nation so extravagantly presumptuous in representing its own strength and so ignorant of our superior means".⁵⁸ The more important consideration, therefore, was to cripple the Gorkha power and bring Nepal under some sort of British political influence. That was why after the war Garhwal, Kumaon and large parts of the Terai were taken away from Nepal, and the disputed territories were returned to her. Similarly, the motive of the British was to open the gates of Nepal and utilize her passes for the exploitation of the markets of Tibet and China through the Central Himalayan route. Even earlier the missions of Bogle, Kirkpatrick, Turner and Knox were despatched with this purpose.

VII

There were certain military and political difficulties which made it necessary for the Indian Government to decide in advance their objectives to be gained by war. The geography of the country between Sutlej and Jamuna and the numerical strength of force which could be brought to act in it, rendered the co-operation of the inhabitants of those hills necessary. Therefore, with a view to win their support

57. Dr. K. K. Dutta has observed: "A collision between the Gorkhas and the new rulers of Bengal was thus inevitable particularly because the former occasionally encroached on the northern frontier of Bihar and also interrupted Bengal's age long commerce with Nepal and Tibet".

"Some unpublished letters relating to Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the Beginning of the nineteenth century," *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vol. XXV, 1939.

58. Marquess of Hastings, n. 45, p. 11.

a declaration was made that the old chiefs would be restored in the territory annexed from the Nepalese.⁵⁹

Nepal's political relationship with China was also a serious consideration for the British because of the commercial interests at Canton. Any conquest of Nepal by them was sure to be viewed with disfavour by the Chinese. Therefore, as a means of assuring them that Britain had no intentions of increasing its territory, it was declared that Sikkim would be restored to its old Raja.⁶⁰ Sikkim was a tributary of Tibet, and its restoration would have pleased the Chinese. The Magistrate of Rangpore was also asked to communicate directly with the Tibetan authorities at Lhasa in order to apprise them of the British viewpoint and convince them that the British aim of war was not aggrandizement.⁶¹

The chief aim of Lord Hastings in war was to cripple the Gorkha power. To attain this objective, it was decided that the Gorkhas should be permanently expelled from the territories west of the river Kali and the rich tract of the Terai, on the income of which their armies had been thriving, would be annexed.⁶² Annexation of the Terai was also deemed necessary so as to preclude the Gorkhas from any interest in the plains, and thus remove the source of future disputes.

With a view to develop trade with the trans-Himalayan countries, Kumaon or Garhwal, whichever had better mountain passes, was to be annexed.⁶³ With the same view, the commercial treaty of 1792 was to be renewed.

Finally, with a view to improve mutual relations, a British legation was to be established at the Court of Kathmandu.

All these objectives were formally included in a draft of the treaty, which was to be the basis of the future peace and relationship with Nepal.⁶⁴

59. NWP, p. 63.

60. Ibid., p. 258, and also see p. 45.

61. NWP, p. 721.

62. Ibid., p. 260.

63. NWP, p. 50. Also see p. 139.

64. See the Appendix No. 3.

VIII

Lord Hastings declared war on Nepal on November 2, 1814 and himself took the charge of operations. Considering the nature of the terrain and immense length of the frontier, the Indian Government employed a big force of more than 30,000 men with sixty guns. The Gorkhas could not muster more than 12,000 ill-equipped troops and were not always faithfully served by their subjects. Concentrated attacks were made from four different directions to cripple the military power of Nepal. The results of the first campaign were most unexpected. While the Gorkhas displayed an extraordinary bravery, four out of five British generals employed showed grave incompetence. General R. R. Gillespie's force was beaten back several times while assaulting a small fort of Kalanga near Dehra Dun by an insignificant number of Gorkhas under the able command of Balbhadra Singh. Thirty one officers and seven hundred and eighteen men had perished in the assault. On December 25, a European storming party was chased from Jaithuk; the Gorkhas even out-stripped them and inflicted a loss of five hundred men. General Wood was defeated at Jitgarh. Another part of the army lost over a thousand men. Only the fourth army of Col. David Ochterlony (later General Ochterlony) did not suffer defeat. He steadily followed his plans by slow and cautious manoeuvres, but could not gain any advantage over his equally cautious antagonist General Amar Singh Thapa.

These British reverses and almost uniform success of the Gorkhas produced consternation in the Indian states.⁶⁵

65. Sir Charles Matcalfe expressed his opinion on the British reverses thus: "we have met with an enemy who shows decidedly greater bravery and greater steadiness than our troops possess; and it is impossible to say what may be the end of such a reverse of the order of things. In some instances our troops, European and Native, have been repulsed by inferior number with sticks and stones. In others our troops have been charged by the enemy sword in hand, and driven for miles like a flock of sheep. In a late instance of complete route, we lost more muskets by a greater number than there were killed, wounded and missing. In short, I who have always thought our power in India precarious cannot help thinking that our downfall has already commenced. Our power rested solely

Ranjit Singh assumed a threatening posture in the north-west and Amir Khan, the Pindari leader, started collecting his troops in the Central India. The tone of Sindhia was hardly conciliatory, and it was at this time that "the seeds of next Maratha war were sown". The real effect of the reverses was manifested by the Governor General himself. The coming unfavourable season coupled with uniform failure meant a protracted and expensive war. The Indian Government was in a most precarious financial condition so much so that the Nawab of Oudh had to be extorted to the tune of two and a half crores of rupees during the whole war. These factors induced Lord Hastings to modify the terms of peace materially.*

The expulsion of the Gorkha power west of Kali river, the article concerning the guarantee to the chiefs, the exclusion of the Europeans and the Americans from Nepal and the clause relating to the surrender of Terai and Sikkim were still deemed as essential objectives of war. But the important articles concerning the mutual reception of permanent representatives, the renewal of the commercial treaty of 1792, the demand for a pecuniary payment for the indemnification of the expenses of the war and the annexation of Morang—the lowlands east of Kosi river—were deleted from the terms of the treaty. It was not because of any change of opinion regarding the importance of these objectives, but due to the reason that an early peace "on terms consistent with British security and dignity was at the moment more desirable", than the attainment of those valuable aims at the expense of a protracted war.

The Nepalese could not push on with their military success, because their tactics were purely defensive. They were "satisfied with repulsing an attack or cutting off an

(Continued from page 28)

on our military superiority. With respect to one enemy, that is gone. In this war dreadful—to say, we have had number on our side, and skill and bravery on the side of our enemy. We have had the inhabitants of the country disposed to favour us, and yet overawed, notwithstanding our presence and partial success, by the character of our enemy". See Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, Lond., 1935. pp. 256-57.

66. See NWP, pp. 764-65.

outpost". The British Generals, on the contrary, gradually learnt the Gorkha tactics and applied the same against their enemy. Ochterlony gradually pressed on General Amar Singh Thapa. Important battles were won by the British at Nala Pani, Malown, Deothal and Almora in April and May 1815, and soon Kumaon, Garhwal and the territory west of Jamuna were over-run. The Gorkha Commander of this area Gen. Amar Singh Thapa was deserted by whole of his detachment except his son and a few soldiers. Thus pressed from all directions, he agreed to surrender the whole of the Nepalese territory west of Kali River in exchange of his honourable retirement towards east.⁶⁷ A convention to this effect was signed on the 15th May 1815 between General Ochterlony and General Amar Singh Thapa.⁶⁸

These victories had an immediate effect both on the Indian Government and the Nepalese Darbar. Soon after hearing the news of victories the Governor General decided to include in the terms of the treaty many of those important provisions which he had earlier decided to drop.⁶⁹ The cession of Morang was introduced for securing a good frontier for the Raja of Sikkim and for erecting a barrier against the extension of the Gorkha power towards the east. For similar reasons a new article for the cession of Nagree and Nagarkote was also included. The important clauses of the mutual reception of Residents and the revival of the former commercial treaty were re-introduced. The revival of the commercial treaty was, however, not to be insisted upon. The two articles, the demand of pecuniary payment for the expenses of war and the surrender of Munraj Faujdar, were deleted even from the new draft.

In Nepal defeat and the loss of more than one-third of their territory convinced the Darbar of the hopelessness of the contest. A desire for peace was soon expressed. Guru Gajraj Missur and Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya were sent as representatives to negotiate all the differences with the British political agent Lt. Col. P. Bradshaw, who told them that peace could be granted only when the Gorkhas "admit

67. NWP, p. 607.

68. HRRK, pp. 100-101.

68. HRRK, pp. 100-101.

the principle of compensation... for the expenses of war as the basis of negotiations".⁷⁰ The British demands, in short, were the cession of all the territory west of Kali, east of Mechi and the whole low lands from Kali to Teesa, the recognition of all the treaties contracted by the Indian Government with the Raja of Sikkim and other chiefs of the western Nepal, and, finally, the acceptance of a British Resident at Kathmandu.

These conditions were more than the Nepalese were ready to concede. Guru distinctly told that, "he did not possess authority to comply with such extensive demands and that sacrifices of such magnitude were not contemplated by any party at Kathmandu as justly resulting from the events of actual state of war".⁷¹ Similarly, another Gorkha negotiator Rudra Beer Sah said that the sacrifice of the Terai "would ruin the state of Nepal... as principal chiefs and great part of soldiery drew their subsistence from jagirs situated in that tract".⁷² The Terai, thus, formed the main obstacle in the way of peace.

The extreme repugnance of the Nepalese against parting off the Terai and the fact that important chiefs held their jagirs in that tract induced Lord Hastings to relax the terms to some extent. With a view to compensate the loss of the Terai it was proposed that the Indian Government would pay a pension of two to three lakh rupees per annum to the chiefs whose jagirs were situated in that area.⁷³ The Governor General also thought that such dependence of the influential chiefs on British pension would help in maintaining good relations with Nepal. This proposal could not be accepted by Guru, who returned to Kathmandu for consultations declaring that cession of whole of the Terai was not feasible, because it was their main source of subsistence. He warned that such a sacrifice would be extremely unpopular among all the subjects and would provoke even the friendly chiefs to join hands with the Thapas for a united defence.⁷⁴

70. Ibid., p. 770.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., p. 776.

73. Ibid., p. 777.

74. NWP, p. 808. Also see Prinsep, p. 185.

The Gorkha repugnance to cede whole of the Terai was due to the high estimate of the pecuniary value of that territory entertained by the chiefs. The British demand for its cession originated in a desire to exclude the Nepalese from any interest in the lowlands so as to remove the source of future conflicts for ever. Against this consideration was the pressing expediency of bringing an early termination of this arduous war, which if prolonged might have created dangerous situation in Central India and north-west. The experience of a few months of the administration of the Terai also proved troublesome and expensive due to its climate.

Weighing all the considerations the Governor General modified his terms.⁷⁵ Instead of the whole Terai he now demanded only so much as was situated between the rivers Kali and Gandak and the rivers Mechi and Kosi. The lowlands from Mechi to Kosi were considered essential for the security of Sikkim. Out of the tract situated between the rivers Gandak and Kosi only the territory in as far as the British authority had been introduced was demanded. The pension for that part of the area where the British authority had been established was still offered to the Gorkha chiefs as compensation. The Governor General was ready to delete even the clause concerning the Resident should "it prove to be an obstacle in the way of peace".

Even this did not satisfy the Nepalese. On the 29th October 1815, Guru received instructions from Kathmandu and "was not authorised to sign the conditions as offered by the British".⁷⁶ After some discussions he offered to sign the treaty on the condition that "the grants of... pensions were exchanged for all the Terai lying between Kosi and Gandak". Bradshaw flatly refused to entertain this proposal. More time was given for re-consideration and Guru promised to bring a positive answer.

On the British side the expediency of concluding an early peace and reconciling the Gorkhas induced the Governor General to further relax the terms. Bradshaw was directed to tell the Gorkha representative that the British Government was ready to give up even those parts of the

75. NWP, p. 821.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 838.

Terai between Kosi and Gandak where the British authority had been introduced, except those portions which were essential for the maintenance of a good boundary.⁷⁷

Guru returned to Sagauli on November 28, 1815, and without objecting to any part of the earlier terms signed the treaty on the December 2, 1815. Bradshaw did not have to propose the concessions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and Guru promised to get the treaty ratified within fifteen days. The Indian Government ratified it on December 9, 1815.

The treaty, however, could not be ratified by the Maharaja of Nepal within the specified time. It was mainly because the faction which still advocated war got substantial support from the recently returned General Amar Singh Thapa and his family.⁷⁸ The grounds on which he could induce the Maharaja not to ratify the treaty reveal very clearly the Gorkha character and their suspicion of the British intentions.⁷⁹ He contended that a treaty concluded after defeat could not be trusted. Once the British had known the weakness of Nepal they would ultimately subjugate the entire country. He considered the establishment of the Residency as the first step towards subjugation. Amar Singh Thapa explained the advantages of resistance. Examples of the Raja of Bharatpur, who did not yield to the British demands and then remained unmolested, impressed him as much as that of Tipu who was ruined after concluding the first treaty. The Gorkha General, in fact, took rather an exaggerated view of the Nepalese resources, courage of his troops and the natural strength of his country. He had also a wrong impression of the early British reverses, which were more due to the incompetence of the generals and lack of geographical knowledge than anything else. It can, however, be asserted that the main fear of the Nepalese was the ulterior motives of the British. Being highly patriotic and hopeful of some help from disaffected Indian princes and China they once again decided to take recourse to arms.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 839.

78. NWP, p. 841.

79. See the intercepted letter of Gen. Amar Singh Thapa to his son. It is given by Prinsep in the Appendix 'B', n. 41, pp. 462-472.

As a consequence of the non-ratification of the Treaty of Sagauli hostilities commenced once again. The second campaign did not last long. The first defeat at Mackwanpur brought the Nepalese to their knees. Before the invaders could enter the inner range of hills, Guru Gajraj Missur and Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya were sent with the formal acceptance of the Treaty of Sagauli to sue for peace. Major General Ochterlony (now the negotiator) at the first instant refused to grant peace on the former terms, but after repeated requests he accepted the treaty from Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya in the valley of Mackwanpur at half-past two in the afternoon of March 4, 1816.⁸⁰

Maj. Gen. Ochterlony accepted the treaty at that moment mainly due to British military weakness rather than Gorkha importunities. Due to approaching unhealthy season difficulties were cropping up in maintaining adequate supplies and sickness was wide-spread in the British Camp. Finances of the Company were already in a precarious state and the prolongation of contest would have worsened them. The nature of the country and the remoteness of the British frontier would have made a prolonged occupation extremely difficult. Nor, such a situation would have passed without a stir in Central India. On the other hand, the Indian Government had already secured whatever it desired. Several decisive battles had already been won and Gorkha vanity and their myth of impregnable mountain barrier had been shattered. Territorial gains had been secured to satisfy the British objectives.

Due to all these factors General Ochterlony accepted the treaty, but he clarified that no hope should be entertained for the concessions which Bradshaw had been authorised to give in the hope of treaty being ratified in the first instant.⁸¹ Thus ended the two years old war which was one of the most arduous that the British had to fight in India. The Treaty of Sagauli became the basis of future relationship of the British with Nepal.

80. NWP, p. 947, See Aitchison n. 22, pp. 110-112.

81. NWP, p. 947.

IX

It will be useful to mention the immediate advantages that the British gained from the Treaty of Sagauli.

With the expulsion of the Gorkha power west of Jamuna and the restoration of the former hill chiefs therein on terms of feudal alliance with the Company, an important barrier had been interposed against Ranjit Singh ever getting on the flank of British possessions.⁸² It further reduced the chances of direct combination of the two Indian powers—the Sikhs and the Gorkhas. Moreover, the restoration of hill chiefs gave the Indian Government the role of an arbitrator among them. It minimised the chances of any one of them becoming dominant and gave the Company an authority to maintain peace, which was essential for the success of commerce in that direction.

The possession of •Kumaon, Dehra Dun, Kyarda, Nahan, Sabathoo, Malown and the passages of the river Ganges gave the British an unbroken chain of communications in the hills from river Kali to Sutlej, and the whole of the country beyond it up to the snowy mountains came to be possessed by feudatory and dependent chiefs. Strategically it gave the British “the most valuable and important position of . . . North West frontier line”.⁸³ It is apparent from the map that all the Gorkha fortresses which commanded the passes from plains were now turned against them. It offered “a complete barrier against any extension of the Gorkha power in the western direction, a bulwark to the whole country in its rear”. Moreover, Kumaon offered a ready entrance into the enemy country by the great road of communication from Kathmandu to the western provinces.

Through Kumaon the easiest road to Tibet was secured. This opened for the British merchants all the prospects for developing trade with the countries beyond the Himalayas. They had no longer to depend on the mountain chiefs for passage. From the point of view of the Chinese trade it offered them one more route, which was considered by the

82. NWP, p. 673.

83. NWP, p. 761.

Committee at Canton "as the happiest check on the disposition of the viceroy of Canton."⁸⁴

In Kumaon the Company secured rich mines of iron, copper, lead and hemp of a very superior kind and in the forests of the Terai they secured most valuable timber and herbs of various kinds.

With Sikkim as the protectorate of the Company on the east, British territories on the south and the west and China on the north, Nepal came to be circumscribed. No longer there was any danger of the Gorkha martial energy thriving at the cost of their weak neighbours. Besides, by taking away more than one-third of their territory the British thought that the Gorkha power to menace Indian province had been shattered.

In Kumaon, Garhwal and Darjeeling the British secured their best hill stations and summer resorts. For the Europeans accustomed to cold climate it was a very important gain.

In the war the British met one of the best fighting soldiers in Gorkhas. The Indian Government realised their value and immediately after the war local levies of the Gorkhas were raised.

Lastly, the British could establish their legation and send their representative to the Court of Kathmandu, which they had been trying for the last few decades.

Before concluding this chapter, a question can be asked as to why the Indian Government did not annex Nepal, which was so important for the safety of its northern frontier? Mainly it was due to the fear of the Chinese. The British had always an exaggerated estimate of the Chinese influence in the Himalayas. The conquest of the Valley of Nepal would have only been viewed by them with disfavour.⁸⁵

84. *Ibid.*, p. 672.

85. Lord Hastings admitted that, "The Principle of negotiation on my part was that our future tranquillity made it necessary to debilitate the Gorkha State, as far as might be done without entirely overthrowing the old Government. We should have had infinite troubles in the formation of and maintenance of any other Government and we might also have dissatisfied the Chinese, by setting up a dependent of our own". NWP, p. 996.

Such a situation would have impaired the Anglo-Chinese friendship, "which was so necessary for the Company's existence".⁸⁶ Nepal as a buffer between British India and Tibet, therefore, would have suited British interests more than an outright annexation. Nor was the administration of Nepal an easy task. The nature of the country, its distance from the British headquarters, lack of any easy route and extremely nationalistic and martial character of the Gorkhas, all these factors would have rendered the management of Nepal by the Britishers an extremely difficult task. Even for the development of trade, what the British wanted was a peaceful atmosphere, which would surely have been disturbed by an unwarranted annexation. Therefore, the British aims in fighting the Anglo-Nepalese war were limited. They only wanted a peaceful and friendly country on the northern frontier, which they hoped Nepal would become on the basis of the relations established by the Treaty of Sagauli.

86. Ibid., p. 45.

CHAPTER II

THE TREATY ITS NATURE AND IMPLEMENTATION

I

THE discussion of the nature of the Treaty of Sagauli raises two questions: how far it was a dictated peace and what was the nature of its obligations? The Nepalese writers have generally contended that it was purely an imposed peace much against the wishes of the Gorkhas. This statement, though true to a great extent, is not entirely correct. Having won the war, the British held the initiative in the negotiations of the Treaty of Sagauli. Any defeated country has to accept the terms of the victors and whatever the relaxations, these are mostly due to external factors or with a view to preserve future friendship. In the present case some of the clauses were made essential for peace, while others were relaxed with a view to bring about a speedy termination of the war and to make the treaty palatable to the defeated Gorkhas.

There were at least five articles for which no relaxation was made by the British Government. Art. 2, viz., "The Raja of Nepal renounces all claim to the lands which were the subject of discussion between the two states before the war", was treated throughout the discussions as indispensable.¹ The main object behind it was to justify the British claims and indemnify their subjects. Art. 5, viz., the surrender of the territory west of Kali river, was put before the Gorkhas as an accomplished fact. As early as the 15th May 1815, before the discussions for the peace started, General Amar Singh Thapa was forced to sign such a con-

1. Secretary to the Government J. Adam remarked about the British demand for disputed lands that, "This article is indispensable and can admit no qualification". HRRK, p. 119.

vention.² This cost the Nepalese one-third of their territory and actually brought them to their knees. This was deemed necessary to cripple the Nepalese military power and to secure for the British a very useful territory with a road to China.³ It was, in fact, always considered by the Nepalese as an undue punishment, yet they had to accept it. Again, to circumlocate the territories of Nepal and put an effective check on her eastward expansion, a guarantee was exacted from them not to molest the Raja of Sikkim. All the differences between them were compulsorily to be referred to the British Government by whose awards Nepal engaged to abide.⁴ These territorial sacrifices were the necessary conditions of peace and never a relaxation was thought for them.

Two more articles of the treaty, viz., 7th and 8th concerning the Americans and Europeans and the Resident, were dictated to the Gorkhas. The first one was always inserted in the British treaties with Indian States as a means to counteract the yet prevailing influence of the French and the Dutch.⁵ Nepal being a frontier state had an added importance. It was neither objected to by the Nepalese, nor the British Government ever contemplated its relaxation.⁶

The article concerning the Resident was long resented by the Nepalese Darbar. Since the times of Prithvi Narayan Sah the Nepalese had refrained from closer connections with the British. They had a genuine apprehension that the Resi-

2. See page 30 of Chapter I.

3. "The total exclusion of the Gorkha influence, power and authority from the territories west of Gogra, is indispensable. This will leave at our disposal Kumaon and will greatly circumscribe the resources of the Gorkhas....". From J. Adam, Secretary to Government, to Hon. Edward Gardner, HRRK. p. 119.

4. See article sixth of the Treaty of Sagauli. Aitchison, n. 22, Ch. I, p. 112.

5. Such articles of excluding the Europeans and Americans were generally included in the treaties of the British with the Indian States and other Asian States. In their treaty of 1817 with Sikkim the article fifth ran as follows: "That he (Raja of Sikkim) will not permit any British subject nor the subject of any European and American State to reside within his domain without the permission of the English Government". Ibid., p. 322.

6. Even after the British reverses, when the terms of treaty were drastically relaxed by Lord Hastings, this article was considered indispensable. NWP, p. 765.

dent was an advance guard of subsidiary force ultimately leading to the annexation of their country.⁷ At least twice in the past—1792 and 1802—British attempts for installing permanent representative were frustrated. This time, however, the initiative was in the British hands. They were conscious that only a Resident could put a stop to the continuous unavowed expansion of the Nepalese boundary and the border crimes. Side by side he could also explore the unknown routes of Nepal and convince the Nepalese to throw open their country for the British traders. Consequently, after the second campaign the clause relating to Resident was made *sine qua non* of peace. By the express orders of Lord Hastings, General Ochterlony told the Nepalese negotiator “that all other points of the treaty were more or less open to subsequent discussion but that they must take Resident or War”.⁸ Reluctantly consent was given by the Gorkhas and, even without waiting for the accredited Resident E. Gardner to reach Kathmandu the Indian Government directed Lt. Boileau to act as *locumtenens* of that office. This imposition of the Resident on the unwilling people remained the greatest cause of jealousy and discontent of the Gorkhas for decades to come, and more than anything else this entitled the treaty to be called a “Diktat”.

Apart from the above five articles, all other articles of the treaty, viz., articles 3rd and 4th, were freely discussed and substantially modified in the course of negotiations. They were related to cession of the Terai from the river Kali to the river Teesa. In the first meeting with Guru Gajraj Missur Bradshaw did not hesitate to place the aforesaid demand. Guru and Rudra Beer Sah, however, told that it was impossible to accept it. Expediency of an early termination of the war and the high value that the Nepalese attached to this tract induced Lord Hastings to relax this demand considerably. After the peace treaty had been concluded the British restored to the Nepalese the Terai from the river Gandak to the western limits of Gorakhpur. The settlement concerning the Terai was indeed a negotiated one.

7. Intercepted letter of Gen. Amar Singh Thapa to his son. T.H. Prinsep, n. 41, Ch. I, Vol. I, Appendix ‘B’, pp. 462-72.

8. PT, para 52.

Turning to the nature of obligations we can classify the provisions of the Treaty of Sagauli into three parts: (a) the clauses relating to the territorial arrangements, (b) the clauses restricting Nepalese freedom of action in foreign affairs and (c) the clauses relating to the Resident.

The first category of articles, four in numbers, viz., 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th, only specified the territories to be ceded by Nepal to the East India Company and to the pension, in lieu of this sacrifice, to the Bhardars (Chiefs).

In the second category there were two articles, i.e., the sixth and the seventh. In Art. 6, Nepal agreed to abide with the British arbitration in any dispute with Sikkim. This was legally a restriction on the Nepalese freedom of action. But it should be noted that Sikkim became British protectorate after eleven months of the conclusion of the Treaty of Sagauli, in February 1817, after which, of course, Sikkim had no foreign policy of her own. Art. 7 was also a restriction on the Nepalese freedom of action. According to it, the Maharaja of Nepal undertook never to employ Europeans and Americans without the British consent.⁹

Finally, the article relating to the Resident has aroused a lot of controversy. This office in Nepal has generally been confused with the office of the Resident in the Indian States. But, both according to the terminology of the treaty and actual practice, it was not so.¹⁰

II

THE IMPLEMENTATION

The implementation of the Treaty of Sagauli has relevance from the point of view of three articles only, viz., Articles 3 and 4 concerning the territorial cessions and Art. 7 relating to the employment of Americans and Europeans by the Government of Nepal. Rest of the articles were ipso facto executed with the signing of the treaty. Even Art. 5, stipulating the surrender of the territory west of Kali, stood implemented when the Gorkha army had

9. See Chapter XII, "Conclusions", for details.

10. See Chapter XII, "Conclusions", for details.

withdrawn and on May 15, 1815, a convention was signed by General D. Ochterlony and General Amar Singh Thapa.

Coming to the clauses relating to the Terai settlement, it must be borne in mind that the Treaty of Sagauli did not guarantee its immediate execution.¹¹ At the same time, the treaty included certain clauses for the execution of which the British Government had a double responsibility, i.e., the lands east of Mechi were to be given to the Raja of Sikkim and the Terai from Kali to Rapti was to be transferred to the Nawab Vazier of Oudh. Naturally it was obligatory on its part to occupy these lands as soon as possible. Lord Hastings therefore adopted a strict policy to secure the transfer of this territory without delay. Attention of General Ochterlony was at once drawn to obtain the execution of those parts of the treaty, the performance of which depended on the Nepalese government, and to secure the orders of the Darbar for the evacuation of forts and territories to be ceded to the British Government.¹²

The lands east of Mechi were first to be evacuated. This was quite natural, as the clause relating to it also contained a forty days guarantee for its evacuation. The English political agent in that quarter, Capt. B. Latter, immediately after hearing the conclusion of the treaty, demanded the evacuation. The Nepalese officers refused to oblige him, stating that they had not received orders from the Darbar to that effect.¹³ After the demand of evacuation had been repeatedly turned down, Capt. Latter advanced a detachment towards the fort of Nagree. Under this threat the Gorkhas evacuated the fort and the territories on the 13th April, 1816.¹⁴ This delay, however, cannot be ascribed to any designs on the part of the Nepalese, who were only desir-

11. The only exception was the 5th clause of the third Article, i.e., territory east of Mechi, including the fort and lands of Nagree and the pass of Nagarcote, leading from Morang into the hills, together with the territory lying between that pass and Nagree. For its evacuation 40 days' time limit since the day of signing was mentioned in the treaty.

12. See NWP, pp. 950-51.

13. PT, para 36.

14. The formal orders of the evacuation were also delivered to Lt. Boileau on 21st April, 1816. S.C. May 4, 1816—No. 57.

ous of receiving the requisite orders from their Government.” Having very slow means of communications such delay was quite likely in Nepal.

Rest of the clauses of cession related to the Terai from the Kali to the Kosi river. Its cession was subjected to a lot of delay and procrastination by the Nepalese. To understand it we must go back to the negotiations of peace. Defeat in the late war and the loss of more than one-third of their empire west of Kali and east of Mechi came to Bhim Sen as a rude shock. But he had to accept it as *fait accompli*. The Terai, on the contrary, was entirely a different matter. The Nepalese agents Guru Gujraj Missur and Rudra Beer Sah had frankly told the British representative that Nepal would never consent to give up the whole of Terai. Jagirs of influential chiefs were situated in this tract and it was their main source of income. Though the British Government could not correctly assess the value of this marshy tract, it meant a lot for the Gorkhas.¹⁵ Rest of the kingdom being mountainous, the Terai provided a rich cultivable soil. Lord Hastings, realising the expediency of bringing the war to an early end, gave certain concessions, yet the Terai from Kali to Gandak was definitely to be acquired. All further hopes of any relaxation had to be relinquished by the Gorkhas due to the second campaign. After the establishment of peace, the Gorkha policy was naturally directed to prevent and delay the transfer of the Terai as much as possible and to gain maximum out of the liberal policy of the British regarding the border adjustment. While discussing these details the broad fact must not be forgotten that while all other boundaries were well defined, the Terai was the only area yet undemarcated. Only here the Nepalese could have expected to retain as much as possible. On his demand for evacuation the Officiating Resident Lt. I. P. Boileau was told

15. Lt. Waston taking the charge of the aforesaid territory wrote: “I cannot conceive any other cause for the Soobha’s delay in evacuating the place than the desire of receiving the orders of his Government of whose displeasure he is still very apprehensive....”. PT, para 37.

16. The value of Terai situated between Rapti and Kosi was estimated by the British Officers only at two lakhs rupees per annum; while later on it was called a mine with an estimated income of 12 lakhs rupees per year. PT, para 64.

that the treaty did not define the extent of the Terai.¹⁷ The Nepalese contention was that the word Terai did not include forests.¹⁸ Accordingly, they ordered their troops to retire only from the Terai and stay at the southern edge of the forests.¹⁹

The Governor General well understood the feelings of the Nepalese. After humbling the Gorkha power and pride he genuinely desired to reconcile them. As early as March 16, 1816, the Secretary to Foreign Department, Mr. J. Adam, instructed E. Gardner, who had been appointed as Resident, to make a few more relaxations concerning the articles of cession, provided the conduct of the Maharaja of Nepal was faithful.²⁰ At the same time, there were the clear instructions from the Governor General that prior to any concession all articles of the treaty must be executed. Only then the concessions were to be granted as a boon.

Lord Hastings wanted to postpone the declaration of his intentions till the arrival of Edward Gardner, the Resident designate, but, observing considerable anxiety and irritation on the part of the Nepalese regarding the southern boundary, an explicit declaration of the policy and future plans was deemed unavoidable.²¹ This would have calmed down the prevailing irritation, and also encouraged the Nepalese to promptly execute other clauses of the treaty. Clause three of Art. 3 of the treaty was to be entirely deleted. It stipulated that the Terai between Gandak and Kosi, in so far as British authority had been introduced, would be ceded by Nepal. It was subsequently realised that the uncertainty regarding the actual extent to which the British authority had been introduced would open a new fertile source of objections, border disputes and difficulties in demarcation. Therefore, the Indian Government thought it better to give back whole of it, and Lt. Boileau lost no time to declare that "an arrangement would shortly be proposed

17. S.C. May 14, 1816—No. 57.

18. There is still a view prevalent among the Nepalese that the word 'Terai' and Jungles below the hills are quite different connotations.

19. S.C. June 1, 1816—No. 21.

20. NWP, 951.

21. S.C. May 4, 1816—No. 69.

to the Maharaja which would include not only the forests lying between Gandak and Kosi, but a portion of the cultivated Kheti-lands south of it" also.²² It was specifically told that the above concession was based on the idea that the rest of the Terai—Gandak to Kali—would be promptly surrendered. The definition of the word Terai was clarified so as to include "the whole country including the forest up to the foot of the hills. . . ."²³

Despite this relaxation, the Nepalese did not evacuate the western Terai, upon which Gardner, taking the charge of the Residency on July 10, 1816, expressed his extreme disappointment and refused to discuss any other business unless that portion of Terai, including the forests, was delivered.²⁴ The Nepalese again fell back on their former plea that the Terai did not include the forests. Observing the continuous delay and procrastination, Gardner gave one more hint of further relaxation that the British Government would have no difficulty for a future arrangement of Butwal and Sheoraj.²⁵ At the same time, he refused to move from his encampment until the requisite orders for the surrender of Terai from Gandak to Kali had been issued. This threat and temptation had the desired effect and the orders of evacuation were promptly sent by the Darbar on July 15, 1816.²⁶

Thus theoretically all the clauses concerning the territorial arrangements were fulfilled. Art. 7 of the treaty relating to the Europeans and Americans was also soon put into practice. On the 19th April, 1816, Boileau demanded the surrender of the two Europeans, who were employed in Maharaja's service.²⁷ Request was evaded for some time but finally in July they were sent out of Nepal.²⁸ With it the whole of the treaty came to be legally implemented. All

22. S.C. June 15, 1816—No. 16.

23. S.C. May 4, 1816—No. 69.

24. S.C. August 3, 1816—No. 10.

25. C. S. Upadhyaya even argued that the treaty was concluded under the implied promise of future settlement. This was, however, not correct. Because after the second campaign all such promises were expressly withdrawn. S.C. August 3, 1816—No. 12.

26. S.C. August 10, 1816—Nos. 10 and 12.

27. S.C. May 4, 1816—No. 55.

28. S.C. July 27, 1816—No. 14.

the concessions and the alterations made afterwards were treated by the English Government as "boon".

III

RESTORATION OF THE TERAJ FROM THE RIVER KOSI TO THE RIVER RAPTI

The British Government wanted to annex the lowlands along the Indo-Nepalese border so as to shatter the Gorkha power and also to expel the Nepalese from a territory which had been a matter of dispute for a long time. But after the first campaign of the war his anxiety to avoid a long and tough contest induced Lord Hastings not to annex whole of the Terai from the river Kosi to Gandak but only those portions where the British authority had been introduced.²⁹ After the Treaty of Sagauli had been signed the Governor General faced a double problem: to get the treaty implemented and to make it palatable to the Nepalese as well. There were articles, particularly the one concerning the Resident, which the Nepalese were forced to accept.

The article concerning pension was incorporated in the treaty so as to compensate the loss of the Terai and to make some of the influential chiefs, who had their jagirs in that area, sympathetic towards the British Government. But gradually aversion of the Gorkhas to such a dependence on the British became clear. It was also realised that such a responsibility would involve the British Government in serious troubles. Nor were the English Magistrates of the frontier districts in favour of retaining any portion of the Terai. Their experience of one year's administration of this area was none too pleasant. Its climate was extremely unhealthy and the administration most expensive and troublesome.³⁰

29. During the course of negotiations for the Treaty of Sagauli Lord Hastings had authorised Col. Bradshaw to give up even those portions of the Terai where British authority had been introduced, except the disputed areas. But the Nepalese representative Guru Gajraj Missur signed the treaty, without any objection on November 28, 1815. NWP, p. 839.

30. The Magistrate of Rangpore reported on August 28, 1816
(Continued on Page 47).

Induced by the above factors the British Government decided that for all lowlands, except those situated between the river Kali and Rapti, an arrangement be made with Nepal.³¹ In return it wanted to get Art. 4 of the treaty, concerning pension, annulled.³² The British policy in all these transactions was to give an air of gratuity and to avoid every discussion. It was, according to them, entirely due to Maharaja's repeated requests that annulment of pension and restoration of the eastern Terai were proposed.³³

The Nepalese policy on the other hand was to regain as much Terai as possible and to make the future arrangement subject to negotiations. The constitution of the Nepalese Government and vested interests of some chiefs had also rendered any steadiness and quick negotiations impossible in this transaction.³⁴ That is why the negotiations took about six months before the formal memorandum of the restoration was put before the Maharaja.

Soon after the orders of the surrender of the western Terai had been issued, Guru and C. S. Upadhyaya visited the Residency on July 25, 1816 to discuss the restitution of the eastern Terai.³⁵ Gardner immediately came out with the British proposal. Notwithstanding the past he was ready

(Continued from Page 46).

that "No inconvenience can I conceive arise from the Nepalese being allowed to retain whole of land situated in Butwal and Sheoraj.... provided a definite line of demarcation can be established. The insolubility of climate in the immediate vicinity of the hills will render it extremely difficult to maintain an efficient police administration". S.C. September 14, 1816—No. 52 Magistrate of Gorakhpur noted that, "I am not aware of any objection to the whole or any part of the Terai bordering on the Gorakhpur district being ceded to the Gorkha Government". S.C. September 28, 1816. No. 68. Nor was any difficulty raised by Lt. Col. Bradshaw, P.C. January 4, 1817—No. 14.

31. S.C. July 23, 1816—No. 9.

32. S.C. May 4, 1816—No. 70.

33. S.C. July 23, 1816—No. 14.

34. In the course of his talks with Gardner Guru Gajraj Missur once remarked that, "in the councils and among the individual members of the Darbar little consistency or steadiness was to be found and the nature and character of administration did not admit of business being transacted expeditiously". S.C. August 24, 1816—No. 10.

35. S.C. August 24, 1816—No. 7.

to restore the Terai situated between Kosi and Rapti, with the exception of two 'Koses'³⁶ of territory in depth from the most northern projecting point of the former frontier. In exchange of this arrangement the pension of two lakhs per annum was to be annulled. The two Koses excepted were reserved for the demarcation of a good boundary line. The disputed portions of territory on Tirhoot and Saran frontier and certain other places of commercial importance were not to be restored in this deal.³⁷

The first reaction of this proposal, as reported by the Resident, was that of satisfaction. Not a single objection was raised for the annulment of the pension; it was rather viewed with pleasure. Some trifling objections were raised on other issues, but Gardner told strictly that, "British Government in this transaction is actuated by no view of increasing its possessions and there is no necessity of giving back any. But it is a desire only of meeting the view of this state in every practicable way and thereby impressing the friendly relations".³⁸

Soon the Nepalese adopted an attitude of securing as much as possible. Inquiries were made about the possible additions.³⁹ It was argued that the excepted two Koses would take away most important part of the Terai and a proposal for two Koses from the most southern projection was put forward. C. S. Upadhyaya even said that the Terai reverted would not be equal to two lakhs of rupees.

The real objects of the two Koses excepted were to recover for the British subjects their lands forcibly occupied by the Gorkhas, and that the intervention of this tract, between Nepal's territory and the lands which were subject of most serious disputes, would also have removed all the future troubles. This aim could have also been attained by two Koses measured from "the most retired part, instead of most advanced part". Therefore the Resident was advised not to

36. One 'Kose' is equal to $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

37. Matter-danee, Inlesur, Samroungarh, Janakpur, Roopelau-garh, were to remain with the British Government. S.C. August 24, 1816—No. 7.

38. S.C. August 24, 1816—No. 8.

39. S.C. August 24, 1816—Nos. 10 and 11.

follow the two Koses line rigidly and to come to an understanding with the Darbar on principles and then take away only the lands which were essential for the British subjects.⁴⁰ Eventually, it was agreed between Bhim Sen and Gardner that instead of two Koses taken from the southernmost projection, only half Kose throughout the length of the area to be restored to Nepal will be reserved by the British.⁴¹ It was also decided by Lord Hastings that the tracts situated between the rivers Kosi and Orriah and between Tanavi and Gandak will also be given back to Nepal at the time of demarcation of the border.⁴²

To fulfil their ultimate aim of securing the old boundary further objections and requests were now put forward by the Nepalese. In fact, the regular compliance with their requests on the part of the British Government convinced them that by holding on with importunating more and more concessions could be secured. The restoration of even the remaining half Kose was now requested. They argued that the old boundary was good enough, with the exception of disputed portions, and, given a good demarcation, no occasion for future disputes would arise.⁴³

The earnestness displayed by the Gorkhas for the remaining half Kose, its insignificance to the British, and the importance of an early border settlement in the fast approaching good season, induced Lord Hastings to grant the old boundary except the disputed portions.⁴⁴ The Resident was asked not to insist on any new boundary. Nevertheless to fulfil the paramount aim of securing a good frontier, an exchange of territories was made an essential condition for the future demarcation with a view to straighten the boundary line. The word "disputed lands" was also to be most liberally interpreted. Only the twenty two villages of Naunore and other such portions, which were the subject of dispute since 1812, were to be retained by the British Government.

40. S.C. August 24, 1816—No. 12.

41. P.C. November 2, 1816—No. 29.

42. S.C. September 14, 1816—No. 52.

43. P.C. November 2, 1816—No. 33.

44. P.C. November 2, 1816—No. 35.

On the basis of the above principles Gardner prepared a memorandum of the retrocession of the Eastern Terai and the annulment of the pension.⁴⁵ It was presented to the young Maharaja Rajendra Vikram Sah⁴⁶ on December 8, 1816, the day of his accession.⁴⁷ The Maharaja acknowledged and expressed his satisfaction in a formal note.

The Eastern Terai having been restored to Nepal, the British demanded evacuation of the Western Terai from Rapti to Kali, which was to be given to the Nawab of Oudh. Observing some delay Gardner addressed a written note, upon which Rudra Beer Sah Chautria was appointed to do the needful.⁴⁸ By the end of January 1817 Nepalese had evacuated the Western Terai. Here too some minor concessions were made by the British Government.⁴⁹ A small Bhotia pargana of Bearee situated on the river Kali and another spot on its left bank, having some commercial importance, were given back to Nepal.

Hardly the evacuation of the Western Terai had been completed, a controversy arose on the Gorakhpur frontier. In his acknowledgement of the restoration of the Eastern Terai the Maharaja deliberately misrepresented its western limits. Instead of writing the Terai from Kosi to Rapti, "that is to say from the river Gandak to the western limits of the Zillah of Gorakhpur", as the British had done, he only mentioned it from "Coosa to Rapti", and thus entirely omitted the reference to the western limits of Gorakhpur.⁵⁰ In fact, the British reference to the river Rapti arose from an impression that it formed the western limits of that district, which was not a fact. There also existed a tract between the western limits of Gorakhpur and the river Rapti. The Nawab of Oudh naturally claimed this territory.⁵¹ The

45. See Appendix No. V.

46. Maharaja Judh Vikram Sah had died in November 1816. He was succeeded by his two years old son Maharaja Rajendra Vikram Sah.

47. P.C. December 28, 1816—No. 50.

48. P.C. January 11, 1817—No. 31.

49. P.C. February 4, 1817—Nos. 25-27.

50. See the Memorandum presented by the Resident to the Maharaja of Nepal dated 8th December 1816. Also refer to the letter of the Maharaja Nepal—dated December 11, 1816. See Aitchison n. 22, Ch. I, pp. 113-15.

British Government also claimed it as its legal right. Retrocession being a so-called boon, it considered itself final authority to decide the misunderstanding.⁵¹ More than anything else it was a matter of prestige for it to give whatever had been promised to the Nawab. To compensate the Gorkhas, the restoration of the lands between Gandak and Tanavi was immediately announced, which was formerly left to be done by the Magistrate at the time of the demarcation of that frontier.

The Gorkhas first expressed dissatisfaction. Then on learning the compensation they readily gave up the required portion of the Terai⁵² By the 23rd July 1817, Resident could report that all the Terai from Kali to Gorakhpur had been given over to Oudh.⁵³ He now considered the treaty to be completely fulfilled.

IV

THE SURVEY AND THE DEMARCATION OF THE FRONTIER

A proper demarcation of frontier is an essential condition for international peace, and with the states having the land frontier it has an added importance. Often the causes of war are born out of unsatisfactory condition of frontier. Even the Indo-Nepal war was partly due to such factors. Therefore, the Governor General, dealing with a country like Nepal, which had been expanding at the expense of the Indian territory since 1787, regarded a proper and lasting demarcation very essential. Only it could have made the Gorkhas realise the altered conditions after the war. A good and secure boundary free from all disputes is also a necessary condition for the development of trade and commerce. Prompted by such considerations the British Government

51. British gave this tract to the Nawab in exchange of one crore of war loan that he gave during the Indo-Nepalese war. Prinsep, No. 41, Ch. I, p. 207.

52. P.C. March 22, 1817—No. 27.

53. P.C. August 8, 1817—No. 56.

54. P.C. August 8, 1817—No. 53.

repeatedly drew the attention of the Darbar for a proper survey and demarcation.

From the River Kali to Gorakhpur

With the commencement of the healthy season, the Resident invited the Darbar on December 7, 1817 to nominate boundary commissioners. The Darbar immediately ordered Bum Sah Chautria and Rudra Beer Sah to proceed for the Western Terai. From the British side Lt. Grant was deputed. The basic principle of demarcation was that everything up to the foot of the hills belonged to Oudh and beyond that to the Nepalese.⁵⁵ As the work could not be started early, the Commissioners could only demarcate the boundary from river Arrah to the river Chirolee.⁵⁶ Rest of the work was postponed for the next good season. In November 1818 Lt. Grant and the Nepalese Commissioners Bum Sah and Rudra Beer Sah again proceeded with their work. During this season a serious dispute arose in March 1819. Two years back in March 1817 the cession of the Terai from Nepal to Oudh had been satisfactorily adjusted and the Nawab had declared himself satisfied. Even the British Commissioners had given the Gorkhas receipt acknowledging the cession.⁵⁷ However, taking advantage of the carelessness of the Oudh authorities the Gorkhas did not evacuate the lands situated between the projecting ridges, nor were they ever asked to do so. Consequently, they claimed "all the low lands included between the ridges projecting from the first range of hills towards the plains".⁵⁸ Their interpretation of the word ridge also included these lands.

British Officiating Resident Stuard gave it rather a restricted meaning and insisted on complete evacuation of all the territory up to "the foot of the hills".⁵⁹ However, the Gorkhas insisted on their claim and the matter reached a climax when they even advanced two armed companies⁶⁰ to

55. P.C. April 3, 1821—No. 41.

56. P.C. April 3, 1818—No. 51.

57. P.C. April 8, 1819—No. 56.

58. P.C. June 19, 1819—No. 9.

59. The Gorkhas applied the term hills up to ridges—"Nake Tek"—which included even the low lying plains situated in their gaps too. P.C. April 8, 1819—No. 56.

occupy this tract. It aroused the British Government to the danger of letting the Nepalese revive their old policy of expansion. Lord Hastings demanded an immediate evacuation of those portions and the submission of the dispute for his decision. The Resident was also asked to withdraw from Nepal in case the Darbar did not meet these demands.⁶¹ It was enough and the Darbar agreed to withdraw from the lands situated between the projecting ridges. On the 23rd July 1819, Bhim Sen agreed to give up everything as demarcated by Lt. Grant.

In the next winter of 1819-20 the rest of the survey and demarcation was completed. In his report Lt. Grant commended the sincerity and the co-operation of the Nepalese.⁶² The principle of the "foot of the hills" was adhered to throughout the demarcated line.

Demarcation from Gorakhpur to River Kosi

The demarcation of the boundary from the River Kosi to the western limits of Gorakhpur was based on entirely different footing. Here the British Government was giving this territory to Nepal as a boon not subject to any negotiations. In the demarcation of the Western Terai Nepal had a *locus standi* to decide the extent of the Terai according to the treaty, but here they were only the receivers. However, the British Government was ready to meet the Nepalese wishes in every practical way without affecting its own interests.

The general principles of restoration and demarcation of this Terai were as follows.⁶³ The Nepalese were to be restored all the lands which could have possibly been given without endangering the tranquillity of the frontier and the future adjustment of the exact boundary line. The reservation of the disputed tracts was to be kept to the narrowest limits. Wherever the actual line of boundary, as it stood in 1812, could be accurately known no local considerations, such as the division of private property, were to stand in

60. P.C. June 19, 1819—No. 10.

61. P.C. June 19, 1819—No. 11.

62. P.C. April 3, 1820—No. 42.

63. P.C. December 17, 1816—No. 45.

the way of demarcation. Finally, the boundary was to be made as straight as possible by exchanging the lands that came in its way. The British Government agreed to bear all the expenses of the survey and demarcation.

The Magistrates of Gorakhpur, Sarun and Tirhut were appointed boundary Commissioners of their respective districts and Lt. Col. P. Bradshaw was made incharge of Butwal and Sheoraj.

Soon the demarcation of the above frontier was over. Bradshaw completed it on March 27, 1817.⁶⁴ The demarcation of Sarun frontier was over by April 30, 1817. Along Tirhut and Gorakhpur, the demarcation was completed in March and May 1817 respectively.⁶⁵

The only portion that could not be adjusted was the tract between the rivers Orriah and Gandak. The British Government invited the Darbar to appoint the Commissioners, but here the Nepalese did not like to take any interest in the matter. They refused to send their Commissioners under various pretexts and in October 1817 even officially declined to appoint them.⁶⁶ It put the British Government in a very awkward situation. It could neither dispense with the demarcation, nor could have undertaken it in the absence of the Nepalese, because such a unilateral demarcation could have been challenged by the Nepalese in future. Eventually, it decided to conduct it alone, and it was completed in December 1817.⁶⁷

From Kosi to Mechi River

The boundary between the rivers Kosi and Mechi was also surveyed and demarcated. At first the Darbar declined to appoint Commissioners on various excuses, i.e., that nothing had been mentioned in the treaty about this tract, that there existed no dispute in that quarter and that if the British Government considered it necessary it could do it alone.⁶⁸ After repeated urges they agreed and their Commissioner

64. P.C. April 19, 1817—No. 55.

65. P.C. May 3, 1817—No. 16. Also see P.C. May 31, 1817—No. 83.

66. P.C. November 21, 1817—No. 49.

67. P.C. January 30, 1818—No. 43.

was ordered to meet the British Magistrate of Purnea. Here the old frontier was to be confirmed. The survey and demarcation were completed in February 1818.⁶⁸

The boundary between Sikkim and Nepal was naturally demarcated, but the usual accuracy could not be obtained here. This portion was clearly demarcated by the river Mechi, but the problem arose because the river divided itself in two branches before entering India. English Political Agent in Sikkim, Capt. B. Latter, advised that the old Mechi should be confirmed as the boundary and the British Government also agreed.⁷⁰ But Resident Gardner feared that any discussion of this sort would create trouble, because the Treaty of Sagauli did not clarify whether the old or new Mechi would be boundary and it would be impossible to satisfy the Nepalese on this point.⁷¹ He did not consider it wise to raise the issue at this time, and, therefore, the matter was allowed to pass away quietly till 1830's when it gave rise to a serious and prolonged dispute.

On the whole, it can be said that the survey and demarcation, wherever carried out by the commissioners of both the sides, was satisfactory. Some mistakes in the first survey were quite natural, and particularly in a mountainous land of Nepal it was more so.

68. P.C. November 7, 1817—No. 50.

69. P.C. March 13, 1818—No. 20.

70. P.C. April 7, 1817—Nos. 69 and 73.

71. P.C. April 26, 1817—No. 22.

CHAPTER III

THE BRITISH POLICY OF PATIENCE AND BHIM SEN'S DILEMMA (1816 to 1818)

I

THE permanent political relations between Nepal and the East India Company started in March 1816, when in accordance with the Treaty of Sagauli Hon. Edward Gardner¹ was accredited as the British "Minister" to the court of Nepal. The Maharaja Girwan Judh Vikram Sah was on the throne at that time and General Bhim Sen Thapa was in charge of Prime Ministership since 1804. For all the practical purposes he was the guiding spirit of the Darbar. He can easily be called one of the greatest statesmen of Nepal since the Gorkha conquest of the Valley. He was the man who accompanied Maharaja Ran Bahadur Sah in exile, on his return got his rival Damodar Pande executed and after Maharaja's murder took over the administration in his hands. The new King Girwan Judh being a minor, the Prime Minister was the real ruler of the kingdom at that time.

The conclusion of the war did not solve all the problems of Bhim Sen. In fact, it had put him in an awkward and more difficult situation. It was a great disillusionment. Experience of 1767 had convinced him that the British were

1. Born in 1784; arrived in India as a writer in 1802; Registrar and Assistant to the Magistrate of Aligarh in 1805. Assistant to the Resident of Delhi in 1808; acting Judge and Magistrate of Moradabad 1813; Commissioner and Governor General's agent in Kumaon in 1814; Resident in Nepal 1816; for a short time Resident for the Indian States in Bundelkhand and Superintendent of Narbada Territories in 1819; but then resumed the charge of Resident in Nepal; retired from the service in 1829; died in England on October 5, 1861. W.W. Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, footnote on p. 58.

2. The Treaty does not mention the word Resident, but 'Minister'.

ineffective as an opponent, and that of 1803 that they were equally worthless as an ally.³ This belief became an illusion in 1816. The British arms had rudely shattered the Gorkha pride and power. The second campaign of the war was stopped just a few marches from Kathmandu. It made him realise the reality of the British power—"a power", which he called, "crushed thrones like pot shreds."⁴ He was convinced that the era of conquest was over and resolved never to go for war again. Independence of his country was dearest to him. He was conscious that another war with the Company would reduce Nepal to the status of a protected state and might even result in the extirpation of the Gorkha dynasty.

The mood and views of the Nepalese people, chiefs and soldiery were different from Bhim Sen. Being isolated since ages they had no idea of the English power. They only saw an intrinsic injustice in the fact that just for twenty two villages they had been deprived of more than one-third of their territory at the point of bayonet. They considered it unworthy of their warlike traditions to suffer such a loss without enough fighting. Nor was it a mere sentiment. The present situation gave them no hope at all of following successful policy of war and constant expansion. Now they had not only been stripped off their one-third kingdom, but also hemmed on the three sides by the British domains or those of its protected allies. A permanent Resident had been kept to watch their activities and ask explanations. It practically meant an end of all the hopes of extending their empire, and also implied an end of their most cherished martial profession. In fact, the treaty was a blow to their most loved social values.⁵ These were the misfortunes caused by the English.

Naturally, after the war the Nepalese were seething with bitterness. But they were not demoralized. They were

3. In 1767 Capt. Kinloch miserably failed to help Newar Rajas and was defeated by the Gorkhas. In 1803 Capt. Knox could not successfully side with the Pande faction.

4. W.W. Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 100.

5. See Chapter IV, pp. 78 to 92.

just baffled and full of vengeance. Gardner, when he reached Kathmandu, did not find them obsequious and slavish. Instead, they were jealous, proud, insolent in their bearing and not yet clear whether to abide by the treaty or break it to try another contest.⁶ Immediately after his arrival Lt. I. P. Boileau noted that he was "not aware of their having to this period adopted any measure to ensure the performance of any one of the articles of the treaty".⁷

These were, thus, the two difficult contradictions which Bhim Sen set himself to reconcile: the British power that he dreaded and the appeasement of the Gorkha soldiery and the chiefs, on whose support even his own tenure of office depended. It goes without saying that being a Prime Minister, who had lately lost the war, he was faced with more than an ordinarily difficult situation. To keep his hold strong on the soldiery, he first of all wanted to keep them engaged and show that peace was not so dishonourable. For it he adopted a policy of keeping the war fever at its high pitch. Throughout the kingdom recruitment was made, military stores were accumulated, ammunition was manufactured, parades were held and rumours were spread that the "ministers were only awaiting the arrival of foreign aid".⁸ But this was just to keep the soldiery engaged and the chiefs guessing. There was no ulterior intention of Bhim Sen to break the treaty.

With similar intentions the Resident was boycotted and treated with indifference. For the Gorkhas this was the most disliked and touchy article in the entire treaty, which they had accepted under compulsion. However, having accepted the Resident, Bhim Sen was determined to follow the letters of the treaty literally, as a result of which the Resident was reduced to the position of an honoured prisoner.

6. PT, Para 55.

7. S.C. May 4, 1816—No. 55.

8. Lt. Boileau informed on June 2, 1816 that, "the appearance of an unfavourable nature towards the continuance of amicable relations instead diminishing had been increased and less secrecy seemed to be attached to the preparations going forward". Soldiers said that "the ministers only awaited the arrival of aid from Bhutan to renew the contest. Preparations to a considerable extent in the manufacture of arms and gun powder go on in the Valley." S.C. June 15, 1816—No. 16. Also see S.C. May 11, 1816—No. 30.

Boileau reported that, "A company of Sipahes have been ordered by Bhim Sen to be dispersed between my house and the city during all hours to apprehend any person who may be thought to hold communications with me".⁹ It was with a double aim to show to his people that the existing administration had no liaison with the foreign agent, and, secondly, not to allow the Resident to collect any data or information about the country and to prevent any intrigue between him and the disaffected element.

To the English Government otherwise he extended a hand of friendship. Formally and in private interviews with the Resident he assured peaceful intentions of his Government.¹⁰ Bhim Sen's manners so much impressed Gardner that he was induced to believe in his sincerity regarding the maintenance of future relations.¹¹ The Nepalese Prime Minister knew that peace was the best policy to preserve the independence of his country intact. In fact, his dread of the English design on Nepal was a real one. In future, therefore, he had everything to lose and nothing to gain with a war. It was always in his interest, more than that of the British, to preserve peace. The alarming despatches of the Resident and reckless remarks of the English writers overlooked the above important consideration. They were more impressed by the details of his policy with which he kept the soldiery busy and was trying to consolidate his position.

In a nutshell, there were three factors that determined the policies of Bhim Sen after the war, i.e., his recognition of the British strength and a corresponding anxiety to avoid hostilities; the appeasement of the Gorkha soldiery and chiefs, on whose support his own tenure of office depended; and finally his determination to render the treaty as little pro-

9. S.C. May 11, 1816—No. 30.

10. P.C. December 23, 1816—No. 49.

11. Gardner reported on August 19, 1816, "I am inclined to believe that the best disposition towards the British Government which the actual circumstance admit of, is at present felt by the existing administration. That the policy of maintaining the relations which had been entered into is understood and acknowledged".

Here the words "actual circumstance" mean the mood of Nepalese chiefs and soldiery against whom Bhim Sen could not have gone.

S.C. September 14, 1816—No. 38.

ductive as possible for the British and to gain the maximum out of their ignorance and generosity.

The late war had equally been a disillusionment for the British. It had lasted for one and a half years and the British in India had not yet encountered such an enemy.¹² The bravery and patriotism displayed by the Gorkhas led General Ochterlony to declare frankly that the "Indian soldiers of the Company would never be able to hold their own against the Nepalese in their mountain fastness".¹³ Naturally, as Bhim Sen came to realize the English strength, the British also felt the taste of Gorkha character, and both came to respect each other. Nor was it possible and profitable for Lord Hastings to carry on the offensive any further against the Nepalese. In a country so rugged and cut-off from the plains administration for a European race would have been very difficult. Moreover, the British had already secured all the objectives of the war. The defeat had shattered the Nepalese myth of impregnable mountain barrier, and the sacrifice of more than one-third of their territory had crippled their capacity to menace the British provinces in future. In fact, Lord Hastings had a fixed idea in 1816 that the military power of Nepal had been broken for ever.¹⁴ This

12. Sir Charles Metcalfe remarked about Gorkha bravery: "None ever displayed so much bravery in action, so much system, skill and conduct, so much prudent caution, and so much well timed confidence. None other ever possessed a country so easily defended, and so difficult to the invader".

Sir Charles Metcalf dated January 15, 1815—quoted by Thompson and Garratt, **Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India**, London, 1935, pp. 256.

13. PT, Para 64.

14. Drafting the terms of the first draft of the treaty, Lord Hastings commented that, "such a peace following a successful war, must reduce the power, resources and reputation of the Gorkhas so low, and probably to prevent them from ever again becoming dangerous or troublesome to the British Government. It is not to be supposed that they will be able to recover any portion of their former power and resources. Their military reputation will be no less tarnished than their actual strength circumscribed. The restored chiefs and their subjects having experienced their tyranny and barbarity, will, it may be supposed, strenuously oppose any efforts on the part of the Nepalese to interfere in their disputes, in the hope of converting them, as heretofore, to their own advantage and the guarantee of the British Government must deter the Gorkhas

(Continued on page 61)

being accomplished, he wanted to reconcile this frontier state with every practicable means.

The circumstances prevailing in the other parts of India compelled the Governor General to follow his policy of moderation with a greater force of logic. Immediately after the conclusion of the Gorkha war, the British Government was involved in prolonged military campaigns in Central India against the Pindaries and the Marathas. In the north-west Ranjit Singh always threatened an opportune rupture. Nor were the relations with Burma in any way cordial. Consequently, Lord Hastings was disinclined to change his opinion about the crushed Gorkha power. The Resident constantly reported certain Gorkha intrigues and hostile preparations,¹⁵ but the Governor General considered it "improbable that any such designs should be entertained by the Gorkhas after their recent experience with much diminished resources".¹⁶ Still less was his inclination to risk a rupture with Nepal under the existing circumstances. The Resident was told that his Government "have no motives for reducing the Nepal power and resources below their present state, which many powerful considerations suggest the expediency of avoiding a war with that people, however, justly provoked. . . ."¹⁷ Indeed, the British position in Central India after the war went to a great extent to determine their policy of reconciliation and toleration towards Nepal. It would have been a singular folly on their part to fight a war in the Cen-

(Continued from page 60)

from attempting to recover the possession by force. Even if they should have the tenacity to do so, the free access which the British Government will have to those countries will enable it to repel and chastise the invaders without preparation and expense, which has been necessary for the present occasion". NWP, p. 260.

15. Boileau reported on the 24th April, 1816 that, "the counsels of the Gorkha Darbar are not even now guided by more sincerity or regard to faith than hitherto been. Recruiting of men goes on daily in and around the Valley". S.C. May 11, 1816—No. 30.

In another letter -he reported that, "the appearance of an unfavourable nature towards the continuance of amicable relations. . . . instead of diminishing had been increased and less secrecy seemed to be attached to preparations going forward'. S.C. June 15, 1816—No. 16.

16. S.C. May 11, 1816—No. 32.

17. S.C. December 19, 1816—No. 29.

tral India with an estranged martial country of the Gorkhas extending five hundred miles on the northern frontier.

Apart from these immediate pressures, the ulterior aims of the English also suggested reconciliation. Through Nepal lay the best routes and the passes to China. The British Government had been trying to open its gates for her merchants for the last fifty years. For the development of this lucrative trade cordial relations with Nepal were essential.

These were the factors that suggested to the British the expediency of reconciling Nepal. Lord Hastings now aimed at converting Nepal from a troublesome neighbour into a peaceful and friendly frontier state. For it he was ready to accommodate with the irritated mood of the Nepalese. In his own words, "it would have been singular if the events of the late war so injurious to the interests and humiliating to the pride of the Gorkhas, had not inflamed that spirit in a high degree...."¹⁸ A sudden change in the behaviour of those who had led a continuous career of war and expansion was impossible. On the contrary, temper was bound to be haughty and jealous. The Governor General expected this and other instances of irregularity and evasion in the execution of the treaty. Only in due course of time these sentiments could have abated, and only with extreme caution the Gorkhas could have been convinced of the uses of trade and unrestricted relations with the English.

Lord Hastings, therefore, wanted that all the causes of

18. Foreign Secretary wrote to the Resident that it was difficult "that the spirit of jealousy and suspicion of our designs and that aversion to our intimate intercourse with us, which has at all times marked the disposition of the Gorkhas should at once subside. It would indeed have been singular if the events of the late war so injurious to the interests and humiliating to the pride of the Gorkhas, had not inflamed that spirit in a high degree and rendered them peculiarly uneasy under the operation of circumstances to which they had been compelled to submit". Therefore Governor General was "prepared to expect frequent indications of this spirit in the early stage of our intercourse with Gorkhas as well as much irregularity and evasion in the execution of the treaty and in other transactions immediately arising out of the renewal of peace. In point of fact there has been much less of both than could reasonably have been expected adverting to the considerations already stated to the conflict of interests and authority which would appear to be inherent vice in the constitution of the Nepalese Government". S.C. May 11, 1816—No. 32.

future misunderstanding should be avoided. General instructions to Lt. Boileau were that his conduct "should be regulated on all occasions by a spirit of conciliation and prudence which may be expected finally to remove the characteristic jealousy of the Nepalese Government and introduce confidence and reciprocal goodwill into our intercourse with that state."¹⁹ Resident Gardner was also asked to adopt a conciliatory attitude and to show every practicable degree of favour. He was to avoid anything that could have been misunderstood and led to the interruption of the growth of confidence.

Such were the views and attitudes of both the sides when the relations started. The very first problem that arose was of the implementation of the treaty.²⁰ Lord Hastings insisted that the treaty must strictly be looked upon as the basis of the new relations.²¹ Bhim Sen, on the contrary, followed a policy of rendering the treaty as much nugatory as possible. He took advantage of every opportunity to evade and revise the issue, and cleverly pointed out the vague phrases of the treaty. He broke every nerve to convince the British that the subsistence of Nepal depended on the Terai, and the sacrifice of the whole of it would be a most unpopular measure. The Governor General following his policy of reconciliation, assured the Gorkhas that the British had no designs of territorial expansion, and to make the treaty as much palatable as possible he restored whole of the eastern Terai from Kosi river to the western limits of Gorakhpur district along with the old southern frontiers. In exchange the Indian Government got the pension clause of the treaty annulled. Throughout the transaction the British attitude was to admit no negotiations and give it an air of gratuiton.

Although no radical change in its behaviour could have been expected, the retrocession of Terai produced a desirable effect on the Darbar. It helped in the execution of the treaty and to some extent gave rise to much needed confidence in the minds of the Gorkhas regarding the English intentions

19. S.C. May 4, 1816—Nos. 69 and 70.

20. See Chapter II, for details.

21. P.C. August 1, 1817—No. 4.

To Bhim Sen it gave an occasion for propaganda to strengthen his position by showing this achievement to the chiefs and the general public.

Carrying on the same policy, Bhim Sen suggested that to make everything clear another treaty should be concluded in place of the Treaty of Sagauli, in which the articles providing for cession of the eastern low lands, just restored to Nepal, and relating to pension were to be altogether omitted.²² The proposal arose from a desire to obliterate the record of the peace treaty, because a feeling of humiliation was attached to it and particularly to the clause relating to pension.²³

Lord Hastings, however, considered the formal abrogation of the Treaty of Sagauli "highly inexpedient".²⁴ It would have opened the whole issue and given a chance for Bhim Sen to revise the just established relations. Nor had the British any interest in obliterating the record of this transaction, rather, they positively wanted to maintain it as a memory to the Gorkhas. The Governor General, therefore, insisted that the treaty "must" be the basis of relations. Instead of substitution, he proposed a supplementary treaty embracing the retrocession of the Terai and annulment of the pension clause. This was in turn unacceptable to the Nepalese.²⁵ The question was never raised again by the Darbar and the Indian Government also kept silent.

II

The relations between the two countries were just settling down and improving when a serious trouble arose on the northern frontier of Nepal. Due to repeated requests from the Gorkhas, the Chinese Emperor despatched a small force to enquire into the causes of the late war. It might

22. P.C. July 25, 1817—No. 26.

23. Resident reported that, "A feeling of humiliation—a natural desire to obliterate, as far as possible, the record of the transaction connected with it—constitute...the true cause of the pertinacity on this point". P.C. August 8, 1817—No. 51.

24. P.C. August 1, 1817—No. 4.

25. P.C. November 7, 1817—No. 48.

be recalled that Nepal had her political contacts with China since 1792, when the latter had intervened in the Tibeto-Nepalese war.²⁶ Accordingly, Nepal used to send a periodical mission with presents to Peking every fifth year. This relationship was of a very convenient type. The Chinese always kept aloof from the political affairs of Nepal and never directly or indirectly tried to interfere in her policies. The Gorkhas also thought it wise to have such relationship, particularly to be invoked against the British.

Since the beginning of the Indo-Nepalese war and even before that, the Nepalese were trying to invoke the Chinese Emperor against the British, and after their defeat and the loss of Kumaon and Sikkim in the summer of 1815 they repeatedly requested the Chinese Ambans at Lhasa to forward their letters to Peking.²⁷ Misrepresenting the cause of the war they wrote to the Chinese Emperor that the British were demanding tributes and passage through Nepal to attack Tibet.²⁸

China had always been a serious consideration for the British. They neither wanted to estrange her nor relished the idea of her predominance over the Himalayan States. On learning about these intrigues, the Indian Government adopted two ways to tackle the problem. Firstly, it sought to clarify to the Chinese directly about their position with

26. See pp. 8-12 for details.

27. As early as Aug. 19, 1814, Dr. B. Hamilton wrote that, "a message was sent (by the Gorkhas) for assistance to China or at least to the neighbouring viceroy (Tibetan)...". N.W.P. p. 45.

Gen. Amar Singh Thapa was one of the chief architects of intrigues with China, Sindhia and Ranjit Singh, S.C. November 2, 1816—No. 13.

Chitranjan Nepali has given a detailed account of Nepal's repeated urges to China for aid. See pp. 136-147 and letters Nos. 27, 28, 32, 33 and 34 as given in the appendix of his book. n. 17, Ch. I.

28. Governor of Arzung wrote to British political agent at Sikkim on June 17, 1816 that Gorkhas had written them a letter complaining "that the English had demanded from the Raja of Gorkhas... a free passage to this quarter declaring that they had no intention of attacking those chiefs and they only wished to be allowed a free passage to Lhasa. It was stated also that the English proposed that the above mentioned chiefs should pay to them the tribute which they now pay to China...."

S.C. July 13, 1816—No. 17.

regard to the Indo-Nepalese war through the agency of the Magistrate of Rangpur,²⁹ the Raja of Sikkim and the British Select Committee at Canton.³⁰ It assured that the British struggle against Nepal was in no way adverse to the Chinese interests, nor the English had any ambition beyond the Himalayas.³¹ Secondly, the British Resident was directed to tell the Nepalese Government plainly about its conduct in misrepresenting the facts of the late war to the Chinese Emperor.³² The Governor General hoped that as the war had ended the Gorkhas would hold no further communications with that quarter.

This double move had the intended effect to some extent. Prompt reply was forthcoming from the Chinese Amban at Lhasa, who declared himself satisfied with the British explanation, and, expressing his indifference, he wrote that "the truth is that the Gorkhas Raja and the English inhabit far distant countries and the sovereign authority of the Emperor of China does not extend over you".³³

Persistent efforts of the Nepalese eventually induced the Ambans at Lhasa to despatch a long report to Peking. Considering Nepal his tributary, the Chinese Emperor ordered a small force of five thousand to proceed southwards with an avowed object "to investigate the cause of the war and to ascertain who were in fault".³⁴ It is difficult to state with what object the force was despatched. May be it was due to the Nepalese allegation that the British had demanded a passage through Nepal to attack Tibet, or that the Chinese were jealous of the recently concluded Anglo-Nepalese relations. It is also possible that the force was despatched because Nepal had not sent the usual periodical mission on the last occasion. But it is clear that the Chinese could not have intervened effectively in the Anglo-Gorkha War on the basis of their own strength. The Chinese Ambans of Lhasa had plainly accepted that the Nepalese and the British inhabit

29. HRRK, pp. 26-27.

30. S.C. June 15, 1816—No. 17.

31. S.C. August 3, 1816—No. 19.

32. S.C. August 3, 1816—No. 21.

33. S.C. June 22, 1816—No. 31.

34. S.C. August 10, 1816—Nos. 15 and 16.

far distant lands to interest the Emperor. More plausibly, it was a warning to both the parties against any interference in the Chinese interests.

The arrival of the Chinese force had put Bhim Sen in an awkward position. It had no practical value since the war had already ended and the treaty had been signed. Nor was the concentration of the imperial army in any way helpful for the future independence of the Nepalese. They had fought the war without Emperor's permission, the periodical mission could not be sent and they had misrepresented the real facts of the war. So naturally they dreaded the Chinese wrath and the consequent increase of their political influence. Yet, Bhim Sen wanted to make maximum capital so long as the force was there. His underhand policy was to bring about a clash between the British and the Chinese. For it he tried by various means to win over the British support against the Chinese. It was from every point of view in his interest to involve the British with China, whether in avoiding Chinese wrath or to recover Nepal's old provinces from the British and get rid of the British Resident. Furthermore, it was a part of his policy to instil the fear of the Chinese in the British and thus indirectly induce the British to give greater concessions in the Terai adjustment.³⁵

The moment the Chinese force arrived on the Nepalese frontier, the Gorkhas started giving exaggerated accounts of its intentions. The Resident was told that the discontinuation of the periodical mission and the arrival of the Resident in Nepal were responsible for the Chinese action. The British were given to understand that the Chinese wanted to further strengthen the political ties with Nepal and that only the British interference could avoid this catastrophe.³⁶ On August 30, 1816 Gardner was even told that being situated between the two powerful states they could only be saved by throwing their lot with the British.³⁷ They, in fact, so

35. The Resident held the view that exaggerated reports about Chinese were "rather intended to create alarm in my mind and so lead me to suppose that the Chinese were seriously preparing to afford some military aid" and thus "induce, as great latitude as possible in the concessions about to be made....."

S.C. August 10, 1816—No. 18.

36. S.C. September 14, 1816—Nos. 39 and 41. Also see S.C. September 7, 1816—No. 18.

37. S.C. August 14, 1816—No. 42.

seriously solicited the British support that Gardner was induced to report the gravity of the situation. It was remarkable that the Gorkhas had most frequently alleged that the recently concluded relations with the British had given rise to the Chinese action. Yet, direct aid was never solicited. It appears that they probably wanted to know the British attitude before taking any definite step.

In the beginning the Indian Government did not take the Chinese affair at all seriously and hoped that on hearing of the conclusion of peace, they would retire. But upon Resident's taking a serious view of the situation and Gorkhas' wish to know the British attitude, the Governor General had to make a detailed policy statement.

Lord Hastings faced a similar dilemma as Lord Cornwallis had to face twentyfour years back. He did not like any permanent establishment of the Chinese influence in Nepal, which would have given occasions for disputes with that Empire.³⁸ At the same time he could not afford to estrange the Chinese Emperor, because the commercial interests of the British in China were of such great consequence, that the small advantages arising out of the Nepalese Treaty stood nowhere in comparison. On September 14, 1816, he observed that: "The maintenance of peace and amity with the Emperor of China, is an object of such vast consequences to the commercial interests of the Company and indeed of the United Kingdom that no efforts ought to be spared on the part of this Government to prevent the present state of things from taking a turn which might occasion even any suspension of those relations. Therefore, exclusive of all considerations of more direct expediency and convenience for this Government, the avoidance of any engagement with the Nepalese which may embroil us with or even give umbrage to the Chinese must be regarded as the basis of our whole proceedings".³⁹

38. In his policy statement Lord Hastings observed: "The subjection of Nepal by Chinese in the sense of establishment of the Chinese power in that country would indeed be a circumstance greatly to be deprecated by us, as bringing us more directly in contact with that Government and multiplying the chances of dispute and dissensions".

S.C. September 14, 1816—No. 43.

39. S.C. September 14, 1816—No. 43.

Therefore, every effort was made to keep aloof from the Sino-Nepalese tangle, and utmost Lord Hastings was ready to accord was British mediation "if applied for and urged by both parties". Even this he considered was "desirable to avoid". Nepal was advised to "renew her old relations with China and then to submit to further concessions rather than expose itself to the hazard of a rupture".

As regards the Chinese jealousy towards the Indo-Nepalese relations and the establishment of the Residency, the Governor General was prepared to surrender its advantage, and, if the Chinese insisted, the Resident was instructed to withdraw soon after the border settlement. But, as far as the territories annexed and brought under protection were concerned, the Indian Government was determined to maintain its hold. This was because of the great advantage that they had secured in and through those territories and the confidence that for such far distant lands China would not hazard a rupture.

The Nepalese waited for sometime for a positive move on the part of the Company. Eventually, having failed in his efforts to secure British intervention, Bhim Sen despatched a mission on September 10, 1816 to attend on the Chinese Officer.⁴⁰ It was now hoped that matter would be "amicably adjusted" and the Chinese would "be induced to retire". This sudden move on the part of the Nepalese is only indicative of the fact that for long they tried to bring about a clash between the two great powers, and it was mainly with this aim that the exaggerated accounts of the Chinese intentions were given. When Gardner made the policy statement a marked indifference was observed by him in the Darbar's attitude.⁴¹ It was again remarkable and indicative of the double-dealing of the Gorkha Government that the Maharaja again complained to the Chinese about the lost territories and the British Residency, which he urged should be withdrawn.⁴²

Fortunately for all the parties the whole affair terminated happily. The Nepalese Officers were at first accused

40. S.C. October 12, 1816—No. 23.

41. S.C. November 2, 1816—No. 12.

42. S.C. October 12, 1816—No. 25.

of aggression and then rebuked for having asked for aid after signing the treaty. In the end, however, the Chinese Officer expressed satisfaction at the peace concluded with the British. The arrangements were made for the renewal of the old relations between Nepal and China "without involving the necessity of any further concessions", and the Chinese on their part agreed to break up their force early.⁴³

The Chinese authorities wrote to the Indian Government expressing their satisfaction at the explanation of the late war and the treaty,⁴⁴ but, yielding to the Gorkha entreaties, they urged the British to withdraw their Resident from Nepal.⁴⁵ To this request Lord Hastings replied that the object of accredited minister to Nepal was solely to prevent the reoccurrence of disputes and not to interfere in the external and internal affairs of that country.⁴⁶ The Governor General expostulated that, "... at least one civilized nation ought to be represented" at the capital of other.⁴⁷ This had the intended effect and the Chinese declared themselves finally satisfied.⁴⁸ Thus the Chinese intervention ended to the satisfaction of all concerned. There was hardly a chance of its taking a serious turn. The British, Nepalese and the Chinese realised the limitations of their respective positions and did not like to go beyond that.

III

The Chinese intervention being over, the Indo-Nepalese relations further improved and both the sides tried to reconcile with each other. Even the Chinese episode in no way adversely affected their relations. It is, however, the opi-

43. S.C. October 9, 1816—No. 17.

44. S.C. November 9, 1816—No. 19.

45. A Chinese Officer wrote to Lord Hastings: "This is a matter of no consequence; (but) if you would out of kindness towards us and in consideration of his friendship, withdraw your Vakeel from there, it would be better, and we would be expressly grateful." S.C. January 11, 1817—No. 6.

46. S.C. January 11, 1817—No. 7.

47. Ross-of-Blandenburg. n. 47, Ch. I, p. 83.

48. S.C. May 15, 1818—No. 69.

nion of some writers that till 1818 Bhim Sen was trying by conspiracies and intrigues with the Chinese Emperor and the Indian States to recover his lost provinces.⁴⁹ They contend that even after defeat he took some time to realise the English power and his policy was only a prudent waiting for a favourable opportunity to try another contest with the Company.⁵⁰ It cannot be denied that constant military activity and recruitment went on increasing in Nepal after the termination of the war. Nor can it be challenged that the Gorkha emissaries were secretly involved in intrigues with the Indian States against the British Government. But mere existence of the military activity and intrigues is not sufficient to prove the hostile intentions if we overlook the more fundamental facts. Nor were the intrigues so inimical as were generally depicted by the Resident.

A close examination of the nature and the extent of intrigues reveals, that just as with the Chinese Emperor, the Nepalese were also trying to arouse the disaffected Indian States against the British since the very beginning of the war.⁵¹ Even after the war had ended, the already sent emissaries were at work, and the military preparations inside Nepal were carried on with the same vigour. But this was not with an intention to break the treaty. Nor was there any doubt in the mind of Bhim Sen about the policy of keeping peace. He was convinced that peace was the best guarantee for the Nepalese independence. More than anything else the motive behind military preparations and foreign intrigues was to keep the army busy and maintain an ap-

49. F. Toker has noted: "...the matters were to continue so long as British resources were stretched by the exigencies of the Maratha campaign, the Pindari War and the expedition to Burma.... Bhim Sen was yet, in his balancing act to make up his mind on which side the scales were to be weighed, on the Company's side or on the side of its formidable enemies". n. 19, Ch. I, p. 97.

50. P. Landon contends. "...Bhim Sen took some time to learn of confidence in the British....the heavy demand made upon the military strength of the Company by the Maratha war assisted Bhim Sen in his policy of pinpricks which he now adopted". n. 9, Ch. I, p. 84.

51. Gen. Amar Singh's intercepted letter dated April 12, 1815, shows an attempt to array Ranjit Singh, Nawab of Lucknow, Sindhia, and other Indian States, against the British. Prinsep. n. 41, Ch. I, pp. 462-72.

pearance of independence. On August 19, 1816 the Resident observed that "best disposition" was felt by the existing Nepalese administration.⁵² After the Chinese intervention and restoration of the Terai, the relations further improved. An offer of complimentary mission was made by the Darbar in May 1817 and was repeated on July 1, 1817.⁵³ On June 4, 1817 the Resident noted that his relations with the Darbar were markedly improving.⁵⁴ Therefore, in the first year and a half after the treaty there is enough evidence to prove that Bhim Sen had no ulterior motive behind his activities.

With the end of 1817, however, the occurrences in Central India gave a fillip to Gorkha activities and consequently a reason for the British to be suspicious. The trouble in Central India with the Pindaries and Marathas was brewing since long. The Pindaries were freebooters formed out of the disbanded soldiery of the Maratha chiefs. Every year they made devastations in the British provinces and were getting stronger and stronger due to the pacific British policy and the encouragement from the Maratha chiefs. Sindhia and Holkar invaded the Rajput States, exacted the Chauth and always challenged the British supremacy. The Peshwa was most restive under the subsidiary alliance and only awaited an opportunity to break the shackles of that ignominious treaty. The volcano exploded in 1817-18 as the British Government decided to extirpate the Pindaries and force the treaties of subordinate alliances on the Maratha chiefs.

The British troubles naturally presented before the Gorkha chiefs and the soldiery an opportunity to recover their lost territory. For a Prime Minister, whose tenure of office so entirely depended on the support of the soldiers and

52. S.C. September 14, 1816—No. 38.

53. P.C. June 21, 1817—No. 18. Also see P.C. July 18, 1817—No. 12.

53. P.C. June 21, 1817—No. 18. P.C. July 18, 1817—No. 12.
P.C. July 18, 1817—No. 12.

54. Gardner reported on June 4, 1817 that, "...it is worthy of remark that the nature of my official intercourse with the Government has of late undergone an evident improvement. They are perceptibly becoming by degree less jealous and apprehensive of us and more reconcile to our connection....".

S.C. June 21, 1817—No. 1.

chiefs, it would have been suicidal to neglect the popular desire. And, Bhim Sen did exploit the chance by sending emissaries to China, Lahore and Gwalior. One of the emissaries, Padm Pani, who had been sent to Gwalior, had been caught by the British with his papers. Certainly it created such an atmosphere that even the Resident was led to believe that the intrigues had an inimical character. He sent many reports of intelligence about them.⁵⁵ But if we examine the circumstances and his reports closely, the conclusion would be inevitable that the Resident took rather an alarming attitude and only fulfilled his official duty in conveying the various broken and sometimes unconfirmed pieces of informations. Gardner was in fact lost in the details of Bhim Sen's policy. He was at times confused by the sincere assurances of Bhim Sen at the very face of military activities.⁵⁶

The Indian Government, though realised the danger arising out of Nepalese intrigues, was not in a position to take any strict step. The wars at hand, the general discontent among other Indian States, and all other considerations with regard to Nepal, suggested a pacific policy towards her. Lord Hastings, therefore, considered it expedient to avoid "a war with that people, however justly provoked, if peace can be maintained without the loss of honour", and asked Gardner to keep Nepal quiet.⁵⁷ At the same time, the Governor General hoped that the quick British victories would induce Nepal to abandon her activities. Fortunately,

55. Following are the dispatches sent by the Resident regarding the intelligence of Gorkha hostile activities:—

- (i) S.C. November 21, 1817—No. 44.
- (ii) S.C. December 5, 1817—No. 53.
- (iii) S.C. December 19, 1817—No. 148.
- (iv) S.C. January 9, 1818—Nos. 64, 66, 68.
- (v) S.C. January 16, 1818—Nos. 80, 83, 85.

56. On August 3, 1817—Gardner wrote: "A correspondence of this nature has been mentioned since" a long time "throug the agent of this state at Gwaliar. . . . It is certainly far from being of a friendly character". But he believed that Nepal had no desire "of undermining the existing relations with our Government by seriously connecting themselves with Sindhia for the purpose hostile to our interest. Every opportunity is taken by the administration of renewing the assurances" of friendship with the British. S.C. August 22, 1817—No. 36.

57. S.C. December 19, 1817—No. 29.

as the campaign against the Pindaries was to start, the British Government succeeded on November 5, 1817 in concluding a treaty with Daulat Rao Sindhia. According to it the Sindhia had engaged to co-operate with the English in liquidating the Pindaries. This was an important diplomatic victory for the British, which knocked the bottom out of the developing coalition between Nepal and Gwalior. Incidentally Nepal's emissary Padm Pani was also apprehended in the British provinces with his hostile papers. Both these developments put the British in a position of strength. The Resident was asked to communicate to the Darbar the settlement with Sindhia and the progress of negotiations "with all the remaining states of Hindustan for ranging them under its protection." He was further instructed to put in the hands of the Prime Minister the intercepted letters of Padm Pani.

The news of the treaty with Sindhia had the expected effect of cooling down the temper of the Nepalese Darbar.⁵⁸ The handing over of the intercepted letters also brought about an immediate explanation and friendly assurance that Padm Pani had exceeded his powers and he would be dismissed.⁵⁹ On December 24, 1817 Kajee Chunni Lal assured, with a view to remove any impression of the Gorkha hostility from the Resident's mind, that the Nepalese missions to Poona and China had no inimical purpose. He further clarified that, "Reviews of the troops and manufactures of cannons....the other amusement of that kind were....the common occupation of princes and should not occasion any distrust".⁶⁰ Bhim Sen himself came to express his wish to maintain friendly relations.⁶¹ The Indian Gov-

58. S.C. December 19, 1817—No. 144.

59. S.C. December 26, 1817—No. 90.

60. S.C. January 16, 1818—No. 78.

61. Resident remarked about the assurance of Bhim Sen that he had not received such type of sentiments some time past and was induced to look upon it as intended to demonstrate the feeling of Darbar. S.C. January 30, 1818—No. 49.

On January 3, 1818 again Gardner noted that, "I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that notwithstanding very suspicious appearance matters as yet continue tranquil and quiet at court, though military preparations....are still at foot....". S.C. January 23, 1818—No. 53.

ernment also considered it sufficient to have procured a formal disavowal of the intrigues from the Nepalese Darbar.

The remaining activities and suspicions were brought to an end with the defeat of Holkar. There was no longer any serious trouble for the British India on the basis of which the Nepalese government could have hoped an alliance with the Indian States. The news of Holkar's defeat was well received by the Gorkhas and Indian Government was congratulated.⁶²

The crisis in central India had passed away but the Nepalese now became apprehensive of the British retort. The belief of the Darbar that the Governor General had the full knowledge of their intrigues and military movements made them quite fearful.⁶³ Bhim Sen came on March 13, 1818 to assure "Cordial and sincere friendship" and surprisingly offered the services of the Gorkha troops.⁶⁴ The offer was politely refused, but the Resident believed that it originated in a "serious determination to maintain and improve the existing ties of amity between the two governments". The Indian Government also rose to the occasion and the Resident was instructed to remove fears from the Prime Minister's mind regarding the British intention by assuring him that the Governor General was ready to forget the past which was only "an indiscretion".⁶⁵

Despite the repeated assurances of the Resident the Nepalese remained fearful of the British power.⁶⁶ The mere fact that the Governor General was to take a tour of the Upper Provinces made them highly suspicious, which they considered an attempt to bring the relations closer.⁶⁷ Similarly, the departure of Resident Gardner for a brief period made them disquiet.⁶⁸ All these instances make it sufficiently

62. S.C. January 30, 1818—Nos. 51 and 52.

63. S.C. March 6, 1818—No. 22.

64. P.C. March 27, 1818—No. 31.

65. S.C. March 6, 1818—No. 22.

66. Resident reported that "I am afraid, that even the public assurances that have been given to this court...have failed in removing altogether the suspicion and distrust with which the counsel of this state have long been agitated". P.C. June 19, 1818—No. 37.

67. P.C. April 17, 1818—No. 74.

68. S.C. May 29, 1819—No. 15.

clear that the dread of the British power was a real one. The military parades still remained a usual feature of their system and the enquiries were frequently made about the various Indian States, yet, there was no intrinsic hostility in all that. The Resident always reported the prevailing tranquillity and a wish on the part of the Darbar to maintain friendly relations. The routine business was attended to regularly and gradually every indication of hostility passed away.⁶⁹ The Indian Government also thought it wise to let these apprehensions be refuted by the events.⁷⁰

The Resident Gardner held the opinion that the late intrigues were positively hostile and were intended to break the treaty at the first favourable opportunity.⁷¹ His opinion was based on the hostile contents of the intercepted letters and the unusual degree of military activity in Nepal. This observation overlooked many important factors that determined the policy of Bhim Sen. The reviews of parades, battle practices and manufacture of guns were the common amusements of that warlike race and the princes. Bhim Sen, being the Prime Minister of a defeated martial nation, had always to keep the soldiery in good humour by maintaining a war atmosphere so as to secure his own position. It must not be forgotten that there always existed a permanent war party in the Darbar. Bhim Sen himself observed that "all persons were not unanimous of the same way of thinking and that different times induce different conduct and ideas", and that, "the procedure of this Government had been in a great measure swayed by the violence of party

69. Resident had written on August 12, 1820 that, "the feeling of distrust and suspicion, which was so long and generally indulged appear to have been dismissed from the mind of the administration. Government is daily reconciling itself more and more to actual circumstances and has become sensible from the conviction of the impolicy of attempting to alter them....".

P.C. September 2, 1820—No. 11.

70. P.C. June 19, 1818—No. 37.

71. Gardner had remarked on December 8, 1817 that, "...the intrigues this Government has been engaged in, were of nature decidedly inimical to our interests and it seems pretty certain that it had been resolved to commence hostilities against the British Government in this quarter as soon as it was ascertained that war had actually occurred with Sindhia". S.C. December 16, 1817—No. 87. Also see S.C. December 5, 1817—No. 53.

spirit here".⁷² It is, in fact, hard to believe that a wise statesman like him would have plunged Nepal in a war after his recent experience. The present need for him was not a war, but consolidation of the Nepalese resources. Finally, the very anxiety of the Gorkhas after the defeat of Holkar, that the British might retort, shows that they themselves genuinely dreaded the British power.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that Bhim Sen made some capital out of the British troubles. The British position in Central India gave rise to his pinprick policy in the frontier settlement. The Nepalese deliberately made delays in appointing the boundary commissioners on one pretext or the other. In October 1817 they even officially declined to depute their representative, which was actually the time the British were taking field against the Pindaries.⁷³

72. P.C. March 27, 1818—No. 31.

73. P.C. November 21, 1817—No. 17. Also see P.C. November 7, 1817—No. 50.

CHAPTER IV

PEACE WITHOUT CORDIALITY (1818 to 1832)

I

No period in history is without significance; still there are periods full of turmoil and revolution and others without any apparent interesting episode. In the annals of Indo-Nepalese relations there was hardly any interesting event during the period from 1818 to 1832. By the middle of 1818 the relations had stabilised and they continued to be smooth till the death of the Regent Maharani Tripura Sundari Devi in 1832. The concentration of authority in the single hands of the all powerful Bhim Sen and equally undisputed authority of the British in India had contributed to this effect. The Maharaja being a minor, Bhim Sen with the support of the Queen Regent continued to wield absolute power. Incidentally, except the first Burmese war (1824-1826), the period from 1818 onwards till the first Afghan war was also quite peaceful for the British. And, yet, to say this period had no importance of its own is wrong. It was during this period that the Gorkha policy of seclusion was nourished. The British on their part followed the policy of non-interference in the hope of reconciling the Gorkhas. In fact, the foundations of the whole mode and style of conducting mutual relations between the two governments were established during this period.

Prime Minister Bhim Sen realised the overall situation. Any attempt either for the recovery of the lost territory or for the expulsion of the Resident would have been fatal. Therefore, all his energies were concentrated towards consolidating his own power and that of his country. And in spite of the serious damages done by the last war, his efforts towards the reorganisation of the economy and the revenue

system succeeded and the country progressed.¹

An outstanding feature of this period had been the intense jealousy and mistrust of the Gorkhas towards the Europeans. This characteristic attitude was displayed towards the British in particular, because they were the only imperialistic power with which they had to deal regularly. Anxious to maintain their independence and fearful of the British intentions, the Nepalese thought it best to exclude all the foreigners from their country as far as possible. Even in China "the doors" had been successfully opened by the imperialists and the impact of western trade and technology had been tremendous throughout the Oriental World, but Nepal had so jealously guarded herself against the aliens that throughout the British regime in India this barrier could never be broken.

The first and the foremost target of their exclusion was the permanent British Resident. The general feeling against the Europeans coupled with the circumstances in which the Residency was established, made him particularly an object of their jealousy. While negotiating the peace in 1816, General Ochterlony, literally following the instructions, told the Gorkha negotiators that "they must take the Resident or war".² This dictated clause had ever since been resented by the Nepalese. But they were helpless, since their refusal would only have been followed by the occupation of the whole Terai or even the Valley. The Resident had to be accepted, but it led the Prime Minister and the Queen Regent to follow only the terms of the treaty most literally. The Resident was almost reduced to the status of a dignified prisoner, and there always existed a desire among the ministers and the public to somehow get rid of him.³ The intrigues with China in 1816 had precisely this object in view.

Right from the very beginning the Resident was socially

1. Chitranjan Nepali has devoted a full chapter for Bhim Sen's internal organisation. n. 17, Ch. I, pp. 184-244.

2. PT-Para 52.

3. Gardner wrote on November 20, 1824: "Considering their nature military attitude and the position in which they were forced, they have always secretly wished to be free from foreign control". S.C. December 17, 1824. No. 8.

boycotted and treated with reserve. As noted earlier, a company of soldiers was posted around the Residency during the incumbency of Lt. Boileau to check any one from attempting to contact the Resident.⁴ Even when the amicable relations had been established after the defeat of Holkar, Gardner reported in June 1818 that "my intercourse with the court is confined to the mere courtesies and attentions incidental to my public situation here".⁵ His successor Sir H. Maddock took the matter more seriously. He remarked that the intercourse between the Nepalese Darbar and the Residency had been confined to two public visits paid annually by the Resident to the Maharaja, one at Holi and the other at Dashehra festival, and the two public visits of the Prime Minister to the Resident.⁶ The remaining communications with the Darbar were carried on through the court Munshee. He added, "while the jealousy of the Nepal Government and its original aversion to the establishment of our mission here are still undiminished, the narrow bounds within which it studies to limit its intercourse with the Resident and the strict interdict placed upon its subjects who might otherwise seek our society, have conduced to render our situation more isolated, with reference both to the court and to the people of the country, than is the case anywhere else".

So great was the Nepalese distrust of the foreigners that the movements of the Resident were rather rigidly restricted. While the Nepalese chiefs travelling in India with their armed escorts were given all the normal immunities, the Resident was not even allowed to traverse in whole of the Valley.⁷

4. See p. 59.

5. P.C. July 10, 1818—No. 87.

6. P.C. August 27, 1832—No. 18.

7. In a subsequent letter to Government dated December 2, 1832, Maddock stated that the Resident must be satisfied if he can avoid experiencing incivility or insults. Having visited during the rains a cottage built on one of the hills surrounding the Valley, and having heard that guards had been posted at the various outlets of the valley to prevent the Residency Officers from rambling beyond its limits, he remonstrated with the court Munshi and was assured that he might move about wherever he pleased. When, however, he proposed to make a short excursion of three or four marches towards snowy range, a council was held, a resolution to oppose the plan was

The customary diplomatic privileges were denied to him and even the supplies for his table and his personal baggage were regularly searched and examined on entering the Nepalese territory.⁸

The rules regarding the foreign visitors were equally rigid. No European visitor was allowed to enter Nepal unless he had both the invitation of Darbar and the guarantee of the Indian Government.⁹ Nor were they permitted to see any part of Nepal except few parts of the Valley of Kathmandu. Entry of white women was strictly prohibited.¹⁰ It is really surprising that in fortyfour years only one hundred and fiftythree Europeans, excluding the residents, envoy officials and surgeons had the opportunity of visiting Nepal. And even among them fiftyfive were the guests of His Highness.¹¹

The Gorkhas were also very apprehensive of the Indian traders coming from the British India. They dreaded the introduction of British trade in any form. There was an oft-quoted saying in Nepal that, "The tradesman brings the Bible, the Bible brings the bayonet". They had seen that the British came to India as traders and became its master. The Gorkhas understood that the first British step for annexing any state had been to procure trade concessions. A strong nation with large-scale production would naturally desire maximum freedom in international trade. And, this was precisely what the Nepalese did not permit. It was, however, not on account of the fear of adverse trade balance that the Darbar did not give usual privileges to the Indian traders, but because it apprehended political motives behind

(Contd. from page 80)

taken and Maddock was exhorted not to think of marching towards the snows. The Darbar gave the explanation, in the words of Maddock, that "although this government entertained no jealousy or apprehension from my visiting any part of the Nepal territories, the suspicious chinese authorities would be excited by our nearer approach to their frontier, and they would not fail to express their displeasure on the occasion." P.C. February 12, 1833. No. 60.

8. P.C. May 28, 1830—No. 33.

9. P. Landon, n. 9, Ch. I, Vol. II, p. 62.

10. Mrs. Hanoria Lawrence, the wife of Sir Henry Lawrence, was the first woman to cross the border in 1844.

11. P. Landon, n. 9, Ch. I, Vol. II, p. 298.

it. Naturally, the Darbar adopted every means to put obstacles in the way of free commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of both the countries, so much so that even the security of traders was not guaranteed. The direct access of the traders to the Resident was debarred, and they had practically no legal status or the means of redress.¹² It is, of course, not to be denied that the trade in both the countries increased in this period, which was natural and could not be checked. But the point to be emphasised is the deliberate aversion of the Nepalese Government against the British traders.

Various factors were responsible for this attitude of the Nepalese and for the British acquiescence therein. Religion itself contributed a lot towards it. Nepal was a country where the untouchability of Hinduism in spite of the impact of Buddhism had been retained and the very sight of a Christian was regarded inauspicious.¹³ It had been a matter of faith with them that if the Firangees got a foothold in the country their religion would be lost. For a Prime Minister situated in Bhim Sen's position it must have been a very important factor in the beginning of the relations. Any step in the direction of unrestricted influx of the Europeans into the country would have been most unpopular.

Besides religion, there was another important political consideration. One regular phenomenon the Gorkhas had witnessed in India, since their own rise, was the gradual expansion of the British Empire. They were not blind to developments that led to the establishment of the English as the strongest power in the sub-continent. Within a span of seven decades since Plassy every powerful Indian State, Mysore, Marathas, Oudh, Nizam etc., had succumbed before the British might. Naturally they looked at the British Government as a dangerous and encroaching neighbour fully convinced that "Once British gain a foothold in the Valley

12. PT—Para 59.

13. Landon attests this view: "probably at the root of it is a religious jealousy that is found in a greater or less measure in all creeds. Certainly the tradition that seals Nepal against visitors has its origin in a natural intolerance of the presence of infidel European at or near her holiest shrines—and all Nepal is holy in the eyes of Nepalese"—n. 9, Ch. I, Vol. II, p. 61.

(even though of friendly character) that would mark the knell of their independence". They distrusted every friendly overture made to them.¹⁴ The past experience with the British was also in no way encouraging. In 1767 the English Government intervened on behalf of their enemies and in 1801 it had tried to make capital out of their internal dissensions. Extensive losses in the late war confirmed their apprehension of the English motives. They were now convinced that isolation was the best guarantee of their independence.

The British on their part did not tolerate such condition of affairs without sufficient reasons. To understand the reasons of this attitude it must first be understood that the Indian Government had no grounds to meddle in the domestic affairs of Nepal, as it generally had with the other Indian States. The Nepalese armies were not subsidised by the British, nor the British had borrowed their money or had counter claims on Nepal. There was no pledge of aid in case of attack by a third party. Neither had the Indian Government guaranteed the throne to a certain prince, nor were the Nepalese chiefs in any way dependent on its support. Finally, the Nepalese Government was not even bound to ask the advice of the British on any foreign or internal matter. In short, Nepal was an independent state and the British could not have legally interfered in her affairs.

The past experience also pointed out that with a patriotic people like the Gorkhas it was not discreet to interfere in their internal affairs. In 1802 the Indian Government tried to gain influence in the actual administration by promising to grant pension to the pro-British chiefs. This closer connection with the ruling faction resulted in fatal consequences. The faction lost its power and the British Resident Capt. Knox was forced to retire. In 1816 again

14. Governor General had a plan in the summer of 1818 to visit Northern province. Its rumour disturbed the Gorkhas greatly. They feared "...some closer connection or more binding relations will be attempted in the shape of a new supplemental treaty...."

P.C. April 17, 1818—No. 74.

In another letter Resident reported that, "...even the public assurances that have been given.....have failed in removing altogether the suspicion and distrust...." P.C. June 19, 1819—No. 37

Indian Government had such plans, and a clause of this nature had been included in the Treaty of Sagauli, but subsequently it was deleted due to similar apprehensions. The circumstances under which the Residency was established also led to this attitude.¹⁵ The British preoccupation in Central India, Lord Hasting's realisation that time alone could overcome the jealousy of the Gorkhas and his sincere desire to befriend Nepal, all these factors suggested the expediency of toleration and non-interference.¹⁶

After the Residency had been established Gardner made it a point to refrain from every internal involvement.¹⁷ His every act was directed to produce confidence in the Gorkhas about the British intentions. Only a few months after his arrival he got a ready opportunity. Bhim Sen at that time was in the absolute control of affairs. The ruling Prince was inexperienced and young and the other rival factions too weak to challenge his authority. The Prime Minister's conduct was over-bearing towards these high families. At the same time, he treated the Resident with reserve and distrust, while his rivals promised a better treatment. But Gardner, fearing the consequences, did not try to cultivate any intimacy or gain their goodwill. After a few months in November 1816 Maharaja Girwan Judh Vikram Sah passed away and intense tussel developed among the various groups on account of a minor ascending the throne.¹⁸ The Resident deliberately kept away and avoided any move that might weaken the ruling faction.¹⁹

15. See pp. 57-58.

16. Resident wrote to Foreign Secretary on August 4, 1818 that "their ancient policy of excluding strangers as much as possible, through the national jealousy and distrust of their neighbours, is an obstacle not easily overcome even by themselves. Time alone, which will prove its expediency, can remove it and though slow in its operation effect will be surer by it than by any attempt for the interference by foreigners. I have, therefore, never pressed this point rather abstained from it". P.C. September 5, 1818—No. 51.

17. "I have on no occasion interfered in the slightest degree in any public or domestic matter of this Darbar in which we are not immediately concerned....I shall pursue the same policy of non-interference in internal affairs". Gardner to Secretary Foreign Deptt, dated November 20, 1824—S.C. December 17, 1824—No. 8.

18. S.C. December 28, 1816—No. 27. Also see Principal Transaction—para 56.

19. S.C. December 28, 1816—Nos. 27 and 28.

Finally, a more important cause for the continued non-interference was the British faith in the friendship of Bhim Sen. As early as the 19th August, 1816 Gardner reported that, "the best disposition towards British Government... is at present felt by the existing administration...the policy of maintaining the relations is understood and acknowledged".²⁰ During the next months every opportunity was utilised by Bhim Sen to renew the assurance of friendship, and after the defeat of Holkar in 1818 every disposition was shown to adhere to the existing relationship. In April 1824 Bhim Sen went to the extent of tendering an offer of military aid during the first Burmese war.²¹ In this way Bhim Sen came to be regarded as a preserver of peace, a cordial ally, a really powerful man who had been controlling the ever increasing Gorkha army, and a person who realized the British power.²² So all that the British did was to stand aside and strengthen the hands of the Prime Minister, who, they thought, would gradually be won over to allow unrestricted trade relations.

This policy brought mixed results for the Indian Government. It provided both the countries with sixteen years—1816 to 1832—of peace and tranquillity.²³ It was largely

20. S.C. September 14, 1816—No. 38.

21. S.C. April 30, 1824—No. 25.

22. Hodgson reported on September 24, 1829: "Since peace he (Bhim Sen) has been our cordial ally and his energies and sagacity are the qualities indebted for the duration of the peace concluded under unpromising circumstances.... Though I do not imagine that this Government is at all likely to break with us.... So long as it has the liberty of deliberate choice I cannot but apprehend its liability to see that choice wrested out of its hands by the national current of warlike enthusiasm or by unmanageable soldiery tired of peace.... It is in this view that the permanence of Bhim Sen's power, seems to me to be of great importance. His attachment to our alliance is steady because it is founded on an adequate conception of our power (which no other Nepalese is capable of forming)... and in him soldiery are accustomed to acknowledge the hands of a master. Therefore, as long as he is there all is safe". S.C. October 14, 1829—No. 23.

23. Acting Resident B.H. Hodgson remarked on September 24, 1829: "That Mr. Gardner in his negative and invisible manner gave real support to the Minister is unquestionable and that he was enabled to do so and thus most effectively to promote their views of lasting peace with which he was accredited...." P.C. October 14, 1829—No. 23.

because of this liberal attitude that Nepal could reconcile itself with the Treaty of Sagauli and particularly with the presence of the Resident. These sixteen years produced such a good effect on the relations between the two countries that Hodgson was led to believe that "fifteen years more of such tranquillity... would suffice to render our commerce with these countries of high value to all the parties concerned".²⁴

An unfortunate consequence of the British non-interference was the establishment of a curious mode of intercourse between the Residency and the Darbar. Usually members of the Residency carried on their business only through the Prime Minister and his official agents. The other factions were debarred from contacting the Resident. Bhim Sen created a belief among the Nepalese chiefs that the treaty expressly forbade all contacts with the Residency except officially and that he alone was fit to cope with the English in politics. The British were also led to believe that their connections with other parties would lead to the formation of a discontented faction and through Bhim Sen alone they could deal in peace and amity.²⁵ With such a system of communication it was quite easy to follow a double edged policy. On the one hand, the Prime Minister could strengthen his position, because the style of intercourse gave an impression of support of the British Government to him, and on the other hand, the Resident and his staff could also be restricted to a limited circle. Thus both the Resident and various other great families of Nepal were deprived of their legitimate right.

Finally, British attitude of non-interference proved harmful to some of their basic interests. While Nepal en-

24. P.C. March 26, 1830—No. 24.

25. "He (Bhim Sen) insinuated to the Nepalese chiefs that the intercourse with the Resident must inevitably lead to the formation of a discontented faction in the state, and that treaties expressly forbade such intercourse. Whilst under these pretexts he debarred one and all of the privileges of personal intercourse with us, he had little difficulty in persuading Nepalese vulgar, great or small, that he alone was fit to cope with us in politics and I fear that he has found it too easy to persuade us too, that through him and him only, could we manage to deal in peace and amity, with the alleged hostile disposition of Nepalese chiefs to the British Government". FT—Para 58.

joyed all the advantages of British relations, she obstinately refused any reciprocal benefits. The Nepalese made every use of the commercial treaty of 1792 and paid only the two and a half per cent of the stipulated duty for their goods. The Indian goods, on the contrary, were charged at many places and much more than two and a half per cent." Nor were the British traders in any way safe as regards their claims in Nepal. So averse was the Gorkha policy towards developing trade with the English that the Resident could neither collect necessary information nor could he protect the Indian merchants against Nepalese laws. Naturally no extensive trade could develop with Nepal under these circumstances and the age old aim of the British could not be fulfilled.

II

Along with the policy of seclusion, the maintenance of a big standing army and its constant increase was another remarkable feature of Nepal in this period. During the late war the aim of Lord Hastings was to break the military power of Nepal by depriving her of the means of maintaining a big army and by surrounding her with the British territories. Accordingly by the Treaty of Sagauli one-third of the Nepalese territory, including the rich portions of the Terai, had been taken away and rest of the Kingdom had been surrounded on three sides by the British territories or that of her protected allies, while on the fourth side stood the Chinese empire, which left no scope for the Nepalese territorial expansion at the cost of weak neighbours. Presuming that the Gorkha power had been broken, Lord Hastings aimed (after the war) at converting Nepal "from a troublesome neighbour into, if possible, a friendly or at least quiescent ally". Every possible concession was given to the Gorkhas in the negotiations of border settlement and their jealousy was put up with. Lord Moira hoped that forced by geographical necessity—being surrounded by British provinces—and having no purpose of maintaining a big

26. See Chapter VI, Section IV.

army, Nepalese would abandon their martial institutions and divert their energies towards peaceful ways of trade and commerce. None of these expectations, however, proved true. Against her physical situation, Nepal deliberately shut her eyes. Instead of galvanising the energies of her martial races into some peaceful ways, every effort was made to perpetuate their warlike habits and a standing army was raised to the highest point she was capable of supporting.

Variety of factors were responsible for this phenomenon. It was not merely because a particular Prime Minister had deliberately fostered such a policy, but so many socio-economic pressures were also responsible for it. The Gorkhas, who were originally from the martial Rajput race, had settled down in Nepal as refugees in the 14th century. Gradually they conquered the less warlike Newars of Nepal, established their Kingdom and spread in every direction with an amazing rapidity. Arms constituted their main profession and most of the chieftainry and higher classes were in military service. Any other occupation was regarded as degrading and a mark of cowardice. Even in peace time, reviews of troops and manufacture of arms were the common "amusement of princes".²⁷ The ruling class had nothing to do with agriculture and trade, which was entirely in the hands of the Newars. Therefore, the class which governed the country had its vested interest in the maintenance of army. The state had to keep a big standing army and pay for it.

The system of recruitment also kept the martial spirit alive. The Gorkha method of recruitment was by rotation. According to it, by usage, Government required an entire change in the whole army every year. After a service of one year every soldier had to retire for the next two years and only after that he could come up again on rolls. These discharged soldiers lived in a very precarious condition, they received no pay and abhorred any other occupation.²⁸ Consequently, they desired nothing so much as war, because only war could have brought them on rolls. As for their

27. S.C. January 16, 1818—No. 78.

28. P.C. February 12, 1833—No. 160.

efficiency they did not lose it due to fast recurring periods of recruitment.

These factors were assisted by two political considerations. Being face to face with a growing imperialistic power, the Nepalese thought that ultimately a constant military preparation was the only defence against the English.²⁹ No Gorkha statesman could have neglected this aspect of their relations with the British. Moreover, the internal politics of the Darbar was such that only one who appeased the martial races and kept them engaged could control the Government. There were many rival factions in the Darbar and each was contesting to grapple the control of the state. Therefore, both Bhim Sen and the Queen Regent knew that their own tenure of office depended in the long run on their fulfilling the fundamental condition of providing a career of arms to the chiefs and martial races of Nepal.

The results of this condition of affairs were most unfortunate. Instead of realising that the days of constant expansion and warfare were over, the Prime Minister persisted in maintaining a big army. Daily parades were held, ammunition was manufactured and military displays were organised. The mood of army was kept in perfect readiness for war.³⁰ In 1816 Gardner estimated the number of the Gorkha army at ten thousand, which was much more than the country needed for internal security or could have easily afforded. For it three thousand were enough, but the Prime Minister could not dare attempt a reduction. Such

29. S.C. October 14, 1829—No. 23.

30. Hodgson remarked in his letter, dated September 24, 1829, to Secretary, Foreign Department, that, "...this was a nation of warriors and conquerors whose vision of glory we first obscured, stripped them in two campaigns of half the territories and left them the future as blank as the present and in as violent contrast with past. The more I consider the still...martial enthusiasm of the Government, the chiefs and soldiery, the more I reflect upon their history and the present prospect, the more I am amazed that a standing army and incessant military display, have not hurried the country into war. Troops are more than fourteen years ago, with daily preparation. Yet, the internal tranquillity of the country is undisturbed and the disposition of Darbar most friendly towards us. Truth is that the warlike affairs are the habits and passions of the people. Government pursues the old ways of rotation heedless of altered conditions...." S.C. October 14—No. 23.

a step would have been too radical and against the most cherished traditions. In 1817 efforts were made for retrenchment but with no results.³¹ In fact, even after the war the army continued to increase. In 1819 according to Assistant Resident Mr. Stuard, the strength of the Gorkha army was twelve thousand. From this date it again increased gradually and in 1831 Hodgson estimated it at fifteen thousand.³² This was, however, not all; the Dhakarias—off-the-roll soldiers—were always anxious to join at any time. Thus the army could have been doubled within three months and trebled within six months.

This was, then, Nepal sixteen years after the war. Lord Hasting's idea that its power had been crippled proved greatly mistaken. Now she had an army more than one and half times than in 1814; trade with her could not in any substantial degree be developed, nor could her people be made friendly to the British. There were always fortytwo thousand soldiers ready for war.

This period, however, is one of the most peaceful. From 1818 to 1832 the Resident had been regularly informing the Government about the tranquil state of affairs. The reason for this lay in the great personality of Bhim Sen. It was his strong hand that controlled the army and in him the army acknowledged a master.³³ Bhim Sen realised the British power and was determined to maintain friendly relations. Therefore, so long as Bhim Sen lived and dominated

31. "There has been some talk of reduction in the rank of the officers of the army, but such a measure must be dangerous and impolitic for the ministers to touch upon in the present feeling of the body the members of which are naturally much dissatisfied with their fallen condition; and this temper not infrequently breaks out, though, it has not hitherto shown itself seriously. The Government is not little embarrassed on this account, for it must be sensible that the military force is greater than the state now requires and even can maintain. At the same time from the nature of constitution ministers have not the hardihood perhaps to attempt effecting the requisite reduction".—PT Para 62.

32. See PT—Para 62.

33. About the influence of Bhim Sen Official report mentions, "Such is the influence of this man over his countrymen, and so strong is his power, that before him the name of Raja has nearly vanished and that of General is associated with all notions of greatness". PT—Para 63.

all was safe. But after him there was a real danger. There was no one in Nepal who could have filled his place or had a clear idea of the British power. National current of martial enthusiasm, the ignorance of the relative strength vis-a-vis the British, or an unmanageable soldiery tired to peace, could have precipitated a crisis. In view of Bhim Sen's advanced age and considering the fact that the Maharaja was growing adult, it was not a remote possibility. In such a contingency the long suppressed energies of soldiery would either have found an outlet in a civil war or a foreign invasion. The former was not likely on account of strong Gorkha patriotism and the habit of sinking their mutual differences in national crisis; but the latter was a distinct possibility. For the British it was a serious situation. But they thought it better not to meddle in the internal affairs, and only hoped that Bhim Sen would gradually be induced to smoothen the Gorkha system.

Bhim Sen was indeed a great statesman; he gave his country power, prosperity and peace. It was due to his great efforts that Nepal after a shattering war could again emerge as a power within less than two decades. Yet, his foreign policy suffered from grave weakness and did not take the reality of the situation into account. It is really difficult to understand how a statesman of his calibre and understanding failed to realise the altered political, economic and geographical situation of Nepal. The war of 1814-16 meant that the era of conquest was over and Bhim Sen understood it. What then was the necessity of maintaining a big army?

Partly it was because of the social and martial habits of the people and partly because Bhim Sen thought that ultimately only arms could save Nepal against the British. But he failed to understand that no extent of military preparedness could have saved Nepal if the English had decided to annex her. Here lay the fundamental weakness of his foreign policy. He failed to galvanize the nation in a proper direction, which Jung Bahadur successfully attempted a decade after his uncle's fall.

The dire consequences of Bhim Sen's political system became apparent soon after his fall. Long suppressed fac-

tions tried every means to grab power, exploited the anti-English sentiments of the people and even abandoned the age old maxim of keeping the Resident away from the internal affairs. The turbulent decade that followed was most unfortunate and Bhim Sen cannot be absolved of his bit of responsibility therein.

III

Apart from this silent march of history, this period is not very interesting. The relations between the two Governments remained cordial. Business of the Residency was promptly attended to. The feelings of distrust and suspicion, which had been so conspicuous before and after the war, were gradually declining. In 1830 the Resident observed a growing inclination of some chiefs, specially of Bhim Sen, for British luxuries and manner of living.³⁴ European architecture was imitated in the construction of new buildings. A gradual improvement in the Indo-Nepalese trade also helped to bring the two nations closer to each other. In 1816, when the Residency was established, the Indian Government had to bear all the expenses of the Resident's establishment, but by 1829 this expenditure could be covered by trade.³⁵ In 1816 there were no Indian merchants in Nepal, but, after fourteen years, many were coming annually. It was remarkable that southern trade of Nepal was gradually superseding the northern trade, and even English material was being imported now.³⁶ These developments took place in spite of the policy of Bhim Sen.

The problem of border crime was practically non-existent in this period. Before the war a lot of crime existed on the borders and criminals found a ready shelter in the territory on the other side of the border. With the establishment of the Residency the prevention of the border crimes became one of the chief duties of the Resident. Unfortunately this problem had never been tackled on a formal basis, nor the Peace Treaty contained any clause relating to it.

34. P.C. March 26, 1830—No. 24.

35. P.C. October 14, 1829—No. 58.

36. Ibid.

Police of both sides watched their own frontier and every case was treated separately. As a custom, the Resident was the medium to settle cases of dacoity, theft or affray involving the escape of criminals to the territory of the other Government. The local British authorities used to approach the Resident, who by representation, got the cases redressed from the Darbar. Similarly, the Nepalese authorities got their cases redressed from the British authorities through the Resident. This system had the obvious difficulties, but due to friendly relations the problem did not assume an aggravated form.

During 1831 some cases of debtors and revenue defaulters led to the scrutiny of the whole problem. While the Nepalese Government promptly surrendered some debtors of the British frontier timber agency, the Indian Government refused to hand over a dozen revenue defaulters of Nepal.³⁷ It only offered to get redress to the Nepalese Government through its own courts.³⁸ For the time being the Nepalese government accepted the British offer, but they expressed a keen desire to conclude an engagement regarding such cases.³⁹

It is worth observing that the Nepalese attitude towards border crimes had been excellent since 1816. They had been prompt and regular in attending to the British demands, even to the extent of surrendering their own subject. They had, in fact, a real interest in maintaining peace on the border and introducing an efficient administration in that area. The forests of the Terai were now gradually brought under cultivation and its management required security against revenue defaulters and other crimes. The Resident B. H. Hodgson strongly recommended to the Government the necessity of an engagement to tackle the problem.⁴⁰ He admitted that the Nepalese code of law was backward and their fiscal and judicial administration cruel. But he clarified and pleaded that the laws in the Terai were not so severe, and an agreement could be concluded for the establishment of special courts in the Terai, "which would take pitch out of objec-

37. P.C. May 13, 1831—No. 56.

38. P.C. June 10, 1831—No. 21.

39. P.C. May 13, 1831—No. 56.

40. P.C. June 10, 1831—No. 23.

tion". Moreover, he had a political motive behind his arguments. The Terai, he contended, was Britain's "chief hold on Nepal". Gradually it was being brought under cultivation, and in due course of time it would have become very important for the Nepalese economy. This would have, on the one hand, bound Nepal with one more peaceful tie, and, on the other, it would have contributed in the development of trade.

The Indian Government, on the contrary, was always opposed to any such formal agreement, which would "bind Government under all circumstances to surrender debtors and defaulters to any bordering native state that may demand refugees on this plea".⁴¹ The British considered the Nepalese code of law and punishments too cruel and primitive.⁴² For minor crimes there were heavy punishments of mutilation or death. Therefore, the Resident was instructed to keep the matters at the existing footing so as "to allow the Government to judge each case that may occur according to its own particular merit".⁴³

Finally, this period is comparatively peaceful as regards border affrays and encroachments. It was primarily due to the friendly policy of Bhim Sen and his recognition of British strength. The Indian Government was also very particular about the border. In past they had experienced that their negligence was exploited by the Gorkhas. Therefore, once for ever they had determined to show that the old days were over. Every possible step was taken to avoid pre-war condition. Special Superintendents for the frontier were appointed with instructions to correspond on all subjects with the Resident.⁴⁴ This arrangement proved very successful for many years. In April 1827, however, quiet state of the border induced the Indian Government to abolish these offices and their duties were transferred to the frontier District Magistrates, whose preoccupation with other duties naturally precluded them from giving due attention to the border

41. P.C. June 10, 1831—No. 24.

42. P.C. January 28, 1831—No. 6.

43. P.C. June 10, 1831—No. 23.

44. PT—Para 45.

problem. But the vigilance and care of the Resident kept the problem quiet and every dispute was peacefully settled.

The general principle on which the disputes were settled was that the subjects of the Indian Government, having disputed claims on the Nepalese, used to make representation through British Magistrate to the Nepalese Government.⁴⁵ And similarly Nepalese subjects represented through their own authorities to the Indian Government. After the complaint had been properly lodged the officers of both the sides settled it mutually.

In 1825 some disputes arose along the Tirhut, Sarun and Bettiah border. It seems that the slackness of the local Nepalese authorities had led to the trouble. Even then Gardner took the issue seriously. He brought the cases to the Darbar's notice "with more than usual formality", with a view to make it conscious of the importance of the border.⁴⁶ The Darbar readily recognised the necessity of preventing such disorder and assured that precautions would be taken to prevent such cases. It appointed two officers in the Terai for the purpose of visiting the Nepalese side of the boundary with a view to check any encroachment.⁴⁷

Official report of the British has taken a different view of these disputes. It contends that since the British at this time were awkwardly situated against Burma, Bhim Sen might have "intentionally relaxed for the time an authority over her Terai police, which for the most part is too vigorous to admit any neglect of duty by the subordinates."⁴⁸ This view was supported by Resident Gardner. Both these opinions, however, do not appear to be very convincing. During the Burmese war Bhim Sen had offered military aid to the British and the Resident had believed it to be sincere. The later history of border disputes indicates how difficult it was to manage the Terai administration. Moreover, it is difficult to understand what advantage Bhim Sen could have

45. Ibid—Para 46.

46. P.C. April 29, 1825—No. 30.

47. P.C. January 27, 1826—No. 41.

48. PT—Para 48.

secured by such minor disputes. Therefore, it was primarily a local dispute such as were quite frequent in that area.⁴⁹

From this date till 1829 the border remained tranquil. In August 1829 Hodgson drew the attention of both the Governments towards the ill-defined condition of the Oudh-Nepal border.⁵⁰ It was found that on the whole border the original demarcation pillars needed repair and reconstruction. The British boundary was comparatively straight and well marked by a series of pillars closely constructed, but Oudh frontier was "sinuous to the last degree" having disconnected hills.⁵¹ On such a border of three hundred and fifty miles there were only six spots defined by pillars. The Treaty of Sagauli was also vague on this point.. It defined the boundary by the mention of "first continuous line of hills". But it was well known that hills had "no continuity". Nor was the Oudh boundary so minutely defined by Lt. Grant in 1819 as was generally supposed.⁵² The acting Magistrate of Gorakhpur district remarked on March 20, 1820 that the pillars had been constructed only where disputes had existed.⁵³ He feared that there were so many mountain openings on that frontier that it could easily encourage silent encroachment.

Apart from the fact that border disputes would have formed the principal pretext of any future hostility, Resident Hodgson judged the problem from a commercial viewpoint. Commerce can only flourish in a state of peace and security. And only by commerce and trade Nepal could have been bound securely with India. Therefore, he strongly recommended to the Government the necessity of redemarcation of the whole Oudh frontier and an arrangement between the Nawab of Oudh and the Maharaja of Nepal for regular

49. Acting Resident Hodgson reported that "...the recent instance of petty border disputes that have occurred there cannot exist a suspicion that either the Government disposed or its local officers, were posed to encourage such proceedings though the immediate authorities in Terai may have relapsed in their watchfulness". P.C. April 29, 1825—No. 30.

50. P.C. October 14, 1829—No. 58.

51. P.C. December 26, 1829—No. 14.

52. P.C. March 12, 1830—No. 19.

53. P.C. December 26, 1819—No. 14.

inspection and arbitration of disputes." The Darbar immediately agreed for the reconstruction and addition of pillars, but it refused to bear even half of the expense involved in regular inspection." The latter proposal had, therefore, to be dropped.

On Hodgson's recommendation Capt. R. Codrington was appointed in the winter of 1829-30 to survey and re-demarcate the Oudh frontier. He was accompanied by the commissioners of both Nepal and Oudh. Capt. Codrington was not required to introduce any new principle in this survey. He was only to adhere to the old principle, i.e., the hills belonged to the Gorkhas and the plains to the Nawab of Oudh. He was, therefore, to discover the demarcation line of Lt. Grant and add new pillars at disputed places. Apart from this general principle, the possession of uninterrupted eight years was considered sufficient to give a right of prescription. Disputes not covered by these principles were to be decided by arbitration.

The survey was carried on with maximum cordiality between the Nepalese and the Oudh Commissioners, but the usual controversy arose on the definition of plains and mountains. There being no clear plain and mountain in that region, this difficulty was natural. Some minor disputes along Mahowlee, Murela and Bhussum and Arrah rivers were settled by mutual agreement." Pillars were added at disputed places, and both the Governments expressed satisfaction.

54. P.C. October 14, 1829—No. 58.

55. P.C. May 28, 1830—No. 19.

56. P.C. May 28, 1830—No. 21.

CHAPTER V

THE BREAK OF BHIM SEN'S HEGEMONY AND QUEST FOR SECURITY (1832-1837)

I

The Regent, Maharani Tripura Sundari, passed away in 1832, which proved a turning point in the political career of the all powerful Prime Minister General Bhim Sen Thapa. The preceding history of Nepal, since last three decades, was based on the fact that the two minor kings gave Bhim Sen an opportunity to consolidate the power of Thapa faction by suppressing his rivals, and on his determination to consolidate the power of Nepal by reorganising the internal administration. In both these aims he received the support and acquiescence of the British Government. But during the years following 1832 all these factors changed. The death of the Regent Maharani on April 6, 1832 marked the first crack in the hegemony of the Prime Minister. It was natural for the young King and the various suppressed parties to make an attempt to gain power in the changed circumstances. The British were also realising their failure to bring about a change in the socio-political institutions of Nepal through Bhim Sen. The inevitable results were conspiracies, revolutions, counter-revolutions, foreign intrigues, murders and massacres. The history of Nepal during the next decade and half is full of these incidents.

For any correct understanding of the Anglo-Nepalese relations, therefore, it is essential to peep deep into the internal politics of the Darbar. Nepal had been a warrior nation ever since the consolidation of the Gorkha power. A race for exploits among tribes was by no means confined to external invasions. In the Darbar too "the price of power was everlasting vengeance". In 1805 Bhim Sen had

almost extirpated his enemies, and for the next twentyseven years he was master of all with the support of the Regent. The rival factions were naturally seething with bitterness and waiting for their chance. Their opportunity came in 1832 and the stage of Nepal started changing. In all there were seven factions that were trying to seize political power.

Unfortunately for the last twentyseven years, and even before that for a long time, the descendants of Prithvi Narayan Sah were "connected more to pathology than to history". Long minorities followed and power during that time remained with a prime minister or a regent. It naturally weakened the authority of the King and concurrently enhanced that of the Prime Minister. Bhim Sen throughout his career had to deal with a minor. In 1816 when he had just become an adult, Maharaja Judh Vikram Sah died and, his successor being a child of two years, Bhim Sen got one more long chance. By 1832, however, Maharaja Rajendra Vikram Sah was eighteen, yet he was kept in strict surveillance by Bhim Sen. The young King, who was full of ambitions, felt a natural irritation. Prompted by his Senior Queen he started asserting his authority with the aid of various parties.

Bhim Sen had his greatest potential danger in the Senior Queen, who felt most degraded at the honoured captivity of the royal family. She always instigated the Maharaja against the Thapa faction and had a wonderful influence over him. Finding her husband unenterprising she even aspired to procure political power in the name of her two male children. Her anxiety in this regard was justified as she feared that the legitimate rights of her elder son might be superseded by the Junior Queen and Bhim Sen. Such a case had actually happened in 1801, when the actual heir to the throne was set aside.¹ In the Kala Pandes—the chief rival of the Thapas—she found her natural ally.

The Junior Queen was a staunch supporter of the Thapas. The two queens were sworn enemies of each other. In fact, Bhim Sen had arranged this second marriage of the

1. In 1801, setting aside the claims of the rightful heir, Maharaja Ran Bahadur Sah got his illegitimate son, Girwan Judh Vikram Sah, installed as King. See p. 13.

S.C. August 22, 1838—No. 18.

King just to counteract the influence of the Senior Queen. Till 1841, however, she remained a non-entity and just managed to save her life from the hands of her rival, the Senior Queen.

The Chautrias or the royal collaterals had always held important positions in the administration. By the constitution, their advice in royal decisions was imperative. Being legitimists they neither supported the Senior Queen nor the Junior one, nor did they support any other faction. Their primary interest was to regain their own authority and that of the King. Yet, the preponderant power of Bhim Sen had deprived them of their hereditary claims.

The Thapas, headed by Bhim Sen, were in power since 1804. But within itself the faction had deep dissensions. Bhim Sen's own brother Ranbir Singh was highly jealous of his power and was trying to conspire against the Prime Minister. Bhim Sen had the strong support of his gallant nephew General Mathbar Singh and both of them managed to keep Ranbir Singh at bay.

Enmity of Kala Pandes towards Bhim Sen was of an entirely different nature. This faction had almost been extirpated by Bhim Sen in 1805. Ranjung Pande, the son of famous Kajee Damodar Pande being spared by Bhim Sen, now headed the group. A chief characteristic of this party was its martial and anti-British attitude. They had their greatest supporter in the Senior Queen.

Finally, there was a strong Brahman faction in Nepal. Being a priestly class, it always enjoyed an extraordinary position. It had also suffered at the hands of Bhim Sen. Their hereditary appointments had been taken away by the Prime Minister and were given to the members of his own clan. Even the ancestral property of the Brahmans had been confiscated by the State. This naturally turned them against Bhim Sen. They were headed by the shrewd but peace-loving Raj Guru Rang Nath Pandit.

All these factions in 1832 realised that with the death of Maharani Tripura Sundari and the Maharaja's attaining maturity, their opportunity had arrived and by conspiracies, intrigues and instigations they tried to make capital out of the new situation.

II

As the stage of Nepal was re-setting itself, important changes were taking place in the offices and the policy of the British Government. Since 1816, E. Gardner uninterruptedly held the charge of the Residency. By necessity and with a hope he followed a policy of strict non-interference. After the war he had been instructed by the Indian Government not to attempt anything which might arouse suspicion. By winning the confidence of the rulers and the people, the British hoped that Nepal would be induced to change her social and political institutions. But, as already stated, these hopes were belied. In 1829 Gardner retired, and B. H. Hodgson² officiated as Resident for the next two years. After that from 1831 to 1833 H. Maddock was Resident and from 1833 till 1843 Hodgson continued in this office. He was a versatile scholar and his knowledge of Nepal and its people was remarkable. His critic J. L. Morrison has rightly entitled him as the man who knew about Nepal more than any Englishman.³ His long association with Nepal and deep insight were widely acknowledged. With such a Resident in office, the attitude of the Indian Government towards Bhim Sen also took a gradual turn.

Hodgson started with a presumption that maximum use must be made of the Indo-Nepalese relations. The original intentions of the British with regard to the northern frontier were to explore new trade routes for China and maintain a chain of buffer states along the Gangetic valley. So long as the Russian expansion in Central Asia had not become a danger to the British Empire in India, English aims in and beyond the Himalayas remained primarily commercial. But towards Nepal after 1816 the necessity of non-involvement in the internal affairs of that country entirely relegated their main commercial aim to the background. The real obs-

2. Brain Houghton Hodgson (1800-1894), I.C.S., went to India, 1818; he was Assistant Commissioner in Kumaon for two years, 1818-1820, Assistant Resident at Kathmandu in Nepal, 1820-1829; acting Resident, 1829-1831; Resident, 1833-44. He kept Nepal quiet during the first Afghan war, but Lord Ellenbrough hastily removed him from Nepal, whereupon he resigned the service. C.E. Buckland. *Dictionary of Indian Biography*. London, 1906, p. 203.

3. J. L. Morrison, *Lawrence of Lucknow*, London, 1934, p. 136.

tacles in the way of the development of trade and commerce were the socio-economic institutions of the Gorkhas. Hodgson saw that the greatest malady of Nepal was the wrong channelization of her energies. Social values of the martial races and the rotation system of recruitment ensured a constantly increasing standing army. Lack of any other outlet, either in the direction of art or commerce, further made Nepal an armed country without a purpose. This, on the one hand, meant frustration of the British hopes for an extended trade through Nepal, and, on the other hand, an armed Nepal constituted a positive danger for the British on a strategically important frontier. But Hodgson did not believe in opposing this country by deploying an adequate force along the whole frontier.⁴ This would have been enormously expensive without turning Nepal into a friendly state. Therefore, his problem was to find out some safe outlet for the Gorkha martial spirit.

For it Hodgson envisaged two methods. One was direct and immediate, and the other was indirect to fructify in the long run. The immediate method was recruitment of the surplus Gorkha soldiery in the British ranks on a permanent regimental basis. There were in 1832, 30,000 off-the-roll soldiers in Nepal. All of them could be absorbed in the Indian army and the Nepalese Government could save huge expenditure and be relieved of its age old burden. It was sure to have a natural effect of moderating the martial policy of Nepal. Side by side, the British could have secured the services of the best fighting soldiers. Introduction of the Gorkha army would have also served as a counter-poise against the Indian army.

Appreciation of the Gorkha soldiers was not something new. In 1815-16, General Ochterlony had even raised few irregular levies of disbanded Gorkha soldiers. In the following years there were suggestions for raising of the Gorkhas as mercenaries. Hodgson, however, wanted a regular supply of the Gorkhas in the British army on regimental basis with an understanding with the Nepal Government. He had no doubt that better pay, more amenities and provision for pension would win their loyalty. Hodgson even put his

suggestions formally for the consideration of the Government in December 1832.⁶ But, unfortunately, his proposal could not bear any result as it came in the years of peace between 1827 to 1839.

Hodgson's views were not confined to such negative methods alone. He also believed that unless some positive peaceful outlets could be provided for the martial energies of the Gorkhas, the chronic unrest would continue. He suggested that Nepalese foreign trade with and through India should be encouraged.⁷ This was the only means which could have provided a healthy way out for the Gorkhas.⁷ Any other measure of force or diplomacy was bound to be looked upon with fear and suspicion and would have been rejected by the Darbar due to its traditional policy. Commerce was one thing which worked unseen. Hodgson did not mean that direct British trade should be introduced in Nepal, for that was always considered by the Nepalese as a cloak to disguise the imperial diplomacy. Instead, he wanted that Indian merchants should be encouraged. Moreover, by means of India supplying Nepal with almost all her convenience and comforts and practically all luxuries, Britain would have bound her with ties that could not have been broken. It was not a mere idea. The nature of Nepal and India was so different in their products that a brisk trade could easily have flourished. It was observed at this time that large proportion of the people of Nepal were clothed by the products of India or British looms.⁸ Its necessity was so great that with an unchecked trade the East India Company could have clothed two-third of the entire Nepalese population. The upper classes of Nepal were also gradually be-

5. SRGB, Vol. No. XXVII—Essay No. VII—'Origin and Classifications of the military tribes of Nepal', by B.H. Hodgson. Calcutta, 1857, p. 146.

6. See Hodgson's report on the trade of Nepal dated December 31, 1831, SRGB, pp. 11 to 29.

7. Hodgson maintained that the policy of Darbar will not change "unless some effective moral element of change be brought to bear upon the tribes. Of the few known elements of the kind, commerce is the only one applicable to the present case. A bond of real amity attempted to be laid by us on the Darbar would be rejected, but commerce works unseen." P.C. June 12, 1834—No. 140.

8. P.T.—Para 83.

coming fond of European luxuries." After careful enquiry Hodgson showed that there had been a marked increase in the Indo-Nepalese trade despite Bhim Sen's policy. Since 1816 the southern trade of Nepal had trebled. There were in 1834 thirtyfour Indian merchants and the amount of exports and imports was roughly twentysix lakh rupees plus exported grain from the Terai worth rupees six lakhs.⁹ Hodgson, therefore, wanted a hold on Nepal through trade and not politics, and on the people not on the rulers. With an extended trade the relations would no longer depend on the caprice and prejudices of a particular ruler, and it would have made the Gorkhas realise the value of the British friendship.

While the immediate object of Hodgson was Nepal, he wanted to revive the great aspirations of Warren Hastings. Through Nepal he saw the great prospects of capturing the unexplored markets of Tibet and China.¹⁰ During the Governor Generalship of Warren Hastings singular attention was paid to Tibet. He had despatched the missions of Bogle and Turner to that country. Subsequently, Kirkpatrick and Knox were sent to Nepal with pretty similar intentions. "To open or enlarge the channel of commerce in this direc-

9. Hodgson wrote to the Government: "Dependence of higher ranks on plains is daily increasing for their luxuries. If the Government can be induced...to raise the restriction from commerce, which it has done since war, Nepal will become bound to us by so many ties that the severance of relations will no longer be subject to Darbar's caprice and animosities". P.C. July 10, 1834—No. 144.

10. Hodgson's statements were here based on general but careful enquiry in the absence of any statistical data. He writes that, "It appears then...at present time there are, in the great towns of the valley of Nepal fifty-two Native and thirty-four Indian merchants engaged in foreign commerce...and that the trading capital of the former is considered to be not less than 50,18,000, nor that of the latter less than 23,05,000 rupees" (this Hodgson considered too high). "...the annual prime cost value of the imports in Sicca rupees was 16,11,000 and...for the annual value, at Kathmandu, of exports 12,77,800 of Nepalese Rupees, equivalent to Kuldars 10,64,893-5-4, thus making the total of Imports and Exports 26,75,833-5-4." Here rupees one lakh of extraordinary purchases of the year 1830-31 can be reduced; thus making it nearly twenty-six lakhs. The excess of export over imports was made up by the export of grains from Terai worth six lakhs". Hodgson, SRGB, pp. 13-14.

11. See Hodgson's report on trade for his views on Trans-Himalayan and Central Asian Trade. SRGB, pp. 15-19.

tion was the leading and almost exclusive object of all these" missions. Even after the Gorkha War the instructions given to Capt. Knox in 1802 were transcribed and sent to Gardner to be always kept in mind by him.¹² Gardner for reasons already explained could not succeed. Hodgson now tried to convince the Government that such a trade should be revived.

With this view Hodgson first turned his attention towards China. Here he saw that Russian trade was flourishing despite better prospects for the British through the Himalayas. Distance from Petersburg to Peking was at least 5,500 miles and the traders encountered sterile country and rigorous climate. The journey took at least a year by land route and the Russian government levied not less than twenty to twentyfive per cent duty on this trade. There were further obstacles in the form of prohibitions and monopolies. Russian exports to China were only peltry, woollen and cotton cloth, glassware, hardware, hides and prepared leather. Half of the peltry was brought from North America mostly via England. Of the woollen and cotton cloth, glassware and hardware the Russians only manufactured the coarse quality, and the fine quality was brought chiefly from England. Hides were certainly the indigenous product. The Russian imports from China were musk, borax, rhubarb, tea, raw and wrought silk and cotton, porcelain, Japan-ware and water colour. But the best musk, borax, rhubarb were found in Tibet and tea in Setchuen. Both these places were nearer to India than to Russia.

From the Indian side trade would have had more attractions and less difficulties. From Calcutta to Peking the distance was 2,800 miles via Kathmandu. Mountains of Himalaya were high but there existed regular passes with habitations, cultivation and temperate climate. Journey from Kathmandu to Peking could be accomplished within five months during the healthy season. Even before reaching Peking traders could have entered the province of Setchuen on the eightyseventh day of their journey where they could sell their articles and purchase musk, borax and rhubarb. Further, for the articles from England such as woollen

12. P.C. July 10, 1834—No. 144.

cloth, cutlery, fur skin, which were much in demand in China, Calcutta was the natural inlet. As for duties, it was eight per cent in Nepal and nothing in Tibet. In this way Hodgson thought of cutting the Russian trade via Himalayas.

Tibet also attracted Hodgson's attention. It was a vast country with moderate, peaceful, lettered and civilized population. People were trade-minded and wore woollen clothes which could be provided by Britain. In exchange borax, musk, wool and rhubarb could be imported from Tibet.

Next he pointed out why this trans-Himalayan trade should take the Nepalese route and not that of Kumaon or Sikkim. In comparison to Kumaon, Nepal had better passes and was centrally situated. All the wealth and civilization of Tibet were confined to its eastern half, which was contiguous to Nepal. Moreover, most of the Tibetan needs could be supplied from Calcutta, Dacca, Patna, Mirzapur, Banaras, the towns which were far from Kumaon. Therefore, he concluded, that trade to and from Tibet via Kumaon was an "obvious absurdity". As for Sikkim it was deemed by all Hindu merchants as an unholy land while Nepal was considered a pious place. Nepal had an efficient government and could provide security to merchants which Sikkim could not. Sikkim also did not possess any substantial capital while Nepalese were known for it. Bhutan was also rejected by him for similar reasons.¹³

For the development of this trans-Himalayan trade Hodgson did not consider it expedient to contact Tibet directly. He feared that, Tibet being a Chinese protectorate, such contact would lead to complications. He wanted that Nepal should be made a meeting place, a common market, where merchants of India, inner Asia, Tibet and Nepal could exchange their commodities. Nor did he desire that the British merchants should step in. This would never have been tolerated by the suspicious Nepalese and Tibetans. But, as Indian merchants were traditionally carrying on such transactions for a long time, the merchants of Calcutta, Bihar and North-West Province were to be encouraged for it.

13. P.C. March 26, 1830—No. 24.

Finally, it was far from Hodgson's intention to revive this trade by coercion." Such means would have defeated their own purpose. Trade could only develop in an atmosphere of mutual confidence, good-will and security. He wanted that Nepal should be induced by advices and explanations to allow free trade. The Indian Government should come to a clear understanding with the Darbar as to the conditions under which goods might enter and pass through Nepal.

According to Hodgson there were four specific obstacles in the way of unrestricted trade. The Indian merchants travelling in Nepal had no definite legal status. The Nepalese courts tried them in accordance with their own law and justice was denied very often due to unnecessary delays. No trader could have felt sure of his own security and that of his goods. Moreover, it was a normal practice with the Nepalese Government that it deliberately prohibited the export of Indian coin and recast it with alloy into its own currency, which made it impossible for the Nepalese traders to secure Indian coin while the Nepalese currency had become too debased to be accepted by the Indians. Another difficulty that the Indian traders faced was that the Darbar had been levying irregular and excessive duties on the British goods since last four decades. Finally, the condition along the border was not yet so conducive as to encourage the traders to move freely with security. Disputes among the subjects of both the Governments were quite frequent and lack of any extradition treaty also encouraged border crimes.

III

Prime Minister Bhim Sen understood the whole situation. Death of Maharani Tripura Sundari was a great blow

14. Hodgson remarked that, "...I am very far from desiring to see any immediate and direct change of system enforced. We have acquiesced so long and have now such important political reasons for further acquiescence, if by it we may hope ultimately to obtain our ends of promoting commerce and binding this state to us through our command over its wants, that our past sacrifices and future aims alike seem to counsel forbearance from all but gradual and persuasive reforms".

for him. She had been his most unflinching supporter since the last three decades and it was through her that he had been so long controlling the royal family. Thirty years of uninterrupted rule, during which he had to deal with two minor kings and subdued chiefs, had turned him into a habitual dictator. Now after Maharani's death he faced a real challenge and was determined to keep up his position supreme in relation to the King as well as the chiefs.

The path for Bhim Sen was by no means easy. Despite a gradual concentration of powers in the Prime Minister's office, the King was regarded an incarnation of God **Vishnu** in Nepal. Prestige of the Monarchy has been so high that even the strongest Prime Minister could not do away with the principle of legitimacy. In 1832 the Maharaja had become a major and had started taking interest in the affairs of the state. The Senior Maharani was also an ambitious woman. She never liked the way in which the Royal family was kept under a close watch by the Prime Minister. Her constant instigations against Bhim Sen made the Maharaja feel indignant at his personal insignificance and the state of surveillance to which he had been subjected.¹⁵ The Brahmans and the Chautrias were highly jealous of Bhim Sen's position. Just before Maharani Tripura Sundari's death the Prime Minister had deprived the Brahmans of their traditional property. The royal collaterals had been long deprived of their hereditary privileges. By constitution they were the advisers of the King. But all the important offices were filled by the family members of the Prime Minister. Finally, the Thapa faction had also its own dissensions.

No immediate action, however, could be taken against the Prime Minister after the Regent's death. The Maharaja was provoked to shake him off, but he was too inexperienced to take any effective step and the Prime Minister was too strong to be shaken off so easily. Yet Bhim Sen did not feel the usual security.¹⁶ Parties against him were numerous and the King only awaited his opportunity. Gradually, as opposition against Bhim Sen increased, the young Prince got

15. See Hunter. n. 40, Ch. I, p. 134.

16. P.C. February 12, 1833—No. 160.

experience and courage and dared break the automatic appointment of Bhim Sen to the prime ministership. It was a custom in Nepal that every year at Dashehra all the state offices were renewed by the King in a ceremony called "Panjani". Since 1804 Bhim Sen secured this appointment for himself as a matter of course, and all other appointments were also filled strictly as he or the Regent desired. But this very custom of annual renewal also indicated that Bhim Sen's own tenure was not something permanent. In 1833 the King gave a short pause in appointing him, which must have brought to the forefront the reality of relationship between the King and his Prime Minister.¹⁷ The Maharaja also retrenched some other officers in the name of fostering economy. The attitude of the royal household against the ministerial party can be judged from the fact that in the rainy season of 1832 the King, having fallen ill, resolutely and against all possible exertions refused to employ the court physician.¹⁸ It was openly alleged that Maharaja Judh Vikram was poisoned by Bhim Sen in 1816.

As opposition against him gathered, Bhim Sen did not sit idly. He carefully tried to stimulate martial sentiments of the Gorkhas. This would have won the imagination of chiefs and soldiery and would have turned their attention from internal affairs to external affairs. Such a war cry had been most popular in Nepal, but the difference between the pre and post 1832 militarism was vital. Formerly Bhim Sen used it at his convenience within proper limits, and after 1832 every party began to court the military. Naturally it became a race between the rival factions to cater to the martial races. Bhim Sen lost no time and by the end of 1832 the number of troops, which was 11,710 in 1825, was raised to 14,530.¹⁹ Military stores were accumulated, parades were held and a fort was constructed near Mackwanpur in the

17. Secret Consultation of January 18, 1841—No. 74. This memorandum under the title of "Excerpts from the letters of the Resident at Kathmandu to Government from 1830 to 1840", was prepared by Mr. J. R. Tickell, the Assistant Resident. Henceforth this document has been referred as "Excerpts".

18. Hodgson's letter to Political Secretary. Quoted by Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 136.

19. Excerpts—1832.

eastern Nepal. Prime Minister's trusted nephew General Mathbar Singh, who was highly popular with the soldiery, was appointed as the Governor of Palpa with extensive military powers. By the year 1834 Bhim Sen and his family were in possession of all the provincial commands throughout Nepal except the province of Doti.

To further foster this spirit Bhim Sen manipulated intrigues with various disaffected Indian States. Rumours were spread of an imminent invasion of Persia and Russia on India. It was an interesting phenomenon in Nepal that whenever the British faced trouble the war party in the Darbar got an upper-hand. In the present instance two spies were sent to and contacts were made with Lahore, Tehran and Bharatpur.²⁰ But when the British succeeded in defeating Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur in 1834, the temper of the Darbar cooled down.²¹ About the nature of these intrigues it must, however, be remarked that they had a limited purpose and surely Bhim Sen was not thinking in terms of breaking away from the English. It was solely to divert the attention of the Darbar to the external affairs so as to enable him to consolidate his precarious position at home. In the present circumstances he had to steal a lead over other parties in the competition of catering the soldiery.

Finally, Bhim Sen tried to restrict the Maharaja to his usual ceremonial position. He knew that only from the King, who was the seat of authority, a genuine danger for his undisputed position could come. Therefore, since his childhood the King had been deliberately kept in an atmosphere where he had all the vices of worldly pleasure and little capability and liking for administration. Even now a close watch was kept on his activities and by all sorts of rumours and tales he was discouraged from going out.²² In

20. P.C. March 19, 1833—No. 26.

21. Excerpts—1834.

22. In his confidential letter dated February 18, 1833 Hodgson reported that, "The Raja is hemmed into his palace, beyond which he cannot stir unaccompanied by the Minister, and then only to the extent of a short ride or a drive. Even within the walls of his palace, the Minister and his brother both reside, the latter in the especial capacity of "dry nurse" to His Highness.

the actual administration the King had practically no power or say. He was discouraged from mixing with the chiefs and the general public. Like the Japanese King during the "Shogonate" system he was a Deity to be worshipped occasionally. And, had it not been for the Senior Queen who constantly inspired and instigated her husband to regain power, the Prime Minister would have perpetuated the old situation. In fact, throughout 1833 and 1834 various means short of force were applied to force his abdication, but, due to suspicious character of the King and his Senior Maharani, Bhim Sen could not succeed.

As regards his policy towards the British, the Prime Minister found himself faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, he observed that the English were the main enemy in the eyes of the Gorkha soldiery. An anti-British bogey was essential to cater to this body, which he could not have avoided at a time when every faction was keen to win over the soldiery. On the other hand, Bhim Sen also shrewdly realised that he could also utilize the British support to maintain his tottering authority. In trying to reconcile these opposite aims Bhim Sen's policy underwent three different phases during this period. From 1832 to 1834, he tried to give a war cry against the British and tried his utmost to restrict the Resident from approaching the Maharaja directly, and, at the same time, he had no objection to adjust the mutual problems between the two countries that did not affect his own position. From 1835 to 1836, he tried to win the British friendship and support by all possible means. From 1836 till his deposition he went all out to stimulate the martial policy again. And the chief aim throughout had certainly been Bhim Sen's own quest for security.

Immediately after Regent Maharani's death Bhim Sen followed the double policy of giving satisfaction to the British on minor points but restricting them to their traditional mode

(Continued from page 110).

"Last year the Raja desired to make an excursion into the lower hills to shoot. He was prevented by all sorts of idle tales and obstructions. This year he proposed visiting his palace at Nayakot, the winter residence of his father; again he was prevented as before". Quoted by Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 132.

of intercourse with the Darbar. Some minor disputes were amicably settled on Sarun frontier,²³ and a keen willingness was manifested to conclude an arrangement as regards Resident's jurisdiction over "the followers of Residency". The negotiations could not successfully be carried out, yet they were conducted with sincerity and cordiality.

Beyond these friendly moves the Prime Minister was not prepared to redress the British grievances. Rather, he tried his utmost to isolate the Resident as much as possible. Since the accession of Maharaja Rajendra Vikram Sah the established custom was that the Resident and his subordinates carried on the business only through the Minister or his representative. On the plea of his minority no direct access to the King was allowed. The British acquiesced to this condition of affairs largely because after 1816 their policy was based on the faith that ultimately Bhim Sen could be induced to throw open Nepal for English trade. Now, the Maharaja had become a major and, yet, the traditional mode of intercourse continued because it suited the interests of the Prime Minister. The King was himself led to believe that "non-intercourse" with the British was "the established etiquette of the court". The British had always been represented to him as highly dangerous people, who had been kept at bay from annexing Nepal only due to the unique genius of the Prime Minister. Whenever there was an unpleasant note from the Indian Government it was deliberately showed to him. This vigilance had increased in the recent years because the King's attaining age, Resident Gardner's retirement and Maharani Tripura Sundari's death came in quick succession. The ruling faction thought that the appointment of Mr. Maddock was a prelude to some material change in the British policy towards access to the Maharaja.²⁴ Bhim Sen's growing opposition rendered him provokingly suspicious towards the Resident.

The Resident was merely not allowed to approach the young King, but he and his suite were also restricted from

²³. P.C. October 29, 1832—No. 83. Also see P.C. March 19, 1833—No. 26.

²⁴. P.C. March 19, 1833—No. 26.

going out for excursions in the neighbourhood.²⁵ Peasants were incited to harass the British Officers while out for shooting. And surprisingly all these restrictions could easily be turned by Bhim Sen in his favour. He disseminated the rumour that the Indian Government, if not pledged, was strongly disposed to countenance his former unrestricted power, which was quite possible for him to do in the absence of any direct contact between the Resident and other chiefs.²⁶ Hodgson felt so irritated that he remarked: "I am decidedly of opinion that it were better to put an end to the ludicrous mockery of Chinese foreign policy which the minister had endeavoured to play off against the Residency since its establishment here".²⁷

IV

The first reaction of the Indian Government towards Bhim Sen after Regent Maharani's death was of sympathy. He had been regarded as a preserver of peace, a person who realised the British power and could control the Gorkha soldiery. Through him the British hoped to achieve their objectives in Nepal. Any subversion of his power was naturally deplored by them. There was practically no chance that he would have been succeeded by any strong personality, rather there was every possibility that violent dissensions would follow his death or dismissal, and war-hungry soldiery in the absence of a strong hand would clamour for aggression, which would have been greatly injurious for the British interests.²⁸ In this context Maddock categorically wrote

25. Indian Political Despatch to Court of Directors, No. 11, dated July 10, 1834.

26. P.C. April 24, 1837—No. 82.

27. Resident to Political Secretary dated June 3, 1833. Hunter. n. 40, Ch. I, pp. 129.

28. Resident Maddock wrote on December 2, 1832, that, "subversion of Bhim Sen's power would be an event greatly to be deplored; for no such efficient ministry can succeed...and it is to his strength and vigour of administration to which we are mainly indebted both for tranquillity in Nepal and for friendly relations with British for last sixteen years...the violent dissensions of parties

(Continued on page 114)

that, "such being the case British Government must feel directly interested in the character of the administration which governs Nepal."²⁹

By the beginning of the year 1833, Maddock having retired, Hodgson became Resident. He continued to follow the policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal, but realised that the most important factor of the Nepalese politics was the King and not this or that Prime Minister. Parties might have come or gone, the King was the only person with permanent stakes. Therefore, the Indian Government must have a direct access to the Maharaja. And this was precisely the thing Bhim Sen had been preventing since 1816. He had been monopolizing the British Resident and misusing this mode of intercourse to serve his own interests. It had certain advantages in the beginning as it led to the peaceful implementation of the Treaty of Sagauli and created a sense of confidence among the chiefs regarding the British intentions. At the same time, it left the British entirely dependent on the mercy of the Thapa factions headed by Bhim Sen, which served him in two ways. Whenever it suited his interests, he could represent the British as mischievous in the eyes of the Maharaja and general public. The mode of contact being restricted, neither the public could know anything, nor the Resident could have clarified the actual position. In such condition, the Prime Minister could also represent a show of British support for whatever he did and, at the same time, could refuse the Resident ordinary privileges and concession in the name of the Maharaja and the chiefs.³⁰ Hodgson understood the situation and also realised that this mode of intercourse, which distorted the British actions and views, must be broken. If the British were to win the sympathy of the Nepalese they must show their reality. Therefore, he assumed the charge

(Continued from page 113)

would be signal for sword. And so great a number of military population and longing for years for the scenes of war, would lead to anarchy in the state and then would be a considerable risk of a reputure with British Government." P.C. February 12, 1833—No. 160.

29. Ibid.

30. P.C. October 9, 1834—No. 17.

of the Residency with a determination to "try to steer a way" to approach the Maharaja and convince the various factions that he looked "to constituted authority, no matter who it be".³¹ Hodgson contended that his demand for access to the Maharaja was not an interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal, but only "the virtual maintenance of that neutrality".³² This was the neutrality which the British had been observing and against which all the acts and power of one party were successfully employed in causing the Resident to exhibit the appearance of violating. The mode of non-access to the Maharaja had created such an injurious effect on the public that British Government was looked upon as a "supporter of the usurping minister". Nor did Hodgson regard this demand an innovation. It was, in fact, an old "distinct right"—a privilege given to all ambassadors. In 1816 Maharaja Judh Vikram Sah was only eighteen and Resident Gardner had direct access to him. But in 1834 Maharaja Rajendra Vikram was twentyone, still the Resident could not approach him.

Armed with these reasons Hodgson firmly demanded in January 1834 right of direct access and audience with the Maharaja.³³ In view of his declining position it was not possible for Bhim Sen to come in direct clash with the Resident. Therefore, Hodgson was told that the Maharaja would be glad to see him as often as he chose but his Munshī (the Resident's) was to continue business as usual exclusively with Minister, except on rare occasions.

His declining position further convinced Bhim Sen that by keeping the Resident in good humour he could also put up a show of British support to him against the rising opposition. The British support was, moreover, essential for him because his attempts were mainly directed against the Maharaja, to whom the Resident was legally accredited.³⁴ With this aim, in May 1834, the Resident and his subordinates were granted full access to the Maharaja. Likewise, the Darbar voluntarily waved the right to search Resident's per-

31. P.C. March 19, 1833—No. 26.

32. P.C. November 6, 1834—No. 25.

33. P.C. February 13, 1834—No. 6.

34. P.C. April 24, 1837—No. 82.

sonal baggage and a willingness was also manifested to permit the suite of Residency to go out a few miles from the capital.³⁵

The Indian Government, as against Hodgson, was by no means willing to press this issue of direct access to the King. It was in favour of continuing the policy of non-interference. Whether the Maharaja ruled or the Minister was considered a domestic problem with which the Indian Government was not concerned.³⁶ The Resident was instructed not to press the issue and take any step which might lead to a clash with Bhim Sen—the actual ruler. By September 1834 even Hodgson became hesitant to insist upon the right of direct access, because, it being against Bhim Sen's interests, might have driven him to open rupture.³⁷ This lack of willingness on the part of the Indian Government soon led Bhim Sen again to restrict the Resident and his suite from approaching the Maharaja. Still his fundamental policy was to win over the British support.

Having failed in his attempt to secure direct access to the Maharaja, the declining influence of Bhim Sen induced Hodgson to attempt his second stroke of diplomacy. As has already been mentioned, he was a firm believer in promoting trade and commerce with Nepal for economic as well as political reasons. Traditional policy of Nepal had been not to allow free trade and contacts with the British and to maintain the exclusive and martial nature of her polity. After the war of 1814-16 the British Government had reasons not

35. P.C. May 22, 1834—No. 46.

36. The Indian Government instructed Resident on October 9, 1834, "It is of no concern to British Government whether the Raja rules the minister or minister rules Raja. Your business is with the Government as you find it. It is obvious that any measure by you against ruling party must dispose them against you....Your Government does not propose to interfere in the internal politics of Nepal. Your duty is strict neutrality and conciliatory inoffensive conduct towards all. Any advances on the part of Raja you will meet with cordiality. But it is not in our advantage to attempt an intimate intercourse with the Raja, what is not sought by him or if it is considered injurious by minister to his interest, will certainly be resisted by him, by which you and actual ruler will be placed in opposition to each other—a thing least desirable." P.C. October 9, 1834—No. 19.

Also see P.C. February 13, 1834—No. 8.

37. P.C. October 9, 1834—No. 17.

to force Nepal to change her system. Therefore, a policy of non-interference was adopted, believing that gradually by force of circumstances—Nepal being geographically surrounded by the British—the Nepalese system would get moderated, and Bhim Sen, who understood the situation, would help in that direction. Gardner's fourteen years' silence from this point of view was perhaps prudent.

After twenty years Hodgson realised that Bhim Sen was himself the main obstacle in the way of free trade and contacts. Two decades of peace had good effect on the Indo-Nepalese relations and trade with India was increasing. Yet the Prime Minister was bent upon maintaining the old exclusive and hostile policy. A large standing army was maintained, war mania was unnecessarily fostered, and every possible obstacle was put in the way of trade and contacts. It became very clear that so long as such a policy was followed peace and commerce would be ineffective to produce any change either in the habits of the martial races or in the political institutions. Hodgson had aptly put it that Bhim Sen had "succeeded in thus rolling back the general current of peaceful events".³⁸

Hodgson was, therefore, not in favour of the continuance of that policy of "acquiescence".³⁹ After the death of

38. P.C. October 9, 1834—No. 17.

39. The Resident remarked on May 19, 1834 that, "... now if Darbar after experience of twenty years of our political integrity does not listen to reason and act to its peaceful obligations to us, it can be asked whether, we by continuance of the present system are not most universally suffering them to draw from our own bowels, under the mask of friendship. We have throughout displayed friendship and tried to prove groundlessness of their suspicions. Nepalese are also sensible to these; but they will continue, by force of habit, and under artful and hostile guidance of Bhim Sen their ancient exclusive warlike policy, converting the fruits of peace into prospective means of hostility". P.C. July 10, 1834—No. 144.

In the same context the Official report mentions that, "whatever may have been the prudence of our discriminating indifference towards the policy of this state there is reason to doubt the wisdom of its continuance. If this system be left in status quo till his death or retirement, a crisis will occur, whether in a civil war or an aggression on us; but in both the cases it would effect our interests. There is no man like him...Bhim Sen must be induced to smoothen his system, to be handled by less intelligent person". PT Para 91.

the Regent Maharani two things became quite clear. Bhim Sen was not the man through whom the British could have easily produced any change in Nepalese institutions and he was no longer as powerful as he had been. In the past his predominant power at least assured a strong hand over a vast standing army, while now every faction was trying to cater to the martial tribes and none of their leaders had the actual idea of the British power. Bhim Sen, despite his anti-British policy and declining position, was the only man who realised the relative strength of Nepal vis-a-vis the English. If before his death or retirement such a change could not be produced, an upsurge of military mania and aggression on the British territory was most likely. Hodgson, therefore, remarked that, "We must procure a relaxation in the anti-social and hostile politics of extraordinary man (Bhim Sen) while he is there".⁴⁰

With these views, in August 1834, the Resident opened up the whole question of trade with the Darbar because he wanted to amicably, but energetically, reform the policies of Bhim Sen. In the first instance he wanted to raise the issue of the Commercial Treaty of 1792. It might be recalled that this engagement was procured by the Indian Government when the Nepalese were awkwardly posed against the Chinese. According to it a uniform duty of two and a half per cent ad valorem invoice was to be levied by the British on all the produce and articles of trade transported from Nepal and Tibet into British provinces. Similarly, the Nepalese Government was to levy two and a half per cent on the British and Indian goods entering the kingdom of Nepal or their being transported to Tibet from there without any additional duty.

In practice this treaty occupied a very ambiguous position. It was clearly affirmed by the treaty of 1801, but the Treaty of Sagauli neither confirmed nor invalidated it. From the British side it was uniformly observed and Nepalese imports were regularly charged only two and a half per cent duties. The Nepalese government, on the contrary, habitually violated all its articles. Instead of two and a half per cent, almost ten per cent duty was charged on the goods

40. P.C. October 9, 1834—No. 17.

imported from India. As a matter of fact, in Nepal duties were levied not only at the Sadar (main) but at so many other minor posts.⁴¹ Thus Nepal enjoyed a clear advantage of seven and a half per cent. Moreover, smuggling of goods into Indian territory was quite prevalent. The interests of the Indian traders were also not properly protected in the courts of Nepal.

Hodgson insisted that the disparity in the duties must be removed, but as usual, he was against any retaliatory or coercive methods. Such means, though could have secured some immediate results, would have destroyed future prospects of the development of trade. He wanted, therefore, that only the rights based on the treaty of 1792 should be demanded. Amicably he wanted to explain, advise and above all to make the Darbar realise that British forbearance did not originate in supineness or lack of information. For him the demand of justice for the Indian traders in the courts of Nepal was a right based on reciprocity and international law. Hodgson was quite confident that his insistence upon the treaty of 1792 would not in any way lead to Bhim Sen's fall—predominance of his power was still a great consideration for the British.⁴²

Soon Hodgson got an opportunity of ascertaining the views of the Darbar regarding the treaty of 1792. As above mentioned, the treaty stipulated for two and half per cent import duties, but Nepalese timber, being by mistake omitted by the British authorities in the Regulation Schedules, was charged at ten per cent in 1834.⁴³ The Darbar immediately preferred the claim and made application for seeking the ratification of mistake. It was an obvious recognition of the treaty and deprived Nepal of its only plausible pretext for violating. The Resident lost no time in asking, on the 1st August 1834, as to why were the additional duties levied

41. P.C. August 21, 1834—No. 38.

42. Hodgson remarked: "My only present purpose is to press 1792 Treaty in the hope of indirectly and slowly influencing Bhim Sen to more wholesome courses; with the alternative of retaliation by this palpable means. And there is no danger that my declining to accept refusal would lead to interference or Bhim Sen's fall". P.C. October 9, 1834—No. 17.

43. P.C. July 19, 1834—No. 90.

by Nepal on Indian goods, while the Nepalese products were regularly charged only at the stipulated rate of two and a half per cent."

This step on the part of the British put Bhim Sen in a very awkward position. In view of his declining influence it was not possible to come in direct clash with the Indian Government. Moreover, any retaliation in the form of embargo or high duties would have been suicidal for him. Gradually Nepal had become so much dependent on this income and trade that its loss would have been a catastrophe. On the other hand, free intercourse with the plains would have removed the popular prejudice, which he had so long nursed. Mathbar Singh frankly admitted that the "recognition of the treaty would cause the whole country to sing the praises of the Company and that the Maharaja (that is Minister) would lose all considerations among his own subjects".⁴⁴ Consequently, there was no way out for Bhim Sen except procrastination. The Resident was first told that the Maharaja's spiritual adviser was against relinquishing the unilateral operation of the treaty and, therefore, the Resident should let the matter stand as such.⁴⁵ Hodgson was in no mood to listen to this lame excuse and required reasons for it. After a few days another extraordinary answer was brought that in consideration of the long permission of such state of affairs, the Maharaja had an earnest desire for the continued unilateral operation of the treaty for five or six years more.⁴⁶ Bhim Sen's motive was to secure a semblance of recognition for King's minority in the form of British consent for unilateral operation of the treaty based on an appeal of his youth.⁴⁷ Hodgson agreed to give only one year's grace on the condition that the treaty would be accepted in letter and spirit. This stern answer of the Resident led Bhim Sen to adopt dilatory tactics, and he even spread rumours of change in the affairs of the Darbar to divert Resident's attention from the treaty of 1792.⁴⁸

44. P.C. August 21, 1834—No. 38.

45. P.C. October 9, 1834—No. 17.

46. Ibid.

47. P.C. October 9, 1834—No. 18.

48. P.C. October 16, 1834—No. 26.

49. P.C. October 16, 1834—Nos. 25 and 26.

At this stage the Indian Government could not follow up the line taken by Hodgson. Hodgson's plan was to insist on the bilateral operation of the treaty of 1792 on the pretext of timber omission case. The Indian Government, on the contrary, wanted first to know whether the Darbar still recognised the treaty in force or not.⁵⁰ It gave Bhim Sen an opportunity to outright refuse to recognise it on November 12, 1834.⁵¹ In fact, the Indian Government had adopted a milder attitude as it did not fully understand the strange politics prevailing in the Darbar.⁵² The refusal by the Nepalese Government was, however, soon followed on December 1, 1834 by a new and a very favourable proposal for a new commercial treaty.⁵³ The Darbar was willing to preserve the substance of the treaties of 1792 and 1801, in so far as they were related to the encouragement of trade, by proposing four per cent ad valorem duty levied at one, the main (Sadar), tax post. The little time that elapsed between the rejection of the old treaty and the proposal of the new one gave an impression of some undue influence from Hodgson.⁵⁴ But the proposal was deliberate and spontaneous, and the reasons for the rejection of the old treaty and for the new proposal were quite obvious.⁵⁵ The old Commercial Treaty was rejected because its recognition on the part of Nepal would have given the British a chance to exact retrospective claims of compensation due to its unilateral operation in the past. Nor the Darbar wanted to revive the various matters connected with the treaty of 1801, which was purely political and was regarded as supplemental to the treaty of 1792. The new proposal was put forward mainly due to the fear of retaliation from the British side. Had it in the least occurred to the Darbar that the old condition of affairs could still be tolerated by the British, it would not have come forward with the new proposal. They were conscious of the favour the British had been giving since last four decades. British acceptance of the new treaty,

50. P.C. October 9, 1834—No. 19.

51. P.C. December 2, 1834—No. 87.

52. P.C. December 2, 1834—No. 89.

53. P.C. December 19, 1834—No. 9.

54. P.C. January 15, 1835—No. 44.

55. P.C. January 23, 1835—No. 52.

therefore, would have given Darbar an authoritative and legal bar against any retrospective claims.⁵⁶ Finally, four per cent duty, being a mean between nominal rates of the old treaty and usual heavy rates of the British, was calculated to benefit Nepal.

Hodgson hailed this proposal as the "first step" towards better relations, which would have placed them "beyond hazard of interruption from the renewal of jealousy.... intrigues and fluctuation of power".⁵⁷ The terms were soon accepted by the Governor General and the details were left to be settled by negotiations.

Besides the disparity in custom duties, the currency problem was another serious obstacle in the way of free trade. This problem had three dimensions.⁵⁸ Firstly, the export of the British coins was rigidly prohibited by the Darbar, and whatever amount of this currency was present in Nepal, it used to be withdrawn from circulation and re coined into Nepalese currency. Secondly, the Nepalese currency was so much adulterated and debased that the Indian merchants would not accept it. Finally, these two factors, coupled with Nepal's situation of being isolated from the financial circle of the plains, led to the want of means to balance commercial accounts and made it difficult to make remittances by bills. Its inevitable consequences were the serious difficulties for the Nepalese merchants to pay off the Indian counterparts.

Hodgson pointed out to the Darbar its suicidal folly. The rate of currency exchange was determined by Calcutta essay and not at the current rate of bazar.⁵⁹ The Nepalese government could not simply gain anything by its prohibition except the general obstruction. But the Nepalese refused to improve the situation.

56. P.C. January 23, 1835—No. 51.

57. P.C. December 19, 1834—No. 9.

58. P.C. July 10, 1834—No. 144.

59. The Nepalese official rate of exchange in 1834 was 100 Indian rupees to 120 Nepalese; Bazar rate—100 to 126-128. Calcutta Mint rate 100 to 135 and $\frac{3}{4}$. Residency rate up to 1830 was 100 to 123; but from 1830 it was raised to 100 to 128. Ibid.

V

While these negotiations were still going on a very important development took place in the factional politics of Nepal, which equally affected the foreign policy of Bhim Sen. Till 1834, in spite of his declining influence, he was predominant and did not have to face any very serious challenge from other factions. In December 1834, however, the rivals of the Thapas, the Kala Pandes, who were an exiled family since last three decades, came into limelight. They had gained the solid support of the Senior Maharani and suddenly came forward and petitioned the Maharaja for the restitution of their family honours and property. The petition was received in a favourable manner. In fact, the royal family was only in search of some such support to counteract the influence of Bhim Sen. The sudden revival of the claims and its favourable reception astonished all, and Bhim Sen's authority no longer appeared unchallenged. "Evil omens" had been occurring since last few years which affected the imagination of the Nepalese public.⁶⁰ On September 18, 1833 a severe earthquake rocked the whole valley; on June 19, 1834 lightning struck the powder magazine; a fortnight later another earthquake occurred; and after a few months Bhaghmati overflowed its banks. In Nepal these things did carry a lot of weight in the nineteenth century. From December 1834 on, in fact, he reckoned the "commencement of a counter-revolution and intrigues of Kala Pandes". For Bhim Sen the nature of these intrigues was entirely different from the previous ones of his own brother. Against these he had to search for his security more desperately. Now more than ever, he realised that the Indian Government could be used to maintain him in power. He was well conscious of his own utility to the British and of the objects for which Hodgson had been striving since last few years. Consequently, the year 1835 opened with Bhim Sen well disposed to conciliate the Indian Government by every practicable means and in return trying to secure British support for his family. It is worth noting that despite the non-interference of the Resident, the Indian Government

60. See S. Levi, n. 1 Ch. I, p. 327, and Oldfield, n. 5, Ch. Is p. 308.

had been a very important factor in the history of Nepal and since the times of Bahadur Sah no Prime Minister could neglect it.

Moved by the above consideration the Darbar responded to Hodgson's overtures for a commercial treaty. In March 1835, after frank and friendly negotiations, the following proposal was put forward for Governor General's consideration:⁶¹

- (I) The produce and manufactures of Nepal and Tibet were to be levied a duty of four per cent Kuldar, ad valorem, in the British provinces; and the British and Indian produce an import duty at Nepal of five per cent Mahendra Mulli rupees, ad valorem, according to the market rates of exchange in Nepal.
- (II) No other or further duty was to be paid in either state under any condition.
- (III) The entire duty above-mentioned was to be levied and paid at once.
- (IV) There were to be a limited number of Custom-Houses in either state, of which a list was given—seventeen in British India and twentyone in Nepal.
- (V) Punishment was to be given to any Custom Officer for infringing the provisions of clause number two.
- (VI) Speedy justice was to be made available to the merchants of either state on any grounds of complaint arising from extortion or irregularity by the Customs Officers in British India or Nepal.
- (VII) Appeals from the decisions of the collectors of customs in either state were to be referred through the Resident.
- (VIII) Lists of the produce of either state were to be prepared and authenticated by the Governor Gene-

61. P.C. July 20, 1835—No. 19.

ral and the Maharaja of Nepal, and goods hitherto free of duty were to remain so.

(IX) The treaties of 1792 and 1801 were to be considered rescinded.

This proposal was different from the previous proposal of December 1834 in which four per cent custom duty had been suggested. The Darbar now claimed a difference in duties in its favour and more custom houses on its side. Even then, compared with the state of things prevailing in the past, the British would have gained a great advantage. Under the conditions prevailing so far, British commerce with Nepal had practically been crippled by heavy import duties. The new proposal at least provided a single moderate payment. Hodgson was so jubilant on this "favourable turn" of the Darbar, that he considered it a great achievement and a prelude to a new era of peace and prosperity for Nepal.⁶²

Unfortunately, the Board of Customs Salt and Opium in India did not agree with the terms of this proposal, as a duty of mere four per cent on all the Nepalese goods was considered too low as compared to the normal rate of import duties levied by the British in India.⁶³ At the same time, the Indian Government did not favour the existing condition in which the Nepalese goods in India were charged

62. Hodgson wrote to one of his friends Lady D. 'Oyly: "The Darbar is growing exceedingly civil, and I have now at last a prospect of seeing the realisation of those hopes which have buoyed me up these ten years. I think I have by unwearied kindness and confidence melted the rock of Gorkha alienation and jealousy; and is so, I shall be, ere long, able to turn the Darbar way from its suicidal prosecution of the old policy of wars of aggression and to induce it gradually to accommodate its institutions to its circumstances, as fixed by the late war with us...and whilst I live I shall reflect with delight that I have saved a gallant and ignorant people from the precipice on which they were rushing by force of habit and incapacity to survey comprehensively their relative situation...The other day when an amicable old chief answered me with tears, whilst I explained the friendly purpose on some of my past earnest and even stern warnings, rejoicing that at least they seemed to have taken effect—when the good old man embraced me and told me that I should long be remembered as the saviour of Nepal..." Quoted by W.W. Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I. pp. 147-148.

63. P.C. July 20, 1835—No. 21.

only two and half per cent, while the Indian goods in Nepal were charged much more. Therefore, it exempted all the Nepalese goods from custom duties in June 1836 and expressed a hope that the Darbar would follow the example to enable a free flow of trade.⁶⁴ The British concession was acknowledged with jubilation by the Darbar, but it was not prepared on its part to lift duties from the British goods.

VI

Bhim Sen's anxiety to please the Indian Government found vent in other directions also. The engagement about the mutual surrender of dacoits, which had been agreed on September 24, 1834, was now, in July 1835, put into force.⁶⁵ Strict orders were issued to the local authorities of the Terai to surrender every criminal irrespective of his caste.⁶⁶

With these friendly steps Bhim Sen was gradually drawing his ring closer around the British. It has already been mentioned that he desperately wanted British support to maintain his authority. But Hodgson's attitude had made it pretty clear that he would not be a party to such design. Failing with the Resident and the Indian Government he tried to get in direct contact with the authorities in London. A complimentary mission to England was proposed in May 1835.⁶⁷ At Bhim Sen's instance, the Maharaja expressed a wish to send General Mathbar Singh to England to see "all the wonders reported of that country and to manifest the entire confidence placed on British faith in thus throwing into their hands the life and honour of one of their principal chiefs".⁶⁸ The proposal was favourably received by the Indian Government and the Governor General agreed to it considering that it would only help in augmenting the faith of the Gorkhas in British intentions.⁶⁹

Hodgson, however, soon detected that the ruling party

64. P.C. July 27, 1836—No. 26.

65. P.C. October 16, 1834—No. 24.

66. P.C. August 3, 1835—No. 44.

67. P.C. May 25, 1835—No. 34.

68. Excerpts—1835.

69. P.C. May 25, 1835—No. 35.

had some ulterior designs, which were not being publicly disclosed. It was found that the letters addressed to the British King and the President of the Board of Control and the Governor General were different from the avowed objects of this mission as were disclosed to the Resident. These letters clearly expressed that the ruling party in Nepal expected some advantage and the mission was intended to serve certain political aims.⁷⁰ Hodgson, therefore, strongly objected to it and insisted that if the Darbar had any proposals to make, it must use the instrumentality of the Resident. In any case Mathbar Singh was not to be allowed to be a medium of any political communication, but was only to pay his respects to the Sovereign of the United Kingdom as a private traveller. It immediately extinguished all the zeal of the Darbar to despatch the mission to England. Mathbar Singh's mission was confined to Calcutta and only in a complimentary letter from the Darbar to the President of the Board of Control a hope of some personal advantage to him was expressed.

There can be no doubt that this step of Bhim Sen was taken with an intention highly injurious to his royal Master.⁷¹ Since the death of the Regent Maharani, he was not in a secure position against the young Maharaja and his ambitious Queen. Throughout 1832 to 1834, he tried by various means, short of force, abdication of the Maharaja, but his schemes failed due to suspicious character of his intended victims. Having failed there, he wanted British support for the maintenance of his position. That was why so many friendly gestures were made by him during 1834 to 1835. But Hodgson knew that under the prevailing circumstances it would not be expedient for him to support a Prime Minister against the King.

Bhim Sen, however, desperately wanted to gain British support in some form or the other. No sooner was the mission proposed, rumours were disseminated, with a view to win the imagination of the people, that its secret purpose was either the retrocession of Kumaon or the removal of the Residency.⁷² In fact, Bhim Sen clearly realised that in

70. P.C. December 21, 1835—No. 29.

71. P.C. April 24, 1837—No. 81.

72. P.C. December 21, 1835—No. 29.

the presence of the Resident, who was accredited to the Maharaja, his plan could not be successfully implemented. The Maharaja also understood Bhim Sen's intentions as is clear from the fact that he always suspected some under-hand conspiracy of the Thapas in sending the mission.⁷³ It was currently believed that Bhim Sen had demanded power from the Maharaja for Mathbar Singh to negotiate at Calcutta or England for the removal of the Residency or for guarantees that he would remain Prime Minister for life and after him the office will go to his family. In return he was ready to promise good relations with the British and to send a periodical mission to Calcutta with presents and stipulated sum of money. This attempt could not succeed due to determined opposition of the Maharani, who feared that in the absence of the Resident there would be left no check on the Prime Minister.

Bhim Sen, thus frustrated, decided to have direct contacts with the English King and the Governor General, and therefore made fresh attempt to write to them. According to Assistant Resident Campbell, who later on accompanied Mathbar Singh during his mission to Calcutta, the plan of Bhim Sen was to open negotiations with the Governor General (the new Governor General Lord Heytesbury was expected at this time) for the removal of the Residency and the retrocession of Kumaon. In the event of the failure of his mission to the Governor General, Mathbar Singh was to proceed to England for the same purpose. In case all these attempts failed, Bhim Sen wanted the British Government to "grace Mathbar's return," in lieu of which he was ready, as a "show not in substance," to lift the restrictions imposed on the Resident and the British trade and to stop all military preparations. He knew that even a semblance of support from the British would strengthen the position of his faction. At last, due to Resident's steadfast refusal to support all these aims, he wrote a letter to the President of the Board of Control hoping some "personal share in the small advantage". Analysing the purpose of the missions

73. A very useful account and analysis of the motives behind Mathbar Singh's visit to Calcutta has been given in a memorandum prepared by Asstt. Resident A. Campbell. P.C. April 24, 1837—No. 82.

Campbell, Assistant Resident, remarked, "...I consider the mission to have been proposed with two real objects in view, different from the avowed ones—First, the deceiving us so far by professions of friendship and change of conduct for the future, as to induce us to withdraw the Residency and thus leave the field more open for increased usurpation by the Minister, and second (the first failing) to deceive us so far by friendly professions, and promises from the Minister (the sole ruler at the time) of laying open the country to us, as should lead us to enter into league with him by giving a grant of land to Mathbar Singh, and thus help to perpetuate his rule against all attempts of the Raja to displace him. The trip to England was a mere pretence, for the gaining of one or both these objects. Its immediate abandonment by the Darbar on the Resident's message just before the Mission started, to the effect that it had better not go, then that any expectation should attach to it, is a clear proof of it."⁷⁴

The Indian Government was least prepared to be a party to such aims. In the past it had the bitter experience of 1802-1803, when Capt. Knox had to retire due to such an alignment with the faction in power. Support to a Prime Minister against the King was always dangerous in Nepal. Consequently, Campbell was strictly instructed not to indulge in any talks of political nature with Mathbar Singh.⁷⁵

In November 1835 Mathbar Singh started for Calcutta with presents to the Governor General and complimentary letters to the King of England and the President of the Board of Control. He was escorted by a splendid retinue of six hundred and fifty picked soldiers and forty elephants. At the Presidency he was well received by the Governor General. During his tour several times he tried to drag Campbell into discussion regarding his strenuous efforts to bring about friendly relations between the two countries and expressed an expectation of reward from the Indian Government. On the 1st January 1836 he even frankly expressed a wish to get a land grant worth ten to twenty thousand rupees per annum. He urged Campbell to use his efforts

74. *Ibid.*

75. P.C. January 11, 1836—No. 49.

and to contact the Governor General, but he was emphatically told that as a custom the British Government did not offer such grants to individual chiefs without specific request from the ruler and for all such deals the instrumentality of the Resident ought to be used. Eventually Mathbar Singh returned to Nepal on March 20, 1836 without a single expectation fulfilled.

Bhim Sen was frustrated in his ulterior designs by the failure of the mission and it naturally affected his position adversely. In fact, the failure of the mission broke the well nourished impression in Nepal that the British were particularly well disposed towards Bhim Sen and the Thapas. It encouraged the Maharaja to regain his authority because the Indian Government had refused to be a party to the evil designs of the Prime Minister. It also made the British realise that their relations with Nepal were not secure under the prevailing policy of the Darbar.

VII

Mathbar Singh's mission was the last serious effort by Bhim Sen to win over the British support. Attitude of the Indian Government convinced him that against the King he would not be supported. As an alternative he went all out to rouse anti-English sentiments of the soldiery so as to maintain his tottering hold. This changed attitude could be discerned in the negotiations of extradition cases. The Darbar deliberately "refused to recognise in any shape or degree" punishment by the British of the Nepalese criminals when the penalty happened to be more than what was provided in their own code.⁷⁶ Due to similar reasons (there were of course many other reasons as well) the Nepalese Government refused to reciprocate the British example of no import duties on trade.

Meanwhile, the internal situation in the Darbar was getting more unfavourable to Bhim Sen as his rivals were gradually making headway. The Maharaja was himself heading the opposition against him. All those, who so far

76. P.C. February 13, 1837—No. 40.

did not dare raise a voice against the all powerful Thapas, were realising that the old man was neither powerful nor popular enough to be dreaded. The Pande faction had been taken into confidence by the Senior Maharani and the Maharaja. Its leader Ranjung Pande could even gather courage to publicly, though unsuccessfully, accuse Mathbar Singh of moral turpitude.

The King now felt powerful enough to take positive steps to reduce the power and influence of the Prime Minister. Many public offices were retrenched and military expenses were reduced.⁷⁷ The onus of these steps obviously fell on Bhim Sen. More than anything else the Maharaja tried to break the monopoly of Thapas from public offices. In 1837 the Pandes secured the nomination to lead the periodical mission to Peking. The nomination could not be ratified but it was also not given to a Thapa, and finally Pushkar Sah Chautria was sent. At "Panjani" many Thapas were deposed and their offices were given to their rivals. Post held by Mathbar Singh was given to a Pande, and after a few months Chief Justiceship was secured by Rang Nath Pandit, the leader of the Brahmans.

All these events pushed the Prime Minister more and more towards hostility to the Indian Government. He had, perhaps, come to the conclusion that exploitation of the Gorkha prejudices remained the only means to maintain his tottering power. It is most remarkable that opposition to the British in the public could still be aroused and exploited in Nepal.⁷⁸ Such a policy would have rightly served Bhim Sen in his quest for power. It did not certainly mean that Bhim Sen had finally decided to cast his lot with the war party. But the way he had now adopted was fraught with grave consequences. The number of army was raised up to seventeen thousand and a professedly complimentary mission

77. P.C. December 12, 1836—No. 36.

78. With reference to British relations Hodgson remarked on July 18, 1837, that if Bhim Sen continued in office, he would by every practical means try to perplex the Darbar on this point, which was the strongest prejudice of the nation, including the Raja. He added, "I know nothing more remarkable in History than the existing strength of those prejudices, in relation to the chiefs generally". P.C. August 14, 1837—No. 34.

was despatched to Lahore in the beginning of 1837.⁷⁹ With a view to make the Resident realise how much dependent he was for his personal comforts on the Prime Minister, deliberate attempts were made to harass him. The permission lately granted for the Resident to excuse a few miles in the Valley was withdrawn.⁸⁰ Bhim Sen hoped that thus harassed the Resident might be forced to seek his protection and in turn fall in line with him. With the same motive every attempt was made to cripple whatever trade existed between India and Nepal. Agents were employed by the Nepalese government to purchase goods in the plains, which were brought without duties and sold in the Valley to undersell the Indian merchants.⁸¹

The increasing hostility of Bhim Sen and growing factional rivalries convinced Hodgson of the impending crises. An eruption of long-checked martial energy was most imminent as every faction wanted to win the support of the army by anti-British bogey. Against such a contingency some positive step by the Indian Government was essential. If Bhim Sen was to drive things to the extreme, Hodgson suggested that, his government should support the weaker party.⁸² Simultaneously, he advocated that a direct access to the King must be secured. The Indian Government, however, did not take any positive step in this direction.⁸³

79. P.C. December 12, 1836—No. 36. Also see Excerpts—1837.

80. P.C. May 1, 1837—No. 55.

81. P.C. August 14, 1837—No. 34.

82. Hodgson wrote to the Private Secretary of Lord Auckland on June 24, 1837 that, "So long as order prevails so long I think we could, if we deemed it expedient, by coming forward distinctly to countenance the weaker party at present, give it the preponderance. But I would not advise such a proceeding unless the Minister were clearly seeking to drive things to extremity with us, because he felt that quiet must undo him at home. This sort of crisis excepted, I would continue looking on merely as heretofore until the expected change occur, or, until having occurred, it produce no amendment or promise of amendment. If the change come not soon or come without improvement, I would take the first fair occasion of a reckoning with Nepal. If the change seems to tremble in the balance, wanting but a simple manifestation on our part in favour of the legitimate head of the state, that manifestation would be made by and by, and under a distincter probability of quiet efficacy than now exists". Quoted by Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 156.

83. P.C. December 12, 1836—No. 37.

The fall of Bhim Sen was not far to come. Affairs at the Darbar were moving at a tremendous speed. Ancestral property of Ranjung Pande was restored to him in July 1837. After gaining the royal patronage he again brought up the charge of adultery against Mathbar Singh. Still Bhim Sen was too powerful to be shaken off easily. Therefore, two steps were taken to cripple his power and popularity. The affairs of the Residency, which were heretofore monopolised by him, were given to his rival faction, and, to further deprive Bhim Sen and Mathbar Singh of their popularity among soldiers, orders were issued to discontinue escorts and retinue of the chiefs.

With these steps already taken, the Pandes soon got the long awaited chance. Maharaja's youngest son died on July 24, 1837. The Pandes lost no time in spreading the rumour that the child had died of poisoning designed by Bhim Sen for his mother—the Senior Queen. In the confusion thus created the King grasped the opportunity of dismissing the Prime Minister, who was arrested along with his nephew Mathbar Singh. Ranjung Pande, who was now favourite of the King and his domineering Maharani, was appointed as the new Prime Minister.

VIII

This period, which witnessed such important developments in the Darbar, is also fairly important as regards the problems of Resident's jurisdiction over his followers and the frontier dacoity. As Bhim Sen's power was gradually declining, it became difficult for him not to heed to the British overtures to come to an agreement upon these mutual problems. There was no treaty or a clear understanding between the two Governments regarding the jurisdiction of the Resident over his followers. Because no dispute had arisen since 1817, this problem did not assume a serious form. The Resident kept a very careful watch over them, and it became a custom that he punished all the ordinary criminals, but surrendered those who deserved capital punishment.

In September 1832, however, a very serious case⁸⁴ occur-

84. P.C. October 29, 1832—No. 2.

red. A sweeper of the Residency, who happened to be a Muslim by religion, committed adultery with a Nepalese woman. According to the Gorkha code it constituted a serious crime entailing a very severe punishment, i.e., the aggrieved husband had the personal right to kill the adulterer any time without any investigation or trial by the courts. The unfortunate episode aroused a lot of indignation among the chiefs and the opposition parties sought to make capital out of it. Resident Maddock took the position that he would surrender the criminal only if he were found guilty after a fair trial. The Maharaja was instigated to take a vigorous action and could only be checked at the threat of Bhim Sen's resignation. The sweeper was ultimately pardoned, but Bhim Sen expressed a desire for an arrangement to avoid any future misunderstanding.

The Indian Government insisted on the general principle that the followers of the Residency were the subjects of the Resident and were not amenable to Nepalese laws unless surrendered by him.⁸⁵ Hodgson proposed draft of a treaty on December 18, 1832, which had the following four main provisions:⁸⁶ Firstly, the subjects of Nepal offending the followers of the Residency, whether caught within or outside it, were to be tried by the Darbar. Similarly, the Darbar was to surrender the followers of the Residency if they happened to be offenders. Secondly, the Resident proposed that in cases where the "policy of Hindu state or national customs of Nepal were violated, he would not pass judgment according to the laws of Company but as far as possible in accordance with the Nepalese laws". Thirdly, in the cases of the peculiar laws of Nepal, which entailed death or mutilation, the Maharaja was to be satisfied by transportation or imprisonment for life or for some years, as might be deemed adequate by the Resident in friendly conference with the Darbar. In case the Darbar did not consider penalty enough, the proceedings were to be stayed and the case was to be decided at diplomatic level. Finally, in the cases of wilful murder, heinous robberies, rape and other universally acknowledged capital offences, the criminals were to suffer capitally.

85. P.C. October 29, 1832—No. 7.

86. P.C. February 4, 1833—No. 58.

The Nepalese Government accepted the proposals, except the provision concerning the capital punishment, and insisted on adding that it considered the practice of revenge by an aggrieved husband "to be part and parcel of the laws and habits of Nepalese people".⁸⁷ It was deemed too sacred to be compromised or bartered away by an engagement. It took out the bottom of the whole proposal. The Resident assured to respect the custom as far as possible, but refused to recognise a private right of murder which preceded all the proofs of guilt and trial. The British objection was not the punishment but the lack of proof. The Resident agreed for the capital punishment provided there was a fair trial, but in any case private right could not be recognised.

The Nepalese, on the contrary, were not ready to abolish this Gorkha custom. It was not that the Darbar could not have saved the followers of the Residency, but they were not ready to abolish the custom in a legal way. Publicly signing away of their custom would have produced too wild a commotion to be controlled. It was told by the Nepalese agent in January 1833 that, "we cannot covenant its omission; you cannot covenant its admission; best way is not to have any covenant". The Indian Government also dropped the issue due to Nepalese aversion against any written engagement.⁸⁸ The practice, therefore, stood on the old footing that the Resident would keep vigilance over his followers and the Darbar would not hesitate to surrender the offender to the Resident.

IX

Dacoities along the Indo-Nepalese border were another serious problem that the two governments had to deal with. The position and the extent of the forest tract, which limited the Terai towards the hills, gave a considerable importance to this question, as it afforded a safe shelter to the dacoits. During 1834 and 1835 this crime on Morang and Purnea border reached an unprecedented height.⁸⁹ It became seri-

87. P.C. February 4, 1833—No. 59.

88. P.C. February 4, 1833—No. 60.

89. P.C. August 15, 1836—No. 22.

ous headache to the Indian Government to apprehend and suppress these bands of free looters. There was a definite fear that if the whole Terai were to fall in this condition, the entire Indian police could not then save the rich districts of the Company.

In the absence of any definite understanding with the Darbar the problem had assumed a more aggravated form. Up to this time the efficiency and co-operation of the Darbar and the Resident's tact had kept on everything well. But in the absence of a general agreement, there was no guarantee that such a smooth working would continue, particularly when Nepal had been twisting such measures with political motives. Nor were the British entirely blameless. They had always considered the Nepalese laws too barbarous, against which they had assumed a sacred duty not to surrender criminals to the Darbar. Consequently, the British subjects who had committed dacoities in Nepal, were not surrendered by them. The Darbar also became adamant and refused to extradite the Indian criminals unless reciprocity was observed.⁹⁰

Hodgson acquainted the Darbar with the seriousness of the situation. It immediately responded and proposed two solutions. Either, both the Governments should surrender all the dacoits, whether their own subjects or that of the demanding state and to let "the crimes be atoned where committed", or, never to surrender one's own subjects, but, on a complaint being made by the aggrieved state, to prosecute the criminal in its own courts on the basis of the proofs furnished. The issue was strictly limited to dacoities.

Pressed by increasing crimes, the Indian Government grasped the opportunity and accepted the former of the two proposals of the Darbar.⁹¹ According to it, criminals were to be surrendered irrespective of their nationality to face their trial before the court of the country in which the offence had been committed upon the presumptive evidence being produced of their guilt. Here sufficient proof of the guilt was essential to satisfy the surrendering state. This

90. P.C. August 21, 1834—No. 32.

91. P.C. August 21, 1834—No. 36.

rule would have vindicated the authority of the suffering state and would have helped in getting the witnesses. The Darbar also accepted this principle in September 1834. But the requisite orders to this effect could not be issued by the Darbar for nearly a year to come, which it evaded on the religious pretext—that Brahmans, who were immune from capital punishment in Nepal, would also have to be surrendered according to this engagement. However, on the 18th July, 1835 the necessary orders were issued to the Terai authorities.⁹²

As in the case of dacoits, for the surrender of the Thugs the Darbar responded promptly. During the time of Lord W. Bentinck this became a countrywide problem and in Terai particularly these Thugs could find an easy shelter. The only obstacle in the way of an arrangement was the Nepalese insistence for equality. The British did not agree to it because Thuggee was a temporary problem. On Hodgson's insistence the Darbar finally agreed and orders were issued on January 20, 1837 to the authorities of the Terai to surrender such persons against whom there was suspicion even on the grounds of *prima facie* evidence alone.⁹³

X

The border problem between the two countries remained comparatively quiet in this period. The new survey and demarcation of the Oudh and Nepalese frontier had already been completed by Capt. Codrington in 1830. The Sikkim boundary, therefore, remained the only source of inconvenience. As early as March 1817 Capt. Latter, the British political agent in Sikkim, reported the doubtful character of the river Mechi as boundary between the two countries.⁹⁴ But Resident Gardner did not then like to raise the issue and the matter remained unadjusted. In 1833, however, the dispute came to the forefront. The real bone of contention was a triangular tract, called Koplashi, lying

92. P.C. August 3, 1835—Nos. 43 and 44.

93. P.C. February 20, 1837—Nos. 31 and 32.

94. See p. 55.

between two streams—the old and new Mechi. In 1817 Capt. Latter fixed the western stream, the old Mechi, as the boundary, whereby Koplashi fell in Sikkim's share and remained in its undisputed possession for seventeen years. The Nepalese did not object and the Indian Government regarded the undisputed possession of Sikkim as valid by right of prescription.⁹⁵

In October 1833 the Government of Nepal stated that the real Mechi in 1817 was the new stream and claimed the tract of Koplashi.⁹⁶ Considering the political importance of Sikkim as a bulwark against the eastward expansion of Nepal, the British Government undertook the survey of the whole frontier and appointed Major P. Loyad in May 1834 to conduct it with the aid of the Gorkha and the Sikkim commissioners.⁹⁷ As for the basic principles Hodgson succeeded in convincing the Darbar that the question of right was no more open and, as the British were the guarantor of the boundary between both the countries according to the Treaty of Sagauli, it was proper for them to know what they had guaranteed.⁹⁸ At last the claims over Koplashi were abandoned by the Nepalese on the understanding that on minor points satisfaction would be afforded to them.⁹⁹

In the course of the survey conducted by Major Loyad, in the winter of 1834-35 another dispute cropped up. This dispute was for a ridge lying between the two streams the junction of which formed Mechi.¹⁰⁰ The ridge was called 'Oontoo'. The western river was called Mechi by Sikkimites and Siddhi by the Gorkhas; and the eastern stream was entitled by Sikkimites as Kanchi and Mechi by the Nepalese. Which of the two streams constituted the real Mechi was the point of dispute, and upon this issue rested the validity of the claim over Oontoo. This dispute is also known as "Siddhi Kola" dispute. Two investigations conducted by Major Loyad in 1834-35 and in 1836-37 could not conclu-

95. P.C. January 10, 1834—No. 25.

96. P.C. January 10, 1834—No. 25.

97. P.C. June 12, 1834—No. 137.

98. P.C. January 10, 1834—No. 25.

99. P.C. January 10, 1834—No. 28.

100. P.C. March 14, 1836—No. 47.

sively establish Sikkim's right over this ridge.¹⁰¹ The final survey was ordered in October 1837 and this time the Nepalese agents and Dr. Campbell, the Assistant Resident, also accompanied Major Loyad in the course of the investigation.¹⁰² The survey was conducted after a year during the winters of 1838-39. Dr. Campbell finally considered the Nepalese claim over Oontoo more conclusive as the western stream was proved to be Siddhi and the eastern one Mechi.¹⁰³ The Governor General decided the dispute on April 10, 1839, in favour of Nepal, and the eastern stream was decided henceforth as the Mechi river and the boundary between Nepal and Sikkim, and the tract lying between the two, called Oontoo, was given over to Nepal.¹⁰⁴

101. P.C. October 16, 1837—No. 88.

102. P.C. October 16, 1837—No. 93.

103. P.C. April 10, 1839—No. 110.

104. P.C. April 10, 1839—No. 112.

THE BREWING OF TROUBLE (1837-1839)

I

The martial and exclusive policy of Nepal had its repercussions after the fall of Bhim Sen. Gardner, Maddock and Hodgson had always feared that being shut up from all the sides and having no out-let—social or political—for their energy, except the occupation of arms, the martial races of Nepal remained a potential source of trouble to the British empire in India. So long as Bhim Sen controlled the affairs of Nepal his strong hand kept the army in check, though he had also from time to time catered to its chauvinism after 1832 to maintain his position. After him the long checked volcano erupted and jingoism engulfed every party and even the Maharaja. In fact, it will be nearer the truth to say that Bhim Sen had himself left this legacy. He had maintained an enormous standing army without a purpose consistent with the geographical position of Nepal. Trade and commerce were prevented from shaping the destiny of the nation, and the popular prejudice against the British had been nourished. Consequently, after him very few were aware of the relative position of Nepal and the British in India.

Maintenance of such a policy in martial country like Nepal could either have resulted in a civil war or in an aggression of the Indian territory. Internal disorder was not possible due to extremely obedient habits and national outlook of the Gorkhas, but the latter probability was a real danger. And had it not been for other factors, such as the vacillating character of the Maharaja, the absence of any strong Prime Minister after Bhim Sen for many years to come, the deep animosity between the rival factions, the self-interest of the Senior Maharani, and the wise policy of

Hodgson, war with Nepal was a possibility. It certainly goes to Hodgson's credit that he saved the Indian Government from a war on its northern flank when it was most awkwardly placed against Afghanistan and Russia in the northwest, and, in the process, he also saved Nepal from its disastrous policy, which would have extirpated the Gorkha dynasty.

For any study of the Indo-Nepalese relations during this period it must at the outset be understood that these relations were most intimately connected with the internal politics of the Darbar and the British position in Burma, China, Punjab and Afghanistan. India had always been an important factor with the Nepalese parties, and after the fall of Bhim Sen certain factors had made it more significant. The Pandes, who were the dominant faction enjoying the royal favour after the fall of the Thapas, had hardly any popular backing. They had to encourage militarism and nationalism so as to maintain their hold on the Government and army. Anti-British bogey was also used by the Senior Queen to harass her husband. The King was also ambitious and, harassed by the Queen, sought his satisfaction in wild dreams of conquest and intrigues. These three, viz., the Senior Maharani, the Pandes and the King mainly represented the anti-British front. Against it, the Thapas, the Brahmans and the Chautrias, came to form a peace party in due course of time. These factions were no less national in their outlook, but due to the internal policy adopted by the Pandes, they were interested in maintaining peace and order. Whenever the former group controlled the affairs a war cry was given and when the latter was in power the peaceful counsels were heard in the Darbar.

After Bhim Sen's fall Nepalese politics centred round the King. Rajendra Vikram Sah was an ambitious prince, but did not possess courage to give effect to his ambitions of conquest. He was always fearful of the British retaliations. That was why Nepal assumed a threatening posture only when the Company faced trouble in other quarters. As chance would have it, the British hands after the fall of Bhim Sen were full in China, Burma, Central India and particularly in Afghanistan. With the court of Ava British were having lean time and their Resident had to retire in

the face of hostility. In the northwest the Russians were trying to extend their influence with Persian co-operation on the rulers of Herate and Afghanistan. This was considered by Lord Auckland as the gravest danger for the British Empire in India. His government committed folly after folly towards Afghanistan till the ignominious retreat of the British army from Bala Hissar in 1842. In Punjab Ranjit Singh, though co-operated with the English during the first Afghan war, was never a reliable ally. After his death in June 1839, condition of Punjab was one of chronic instability. English position in China was no better. From 1839 to 1842 the British Government was on very bad terms with the Chinese Emperor. In Central India the descendants of Peshwa, who had been deposed by Lord Hastings in 1819, were waiting for their chance. The new ruler of Satara was also intriguing against the British till he was dethroned in August 1839. And, the state of Gwalior, though crippled by Lord Hastings, was still a force to be reckoned with its 40,000 troops. Under such condition of affairs the Indian Government naturally could not have afforded rupture with Nepal. Its policy was, therefore, directed to avoid a contest with Nepal till the northwestern trouble was over.

II

Hodgson's initial reaction to Bhim Sen's fall was quite favourable. During the last days of the earlier regime he had become so frustrated that he thought any change would be better.¹ He was particularly hopeful from the new set up because for the first time monopoly of the viceregal Prime Minister had been broken. The British could now have a direct contact with Head of the State. The rulers of the new regime appeared less dangerous because they had neither the talent nor the authority and unity of the past to give effect to hostile inclinations. They were also too busy in their own clashes to molest the Indian Government. Finally, the Maharaja also appeared well-disposed towards the British in the beginning.²

1. P.C. August 14, 1837—No. 34.

2. P.C. September 18, 1837—No. 69.

Hodgson, however, kept aloof from domestic strife.' He feared that till a stable ministry was not formed, every party would try to exploit the anti-British sentiments of the army to win its favour.' At the same time, Hodgson realised that it was a unique opportunity to obtain a direct and free access to the King. It was, therefore, deemed wise by the Indian Government to give firmness and confidence to the Maharaja with its moral support.' The Resident advised the young King to look after the affairs personally, particularly the relations with the British, and distribute the offices of the Government to several persons.'

Apprehensions of Hodgson soon came out to be true. The political vacuum created by the exit of Bhim Sen could not be filled by the King. Time revealed that the Maharaja had a fickle and wicked character. He was extremely ambitious, vain, weak and vacillating. His overruling passion was to wield power of which he had been deprived of since his childhood. But he did not have the ability and resolution to control the affairs. That was why he never gave full powers to any prime minister. No sooner had the revolution against the Thapas succeeded, the Brahmans and the Chautrias strongly remonstrated against Ranjung Pande with the result that he was dismissed. No one was, however, appointed in his place nor was he completely dispensed with because the Maharaja wanted to balance the various factions and thus control the affairs himself.

For a few months everything remained in suspense. The

3. P.C. August 21, 1837—No. 41.

4. P.C. August 14, 1837—No. 34.

5. Hodgson was instructed that, "...the Government is desirous that you should do all that you prudently can to acquire and maintain a free personal intercourse with Raja on all matters in which we are concerned. It will be great point gained to win his confidence, and to give him by courting frequent and direct communication with him, confidence in himself. To seek immediate access to him on occasions in which we are closely interested is a legitimate object,.....It will be enough if your sentiments on internal affairs be asked for, to aid the Raja in keeping the control of the Government in his own hands, and in selecting prudent, impartial and honest counsellors". J.R. Colvin, Private Secretary to the Governor General to B.H. Hodgson; dated August 31, 1837. See Hunter n. 40 Ch. I, p. 158.

6. P.C. October 9, 1837—No. 45.

Maharaja just tried to test the chiefs around him and get a better knowledge of the affairs.⁷ The routine business of the Residency also could not be attended to under these conditions. For a few months, in fact, no arrangement was made by the King to hold contacts with the Residency. Every party wanted to secure the charge of the British affairs, and the Maharaja, knowing their designs, withheld the appointment. His ambitious character, on the contrary, was finding a better field in foreign affairs. With a view to cater to the national pride a confidential envoy was sent to Lahore with instructions to leave no means untried to win over Ranjit Singh for a coalition against the British.⁸ For the same purpose various agents were despatched to Rajputana and China.

The Indian Government did not take the activities of the Darbar seriously at this stage. Under the prevailing condition it considered it natural for the Maharaja to be uncertain. He was not yet well established with the newly acquired power and was surrounded by conflicting factions which were trying to misrepresent each other.⁹ It was also not possible for any party to befriend the Resident in the prevailing atmosphere of hostility towards the British. The Indian Government, therefore, thought it best to stand aloof till the transitional period had passed away, because its interference would have brought the various rival factions together and would have given the war party an upper hand. There was certainly a possibility of Nepalese aggression on the Indian territory, because of its overgrown military strength, but to have anticipated and opposed such a situation from developing by imprudent interference would have hastened it.¹⁰ Therefore, the Governor General only thought

7. Resident's Diary—October 25, 1837 to November 18, 1837—Microfilm No. 77—Roll 8 of National Archives of India. Henceforth this reference is mentioned as "Resident's Diary".

8. P.C. October 9, 1837—No. 46.

9. P.C. October 9, 1837—No. 49.

10. The Governor General remarked on October 30, 1837 in a minute that, "I consider Nepal to be our most dangerous neighbour placed amidst mountains almost inaccessible, with a warlike, well armed and well disciplined population. . . It probably only awaits a time of political difficulties again to try its strength against us. Yet, to anticipate it is to hasten this period. . . ." P.C. October 9, 1837—No. 47.

it proper to create confidence in the Maharaja about British intentions. In November 1837 a "Kharita"¹¹ from the Governor General was given to the Maharaja, in which he admired firmness of His Highness and recommended him to receive the Resident on friendly and unreserved terms.¹² He also hinted that the business of the Residency was lying pending and that there was lack of reciprocity on the part of the Darbar in levying of custom duties. This had the desired effect to some extent. The Maharaja assured amicable relations and promised to look after the business of the Residency.¹³

By December 1837 party politics in Nepal had reached a definite stage. The Pandes had gone down and Rang Nath Pandit, who was a mild supporter of Bhim Sen, secured for himself Prime Ministership¹⁴ He shrewdly realised that he could use the popularity of Bhim Sen with the army to counteract the Pandes. Backed up by the Chautrias, he soon not only got Bhim Sen and Mathbar Singh released but also got their family honours restored to them. The Maharaja was, however, still apprehensive of the Thapas and, with a view to counterbalance them, continued to keep Ranjung in confidence. His attempt was to institute a mixed administration with himself as the actual head.¹⁵ Gradually the views of the various parties were also becoming clear and the contest among them became one of principle between the civil and military chiefs. The Darbar now got divided in two groups; the Senior Maharani vigorously supported the Pandes and the Junior Queen and Rang Nath Pandit favoured the restoration of the Thapas. Attempt of the former was to get Ranjung Pande appointed as Prime Minister and to secure Maharaja's abdication. She feared that with the support of the Thapas the Junior Queen might set aside the legitimate claims of her own son to the throne. The Maharaja was not the least inclined to leave power and kept the affairs of the Darbar as they were. The Thapas

11. "Kharita" was the usual term applied for mutual correspondence of the Maharaja of Nepal and the Governor General.

12. P.C. October 9, 1837—No. 46.

13. P.C. January 24, 1838—No. 38.

14. P.C. December 27, 1837—No. 57.

15. S.C. May 16, 1838—No. 18.

continued to attend the Darbar and Ranjung was kept out of office.

III

Rang Nath Pandit was a man of peaceful disposition, but the circumstances in which he had to work made it necessary for him to manipulate foreign intrigues and foment war atmosphere. The Pandes were heading the militant section of the Darbar and the Maharaja not merely acquiesced in but also encouraged their activities. As rumours of Russo-Persian league against Herat and the withdrawal of the British Resident from Burma gathered, the war party and the King considered it an opportune time to settle the old scores with the Company. Several agents and missions were sent to Herat, Burma, Bhutan, Tibet and Punjab.¹⁶ Great hopes were entertained for an alliance with Ranjit Singh. Mathbar Singh, who had left Nepal in March for Punjab, became the chief means of communication between the Courts of Kathmandu and Lahore.¹⁷ The Nepalese intrigues were not confined to the independent states; the Darbar was also trying to contact and arouse protected Indian States against the Company.¹⁸

The rumours of the British difficulties in Burma and Afghanistan and the unsettled state of Rang Nath's administration gave the war party a good opportunity to come to the top. The chiefs in the Darbar were openly divided into two parties—the extremists who wanted immediate expulsion of the Resident as a prelude to hostilities and the moderates who advocated temporization and taking of no hostile step till the attitude of Ranjit Singh, the King of Burma and the Emperor of China remained unknown.¹⁹ As early as April 28, 1838 Bhim Sen had informed Hodgson that the Darbar was prepared to start hostilities in October if a favourable response was given by Peking, Ava and Lahore.²⁰

16. See the following consultations: P.C. February 5, 1838—No. 14; P.C. March 14, 1838—No. 171; S.C. July 4, 1838—No. 11; and *Resident's Diary*—January 1, 1838 to January 23, 1838.

17. *Excerpts*—1838.

18. S.C. June 13, 1838—No. 8 and S.C. July 11, 1838—No. 12.

19. S.C. July 20, 1838—No. 1.

20. S.C. May 16, 1838—No. 33.

In the beginning the Indian Government did not take these intrigues seriously, but the gradual unfolding of their inimical character aroused it to the ultimate danger and it took steps to meet them. It authorised the Resident to refuse passport to the Nepalese agents going to the British protected states unless he had been fully informed of the nature of the visit.²¹ Subsequently, the British Residents at these courts were asked to get the Gorkha emissaries expelled even before their letters could reach the rulers. From Ava and, particularly, from Lahore a real apprehension was felt as Ranjit Singh himself had taken a keen interest for an alliance with Nepal. However, in June 1838 the Indian Government concluded an alliance with Ranjit Singh against Dost Mohammad of Afghanistan.²² The ruler of Punjab openly disavowed any conspiracy with Nepal against the new ally. Lord Auckland considered the alliance too formidable to be broken and directed the Resident to apprise the Darbar of it with a view to discourage the Nepalese.²³ With Burma the affairs were unsatisfactory till June 1838, but they were not expected to reach the extent of rupture. All these factors and the unfavourable reception, which the Nepalese missions received in various Indian courts, induced Lord Auckland to hope that the Darbar would soon realise the futility of challenging the Indian Government.²⁴

A more strict attitude was not deemed expedient, because dealing with a country like Nepal such a policy would only have united the contending factions in a common cause against the British. Moreover, it seems that Lord Auckland had not yet taken the danger from Nepal very seriously. He was too much occupied with the Afghan problem to change his opinion about Nepal easily and still less to allow an open rupture unless forced to take up arms, which he earnestly urged Hodgson to avoid.²⁵

21. S.C. July 4, 1838—No. 13.

22. S.C. July 25, 1838—No. 6.

23. S.C. September 12, 1838—No. 16.

24. S.C. October 17, 1838—No. 161.

25. S.C. September 12, 1838—No. 16.

IV

The domestic affairs of the Darbar were taking once more a new turn by July 1838. Prime Minister Rang Nath Pandit tried his best to control the administration, but the division of authority and the Queen's opposition rendered him helpless. She had been backing Ranjung's candidature for Prime Ministership and introducing the Pandes in administration. Even the powers of the Prime Minister had been reduced. The command of the army and control of the foreign affairs were taken over by the Maharaja. Rang Nath's schemes to raise more revenue failed in the face of increasing military expenditure. Finding all his attempts thus balked, he resigned in August in sheer disgust.²⁶ This removed a moderating influence from the Darbar. After him there was practically no responsible authority in the Darbar except the King, who deliberately kept the affairs confused. He neither appointed any one to the ministry, nor could do anything himself without the Senior Maharani.²⁷ He was not even willing to have Ranjung Pande as the Prime Minister as he feared he might overshadow his authority. Therefore, in spite of Queen's insistence, he gave him nothing except the Governorship of the eastern province.²⁸

In foreign affairs the Maharaja followed the same policy of intrigues and covert hostility against the British.²⁹ Great hope was entertained from China and rumours were spread that Nepal's envoy Pushkar Sah had secured substantial promises from that quarter.³⁰ News from Mathbar Singh, that Dost Mohammed had joined the Russo-Persian league and that Macnaghten's mission to Lahore had failed where Ranjit Singh had dictated the terms, aroused great interest in the Darbar.³¹

Constant intrigues of the Gorkhas and an important

26. S.C. August 29, 1838—No. 25.

27. S.C. October 17, 1838—No. 171.

28. *Resident's Diary*—August 1 to October 9, 1838.

29. S.C. August 22, 1838—No. 27.

30. *Resident's Diary*—August 1 to August 31, 1838; Also see *Excerpts*—1838.

31. S.C. November 21, 1838—No. 149.

development on Nepal-Sikkim border led the Indian Government to take more strong attitude towards Nepal. In July 1838 Lt. Col. P. Loyad, the Commissioner designate to arbitrate the Nepal-Sikkim border dispute, alarmingly reported collection of Gorkha troops on the Sikkim frontier.³² He forthwith recommended the establishment of strong observation posts along that frontier. The Nepalese on their part could not have been blamed for this particular step. In 1835, the Indian Government had taken over from Sikkim the hill-station of Darjeeling, which occupied an important strategic position at the junction of Sikkim and Nepal boundary.³³ It wanted to get a sanatorium constructed at Darjeeling, but what made the Nepalese suspicious was that Lt. Col. Loyad was also engaged in raising irregular levies in that region. Both these steps naturally alarmed the Darbar.³⁴ They were already hemmed on two sides by the British and the extension of the same influence on the third produced uneasiness in them. There was certainly nothing in the measures taken by the Gorkhas in this direction which was not a necessary consequence of the British step.

It was, however, enough to arouse the Indian Government to take some defensive measures. Col. Morrison, a member of Governor General's council, described the relations in a "very critical posture" and recommended a force of 5,000 to be posted at strategic position between the rivers

32. S.C. July 20, 1838—No. 3.

33. Translation of the Deed of Grant making over Darjeeling to the East India Company dated February 1, 1835.

See Aitchison, Vol. II, Part V, n. 22, Ch. I, p. 325.

34. On August 5, 1838, Commander-in-chief wrote to Governor General that such measures as Col. Loyad had been authorised to pursue ought not to have been entered without a full and perfect understanding with Nepalese Government. The measures of raising suppers and mines, tucking up cannons were calculated to alarm that Darbar and corresponding measures of defence were natural on their part. They were already hemmed by our troops on the west and south and to have the same measures commenced on the east was highly calculated to produce uneasiness and defensive proceedings on their part. He remarked, "I have read Col. Loyad's letter twice and I cannot see any detail of any act or measure on the part of Nepalese, which was not almost necessary result of the measures of Darjeeling, if adopted without full understanding on their part". S.C. August 22, 1838—No. 12.

Gandak and Kosi north of the Ganges.³⁵ Lord Auckland soon ordered a field force of 5,000 to be established under General H. Oglander during the coming winters.³⁶ This step was taken as a defensive measure against any attack from Nepal in the event of the expected march of the British troops to Afghanistan. They did not like to leave their northern flank so unprotected in the present mood of the Darbar.³⁷

The news of the collection of the Indian force and the condition of the British relations in other quarters, which were not yet very unsatisfactory, brought down the temper of the Darbar considerably. Considering the attitude of the Nepalese, it is certain that they would have welcomed a rupture with the British only in five cases, viz., in the event of a war between Burma and the British; in case of breach of the Anglo-Sikh alliance; Russo-Persian invasion of Afghanistan leading to a direct collision with the British; in case the Chinese support was forthcoming; and lastly in the event of internal disturbances in India. But at that time none of these was certain. As regards Burma, it was sufficiently known that Col. R. Benson's mission to that court might succeed. Anglo-Sikh alliance was too formidable to be broken by Nepalese intrigues and Ranjit Singh had openly disavowed any intention of going against it. The advance of the Russians and Persians on Afghanistan was yet a distant hope. Power of China had considerably declined and she was now not in a position to help Nepal. The Nepalese mission to the Chinese Emperor had returned in September and it was rumoured to have received a cold reception in the Imperial Court.³⁸ Finally, there appeared no effect of the Nepalese intrigues on the Indian States, out of which none was ready for a war with the British.³⁹ The Gorkha emissaries were dismissed from these courts and some had even been arrested.

All these factors produced a change in the attitude of the Darbar and, instead of contemplating aggression, it start-

35. S.C. July 20, 1838—No. 4.

36. S.C. August 22, 1838—No. 14.

37. S.C. November 21, 1838—No. 152.

38. S.C. October 17, 1838—No. 178.

39. S.C. November 21, 1838—No. 147.

ed taking defensive measures for its own safety." Two officers were appointed to proceed to the eastern frontier and utmost precautions were taken to meet any British attack from that quarter." Even the general tone of the Darbar improved. Hostility towards Sikkim was openly disclaimed, and a sense of impropriety of its numerous missions to Indian States was also accepted." No doubt unfriendliness towards the British persisted, but there was nothing which seemed to threaten an immediate collision.

As the time passed on, involvement in Afghanistan proved too much for the Indian Government. Although as early as August 28, 1838, orders had been issued to post General Oglander's force, yet Lord Auckland wished that rupture with Nepal must be avoided till the British entanglement in the north-west was over." A month later he manifested further disinclination for an armed involvement with Nepal." On October 22, he specifically warned the Resident not to widen differences and earnestly urged him to preserve peace by every practical means." Hodgson knew this weakness quite well. The force under General Oglander had barely 6,000 illequipped soldiers. To attack Nepal's hilly frontier with such a force, or to defend British provinces against 45,000 trained Gorkha soldiers with it, was a fantastic idea. Therefore, the Resident tried to make best of his

40. Ibid.

41. S.C. August 29, 1838—No. 24.

42. S.C. November 21, 1838—No. 147.

43. The Resident was informed on August 28, 1838 that, "although a powerful force will be assembled in our central provinces, so as to keep Nepal in check. Yet the important operations which are immediately to be undertaken across Indus, as well as other considerations render it inexpedient that we should keep to force or a crisis at that time." Ibid.

44. From John Russell Private Secretary to Governor General to Hodgson—dated September 28, 1838. Quoted by Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 165.

45. Government instructed Hodgson that, "you have been distinctly informed that steps should not be taken to widen differences and increasing alarm. Governor General in Council has every reason to hope, that by proper measures peace can be preserved and even if this hope is diminished he is desirous that nothing should be undertaken, beyond measures of precautions as are absolutely essential, which may have effect of irreconcilable difference on premature issue". S.C. November 21, 1838—No. 159.

available strength. Mood of the Darbar and the vacillating and weak character of the Maharaja convinced him that only fear can improve the situation.⁴⁶ Rumours of the collection of a big British force served him well. Even in his normal behaviour he adopted an attitude of indifference as if nothing extraordinary was happening. He strongly protested against the various Nepalese missions and their intrigues in India, and tried to engage the attention of the Darbar in the ordinary routine matters.⁴⁷ This naturally impressed upon the chiefs, and also the Maharaja and the Queen, that Hodgson had really a strong backing of force behind him.

The King was extremely divided between his fears and ambitions. The British entanglement in Afghanistan tempted him to continue his hostility. At the same time, he was highly worried that the recent intrigues carried on by the Darbar had been detected by the British.⁴⁸ The Maharaja was afraid of the British retaliations before the north-western trouble had actually disabled them.⁴⁹ The result was that Resident's remonstrances were met with excuses, false promises of satisfaction or with professed ignorance. However, Hodgson's efforts partially succeeded on September 24, 1838, when after evasions and delays the Darbar redeemed its promises of openly recanting its various missions and the Resident was furnished with closed royal mandates of the recall of its agents from Hyderabad, Gwalior, Nagpur, Patna, Delhi, Udaipur, Haroutee and Banaras.⁵⁰

After a fortnight on the 7th October 1838 three more grievances, which the Resident had been discussing, were redressed.⁵¹ Firstly, the Darbar accepted the valid claims of Sikkim over Koplashi and agreed to enter into new investigation of the dispute on the basis of its relinquishment. Secondly, redress was promised for the British traders who had been denied justice in the Nepalese courts. Finally, the

46. S.C. August 29, 1838—No. 24.

47. *Resident's Diary*—1st to 30th September 1838.

48. *Ibid.* 20th to 31st October, 1838.

49. *Ibid.* 1st to 18th November, 1838.

50. S.C. October 17, 1838—No. 163.

51. S.C. November 21, 1838—No. 157.

Darbar again admitted its obligations to co-operate in apprehending the Thugs. It may be remarked that complaints of non-cooperation on the part of the Nepalese local authorities had been accumulating since the last few months. In June 1838, on the remonstrance of the Resident, the Darbar had issued orders that prior confession of crimes should no longer be deemed an essential condition to hand over a culprit. In August these orders had been renewed, yet it was only on November 29, 1838 that the principal offenders were actually surrendered to the British Magistrates.⁵²

These agreements do not, ofcourse, imply that the Darbar had given up its attitude of hostility. As already stated, the letters of recall to the emissaries had been given to the Resident under cover, and all the agents were not even called back. It was, however, the maximum that could be achieved by Hodgson without the risk of collision with the Nepalese.

Consistency was the last thing with Maharaja Rajendra Vikram. No sooner had the various missions been recalled from India, several new emissaries were sent to Jodhpur, Mathura and Kanpur. Prophecies of the British downfall and the Nepalese victory were spread in the plains. Majela Guru, a pro-British chief, was twice made incharge of the British affairs and was removed both the times.⁵³ British traders were still being denied justice. To gloss over everything the Darbar proposed a complimentary mission and a letter to the Governor General on November 6, 1838. Its real purpose was to blind the British to the reality of the Nepalese hostility, to get an opportunity to send new spies and to seek permission for sending a marriage mission to Rajputana.⁵⁴ The Resident was not at all inclined to allow such a complimentary mission and only forwarded the complimentary letter to the Governor General.

With the close of 1838 the tone of the Darbar took a better, if not a cordial, turn under the peaceful influence of Majela Guru. On November 28, 1838 the Darbar reassur-

52. P.C. December 19, 1838—No. 69.

53. S.C. November 28, 1838—No. 41.

54. S.C. November 21, 1838—No. 160.

ed impartial justice to the British traders and some hope was entertained for the implementation of the agreement reached on October 7, 1838.⁵⁵

V

From the beginning of 1839 Pandes got a hold over the affairs of the Darbar. The Senior Maharani, who had been backing Ranjung Pande by all sorts of means, at last got him prime ministership, but he had to share it with Pushkar Sah Chautria.⁵⁶ The King always dreaded him, and, therefore, neither confirmed him for a year to come nor gave him substantial powers. Ranjung Pande naturally did not have much authority nor did he appear much in activities. Mostly he used the cover of the Maharani for his various schemes.

Ranjung had fully realised that if the Pande faction was to exist in power, it could only be as a war party. In the absence of general popularity his only support was the army. Moreover, he understood that Maharaja could only have been won over by promising wars and conquests.⁵⁷ Consequently, under him the regime started with martial temper raised to the pitch. During January and February 1838 rumours were spread and belief was fostered that the British downfall was imminent. All out efforts were launched to gather all the sources of the country to face the impending war. Cannons and ammunition were manufactured with great speed and all the able-bodied persons were counted.

Such a policy certainly made Ranjung popular with the army, but it was not a cheap game; it required money. Blind with his lust for power he started grasping money irrespective of the mode and consequences of accumulation.⁵⁸ Public expenditure was drastically retrenched and chiefs

55. Resident's Diary—December 10 to December 19, 1838.

56. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 115.

57. S.C. July 11, 1838—No. 12.

58. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 118. Also see Excerpts, 1838 and 1839.

were forced to pay heavy taxes and fines. All the rent free properties of the last three decades were taken back. To enforce all these measures army was used. Soon acclamations of his war promises turned into "an outcry against the extortions of his war finance". In fact, the Pandes, the Queen and the Maharaja had their separate aims in creating such a condition." Ranjung was thirsting for revenge from his old enemies. The Queen wanted to create perpetual trouble for her husband as a necessary means to secure his abdication. The Maharaja was so much under the influence of the Maharani that, despite knowing her aims and that of the Ranjung's, he co-operated in their schemes of conquest and war preparations. He, in fact, thought that in such conditions he would be able to control the administration. Naturally, every step they took involved hostility abroad and severity at home.

Such was the state of disorder at one stage that the chiefs began to desire British intervention and retaliations which would at least set the affairs right.⁵⁹ In this way things were inevitably drifting towards the formation of a peace party. Under the unofficial aegis of the Resident, who represented external peace and internal order, peaceful

59. Resident reported on April 14, 1839 that, ".....the great body of chiefs is extremely disgusted and discontented. The Senior Rani's irregular and violent ambition is said to find a ready tool in Ranjung for the accomplishment of her particular purposes on condition she prove herself (as she professes to be) equally pliant in regard to his particular ends. She wants Raja to resign in favour of her son; Ranjung wants revenge on his numerous enemies, and the Raja though he dreads with both the one and the other, and thus continues to withhold the (confirmation in the) Premiership from Ranjung, yet gradually gives way to his imperious spouse, seduced by extravagant promises of mighty things which Ranjung is to achieve against the Company".

S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 115.

60. The Resident remarked on April 14, 1839: "All persons of mark now look to the Company's Government, and earnestly hope that the Governor General will ere long be led to address the Raja in such terms as may frighten him into justice at home and abroad, and redeem him from the toils of the Rani and (Ranjung) Pandi, whose unjust and irregular ambition threatens equal mischief to the State in its domestic and in its foreign relations". S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 115.

Also see S.C. December 26, 1839—No. 131.

chiefs started gathering. While dealing with the relations of this period the consequences of Ranjung's internal and economic policy should never be overlooked. This was precisely the reason that alienated the public opinion from the war policy of the Pandes.

As the peace party was gradually coming into existence, Ranjung determined to break this new front. He knew that the Maharaja would not withstand the British threats and retaliations. Therefore, adopting his own methods, he started torturing the Thapa faction. Mathbar Singh, being in British hands, he dared not openly attack Bhim Sen. Every effort was made to poison and to lure Mathbar Singh back to Nepal. The Vaid's (doctor's) family, who had treated the ill-fated child of the Maharaja, was done to death with most horrible means just to secure an evidence against Bhim Sen. Having failed to secure any such proof, Ranjung brought a strange charge of poisoning Maharaja Girwan Judh Vikram and his widow in 1816 against Bhim Sen. The ex-Prime Minister courageously defended himself against the false charge, but none dared support him and the King also denounced him as a traitor. Worn out by constant tortments, the old giant tried to commit suicide on July 20, when he heard the rumour that his wife had been forced to parade naked through the streets. After nine days on July 29, 1838 he is alleged to have died of the wound he had inflicted upon himself in his attempt to suicide. His body was refused even the last Hindu rites and was thrown over rubbish. Thus died one of the greatest statesman of Nepal, who first extended the territory of his country and then tried to save it against the greatest imperialistic power. Despite his few shortcomings, he was a great statesman, who understood the British power, their designs and ways. So long as he was in power Nepal was safe in his hands. Hodgson paid him glowing tributes in following words: "...the great and able statesman who for more than thirty years had ruled this kingdom with more than regal sway, . . . (during which) the uniform success of nearly all his measures had been no less remarkable than the energy and sagacity which so much promoted that success. He was indeed a man born to exercise domain over his fellows alike by the means of command and of persuasion. Nor am I aware of any native statesman of

recent times, except Ranjit Singh, who is, all things considered, worthy to be compared with the late General Bhim Sen of Nepal".⁶¹

Towards the Indian Government the Pandes followed a policy of extreme hostility. Their attempt was to induce the Maharaja to believe that the Governor General neither desired the late amends nor would insist on their fulfilment.⁶² By every means they tried to delude the weak and ambitious King with the dreams of conquest. In this attempt they were greatly helped by three external developments. Firstly, the Governor General himself could not adopt a strict attitude. The letter he had addressed to the Maharaja, in reply to the late engagement of October 7, 1838, was quite moderate.⁶³ It dispelled Darbar's belief that the Indian Government had taken their intrigues seriously. Secondly, news from Burma, that the British Resident had not been treated well, excited great interest.⁶⁴ And finally, the information that Mathbar Singh had crossed the river Sutlej revived all the hope of an alliance with Lahore.⁶⁵ Encouraged by these factors, resumption of intrigues and correspondence was openly talked about in the Darbar. The Resident and the Governor General's Kharita were neglected with contemptuous haughtiness. The Resident was requested to furnish passports for missions to Herat, Bengal and Rajputana. Bhopal Singh Thapa, a Gorkha officer in the service of Ranjit Singh, was engaged to promote an alliance with Lahore. Emissaries, disguised as Sadhus, were sent in large numbers

61. Hodgson to the Deputy Secretary with Governor General dated July 30, 1839. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 82.

S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 82.

62. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 89.

63. Lord Auckland to Maharaja of Nepal dated November 29, 1838: "My friend I will not conceal that some late proceedings of your officers have excited much surprise and regret of mine. You know states of India are under British protection and correspondence with them is possible only through British Government. Under such condition the uninformed emissaries of Nepal gave rise to displeasure and British Government had to take defensive measures. But now I hope that the assurance of Darbar will be materialized". S.C. December 5, 1838—No. 19.

64. S.C. February 6, 1839—No. 53.

65. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 85.

to the Indian Provinces to predict the fall of the English and to create an impression that the British expedition beyond the Sutlej river had drained all their resources.⁶⁶ Indeed the Nepalese affairs were getting difficult for the Indian Government.⁶⁷

The Nepalese Government was getting more and more restless with the increase of British involvement in Afghanistan. But it wanted to contact the Indian States and other powers before taking any hostile step. The problem of searching bride for the Heir Apparent provided a good pretext to the ruling party to send a number of missions to the Indian States. These missions were sent at the instance of the Senior Maharani, who wanted to keep her husband in trouble by pursuing anti-British policy. Under the guise of marriage missions hostile activities were carried out in the British provinces. In March several such emissaries were arrested for carrying intriguing communications. When the Resident protested against them the Maharaja only requested their release. Not merely that, a permission was sought by the Darbar to send larger missions to Rajputana and Rewa.⁶⁸ And with a view to camouflage its real intentions, a complimentary mission to the Governor General was proposed.⁶⁹ But the Maharaja as usual vacillated between the necessity to adhere to his recent promises and a strong inclination to resume intrigues.⁷⁰ He feared that before the English faced difficulties in Afghanistan or Burma, Nepal might be chastised for its covert hostility. In this situation, therefore, his plan was to avoid hostilities for a year more by excuses, evasions and complimentary mission to the Governor General, and observe the British position in other quarters.⁷¹

66.—S.C. September 4, 1839—No. 40.

67. While writing to his father on February 1, 1839, Hodgson remarked: "We have narrowly escaped a war with Nepal and now I see many symptoms that escape was but temporary, and that unless our Governor General makes up his mind to more resolute remonstrance than heretofore, Gorkha presumption and duplicity will speedily enforce our taking up arms against Nepal". Quoted by Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 169.

68. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 95.

69. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 103.

70. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 87.

71. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 89.

The Indian Government was well conscious of the danger from Nepal, where the party in power was deliberately trying to create trouble and the King was ambitious. It certainly wanted to curb the power of Nepal, but the circumstances were not opportune.⁷² It was facing crisis in Afghanistan, China and Burma. Only when free from these quarters could it have adopted a forceful attitude towards Nepal. Therefore, the paramount consideration with the British Government was to defer hostilities. Demonstration of force or even adoption of a strong attitude would only have precipitated a crisis.⁷³ In this dilemma Lord Auckland could only protest and remonstrate feebly with a view to preserve peace.

In the beginning of 1839 when the Darbar started sending marriage missions, the Governor General did not at all take the issue in a tone of resentment.⁷⁴ Only when the Resident repeatedly insisted that the Nepalese liberty to use the plains at their discretion must be checked, and when some of the emissaries had been arrested, that he adopted a more strict attitude.⁷⁵ Orders were issued on February 21, and then

72. The Governor General's council was highly suspicious of Nepal at this time. Almost every member recommended active intervention and reduction of Nepal's power by force, Lord Auckland was, however, against it. He remarked, ".....I regard the reduction of the power of Nepal rather as an end to be attained when all circumstances are favourable....."

"On this essential point I have no hesitation in recording my decided opinion that we ought not to court the risk of war with Nepal in the approaching season.

.....what is our condition now? The full European force assigned to India is yet but very partially supplied.....It cannot be expected that any Regiments which may be recalled from the Army of the India will be in the Provinces before December.....Not more than 12 or 14 regiments could by utmost efforts be set in motion against Nepal". S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 73.

73. In this context Lord Auckland remarked: "I need not on this occasion enlarge on the subject of the specific demands which it is right and fitting that we should make on the Nepal Darbar..... I would only hint that the question is not of less delicacy than importance.....It will hence be difficult so to guide our proceedings as not greatly to alarm and rouse the national spirit. A divided court contending factions, the whole body of Gorkha soldiery, may be united in resistance to us....." S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 73.

74. S.C. January 2, 1839—No. 45.

75. S.C. January 2, 1839—No. 44. Also see S.C. December 18, 1839—Nos. 85 and 87.

repeated on March 18, 1839, that Nepalese emissaries would not be allowed to enter India and all the foreigners entering the Indian territory from that direction were declared liable to be detained and sent back. On March 28, the Darbar was clearly told that its matrimonial missions to Rajputana would not be allowed in the present state of strained relations between the two Governments."

Considering the check on the free use of the plains by Nepalese as "the true secret for controlling the wanton spirit" of the Darbar, the Indian Government continued to withhold its permission till July. To further express his displeasure Lord Auckland addressed two letters to the Maharaja on April 18, 1839, in which it was specified that the various Nepalese missions to the Indian States would not be permitted and the circumstances were also inopportune for receiving a Nepalese complimentary mission.⁷⁷ However, the Resident was instructed to allow such marriage missions if he was convinced of their genuineness.⁷⁸ Beyond this the Governor General was not ready to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal, because too much pressure or interference would have created a general alarm, which he was determined to avoid.⁷⁹ The Darbar's attitude was, however, not to be changed so easily. It understood the British weakness, and realising its own advantage was bent upon pushing it to the utmost. When the Indian Government prevented unauthorised Nepalese to enter the Indian territory, it adopted new tactics, and started sending the Indians in place of the Gorkhas by unusual routes and in separate parties.⁸⁰ The intrigues with the Indian States and war preparations also continued unabated.

VI

By mid 1839 Hodgson's situation at Kathmandu was really getting critical. Having no backing of force from

76. S.C. March 20, 1839—No. 18. Also see S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 93.

77. S.C. December 18, 1839—Nos. 106 and 107.

78. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 113.

79. S.C. December 26, 1839—No. 120.

80. S.C. December 26, 1839—No. 119.

his Government he had to depend upon his own courage and tact. "To put up a good face on" and to temporize became his main aim.⁸¹ Yet, there were two factors in the situation which enabled him to keep his hold on Nepal: firstly, the necessity of seeking a bride for the Heir Apparent in the plains was a great anxiety to the Maharaja; secondly, Ranjung's policy of severity at home and militancy abroad had alienated the sympathy of the people and several influential chiefs.⁸² Both these were ably used by the Resident to prevent Nepal from taking any advantage of the situation in which the British were placed at this time.

By July 1839 the negotiations between the Resident and the Darbar about the marriage missions reached an interesting stage. On the side of the Darbar the anxiety of the marriage of the Heir Apparent kept its hostility under check. On the British side the necessity of temporization for a short period was felt with greater pressure due to strained relations with Burma and Afghanistan. Under these circumstances, the Resident had to reluctantly qualify his heretofore absolute refusal to aid the Darbar in its marriage missions. Any further opposition in this delicate matter of "Hindu marriage" would have been mis-represented by the war party. After much discussion Hodgson agreed on July 9, 1839 to forward a letter to the Maharaja of Rewa, proposing the marriage of the Heir Apparent, on the fulfilment of the following four conditions within ten days:⁸³ abandonment of the marriage mission to Rajputana; promise of co-operation in effectively apprehending the Thugs; renewal of the Darbar's pledge to redress the grievances of the Indian merchants, who had been denied justice; and finally, dismissal of Gwalior's agent Kashi Nath from Kathmandu.

After this engagement protracted negotiations went on between the Resident and the Darbar for quite some time. It is obvious that the above promises had been made by the Maharaja due to the fear of British retaliations and his anxiety of the Heir Apparent's marriage, and he himself would

81. S.C. December 26, 1839—No. 128.

82. S.C. December 26, 1839—No. 128.

83. S.C. September 4, 1839—No. 43.

have also effectuated them, but the virago Maharani and the Pandes did not allow him to do so.⁸⁴ Both these created such an atmosphere of uncertainty in the Darbar that extreme restlessness and equally extreme anxiety nearly balanced each other. Weeks and months passed away and the negotiations could not be expedited due to deliberate and uniform absence of Ministers Ranjung Pande and Pushkar Sah Chautria. During the interval every effort was made to create discontent among the people. Military stores were as usual accumulated and a permission was sought from the Company to attack Bhutan through Sikkim, which was, of course, flatly refused.⁸⁵ Most of the chieftainry stood aloof from the activities of the Darbar, and the general condition became so hopeless by October 1839 that the Resident remarked: "Darbar cannot but now fight a defensive war, for she is not prepared now to provide for a war, however impracticable and shameless she may be in her transactions".⁸⁶

At last, after prolonged debates, the Maharaja agreed to redress the British grievances which Hodgson had been negotiating and an engagement was signed by him on November 6, 1839.⁸⁷ The details of these negotiations were as follows:—⁸⁸

The problem of the marriage missions was the starting point of these talks. As a matter of custom extensive facility was provided in the plains to the Nepalese to search matrimonial matches for the royal family. In the recent years it was greatly abused by them for intrigues. Realising its danger the Indian Government got the Gorkha agents dismissed from Rajputana and strictly refused to allow such missions. In July, however, Hodgson gave way to Darbar's insistence due to the factors above explained. He forwarded a letter of the Darbar, seeking marriage alliance, to the Maharaja of Rewa, on the condition that if the proposal

84. Resident's Diary—from August 15 to 31, 1839.

85. S.C. January 8, 1840—Nos. 147 and 149.

86. Resident's Diary—from October 4 to 18, 1839.

87. Aitchison, n. 22, Ch. I, pp. 116-117.

88. A very detailed analysis of these negotiations has been given in Hodgson's despatch to the Political Secretary—S.C. December 26, 1839—No. 156.

was accepted, he would allow a Nepalese marriage mission to that court to finalise the engagement. The mission was to consist of two chiefs of highest order and forty to sixty followers. The sanction of Governor General was essential for it. This provisionally satisfied the Darbar, but surprisingly it proposed to send a complimentary Kharita to the Governor General, and with that also sought the permission to despatch a still larger mission to Rajputana and Rewa both. This demand was insisted on without the permission of the Maharaja of Rewa and the Governor General and without any redress of the British grievances.

Hodgson was not in a position to defy the wishes of the Darbar in a delicate matter like marriage. Therefore, he enquired from Col. J. Sutherland, the British political agent in Rajputana, about the effect such a mission would produce in those courts. Col. Sutherland assured the harmlessness of the Gorkha mission. Meanwhile the Maharaja of Rewa expressed his unwillingness for matrimonial relations with Nepal. Hodgson knew that Rajputana would be the inevitable demand of the Darbar now. Therefore, he told the Darbar that instead of Rewa, a mission could be allowed to Rajputana provided the Governor General agreed to it and the British Resident and his suit were permitted to excursion in the Valley to a distance of at least fifteen Kos on all the sides. As was anticipated, the Nepalese declined to comply with this condition. The Resident deliberately insisted on it because he had no other proper objection to put forward in this delicate matter. Actually Darbar's proposal to Rajputana was a fraud because according to certain custom Rajput States did not accept matrimonial relations with the Nepalese royal family.⁸⁹ But the Darbar had also its reasons for insisting on it. The Nepalese wanted to fathom the displeasure of the Governor General and to wipe off the last year's disgrace when their representatives had been unceremonially dismissed from those courts, and also sought to create a secret understanding with them through the chiefs of highest order, who could not otherwise have been sent.

Till September 1839 the negotiations dragged on and

89. Ibid.

Hodgson did not budge from his position. Realising that the British would not yield, the Darbar openly abandoned the idea of mission to Rajputana and with that the demand of sending two high ranked chiefs was also given up. From the British side their demand of fifteen Kos limits for the excursion of the Resident was dropped.

Both the demands being dropped the Nepalese expressed a desire to send a marriage mission to the Indian districts of the northern side of the Ganges. Hodgson allowed the mission and in return got the satisfaction of the British grievances on October 26, 1839, which had been promised on July 14, 1839. On November 6, the Maharaja signed the engagement and after two days the Resident granted passports for the marriage party. This mission was to consist of fifty persons including fifteen armed soldiers and all the districts of the northern side of the Ganges up to Banaras were opened to it.

The second subject of discussion was the surprising offer of a complimentary letter by the Darbar to the Governor General. The obvious motives behind this proposal were to fathom Governor General's anger over the past two years' conduct of the Darbar, to make empty professions of friendship and in this way to secure passport for the marriage mission to the Rajput States. To counteract it Hodgson put forward the British grievance of justice to the Indian traders. As early as July the Maharaja had promised its redress, but a month elapsed and nothing was done, while the interval was employed in ceaseless efforts for a marriage mission to Rajputana. Then a Kharita was brought, but the Resident refused to forward it unless actual redress had been given to the British merchants. However, the formal professions of this document induced him to accept it as it had helped him a great deal in his negotiations, and equally helpful it would have been to show the deceit of the Darbar in future.

The third topic of negotiations was the right of the British Resident to excuse in the Valley. The Indian Government had always been against this unwarranted restriction and had authorised the Resident to oppose it by refusing to furnish passports to the Nepalese willing to visit India.

The issue was more than once mooted before the Darbar, but on the pretext of Maharaja's minority it was evaded and due to the British forbearance it could not be pressed. Presently it was revived as a necessity of keeping the Nepalese away from Rajputana on the pretext of marriage mission.

Traditionally the Gorkhas had been highly averse to throw open their country to the foreigners, nor did they regard it a right of the Resident to excuse in the Valley. The various demands that Hodgson had been negotiating were conceded but on this point the Nepalese attitude was quite obstinate. In the course of discussion the Maharaja agreed to offer ten Kos and even fifteen Kos, but not in the northern direction, which he feared would be resented by the Chinese. Hodgson refused to accept this lame excuse and wished that the issue be entirely dropped.

The fourth topic of the debate was the secret intrigues that the Nepalese had been carrying on with the Indian States, which were under British protection. According to treaties these States could only have been contacted through the Indian Government. There were seven foreign agents from India in Kathmandu at this time. On July 14, 1839, Hodgson demanded their expulsion, for which the Maharaja promised an immediate compliance. But only after repeated protests Kashi Nath of Gwalior was dismissed on July 30, 1839, two others could not be sent back till September 20, 1839, and the remaining four till October 5, 1839.

As for the Nepalese emissaries in the plains, Hodgson knew only two in July 1839. He demanded their recall, and they soon came back by themselves. Since July no important emissary came to, or went from, Nepal, and thus the system of intrigues received a decided check. The Resident also got a written assurance for the future. In fact, the first three articles of the engagement were directly or indirectly related to the prevention of such intrigues." In

90. The first three articles of the Engagement were:—

1st. "All the secret intrigues whatever, by messengers or letter, shall totally cease.

2nd. "The Nepal Government engages to have no further intercourse with the dependent allies of the Company beyond the

(Cont. on page 166)

the first article the Maharaja gave a general understanding not to indulge in such intrigues in future. The second article put a further stop to Nepal communicating with the British protected States beyond the Ganges without the knowledge and passport of the Resident. The third article, however, permitted the Gorkhas to continue their usual contacts, by letters and persons, with the "Zamindars and baboos on this side of the Ganges".

For the first article the Darbar, being pressed by the anxiety of Heir Apparent's marriage, raised no objection. But for the second article it was highly averse and wanted it to be somewhat vague. Hodgson, however, pressed his advantage and got it inserted in the engagement. This article was a real gain for the British, as Nepal had now avowedly pledged to hold no contacts with the dependent allies of the British in India.

The fifth issue of negotiations was the denial of justice to the Indian traders at the hands of the Nepalese judicial authorities. During the last few years such cases had markedly increased. The Indian traders were either implicated in the web of Gorkha legal code or were denied justice by means of long delay. The fifth article of the present engagement clearly provided against it. The Darbar promised to regard them as its own subjects before the courts and assured to deal with their cases without delay "according to the usages of Nepal".

The sixth issue of discussion was the problem of transit duties. It may be remarked that there was no uniform system of duties between the two countries as yet. During 1834-35 Hodgson had exerted his endeavours to arrange a definite and fair system, but no mutual agreement could be reached between the two Governments.⁹¹ Since June 1836

(Contd. from page 165)

Ganges, who are by Treaty precluded from such intercourse, except with the Resident's sanction and under his passports.

3rd. "With the Zamindars and baboos on this side of the Ganges who are connected by marriage with the Royal family of Nepal intercourse of letters and persons shall remain open to the Nepal Government as hertofore".

Aitchison, n. 22, Ch. I, pp. 116-117.

91. See pp. 119-122.

the Company had declared the Nepalese frontier duty free and had expressed a hope that the Gorkhas would follow the example. The Darbar, however, had no such intentions and continued to levy seven to ten per cent duties *ad valorem* invoice on the Indian goods. In the present mood of the Maharaja, Hodgson took the chance of making a fair arrangement. The article sixth of the engagement provided that no unauthorised duties would be levied on the Indian goods imported in Nepal and the Darbar promised to forward an authentic statement of all duties leviable. This was certainly an important achievement for the British. Till the fall of Bhim Sen, Hodgson could not induce the Darbar to effect any change with regard to such irregular duties, but now at least a basis for future negotiations could be provided.

The last and a curious aspect of the present negotiations was the Nepalese offer of troops to the British. Hodgson knew that it was just a gesture of the Darbar designed to seek oblivion of its hostile activities of the past two years. Yet, he did not refuse the offer outright because the uncertain position of the British did not warrant an open defiance and also because the internal situation of the Darbar demanded a justification for the peace party and discouragement for the hostile element. With this aim the Resident agreed to forward the offer to the Governor General.

For the Company this engagement was very useful. It secured for the British many important gains for future and temporization for the present. Hodgson had remarked that, "If the greater politics of India go well for some time to come, I may be able to keep Darbar to a new course which those points will define to her".⁹²

Lord Auckland accepted the Kharita of the Maharaja and promptly replied it.⁹³ He was not to be deluded by the empty professions; at the same time, he was not in a position to take any strict step or even adopt a tone of resentment. His reply was couched in a friendly but cautious language. The offer of the troops was politely refused, and with that

92. See Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 180.

93. S.C. December 26, 1839—No. 159.

the Governor General emphasised the necessity of actual deeds instead of professions.

In Darbar the war-party was for the moment cowed down and some cases of the denial of justice to the Indian traders were decided. But by early 1840 the Pandes had gained control of the affairs, and with that the attitude of Nepal worsened towards the English."

**PRIME MINISTERSHIP OF RANJUNG PANDE AND
BRITISH INTERFERENCE
(1840-42)**

I

On February 10, 1840, Senior Maharani prevailed over the Maharaja and Ranjung Pande was appointed as the sole Prime Minister of Nepal.¹ The Pande faction, for the factors earlier explained, could not become popular; it could not even win the full support of the Maharaja. That was why this faction could never control the Government in the sense Bhim Sen did. The King was always suspicious of the Pandes and tried his best to counterbalance them by retaining the Chautrias, the Brahmans and the Thapas.

The rise of the Pandes made the war party in the Darbar stronger than ever. Ranjung Pande had two-fold aims: to create a crisis atmosphere so as to completely control the affairs of the State, and, secondly, to create all sorts of difficulties and problems for the Maharaja so that he might abdicate in favour of his son—the Heir Apparent. To achieve their aims the Pandes oppressed the people and the chiefs and persecuted the Thapas. The King understood the real aims of Ranjung and the Senior Maharani. In matters of external policy they had common approach and objective, but in domestic affairs they had serious differences. As a pre-condition of fulfilling Maharaja's external ambitions, Ranjung wanted full control over internal affairs.²

The Maharaja refused to give Ranjung a free hand in domestic affairs as he feared his and Senior Maharani's designs. Therefore, despite Ranjung being appointed Prime

1. S.C. March 23, 1840—No. 110.

2. *Resident's Diary*—February 5 to 18, 1840.

Minister, the King neither gave him full powers nor allowed him a free hand, and the former was highly disappointed at this lack of complete authority. The Maharani also got dissatisfied with him due to his lack of initiative and failure to do anything substantial. Ranjung Pande, in fact, found himself in a difficult situation as he was neither fully supported by the King nor could he successfully eliminate the influence of his rivals. By the end of March Hodgson described him "dark and confused as an oracle".³ Such being the condition of the Darbar, every chief evaded responsibility.

In external affairs, as already stated, anti-British policy became a watchword for the Pandes. In fact, the Pandes had to be a war party. Thirty years of long exile had made them practically unknown to the existing generation and the foreign powers. Therefore, they had to pander the martial and national feelings of the Gorkhas to maintain their hold on the Government. Moreover, dealing with an ambitious Prince Rajendra Vikram Sah, they could have won his support only by making tempting promises of war and conquest. And, it should also not be forgotten that the Pandes had never hoped to secure British support for themselves. It was still a widespread belief in Nepal that the British were the supporters of Bhim Sen and the Thapas.

The immediate attempt of the Pandes was to allay the fears of the Maharaja by making him believe that the Governor General was not dissatisfied by the past activities of the Darbar and that it was merely the Resident, pro-Thapa in his sympathies, who had been creating trouble, and, therefore, there was no need to keep up to the recent pledges. The Governor General's lenient Kharita, dated December 2, 1839,⁴ and certain external developments, enabled them to follow this policy successfully. The Opium War between British and China had started by this time. The Darbar considered it a very good opportunity to secure some support from the Chinese Emperor against the British

3. Ibid. March 22 to April 3, 1840. It was a popular belief at this time that Bhim Sen's ghost had caught Ranjung by throat, because he rarely came out for official work and generally kept quiet.

4. S.C. December 6, 1839—No. 159.

in India.⁵ In January and March 1840 two letters were sent to Lhasa with that aim. Condition of Punjab, after the death of Ranjit Singh in June 1839, revived the old hopes of an alliance with the Sikhs. Bhopal Singh Thapa and Devi Singh were engaged on behalf of the Darbar to negotiate an understanding with the new ruler Nau Nihal Singh.⁶ At this time, such was the anti-British attitude of the Darbar that even the routine matters, such as extradition cases and the cases of British traders, were neglected in spite of the recent engagement. Under the influence of the Chief Justice Missur Guru, who was a staunch supporter of the Senior Maharani, the British traders were deliberately denied justice in the Nepalese courts.⁷

With the war party at the top in the Nepalese Darbar and due to British entanglement in Afghanistan and China, the Indian Government could not have taken any strict attitude. The utmost it could have done was to place restrictions on the Nepalese crossing India's frontier and to instruct Hodgson to again temporize and prevent the situation from getting worse.⁸ Hodgson on his part tried to assume an air of indifference and his attempt was to engage the attention of the Darbar in the discussion of routine mutual problems of extradition of the criminals and cases of the Indian traders. Dissensions between the Maharaja, the Maharani and the Pandes and the general discontent among the chiefs against the prevailing confusion helped Hodgson considerably in keeping Nepal quiet in this period.

II

The Pandes and the Senior Maharani had realised clearly that the Resident, who was interested in maintaining internal orders and external peace, was the chief obstacle in their way. Therefore, two almost simultaneous attempts were made by them with a view to force him to retire and

5. S.C. January 29, 1840—No. 69. Also see S.C. April 27, 1840—No. 117.

6. S.C. April 27, 1840—No. 119.

7. *Resident's Diary*—January 4 to 17, 1840.

8. S.C. March 23, 1840—No. 120.

in the ensuing confusion also to secure the Maharaja's abdication. In April 1840 a violent aggression was committed by the Nepalese in the Indian district of Champarun. There cannot be a doubt that it was manipulated by the Pandes as an "experimental transgression" to fathom the forbearance of the British and to create troubles for the Maharaja.⁹

The actual aggression occurred on April 12, 1840.¹⁰ Some thirty to forty Gorkhas, acting on the orders of the Darbar and headed by an officer Jusbeer Rana, entered the fair of 'Suhoodia Usthan'. The fair was held in the forests of Ram Nagar. Ram Nagar was situated eight miles south of the Someshwar range, which formed the boundary between Nepal and India.¹¹ At first the Nepalese collected the market duties from the fair and then proceeded to the village of 'Mangorala', five miles south of the boundary, where they held a court, to which the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages were summoned and informed that their villages had been appropriated by the Nepalese Government and they were ordered never to pay their taxes to the British authorities in future. In each village, thus forcibly seized, Gorkha soldiers were stationed and the British Chowkidars were warned against conveying any information to their authorities. Thus a large tract of country, eight or nine miles in breadth and 'twenty or twentyfive miles' in length consisting of ninetyone villages, was entirely cut off from the British dominions.

The Nepalese contention as regards this occupation was that the above villages had been given by the Nepalese King in jagir to the Raja Tej Pertab Sen of Ram Nagar on his marriage with a Nepalese princess, and that these villages were now resumed on account of "the British Government having ordered their escheat on the death of the Granter".¹²

Hodgson strongly remonstrated against this sudden ag-

9. S.C. June 29, 1840—No. 88.

10. See the report of G.D. Wilkins, the Magistrate of the district Champuran, dated May 26, 1840. S.C. June 15, 1840—No. 1.

11. *Narrative of Events in Nepal from 1840 to 1851*. This narrative was prepared by C. H. Nicholetts, the Asstt. Resident. P.C. November 11, 1853—Nos. 22-24. Dated: September 30, 1853—(This document is henceforth referred as "NEN").

12. S.C. June 15, 1840—No. 1.

gression. He demanded an immediate withdrawal of the Gorkha soldiers within the Someshwar ridge and the return of all the lands, thus forcibly seized, to the Indian Government. He argued that the boundary line in Champarun district ran "along the ridge of the first range of Hills... called Someshwar", and this had been finally demarcated by Lt. Grant in 1817-18, therefore, everything south of that ridge belonged to the Indian Government and the aggression in question being three to six Koses south of Someshwar was quite unwarranted.¹³ Following up his strict attitude he made the evacuation of the aforesaid territory a prior condition before any discussion of claims and demanded an explanation of this outrage. To the local authorities of the Company, however, he instructed that they should better suffer the Nepalese aggression than hazard a collision.¹⁴ His policy was to avoid a collision among the subordinate officers, which would have had a bad effect on the general policy of temporization.

Finding the Resident adopting a stiff attitude, the Darbar first sent a verbal assurance of withdrawal, and, then after repeated protests, the orders for the arrest of Fouzdar Jusbeer Rana and the withdrawal of the troops were issued.¹⁵ Yet, no formal explanation of the aggression had been put forward nor had the actual withdrawal been undertaken for a long time.¹⁶ The Pandes and the Maharani were preventing any effectual redress and Hodgson, having no effective backing of force, had to rely on his own resources of diplomacy.

Before amends could be made for this aggression in Ram Nagar, a second conspiracy was being hatched by the ruling clique with pretty similar objectives. Since last few months Ranjung Pande had been trying to reduce pay of the soldiers. He knew that such a step would lead to mutiny among the troops and make the Maharaja unpopular. There were also

13. S.C. June 8, 1840—No. 131.

14. S.C. June 15, 1840—No. 2.

15. S.C. June 20, 1840—No. 71. Also see S.C. June 29, 1840—No. 88.

16. S.C. August 3, 1840—No. 3. Also see S.C. July 13, 1840—No. 81.

some other accumulated grievances of the soldiers. During the last two years instead of being re-enlisted or paid up and discharged at the end of their year's engagements (which was a custom and their right), they had been kept on in service for eight to ten months over their annual term without pay for this broken period under perpetual liability to be ousted by fresh recruits.¹⁷ On June 21, 1840 actually a section of army—6,000 strong—broke into revolt at the general parade at which the long contemplated reduction was to be announced.

The whole affair was organised in a way as to throw the blame of the reduction of pay on the Indian Government.¹⁸ Hodgson and some other members of the Residency were detained at the royal palace throughout the night and in the morning the soldiers were given to be understood that the Resident "had been all night insisting on reduction of the Gorkha army". Ranjung Pande throughout kept himself aloof and the Maharani early on June 21, left for Than-kote. To further harass her husband, she even applied for

17. NEN 1840—Para 9.

18. Hodgson has written in his private note about the happenings of the night of June 21, 1840: "I was called to the Darbar ostensibly for a mere formal visit. I went as usual with the gentlemen of Residency at 7 P.M. at 10 o'clock I rose to go but the Raja begged me to stay a while and so again at 11 o'clock and again at mid-night. Still something was always urged by the court to keep us, and though no adequate cause was assigned, I assented in order if possible to discover the real cause of our detention. I felt there was some cause and possibly a serious one, as I whispered to Dr. Campbell (The Residency Surgeon and Honorary Assistant Resident).

"Soon after mid-night, at a sign from one of the Raja's attendants, His Highness asked me to go to Queen's apartment. I went, Her Highness received me with scant civility, and presently grew angry and offensive, with reference to business. I replied at first seriously and then passed to compliments ending in a jest. This made her laugh and under the cover of momentary good humour Raja carried me off, apparently only too happy to have thus easily got me through an interview demanded by his virago wife, who was the prime mover in all mischief then brewing. It was daylight when I and the gentlemen left the palace and shortly after came rumours of an uproar in the Nepal Cantonments. It was reported to me that the troops at the capital were in a mutinous state, and were threatening mischief to the Residency, they having been told that the Resident had been all night insisting on a reduction of the Gorkha army by instruction from his Government". Quoted by Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, pp. 184-185.

a passport for Banaras, which the King secretly asked the Resident not to issue.¹⁹

Soon after the mutiny a large body of soldiers collected in front of the Residency.²⁰ But in the absence of any formal authority and due to Hodgson's reputation they could not gather courage to ransack it. Having retired from there, they looted the houses of Rang Nath Pandit, Pushkar Sah, Kulraj Pande and Karbar Pande. Throughout the 21st June and the next day tension prevailed in the city and the fate of the few British officials was hanging in balance. The Darbar did not even observe the international duty of providing some protection to British legation to which it was legally entitled.

On the 22nd June the Maharaja accompanied by the whole body of troops proceeded for Thankote to fetch the Queen.²¹ In the evening she could be induced to return and the demands of the soldiers—the pay and the annual discharge—were also conceded. But the next day, on June 23, a strange and mischievous message was sent to the soldiers that, as the King was in dire need of money to fight the English, they should accept lower pay for a few years.²² The

19. S.C. July 20, 1840—No. 59.

20. Hodgson mentioned in his private note that, "ere long the report of the mutiny was confirmed by the appearance of a large body of soldiers in arms moving on the Residency. Arrived at an open space two hundred yards from the embassy house, the troops called a halt and held a palaver. The men objected to perpetrate so cowardly an act as the destruction of Resident, he being a good gentleman long known to them and always kind and courteous to them and their families". The palaver ended in a deputation of a select body of them to the Darbar to say that, if they were to do such a deed, they must have a Lal-mohar...to the effect". Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, pp. 185-186.

21. S.C. July 20, 1840—No. 59.

22. On June 23, 1840 the Maharaja sent the following message to the soldiers: "The English Government is powerful abounding in wealth and in all other resources for war. I have kept well with the English so long, because I am unable to cope with them. Besides, I am bound by treaty of amity and I have now no excuse to break it; nor have I any money to support a war. Troops I have, and arms and ammunition in plenty, but no money. This is the reason why I have reduced your pay. I want treasure to fight the English. Take lower pay for a year or two, and when I have some money in hand, I will throw off the mask and indulge you in war". Ibid.

soldiers did not agree to it."

Ultimately all the grievances of the soldiers had been redressed and they returned to their normal obedient habits. It is quite clear that the whole affair had been manipulated to harass the Maharaja and involve the Resident in the domestic affairs, and in this aim the conspirators had nearly succeeded.²⁴ When the King first heard of the mutiny he was ready to give up all his powers to the Senior Queen, but after a moment's pause he recovered and refused to sign the document to this effect.²⁵ Afterwards he did not allow the Pandes and the Queen to do anything material. Fortunately for the Indian Government, Hodgson coolly tackled the situation. Any hasty step on his part could have created a situation similar to that which was to occur in Afghanistan as a consequence of General Burn's action.

It was clear to Hodgson that if peace was to be maintained strong steps must be taken, otherwise the Pandes and the Queen would do worse." Therefore, from this time

23. The soldiers replied to the Maharaja: "True the English Government is great; but care the wild dogs of Nepal how large in the herd they attack. They are sure to get their bellies filled. We want no money for making war; for war shall support itself. We will plunder Lucknow and Patna. But first we must get rid of the Resident who sees and forestalls all.... Give the word and we shall destroy the Resident and we shall soon make the Ganges your boundary. Or if English, as they say are your friends and want peace, why do they keep possession of half your dominions? Let them restore Kumaon and Sikkim. These are yours, demand them back, and if they refuse, drive out the Resident, and let us have war". *Ibid.*

24. In between these two outrages a futile attempt was made to involve the Resident in a palace scandal. On May 4, 1840 Heir Apparent's marriage was celebrated. But hardly the ceremony was over, Hodgson was suddenly summoned up to palace. Here he had a personal interview with the King and the Queen. She proposed that the marriage should be dissolved as some inauspicious marks had been discovered on the body of the bride, and desired an immediate permission for a marriage mission to search another bride. For herself too she requested a passport to proceed for Benares. Hodgson understood her designs, and kept aloof of the domestic trouble by only stating that without Governor General's permission no mission could be allowed, that during the prevailing malaric season it was dangerous to proceed. Later on the marks detected on the body of the bride were considered auspicious. The Resident believed that his immediate summoning up was due to the anxiety of the Raja to overcome Rani's overbearing temper. NEN 1840—Para 7.

25. *Resident's Diary*—June 21, 1840 to July 4, 1840.

26. S.C. July 20, 1840—No. 59.

onwards till the instalment of the friendly ministry in January 1841 Hodgson's attempts were directed to shake off Maharaja's faith in the Pandes by threats and remonstrances and to convince him that they were heading the country towards disaster. As for the outrage by the troops on the Residency, Hodgson informed the King that his detention on the night of June 21 was deliberate and the news of this outrageous episode had already been sent to the Governor General. He recommended to the Indian Government to put up a show of force, as only that could bring down the temper of the Darbar.

Both the Ram Nagar aggression and the events of June 21, alarmed Lord Auckland and he realised that any delay or leniency in this direction would be fatal. The Resident was asked to demand an instantaneous withdrawal of the Gorkha troops from Ram Nagar, an explanation of the outrage and compensation for the losses.²⁷ The Darbar was to be warned against any further delay in evacuation, which might compel the British to mobilise their troops to vindicate their honour. So stiff was the attitude of Lord Auckland as regards the Ram Nagar case that, when the Resident postponed the demand for explanation, he unequivocally wrote to him that the satisfaction of other demands could be suspended but not the demand for the explanation of encroachment on the British territory.²⁸ Having thus secured the forceful backing of the Government, which he had been lacking for the last few years, Hodgson put forth the British demands on July 20, 1840.²⁹

27. S.C. June 29, 1840—No. 89.

28. S.C. July 27, 1840—Nos. 98 and 100.

29. Note of Resident to the Darbar dated July 20, 1840: "I am commanded.....to demand the instant retirement of every Nepalese without exception from all the lands of Ram Nagar to the South of the Someshwar ridge.....I am further commanded to demand a full explanation of the causes that led to this outrage.... together with ample and public punishment of all the immediate authors.....I am further commanded to demand full pecuniary compensation on behalf of all the subjects.....who may have suffered with either in purse or person in consequence of this aggression and also immediate restitution of all sums collected as public dues within the tract so violently usurped.....Lastly, I am instructed to inform the Darbar that if the above demands be not promptly complied with, the Governor General in council will immediately direct the advance of British forces to the frontier....." S.C. August 17, 1840—No. 71.

From this date onwards till September 20, 1840, under the influence of the Pandes and the Senior Maharani, the Maharaja displayed extreme vacillation in conceding the British demands.³⁰ The Pandes were realising the failure of their schemes and were divided between the necessity of compliance and shame. Their attempt was, therefore, to impress upon the King that the British were not serious in their demands and thus to obstruct any redress of the British grievances. They also did their best to create a war atmosphere and foster a belief that China and Punjab would soon make a common cause against the British. To further confuse the affairs the Senior Maharani employed her peculiar tricks of quitting the palace, as she knew well that her weak-willed husband would not just do anything in her absence. The Maharaja certainly realised the necessity of compliance with British demands and consulted the peaceful chiefs, but the Maharani would neither allow him to do anything nor would she herself take any step. No chief was ready to take any responsibility under these circumstances. It, therefore, created a general paralysis in the Darbar, so much so that even the war preparations were discontinued.

In such an atmosphere an evasive reply to the British demands was sent on July 29, 1840.³¹ The Darbar remained silent on the demand for the evacuation of the disputed territory and it completely denied any official sanction of the seizure of the Ram Nagar lands. A vaguely worded promise was, no doubt, given to punish the persons responsible for this action, but a claim over the occupied territory was also extended. The Nepalese contention was that these lands were given by them to Raja Tej Pertab Sen of Ram Nagar and that at the time of demarcation of this boundary in 1817-18 their representatives were not present.³² This explanation was outright rejected by the Resident and after

30. See pages of *Resident's Diary* from July 19 to September 10, 1840.

31. S.C. August 17, 1840—No. 77.

32. The demarcation of Indo-Nepalese boundary along the Champarun district was first undertaken during 1816-17, and was completed during the next season, i.e., 1817-18, in which the Darbar refused to send its representative despite Resident Gardner's invitation. See p. 54.

a month another answer of similar nature was brought on August 29, 1840, which was also rejected by Hodgson.³³

Finding that the Darbar would not yield by ordinary means, Lord Auckland addressed a strict letter to the Maharaja on August 27, 1840, and asked the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in India to get ready to take up arms against Nepal in case the British demands were not conceded.³⁴ Hodgson was instructed to demand immediate withdrawal of the Gorkhas from Ram Nagar without further delay and to put forward three more demands. The cases of the Indian traders, who had been denied justice for a long time, were to be immediately listened to and Missur Guru, the Chief Justice of Nepal, was to be censured for the deliberate injustice done to them. The secret intrigues of the Darbar with Indian States, including Punjab, were to be stopped at once. The Darbar was also to be asked to explain the unprotected state in which the Residency had been left during the mutiny of soldiers on June 21, 1840 and the Maharaja was to disavow unequivocally the hostile expressions made on that occasion.

Having again secured the forceful backing of the Government, Hodgson put forward the British demands on September 1, 1840, with a warning that "if compliance (was) not yielded within ten days from this date, His Lordship (the Governor General) will be compelled at the expiration of the period at once to add to the amount of pecuniary reparation now required, the whole cost of such military preparations. . . ."³⁵

This strict step of the Indian Government immediately had a sobering effect on the Maharaja. On September 3, 1840 an explanation in reply to the British demands and sum of five thousand rupees as compensation was brought to the Resident. Hodgson did not accept it as the pretensions of claims over the disputed tract were still maintained by the Nepalese, but further extended the period of ultimatum by ten days. The ultimate redress was only a matter of time

33. S.C. September 14, 1840—No. 101.

34. S.C. August 31, 1840—Nos. 84, 85 and 86.

35. S.C. September 21, 1840—No. 151.

now. The King, full of fears, consulted the pro-British chiefs. The censure of Missur Guru proved an obstacle for some time. But, ultimately, the Darbar having conceded all the demands except one, the Resident accepted Darbar's reply on September 20, 1840.³⁶ The Gorkha troops had been withdrawn from Ram Nagar, five thousand rupees had been given as compensation, a confession was made by Missur Guru as regards his deliberate denial of justice to the Indian traders and a promise was given that the cases of injustice would be soon redressed. After observing Darbar's attitude for a few days more, Hodgson forwarded the reply received from it to the Governor General on October 3, 1840. Meanwhile, the officers who were responsible for the Ram Nagar aggression were punished, two out of the four cases of injustice to the Indian traders were adjusted and the remaining two were taken up. Finally, as regards the demand for the public explanation of the outrage on the Residency by the Gorkha troops on June 21, the Resident accepted that the troops will be informed of the non-complicity of the British through their officers, because a public explanation was considered risky.³⁷ This was faithfully carried into effect on October 8, 1840. Even as regards the extradition of the Indian dacoits taking shelter in Nepal, immediate orders for their surrender to the British authorities were issued and the Nepalese local authorities were instructed to co-operate with them in future.³⁸

III

It is quite obvious that the Maharaja had ultimately conceded the British demands out of the fear of retaliation. In his negotiations Hodgson got solid support from the chiefs who did not belong to the war party and that was one of the reasons for his acceptance of these "half concessions".³⁹ These chiefs, thus, succeeded in shaking the faith of the Maharaja in the Pandes and paved the way for the change

36. S.C. October 5, 1840—Nos. 152 and 153.

37. S.C. October 26, 1840—No. 128.

38. S.C. October 26, 1840—No. 135.

39. S.C. October 5, 1840—No. 152.

of the ministry, which was to come soon. Hodgson was convinced now that only by supporting and maintaining a peace party the affairs in the Darbar would improve. So long as the Senior Maharani and the Pandes merely threatened verbally there was no need of such a step, for that would have justified the hostility of the war party in the public eyes and would have united the various contending factions to form a national front." But the gradual unfolding of the intrigues of the Pandes, to the extent of threatening the person of the Resident and the actual usurpation of the British territory, made this step inevitable. Had the British hands been free Hodgson would not have interfered in the domestic affairs of Nepal and would have tackled the situation from a position of strength. In the past the Indian Government had always disliked such a policy of interference in the internal affairs of Nepal, because it had the bitter experience of this policy in the times of Damodar Pande (1802-3) when Capt. Knox was compelled to retire from Kathmandu. But the period 1840 onwards was full of all sorts of troubles for the British and naturally they did not like a full scale war with Nepal. Therefore, they had to rely on Hodgson's skill of averting such a situation by supporting the peace party in the Darbar.

Along with this necessity of interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal, Hodgson also realised that a show of force was essential to bring the weak and ambitious Rajendra Vikram Sah to peaceful ways. The situation in Nepal was rather complex. Generally, the chiefs were not in favour of war and their dissensions had also made it impossible." But the Pandes were trying their best to create a war atmosphere by inciting the soldiery and by fostering a belief that Lahore and Peking would support Nepal against the British who were in a precarious position at that moment. Their attempt primarily was to abate the fears of the Maharaja. Therefore, Hodgson believed that in the face of such a situation a fear complex must be maintained in the King to carry out further improvement and he advised the Indian Government to station a frontier corps at the Nepalese border."

40. S.C. December 18, 1839—No. 68.

41. *Resident's Diary*—September 25, 1840 to October 25, 1840.

42. S.C. October 26, 1840—No. 128.

Agreeing with the views of Hodgson, Lord Auckland addressed a frank letter to the Maharaja on October 26, 1840, in which he strongly protested against continuous evasion, insincerity and postponement on the part of the Darbar in complying with the British demands in the past.⁴³ A feeling of displeasure was expressed and the King was warned that "until it shall be seen, that an entire change has taken place in the spirit of the counsels by which (the Maharaja) was guided those feelings cannot be removed. I must judge the views and intentions of your Government not by any verbal concession but by what I may perceive to be its acts". It was also stated that the British troops would be stationed more contiguous to the Nepalese frontier than usual "so that no delays may take place in the correction of any disorder and injustice which may heretofore arise while such counsels continue to be listened to". The Resident was "empowered, by every prudent and just means, to use the advantage which a distinct statement from the head of the British Government would afford to. . . . with a view to effect such a change for the better in the Nepal councils as shall. . . . give security to the adjoining territories".⁴⁴ At the same time, the Resident was also warned that more effective measures would not be possible in the near future. However, arrangements were made for three infantry regiments, a squadron of cavalry and for field guns, and the strength of Gorakhpur regiment was also increased.⁴⁵ The command of this force was given to Lt. Col. T. Oliver. It is quite obvious that this observation corps, consisting of 3,000 soldiers, was stationed only with a view to check Nepalese intrigues, to give support to the friendly chiefs in Nepal and to create fear in the mind of the Maharaja so that he may not again pursue an aggressive anti-British policy.

The Governor General had one more occasion to express his displeasure more distinctly. A secret Nepalese mission under Capt. Karbeer Khattri was arrested at Banaras, which was proceeding with precious presents and secret letters to the Court of Lahore. Lord Auckland lost no time

43. S.C. October 20, 1840—No. 134.

44. S.C. October 26, 1840—No. 135.

45. S.C. October 26, 1840—No. 137.

in protesting against it. On November 2, 1840 he wrote to the Maharaja that under such conditions his Government will have to rely on force and insisted that the King could in no other way show his "abhorrence of these proceedings, the tendency of which must be ruinous to the good name of Nepal among all states, than by instantly removing from power and favour the parties who have so signally abused the confidence. . . .reposed in them."⁴⁶

Before the first Kharita could be handed over and the second could even be written, important changes had taken place in the Darbar of Nepal. The pro-British chiefs succeeded in influencing the Maharaja to their viewpoint. Gradually he realised that the policy of the Pandes would be ruinous to the country. This realisation on the part of the Maharaja, coupled with the news of Karbeer Khattri's arrest and the rumours that twenty thousand British troops had been stationed on the frontier, induced him to dismiss Ranjung Pande from prime ministership, and in his place Fateh Jung Sah Chautria, a royal collateral, was appointed on November 1, 1840.⁴⁷

IV

Removal of Ranjung Pande from prime ministership did not solve all the problems of Hodgson as several Pandes still held influential positions in the Darbar. He also knew that the Senior Maharani would try her best to restore Ranjung to his former position and with a vacillating King he would have an anxious time. His attempts were, therefore, directed to secure a complete change in the ministry and to maintain it against the vehement opposition of the Maharani and the Pandes. At the same time, he was quite conscious that no effective backing of force would be given to him by the Indian Government due to its preoccupation in Afghanistan. Col. Oliver's brigade was merely an observation corps. Therefore, he followed a policy of making best out of the fears of the Maharaja and to give all practicable support to the new Prime Minister.

46. S.C. November 2, 1840—No. 122.

47. S.C. November 23, 1840—No. 130.

Fateh Jung Sah was a legitimist. He was against the Pandes and the Senior Maharani, and believed in a peaceful policy towards the British. In the very first interview with the Resident he promised to co-operate with the Indian Government and offered to resign whenever he did not fulfil the promise.⁴⁸ He, however, owed his nomination to the apprehensions of the Maharaja, and so did not have much authority. The reins of administration were still in old hands. For a long time after his appointment he made no attempt to win the support of the chiefs and only tried to bring about a conciliation between the King and the Queen. It further became difficult for him to take any effective step due to the opposition of the queen and the Pandes and vacillation of Maharaja.

In the external affairs also, despite the dismissal of Ranjung Pande, a change in the policy of the Darbar did not immediately follow as the King was so much dominated by his Queen that he was not prepared to do anything without her consent. She tried to block every action either by refusing to see any one or by threatening to quit the palace. The Pandes devised a novel way of denouncing the new Prime Minister by displaying placards and spreading rumours against them that they were selling the kingdom to the British.

To counteract these activities Hodgson handed over the first Kharita of the Governor General (dated October 26, 1840) on November 8, 1840, and further asked Lt. Col. Oliver to march his troops up to Mullye (a military station near the Nepalese border).⁴⁹ Fateh Jung Sah was also told by the Resident that he must dissuade the Maharaja and the Maharani from their wrong path if he wanted to enjoy British support.⁵⁰ After a week, on November 16, 1840, he delivered the second Kharita to the Maharaja, and on November 17, even the secret letters, that were found with Karbeer Khattri.⁵¹ It produced an intended effect on the Maharaja, who became utterly subdued and summoned the

48. Ibid.

49. S.C. November 23, 1840—No. 130.

50. Ibid.

51. S.C. December 21, 1840—No. 108.

pro-British chiefs for counsels. In fact, he took the delivery of three documents by the Resident as prelude to the declaration of war. He enquired from the Resident what the Governor General meant by "bad and good" advisers, and whether the Indian Government was satisfied with the new Prime Minister. Hodgson stated that it was up to the Maharaja himself to decide the first point and as for the second he would be satisfied if the Prime Minister was given sufficient powers.⁵²

The Senior Maharani was also not slow to react. On November 22, 1840, she left for Nayakote, with a view to "stay off any efficient or responsible settlement" with the Resident.⁵³ The poor King as usual could not do anything in her absence. He even wanted to send the Prime Minister and go himself to fetch her, but Hodgson detained him by claiming a right to accompany him.⁵⁴ After having waited up to December 2, for her return, the Maharaja proceeded for Nayakote, accompanied by a large number of chiefs and the Resident, and declared his intention that "if she agrees (to return) it is well and good, if not he would adjust with the Resident and will not allow her to destroy the kingdom."⁵⁵

At Nayakote Hodgson seriously warned the Maharaja against dilatory tactics and made it clear that the transfer of the eastern Terai made in 1816 "was not absolute nor her (Nepalese) commercial intercourse with plains beyond the reach of effective impediments, nor the cost of military preparation unquestionable."⁵⁶ He further required that Fateh Jung Sah must be given full powers to reorganise his cabinet.⁵⁷ It is certainly difficult to support the position taken by Hodgson as regards the transfer of the eastern Terai in 1816. His argument was based on the idea that its transfer in 1816 was in lieu of goodwill manifested by the Maharaja, and, therefore, it could be taken back by the British if the Nepalese ever broke that good faith. This was entirely an

52. Ibid.

53. *Resident's Diary*—November 11 to 25, 1840.

54. Ibid. November 25 to December 9, 1840.

55. Ibid.

56. S.C. January 11, 1841—No. 223.

57. Ibid.

erroneous idea and even the Political Secretary had remarked on December 21, 1840 that: ".....after a careful examination he (the Governor General) does not find that the view which you have formed is confirmed by the records of the period.....(and).....that the cession of the tract was expressly treated as absolute and final".⁵⁸

The warning, however, had the desired effect. The very next day Karbeer Pande and Kulraj Pande, the two important members of the Pande faction, and Missur Guru, who was the chief adviser of the Queen, were removed from the administration. From this day onwards a gradual improvement also began in the proceedings of the Darbar. Following up his success Hodgson emphasized the necessity of a total change in the administration with Fateh Jung invested with effective powers to carry out his responsibilities successfully, so that a firm foundation of the new policy could be laid.⁵⁹ It is quite obvious that Fateh Jung Sah got effective support from the Resident and the stationing of the British force on the frontier. Gradually his powers increased, his supporters became influential and he was able to appoint three ministers from his own group.

Under the same spell of fear the Maharaja agreed to dismiss the Pandes entirely from the Government but wanted that the British frontier force, now stationed at Sagauli, be withdrawn.⁶⁰ The ministers, on the contrary, asked the Resident not to do so since it formed a real support for them and even desired that it should be stationed nearer the frontier. But Hodgson did not agree to the proposals of either of them. He knew that the stationing of the troops at the border was essential to keep the Maharaja under check, but moving them just at the Nepalese boundary would have unnecessarily aroused the Gorkha soldiery—a thing which the Governor General strictly asked him to avoid.⁶¹ Ultimately,

58. S.C. December 21, 1840—No. 109.

59. S.C. January 11, 1841—No. 223.

60. S.C. January 25, 1841—No. 121.

61. On December 21, 1840 Political Secretary to the Government of India instructed Hodgson to avoid such direct collision with Darbar "as would be productive of any serious embarrassment to your own position and thus compromise the character of your Gov-

the King dismissed the remaining anti-British chiefs on January 2, 1841 and forwarded two important documents to the Indian Government.⁶² The Pandes and the Senior Maharani, despite their best efforts, could not do anything. The Pandes tried to arouse the soldiery by anti-Fateh Jung and anti-British placards, but these were officially refuted. The Queen also left for Nayakote, but this time it had no effect on her husband.

In the first letter the Maharaja wrote to the Governor General that as advised by him the anti-British chiefs, including Missur Guru who had disturbed friendship between the two countries, had been dismissed and in their place new officers had been appointed.⁶³ He also promised to abide by

(Contd. from page 186)

ernment in general estimation at a movement when it might be impossible to render you vigorous protection and support".

S.C. December 21, 1940—No. 109.

62. S.C. January 25, 1841—No. 121.

63. The Maharaja wrote to the Governor General on January 2, 1841: "According to your Lordship's advice I have dismissed from the office the several individuals who tried to make mischief between the two States, and have selected and appointed Chautria Fateh Jung Sah, an individual of high rank and consideration, as my Prime Minister in order that he may clear up all unfriendly feeling between the two Sirkars—I have also associated with him other prudent and wise counsellors". S.C. January 25, 1841—No. 121.

The King also forwarded the following Yaddast (Memorandum) on January 2, 1841:—

"The Governor General Lord Auckland has written stating that it was necessary and proper to dismiss from office the individuals who had disturbed the friendly feelings existing between the British and Nepal Governments and to appoint in their places others who had the good of the two Sirkars at heart, and that until the individuals who had so behaved had been dismissed, there could be no real friendship on the part of my Government.

Accordingly, therefore.....I have.....decided upon dismissing those persons.....according to the subjoined list.....There will be no change made by me in the above appointments unless the persons holding them shall commit any crime. I have made and confirmed the above mentioned arrangement and they shall always remain so.

Individuals appointed:

Chautria Fateh Jung Sah
Guru Rang Nath Pandit
Guru Krishna Pandit
Chautria Pushkar Sah
Kajee Dul Bhanjan Pandey
Chautria Guru Pershad Sah
Kajee Kaloo Sahi

Individuals discharged:

Guru Krishnaram Missur
Chautria Kool Chander Sah
Kajee Karbir Pandey
Kuperdar Koolraj Pandey
Capt. Ranbeer Thapa
Capt. Indrabeer Thapa
Koomedan Umer Sahi"

S.C. January 25, 1841—No. 121.

the advice of the Resident.

The second communication was a document signed by ninetyfour chiefs in which they promised to promote friendship between the two States, assured that the Resident would always be treated honourably and took the responsibility of avoiding any future mischiefs.⁶⁴ It was only an attempt of the pro-British chiefs to display their solidarity and loyalty to the Indian Government and to the Maharaja and to expose the hopelessness of the Pande faction.

It is true that the British demands were conceded in ill-faith and they did not have "that essential stamp of reality which alone could give them immediate effective value," yet it provided "a decorous compromise" at a time when the British were awkwardly situated in China and Afghanistan.⁶⁵ Moreover, with the overhauling of the ministry, Hodgson succeeded in his attempts to get the Pandes out of office and in their place got the friendly chiefs appointed.

V

The new administration under Fateh Jang Sah was popular and the chiefs in general felt a relief in having got rid of the Pandes. The secret intrigues with the plains had totally stopped. Missur Guru also, as promised by the King, was asked to leave for Banaras. Hodgson, however, knew that in spite of this improvement the Senior Maharani and the Pandes would not sit idle and they would try their utmost to incite the soldiery and create confusion. The British position in Afghanistan and China was also getting no better. Therefore, his efforts were now directed to maintain the new Ministry against this opposition, which, on account of the vacillating character of the Maharaja and the British troubles abroad, was to become powerful again. Considering these factors Hodgson wanted that Oliver's brigade should be retained on the frontier.⁶⁶ Its withdrawal at this stage would have been regarded at Kathmandu as an

64. See Appendix VII.

65. S.C. Januray 25, 1841—No. 121.

66. S.C. February 15, 1841—No. 72.

indication of indifference towards past anti-British activities of the Darbar.

As anticipated by the Resident, soon after the instalment of the new Ministry the Pandes started denouncing and intimidating the ministers in their placards. The Maharani insisted on the marriage of her second son and Hodgson, despite knowing that it was only a means to trouble the King, had to issue a passport for a marriage mission to go to the plains.⁶⁷ The departure of Missur Guru could not be taken by her easily and in order to prevent it she left for Hitounda on February 20, 1841 declaring that she would also go to Banaras.⁶⁸ It was her old device to compel the Maharaja to surrender unconditionally to her wishes.

The weak King promptly followed her. The Resident also sent his assistant with him, as he had been privately urged by the friendly chiefs to prevent the Maharani from crossing the frontier, because they feared that in sheer desperation the Maharaja might give up everything.⁶⁹ Hodgson immediately protested and warned the King against Maharani's crossing the frontier without Governor General's permission, and the Magistrate of Champarun was instructed by him not to allow the royal party to cross the boundary. At Hitounda the royal court stayed for a few weeks, where Queen tried to incite the soldiery against the ministers. The Maharaja continued coming and going to that place, but he assured the Resident that he was only trying to prevent his wife from going to Banaras.⁷⁰ At last he gathered courage and dismissed Missur Guru on March 6, 1841, and on March 8, he returned to Kathmandu leaving the Queen at Hitounda.⁷¹ After two days she also followed her royal master to the Capital.

After her return from Hitounda the Maharani continued her desperate attempts to get Missur Guru back to Kathmandu and openly wanted her husband to abdicate in favour of her son. Being thus troubled, the King once again

67. S.C. February 15, 1841—No. 78.

68. S.C. March 8, 1841—No. 87.

69. Ibid.

70. S.C. March 22, 1841—No. 124.

71. Resident's Diary—March 1 to 16, 1841.

turned his attention to foreign affairs. General tone of King's utterances became anti-British. He denounced the newspaper report that the Chinese had succumbed to the British and that all was quiet beyond the Sutlej. He declared that the Chinese had conceded nothing and were preparing for a war, that the British envoy had fled from Kabul due to Persian fear, that Maharani Chand Kaur of Punjab and the new ruler Sher Singh had reconciled with each other to oppose the British and that the British had lost a battle against Burma.⁷² It was reliably learnt in March 1841 that the ruler of Ladakh had solicited Nepalese help against the Sikhs, who were planning the conquest of this little kingdom.⁷³ It flattered Maharaja's vanity and he referred the appeal to Lhasa expressing his readiness to send troops, provided the Chinese authorities sanctioned it. The Chinese, however, advised him not to interfere in this matter.⁷⁴

All these artifices of the Maharaja induced Hodgson to present a Kharita of the Governor General to him, which he (the Resident) had formerly decided to withhold. In it the Governor General had strongly protested against the late attempt of the Queen to cross frontier.⁷⁵ He warned that he could no longer accept the Maharaja's apologies and professions of friendship and stated that the British force on the frontier would be preserved as long as such hostile acts continue. The feelings of the Governor General were also conveyed to the King through the Nepalese Vakeel at Calcutta.

The Kharita and the warning from the Nepalese Vakeel at Calcutta had the usual effect of cooling down the Maharaja. On April 21, he ordered Guru, who had been still lingering on the frontier, to proceed to Banaras. He also assured the Resident to remove other anti-British chiefs, who could not yet be removed, as he explained, due to their neces-

72. *Ibid.* April 1 to 14, 1841.

73. S.C. April 5, 1841—No. 110. Also see NEN 1840.

74. The Chinese Viceroy at Lhasa replied to the Maharaja's reference of Ladakh's appeal that "Chinese Government had no title or desire to interfere with politics of Ladakh and that Darbar would do well to confine itself to its established circle of connections. . . ." S.C. May 31, 1841—No. 154.

75. S.C. March 29, 1841—No. 44.

sity for settling public accounts." The Maharaja again expressed his faith in friendly relations with the British and promised to uphold the present Ministry."

VI

From this time onwards the tone of the Darbar gradually changed. Some sporadic attempts of the Pandes and the Maharani continued, but there was no actual willingness on the part of the Maharaja or the Darbar to fight the British.⁷⁶ By June 1841, Guru had retired to Banaras, and due to senior Maharani's illness all signs of restlessness and hostility were disappearing. Finding her long and desparate attempts futile to restore the Pandes, she now became desirous of a general reconciliation among the various factions and to carry on the administration on the basis of friendship with the British.⁷⁹

Friendly relation between the two countries continued to develop and the Governor General even wanted to make a public acknowledgement of this changed attitude of the Darbar. But Hodgson advised him to defer such a public statement till the British force could be gracefully withdrawn from the Nepalese frontier.⁸⁰ On September 2, 1841 the King wanted to know "how he (stood) with the British Government; how far, in short, the Governor General (was) disposed to accept the admitted improvement of the Darbar," and he requested that the British force be now withdrawn from the frontier.⁸¹ The Resident knew that since last few months the situation at the Darbar had changed for the better and an occasion could have been availed

76. S.C. May 3, 1841—No. 132.

77. S.C. May 31, 1841—No. 162.

78. "Diary of events in Nepal". June 20, 1841. By J. T. Wheeler, Simla Government, Central Branch Press 1878. The earlier references from Resident's Diary end by April 29, 1841. In the diary compiled by J.T. Wheeler accounts of Nepal up to May 1845 are found.

79. Ibid. June 20, 1841.

80. S.C. August 30, 1841—No. 130.

81. S.C. September 20, 1841—No. 101.

to withdraw the force from the frontier. At the same time, he could also discern that the Pandes were still cherished and secretly upheld and admitted into the highest confidence of the Palace. Under these circumstances the ministry was not yet secure enough to provide an occasion for the withdrawal of the frontier force. The public acknowledgement of the improved relationship that the Governor General wanted could have been misinterpreted and would have prematurely removed the fears of the Maharaja. Therefore, Hodgson accepted the changed attitude of the Darbar, but refused to agree that there was no ground for complaint. He expressed a hope that at the coming **Panjani** Maharaja would again fulfil his promise by reappointing the Ministry.⁸²

During the next two months the Maharaja once more relapsed into a hostile mood, due to continued British involvement in Afghanistan and China. Moreover, the conquest of Ladakh and some portions of Tibet by the Sikh General Zorawar Singh had made Nepal and Punjab contiguous. It became a serious consideration for the British as they never relished the idea of Nepal and Punjab having common boundaries.⁸³ For the Maharaja, however, the new situation revived all the hopes for an alliance with Lahore.⁸⁴ The Governor of Joomla (a Nepalese province on Tibetan border in the north-west) was ordered to hasten in person to Zorawar Singh for this purpose and also to suggest the expediency of making a simultaneous incursion into Tibet "for the purpose of seizing.....a gold mine," which was situated just near to the Nepalese border.

None of the schemes of the King could be realised, but in the wake of this mood he did not confirm the Ministry at **Panjani**, and continued to evade it for some time.⁸⁵ But the information of the crushing defeat of Zorawar Singh at the hands of the Tibetans in the second half of September brought him down.⁸⁶

On October 6, 1841 an important event happened which

82. Ibid.

83. S.C. September 20, 1841—No. 67.

84. S.C. October 4, 1841—No. 40.

85. S.C. October 11, 1841—No. 90.

86. **Diary of events in Nepal**—September 16 to 26, 1841.

affected equally the domestic and the external affairs of Nepal. The Senior Maharani, who had played a major role in the history of Nepal since 1832, had consistently supported the Pande faction and was the chief opponent of the British friendship, suddenly passed away on this date. Certainly with her departure the greatest obstacle in the way of friendly Indo-Nepalese relations was removed. But the attitude of the King did not change with it, he still evaded the confirmation of the ministry on the pretext of the mourning of his wife.⁸⁷ Even in the past it was not merely because of her dominance that he had given way to her hostile inclinations towards the British. It also suited his interests to uphold the anti-British Pandes and the Maharani to a certain extent as a means of controlling the administration and keeping the Thapas away. It was only when they wanted to set aside his own rights and drag the country into war with the British that he withdrew from them. After her death, in his attempts to control the affairs, he started employing the Heir Apparent as a pretext to evade his responsibility.

On November 9, 1841, however, the Ministers were able to persuade the Maharaja and got themselves reappointed.⁸⁸ But even before a week had passed the Heir-Apparent and the King accompanied by 2,500 soldiers proceeded towards south on November 15, 1841 with no ostensible purpose and returned on November 20.⁸⁹ After three days he sent a Kharita to be forwarded to the Governor General, in which he attributed the delay in the re-appointment of the Ministry to the death of his Senior Rani and promised to abide by the Nayakote engagement of January 2, 1841 and requested the withdrawal of the British force stationed at the frontier.⁹⁰ The Resident, however, refused to accept the Kharita unless the late southward movement of the Maharaja with 2,500 troops and the secret contacts with the Court of Lahore via Ladakh were explained. The King explained that the recent Nepalese contacts with the Sikhs were necessitated due to the conquest of Ladakh, by which both the countries

87. S.C. November 1, 1841—No. 78.

88. S.C. December 27, 1841—No. 77.

89. S.C. December 6, 1841—Nos. 99 and 100.

90. S.C. December 27, 1841—Nos. 77 and 78.

had become contiguous, and assured that there was nothing hostile towards the Indian Government in them. The southward movement of the troops was explained by the Maharaja as arising out of the "sudden caprice of a child". He, however, assured that in future no such movement to the south will be made without due notification to the Resident and the number of troops so moving shall be limited.

Hodgson accepted Maharaja's Kharita on November 29, 1841, as he was convinced "of the futility of any further objurgation with....." him.⁹¹ As for the withdrawal of Oliver's brigade from the frontier, Hodgson had two alternatives. He could have either deferred it or made an immediate total withdrawal. The postponement of the withdrawal would have provided enough security at a time when the trouble with Afghanistan and China was not yet over, while a continued adherence to this military attitude could also have been misrepresented in the eyes of the soldiery, particularly when the ministers had promised an early withdrawal. Moreover, a withdrawal at this stage would have earned the ministers a credit in the public eyes, while by not doing so the Indian Government would have lost a graceful occasion to get rid of this "political inconvenience". Led by these considerations Hodgson promised an early withdrawal and gave a stern warning to the Maharaja that in case of default he would again recall the force.⁹²

The importance of these transactions lay in the fact that it marked the culminating point of the success of the British policy, which Hodgson had been trying since 1838. Looking in retrospect it can be said that in November 1839 wrongs done to the Company—intrigues against it, injustice to the Indian traders and extradition cases—were redressed; in January 1841 the Pandes, who were responsible for them, were dismissed and the friendly chiefs were appointed in their place; and in November 1841 these changes were "virtualised". It cannot, of course, be said that with these engagements and declarations of friendship Fateh Jung's Ministry had become supreme or the King had for ever become friendly towards the British. But in dealing with a martial and

91. S.C. December 27, 1841—No. 77.

92. Ibid.

nationalistic people this was the maximum that could have been achieved, and, with a delicate means of foreign pressure, more than this was not possible. The real advantage of these proceedings can only be judged in the light of the fact that the real aim of Hodgson was temporization till the British hands could be free from Afghanistan. Not to have lost anything in such a troubled period was a real gain for the British. However, hopes could now be entertained that in future the relations between the two governments would be peaceful and friendly.

Further developments were to show that the Maharaja did not violate faith when the British force was first annihilated in Afghanistan. In December 1841 disaster fell on more than 16,000 soldiers and camp followers. The Maharaja promptly offered services of the Gorkha soldiers.⁹³ For the Indian Government, however, this period did not pass without any anxiety. In order to further judge the effect of Afghan disaster on the King, Hodgson did not deliver the letter of the Governor General, which he had written on December 27, in reply to King's Kharita of November 23, till February 16, 1842.⁹⁴ After having watched the Maharaja, he ordered the withdrawal of the British force stationed at the frontier, which he did not think it wise to defer in the face of King's sincerity.⁹⁵ The force thus withdrawn from the frontier, the Resident advised the Indian Government to maintain it at the nearest station on the Ganges, as the character of Rajendra Vikram Sah and temper of the Prince could not be relied upon.

Cordial relations continued between both the countries and the Maharaja expressed a wish to send a complimentary mission to the new Governor General Lord Ellenborough. The Resident suggested that presents should be sent first and then the mission might follow.

93. S.C. January 24, 1842—No. 77.

94. S.C. February 28, 1842—No. 81.

95. S.C. February 14, 1842—No. 82.

VII

Before closing this chapter it would be useful to analyse the extent and nature of the British interference in the internal affairs of Nepal. It has already been seen how the Pande faction was ousted and Fateh Jang Sah Chautria and other chiefs, having sympathy towards the British, were entrusted with the reins of administration due to the direct pressure brought about by the Indian Government on the Maharaja of Nepal. To further maintain the new Ministry Col. Oliver's brigade was posted on the frontier and every practicable support was given to the ministers. This, however, did not imply that an unqualified support was ever contemplated or could have been afforded by the British. In the beginning the Resident did not support them openly as he could not rely on them so early.⁹⁶ Then as his main aim was only to secure an improvement in the situation, he thought it better to follow rather than lead a change.⁹⁷ But when Fateh Jang Sah and other ministers had faithfully carried on the administration till the Senior Queen's adventure to Hitounda during February-March 1841, the question of the extent of support that the British could have given to the friendly ministry arose. The Indian Government considered it imprudent "to raise any question of the degree of support", because these ministers were after all "the Darbar's creation", and expressed its inability to protect them with arms due to prevailing difficult circumstances.⁹⁸ Hodgson was also conscious of these considerations, and, therefore, his main aim was to avert a war with Nepal

96. S.C. November 23, 1840—No. 130.

97. S.C. December 21, 1840—No. 108.

98. Political Secretary instructed Hodgson on March 22, 1841: "Governor General in Council would . . . remark that it will not be prudent to raise any nice question of the degree of support claimable from the British Government by the present friendly Ministry of Nepal. The requisitions of Your Government had, you are aware, no reference to the substitution of any particular persons for those obnoxious advisers in whom it was declared that confidence could not be placed, and His Lordship in Council strongly hopes that every object, which we can properly desire, will be effected by the general countenance which you have shown to the ministry and by the further judicious and firm exercise of your influence to prevent the adoption of bad counsels by the Maharaja". S.C. March 22, 1841—No. 126.

at this time. But his real apprehension was the situation in which attempts on the Ministry or on the lives of the ministers were to be made by the Maharaja. After all when the life of the Resident was in danger during June 1840, these chiefs had actually come out to support the British alliance. Naturally they also expected support from the Resident in case any attempt was to be made on them. They were anxious to know British attitude, because they took it with surprise that Bhim Sen, who was supposed to have enjoyed British support, could not be protected by them after his fall." The Indian Government, however, never made its attitude clear. It was, in fact, not prepared to back these chiefs in all circumstances and by all means. In case any attempt was to be made against them, the Resident was only authorised to expostulate and remonstrate "firmly but temperately" and to urge that Fateh Jang's Ministry having evinced a disposition favourable for the maintenance of peace and friendship the Governor General would regard any deliberate injustice done to it as connected with political feelings against the British. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Indian Government throughout this period followed a policy of expediency. It is true that till the times of Lord Auckland these ministers were always supported and an occasion to fathom the extent of the British support never arose. Had any occasion arisen, the British would not have interfered to protect them in any serious manner. Moreover, it was not merely the British support that maintained the Ministry. It was also, to a great extent, due to dissensions among the various factions, the weakness of the Maharaja and the rare integrity and prudence of the Prime Minister Fateh Jang Sah. Otherwise, foreign interference would not have been tolerated in a martial and nationalistic country like Nepal.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BRITISH NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE RISE OF JUNG BAHADUR (1842-1846)

I

Maharaja Rajendra Vikram Sah was, as already seen, a man of youthful ambitions and of a very weak character. He was vain, selfish, full of duplicity and unscrupulousness. The history of Nepal during this period was dominated by his enigmatic personality. His chief ambition was to rule the kingdom, but in this attempt he had always to face the opposition of the various contending factions as well as own queens. From 1832 to October 1841 he was mostly overshadowed by his Senior Queen. Although it is a fact that he did not fully yield to her objectives, yet part of the mischief in the internal as well as the external sphere was the result of her underhand manoeuvres. Being weak and, at the same time, an ambitious person, he deliberately acquiesced in her hostile designs towards the British Government. However, fear was no less conspicuous a feature of his character. A Kharita from the Governor General or a British brigade on the frontier was enough to bring him down. With amazing ups and downs this condition continued according to the British fortunes in Afghanistan, China and Burma till the 6th October, 1841, when the Senior Queen passed away.

The attitude of the Maharaja did not fundamentally change after the death of his Senior Queen. As has already been mentioned, it was not merely because of her dominance, but also because of his own ambitions and duplicity, that the Maharaja had acquiesced in the hostility of the Queen towards the British Government. That was why after her death he found an excuse for his eccentricities and evasion of responsibility in the Heir-Apparent Prince Surendra

Vikram Sah, who was a spoiled child. Though only a boy of eleven, he was made a political tool by his own mother, when she found that all her devices had failed to secure the King's abdication. The King, after her death, made use of him for his own political designs. And the Pande faction, which was cowed down after the death of the Maharani, tried to win over the Prince by inciting him against the Chautrias, the British Government and even his own father.

At the beginning of this period there were four important factors which mattered in the politics of the Darbar. First, the King himself was there. Secondly, the Heir-Apparent had acquired an important position, which was exploited by the Pandes. The third dominant group was of the Chautrias and the Brahmans, who had lately come together as a result of the common danger arising from the economic and foreign policy of Ranjung Pande and the barbarities and eccentricities of the Heir-Apparent. They stood for friendly relations with the British and were, in turn, supported by the Resident. Fourthly, the Senior Queen having passed away, the Junior Queen—Maharani Lakshmi Devi—now found an open field for her own ambitions. Her real aim was to set aside the claims of the Heir-Apparent on the plea of insanity and put forth the candidature of her eldest son. In the Thapas she found a natural ally and had secret contacts with Mathbar Singh, who at that time was enjoying British protection at Simla. It may be remarked that even before the death of Bhim Sen she was a keen supporter of the Thapas. She had a cordial attitude towards the Resident and believed in friendly relations with the Indian Government. However, she was against the Chautrias, who were legitimists, and still more, she was against the Pandes, at whose hands she had suffered a good deal.

Position of the Indian Government vis-a-vis Nepal was relatively better. It had the satisfaction of the renewed pledges of friendship from the Maharaja and of the reinstatement of the friendly Ministry. Petty border disputes and the cases of denial of justice to the Indian traders had been satisfactorily adjusted. And, more than anything else, the Maharaja did not violate faith when the disaster first fell on the British army in Afghanistan. This had induced the

Indian Government to withdraw Oliver's brigade completely from the frontier without taking any subsidiary precaution, although Hodgson had advised for it.¹ This proved a hasty step in dealing with a character like Rajendra Vikram.

In the East Asia the Opium War was still continuing and since December 1841 British misfortunes had taken a worst turn in Afghanistan. After a long and successful career in India, the British army suffered its first major defeat in Afghanistan. The fall of Ghazni, the danger to Kandhar and Jallalabad and General Pollock's extreme delay and alleged inability to advance gave the Maharaja of Nepal the long awaited opportunity to strike at the British power in India. Even before the Afghan debacle, petty tricks and evasions were practised by the King, but a serious defeat like that revived all his hopes, ambitions and hostility towards the Indian Government. Col. Oliver's brigade having been already withdrawn, he had no longer the fear of immediate retaliations from the British side. The Pandes also got their chance to exploit the situation. Exaggerated rumours of the British difficulties and their rift with the Sikhs were widely spread by them. Maharaja Sher Singh of Lahore, drawing his attention to the amazing British reverses, wrote to the Nepalese King that such an opportunity of attacking the British power would never come again.² Even Mathbar Singh tried to bring about a league between the Sikhs and the Gorkhas to improve his own position in the Darbar.³

In the beginning the Maharaja did not take any hostile step and assured friendship, but the Kabul disaster made him restless for action and he became keen for an alliance with Lahore. The Ministers were asked to tell the Resident openly about his desire to send a mission to Punjab. From China pecuniary aid was sought and with that aim Jagat Bam Pande, a prominent member of the Pande faction, was sent as leader of the Nepalese periodical mission to Peking.⁴ The King had, however, to encounter a serious obstacle, i.e.,

1. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 66.

2. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 78.

3. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 69.

4. S.C. August 10, 1842—No. 126.

the alliance of the pro-British chiefs and the Resident. He could never bear the "frequent advantages" of the Resident over him which were rendered possible by "the cooperation of these chiefs" during the two preceding years.

With a view to break this alliance, the Heir-Apparent was instigated to oppress the chiefs. Highly respectable persons were beaten and insulted by him, so much so that the stories of his cruelties and eccentricities have become famous in the Nepalese history. The Pandes also created a halo around him. They got it declared from the astrologers that the Prince was an "Incarnation and destined at no remote period to extirpate the Firangis". These intimidations against the chiefs through the Prince had the "express object" of effecting their breach with the Resident.⁵ It was feared that, if the British were not to remonstrate against these barbarities of the Prince, the chiefs would break off with the Resident just to save their lives. And in this object the Maharaja had partially succeeded, because, had it not been for the dissensions among them, the chiefs would have deserted the Resident.

An attitude of marked hostility was adopted towards the Resident with the same object. The Heir-Apparent threatened to expel him and cut him off. Occasions were sought by the Maharaja to harass and insult him in order to impress upon the chiefs that the Resident was not powerful enough to protect them. Shortly after the removal of the British force from the frontier, the Maharaja used harsh and insulting words for the Governor General over a report by an Anglo-Indian newspaper that the late Maharani had died of poisoning.⁶ On April 23, 1842, the restlessness of the Maharaja suddenly erupted on the pretext of a lawsuit of an Indian trader, Kashi Nath, and gave rise to an inci-

5. The Resident remarked: "I feel assured that the Intimidations now being practised towards the chiefs through the Heir-Apparent have in part the express object of effecting such desertion from me and if the present barbarities be carried a little further and be applied to the Ministry without remonstrance from me I fear our honour would hardly escape unquestioned as I am sure that our interests would be sadly wounded by the desertion of all our numerous and powerful friends....". S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 66.

6. Shortly after the removal of the British force from the frontier "the Maharaja gave utterance to sentiments quite at variance with his peaceful profession. A report.....of the Anglo-Indian

dent which had for reaching repercussions on the internal as well as the external affairs of Nepal.

Kashi Nath had certain claims on another Indian trader 'Shew Bux' (sic). The latter filed a fabricated suit against the former just to harass him in the Nepalese courts. It is clear that, both being British subjects, Nepalese courts had no jurisdiction over them. Still the case was taken up by the Nepalese courts, and on the basis of fabricated documents of the plaintiff Kashi Nath was fined Rs. 16,836 which were taken out of his deposit of Rs. 36,400.⁷ Kashi Nath appealed to the Resident against this high-handedness and, upon Hodgson's protests, the case was set aside by the highest court of Nepal—Kot Linga—on the ground that it was not under Nepalese jurisdiction, and subsequently Kashi Nath got his money back. However, late in February 1842 Shew Bux again brought forward the case and there were rumours that the Nepalese judicial authorities were going to take it up. Hodgson protested and appealed to the Darbar to let the merchant proceed to the plains unmolested. But, despite the Resident's protests, the case was taken up.

Kashi Nath was at that time residing in the Residency

(Contd. from page 201)

newspapers.....that the late Maharani's death had been caused by poison having come to the knowledge of the Maharaja, excited much indignation on his part, and led to.....a most disgraceful and rather ludicrous scene between the Maharaja and Heir-Apparent. The former having desired a conference with the Resident, Mr. Hodgson started for the Palace, but much to his astonishment, he had scarcely reached the Residency gate, when he saw the Maharaja and Heir-Apparent standing on the road attended by several chiefs. The Raja demanded whether the Resident had despatched his letters to the Governor General relative to the late Maharani's death; the Resident replied in affirmative, and assured that every exertion would be made by the Governor General to discover the author of the slanderous tale. Upon this, the Maharaja became extremely violent, and exclaimed with much anger "Tell the Governor General that he must and shall give him up. I will have him and flay him alive, and rub him with salt and lemon until he dies: further, tell the Governor General that if this infamous calumniator is not delivered up there shall be war between us". The Heir-Apparent then commenced abusing his father whom he struck repeatedly. This scene was reacted in the Gooroo's Garden. For the undignified and highly offensive expressions, made use by the Maharaja on these occasions, a full apology was subsequently made to the British Government".

NEN 1842—Para 26.

7. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 51.

for medical treatment. On April 6 and 8, 1842, the Darbar's Munshee came to fetch him, but Hodgson refused to hand him over and requested an interview with the King. But, instead of hearing the Resident, the Maharaja, along with a large number of chiefs and an escort of 2,000 troops, came to the Residency on April 23, 1842.* He demanded the surrender of Kashi Nath and the Resident's reason for withholding him. Hodgson explained that Kashi Nath could not have been given up because, he being a British subject, his "case was not one of disputed jurisdiction but of strong-handed interference with all legal proceedings". He added that the merchant was detained in the Residency for medical treatment and because he was not yet given his deposit with which he could have retired to the plains. Kashi Nath himself came out and "declared (that) he had no wish or intention of opposing (Maharaja), and that all he wanted was justice." The King, however, notwithstanding all these explanations, ordered him to be seized.* Whereupon Hodgson told the Maharaja that if the latter insisted on it, it would be regarded as "coersion" and his "duties as an ambassador would come to an end". Then came the Heir-Apparent and instigated his father to get Kashi Nath dragged away. The Maharaja rushed at the merchant and attempted to "bear him off". About what followed Hodgson himself wrote: "I threw my arms around the merchant and said sternly to the Raja 'you take both of us or neither'. This was more than Raja could screw up his resolution. . . . Seizing the moment, I made an appeal to his better feelings. . . . and thus at length cast the balance against the mischief-makers". Once again the King and the Prince attempted

8. An interesting account of the Kashi Nath episode has been given in Hodgson's despatch to the Political Secretary, dated April 24, 1842; S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 66.

9. The Resident had opposed the case not only on the grounds of jurisdiction and that it had been once decided by the highest court in Nepal. He also protested against the injustice that, while Kashi Nath's sufficient bail had been refused and he was compelled to deposit huge sums, his opponent did not have to pay anything of this sort; while Kashi Nath was not allowed to leave for plains, the other party could go with its security; and that while the papers of Kashi Nath had been improperly rejected, that of the other party were accepted.

S.C. September 7, 1842—No. 89.

to seize Kashi Nath, but the Resident frustrated their attempts with his calm determination. At last the Maharaja retired and sent the friendly chiefs to negotiate with the Resident. On their entreaties Hodgson allowed Kashi Nath to go to the Darbar on the guarantee from the Ministers that his life and property would be safe.

These were, in brief, the facts of the case. The motive behind this incident was to take advantage of the British difficulties. It was purely and simply the result of the Maharaja's restlessness, which was let loose due to the British defeat in Afghanistan, and the aim was to break the alliance of the Resident and the chiefs.¹⁰ It certainly cannot be said that the Resident had in any way insulted the King, and in protesting against the improper proceedings, when the case had already been decided by the highest court of Nepal, Hodgson was only fulfilling his duties as the representative of the Indian Government. If the manner in which the case was taken up were to be looked at, the motives become clear. It was taken up at the time of the climax of the Afghan disaster. The Resident was refused an interview, which he had sought to clear the misunderstanding. The Maharaja had accepted that Kashi Nath was a British subject and still the case was taken up.¹¹ Above all, coming over to the Residency with two thousand soldiers to demand the surrender of the merchant was most improper. It only shows the duplicity of the Maharaja, that till April 23, he had called Hodgson the "Saviour of Nepal" and then immediately afterwards denounced him a "scandal-monger".

Hodgson was aware of these motives of the Maharaja and had realised that if such insults to the British representative were to be tolerated, the chiefs would suffer a "negative breach".¹² He knew that the life and honour of the ministers and the British relations were at stake in this case.¹³ During the time of the incident the chiefs themselves had whispered to the Resident: "Be patient and firm, all depends on you. We cannot act now, but we can and will exact

10. S.C. August 3, 1842—Nos. 90 and 95.

11. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 88.

12. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 90.

13. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 39.

an apology when Raja's fit of violence has abated and we have got him away".¹⁴ This was the reason, why Hodgson took such a strict attitude. He was not blind to the practical difficulties that the Indian Government would encounter in backing him effectively at that moment, but inaction on his part would have resulted in rapid desertions by the chiefs. He, therefore, suggested to the Indian Government to station a military corps again on the Nepalese frontier to impress upon the Maharaja that, whatever the British difficulties, they had enough strength in reserve, and to reject the Nepalese complimentary mission which was on its way to congratulate the new Governor General Lord Ellenborough, unless an apology was tendered to the Resident.

Before the Indian Government could take any step, the quick victories of Pollock and Sale in Afghanistan disheartened the Maharaja. Within a month the tide was turning in the opposite direction and overtures were made by the King through Fateh Jung Sah seeking reconciliation with the Resident.¹⁵ The Maharaja offered his apologies for the disrespect shown to the Resident and assured him of his friendship in future.¹⁶ Kashi Nath's case was discharged from the Nepalese court and he was allowed to return, with his deposit, to Benaras. A great gain that the Resident got out of the Kashi Nath episode was that the pro-British chiefs, who had been divided for the last few months, became united against the cruelties of the Prince and the whims of the Maharaja, and now they hoped the Resident and the Governor General to remonstrate against both. This unity gave the Resident an enormous strength and he advised the Government that, even without stationing a British force on the frontier, only strict remonstrance and rejection of the Nepalese complimentary mission by the Governor General would suffice.¹⁷

In the administration of India, however, very important changes had already taken place by this time. On February 28, 1842 Lord Auckland's tenure of Governor

14. Quoted by Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 210.

15. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 89.

16. S.C. September 7, 1842—No. 89.

17. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 87.

Generalship came to an end amidst the dark days of the Afghan failure. The appointment of Lord Ellenborough at the climax of the north-western disaster appeared almost an act of recall of Lord Auckland by the Home Government. It looked as though a thorough change in the policy was going to be effected, and in his talks the new Governor General gave an impression that, "he believed his mission to be a reversal of his predecessor's measures and supersession of his predecessor's men".¹⁸

Unfortunately, when Hodgson's report of the Kashi Nath episode reached the new Governor General, he was unattended by his Council. It was, therefore, natural for Lord Ellenborough to imagine that the "communications between the two states would henceforth have been of the most amicable and courteous character".¹⁹ He believed that whatever the Maharaja did "must have been done under erroneous impressions with regard to the facts of the case before him or with regard to (Resident's) conduct in relation to it". The Resident was rebuked for having acted "in a manner so entirely different to the known views and wishes" of his Government as to have extended the privilege of a British subject to an ordinary merchant and for having exceeded his own authority beyond "the just limits (of) the Law of Nations and a solemn Treaty.....". He was condemned for having evinced "a want of personal consideration for a friendly and independent sovereign". And the Governor General also expressed his surprise that a sovereign "could so far forget his Personal Dignity and the obligations of Public Law and Treaty as to offer intentional Insult to the Representative at his court of a.....friendly power.....".

Lord Ellenborough wanted an explanation of the case from the Maharaja and refused to accept the Nepalese complimentary mission, till the misunderstanding was removed. The Resident was asked to deliver the letter, containing the above contents, to the Maharaja and report himself at the Governor General's camp to discuss many points connected with Nepal.

18. Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 204.

19. See Lord Ellenborough's letter to Hodgson dated May 8, 1842. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 67.

With these instructions and the order to hand over the letter to the Maharaja, Hodgson did not know what to do. It was strange that Lord Ellenborough regarded the existing relations as amicable. The tone of the Resident's letter to the Government dated May 16, 1842 shows in what an awkward corner he had been placed by the attitude of the new Governor General. Therefore, Hodgson earnestly requested the Governor General not to be deluded by the Maharaja's empty professions and to have some faith in the person, who had lived in Nepal for more than two decades.²⁰ He clarified to Lord Ellenborough that everything was at stake in the Kashi Nath case and that if he did not take a strict attitude all the fruits of the old policy would be lost, the pro-British chiefs would be punished and the British Government would thereby lose the support of the chiefs through whom the Resident had so long been getting the better of the Maharaja. In fact, all the pro-British chiefs expected everything contrary to what the new Governor General had written in his letter and looked to him for remonstrance against the Maharaja's behaviour.²¹

Taking into consideration all these factors and with a view to present a joint anti-Maharaja front with other chiefs, Hodgson handed over to the King a modified version of Governor General's letter in which he conveyed that the Governor General would not accept the presents sent from Nepal unless the Maharaja apologised for the late occurrence.²² This step was regarded as essential to temporize with the King, and, to explain the same to Lord Ellenborough, the Resident sent his Assistant to the Governor General's camp.

Lord Ellenborough, however, considered this step on the part of the Resident as disobedience and on June 3, 1842 he ordered Hodgson to hand over the original Kharita to the Maharaja.²³ On the 5th June, considering that the ministers supported by the Resident had no influence and that such a support impaired the dignity of the British power, the Gov-

20. S.C. August 3, 1842—Nos. 88 and 89.

21. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 95.

22. S.C. September 7, 1842—No. 81.

23. See Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, Foot Note No. I, p. 216.

ernor General instructed Hodgson to withdraw from his false position and follow a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal.²⁴ On June 12, 1842 the Resident was again asked to keep aloof from the chiefs and himself report to the Governor General instead of sending his Assistant.²⁵ On June 21, 1842 he was once more rebuked for disobedience in giving a modified version of Government's letter which the Governor General feared might produce serious embarrassment at a time when the diversion of the British force and further burden on its finances were not desirable. Hodgson was even informed that he would soon be relieved of his present assignment.²⁶

Hodgson, however, faced the situation boldly and refused to throw away the old policy. He, once again, decided to act on his own and took upon himself the responsibility of disregarding the Governor General's directive. As the Resident he considered it his duty to explain the circumstances fully under which the policy of interference was adopted and

24. Secretary to Government of India with the Governor General wrote to Hodgson on June 5, 1842: "The Governor General cannot but infer from your letter of the 25th ultimo, that you attach a degree of importance to the continuance in office of the present ministers of Nepal which the circumstances of the case as made known to His Lordship do not appear to justify."

"To the British Government it is a matter of indifference who are the Ministers of Nepal unless in so far as the influence of the Ministers might affect the question of Peace and War in which alone we are interested.

"But the present Ministers of Nepal appear to have no influence whatever of any sort. They seem to be in a state of perpetual terror, always apprehending some danger to their own persons from the violence of the Rajah and the Heir-Apparent".

He continued that "their influence is not such as to preserve a British subject from oppression and the representative of the British Government from insult. Neither would it preserve the British Government from war, if it suited the purpose of the Rajah, to make upon us."

"The British Government loses a portion of its power when it departs from its Dignity and places itself in a state of subordinate co-operation with the Ministers of Nepal". S.C. June 5, 1842—No. 75.

25. S.C. June 5, 1842—No. 78.

26. Letter from the Secretary with the Governor General to the Resident of Nepal, dated June 21, 1842. Quoted by Hunter. n. 40, Ch. I, p. 212.

maintained for the eighteen months. It was only when the King was found unreliable and the British entanglements in Afghanistan went on increasing that in October 1840 the Resident was authorised to raise a pro-British party and Col. Oliver's brigade was posted on the frontier to maintain the new Ministry in office. This, however, Hodgson maintained, was only a temporary expedient.²⁷ He contended that the essential point in the Nepalese politics of that time was the clash between the Pandes and the other chiefs. The Pande's power was based on pandering the chauvinistic feelings of the soldiers and they stood for hostility towards the British, while the other chiefs realised the futility of such a policy and advocated closer relations with the Indian Government. Lately, as the Maharaja himself headed the war party, the pro-British Ministry was the "sole stay" of the British influence in Nepal and of peace between both the countries.²⁸ But the party which had been supporting the British alliance also expected support from the Indian Government for itself. Therefore, the Resident concluded that, "the literal execution of (Governor General's) orders of 8th ultimo threatened immediately and suddenly to destroy the whole fabric of the policy; perhaps also to bury in its ruins numerous distinguished chiefs, whose pledges of co-operation had been as solemnly tendered to as accepted by my Government and the services of the principal of whom in the capacity of Ministers of this state had first received highest applause from the

27. S.C. September 7, 1842—Nos. 87 and 88.

28. The Resident gave a detailed explanation of his past conduct and the relations of the two states on June 12, 1842. He remarked that, "The Rajah himself has lately stood forth as the head of that faction (the war party), almost without disguise, and recent events have constrained the suggest (sic) and most temperate chiefs of this state to refer the dark features of its domestic and foreign policy during the last three years, effectually to His Highness, and, doing so, to despair almost of the future under his guidance. By his deeds they measure their own danger. They know they are aimed at for having opposed with British sanction his prejudices and passions; and whilst they deliberately declare that there are hardly any means of present safety, and none at all of more enduring kind; for them save behind the Agis of our name and power, they are daily led by the daily pressure of palace upon them to speculate. Omenously for their continued truth to one another and to us, upon the British Resident's unabated will and unabated power to sustain them as heretofore". S.C. September 7, 1842—No. 84.

Governor General in Council; and lastly, to precipitate that very crisis which Lord Ellenborough sought to avoid, as well as to strip us of all the means to meet it when it came.”²⁹

At the same time, Hodgson realised that the new Governor General would not continue the old policy as it was pregnant with future troubles and degrading for a power like the British. With a view of reconciling both the aims, he recommended that, if his connections with the Ministers were to be terminated, it should be done gradually “so that all parties may have opportunity to consult their safety at a place where justice and mercy seem to be vanished from the hearts of Princes.....”.³⁰ He maintained that if the British support was suddenly withdrawn from the present Ministers, the Maharaja would fall in the hands of the Pandes. Therefore, he suggested that the change in the policy should better be deferred till the affairs in Afghanistan and China had been favourably settled. In case the Governor General insisted for an immediate severance with the chiefs, Hodgson recommended that it should be communicated in a manner that their goodwill might be retained, otherwise “those councillors should be allowed on their resignation an asylum if need be in our provinces.”³¹

Before the above recommendations reached him, the new Governor General had realised the mistake he was committing. Just a night after he had written the letter of recall, Lord Ellenborough cancelled the recall on June 22, 1842.³² After receiving the Resident’s detailed explanation, he further modified his views but remarked on July 6 that Hodgson, being “so mixed up with a party” in Nepal, a new policy should better be carried by a new man.³³ On July 26, however, he came to the conclusion that

29. Letter from the Resident in Nepal to T. H. Maddock, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor General dated June 30, 1842, Quoted by Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 213.

30. S.C. September 7, 1842—No. 87.

31. S.C. September 7, 1842—No. 88.

32. Secretary to the Indian Government with Governor General to the Resident in Nepal dated June 22, 1842, Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 217.

33. Ibid.

Hodgson was the best man to carry out the changes.³⁴ Finally, in the public despatch of August 8, 1842, the Governor General substantially changed his attitude from what he had hastily adopted in May. No doubt he still considered it expedient that relations between the ministers and the Resident should cease as he thought these to be "fraught with" future dangers. But it was left to the discretion of the Resident to decide in what manner his conduct should be regulated so as to withdraw the Indian Government gradually from the "position without injury to the persons who may rely upon its protection".³⁵ Hodgson was instructed to bring back the policy of "abstaining from interference in the internal affairsand relying for the due protection of British interests upon the knowledge entertained of the British power".

This change in the British policy by Lord Ellenborough has been viewed differently by the historians. J. L. Morrison, the biographer of Hodgson's successor, Sir Henry Lawrence, writes:

"Hodgson had followed a line of policy which suited his own genius and perhaps, the time he lived in. He had long lived in Nepal and knew Nepal more than any other living Englishman. During his term of office Government of India first occupied then retreated from Afghanistan. The court of Nepal remembering English failure in the old war with them, fully aware how precarious the military situation was, and quite ignorant of the infinite resources of the English strength, might at any time precipitate a new war by some mad inroad into Oudh or in the direction of Patna. Hodgson's policy was to intervene in local politics, support the more peaceful party and temporize until the time of strain was over. But he had none of the com-

34. In a private letter dated July 26, 1842 Lord Ellenborough admiring Hodgson's abilities wrote: "I have much reliance upon your ability and upon the extensive knowledge you possess of the Maharaja and the people; and I can have no doubt that you will, to the utmost exert your ability and use your knowledge for the purpose of maintaining the existing relations of amity between the British Government and Nepal". Ibid.

35. S.C. October 19, 1842—No. 64.

manding power which a similar interventionist, Straford Canning, had exhibited in his wider sphere at Constantinople. In his successor's phrase, he was one day master, the next day slave. He had to face insults and threatened violence, and while he understood, and in part was understood by, the court, he allowed English prestige to decline there, even if he helped to avert hostilities. Lord Ellenborough's arrival brought his regime to a rude end.the Government of India under Lord Ellenborough determined to end the period of truckling to the whims of Nepalese politics and to establish a more dignified policy of strict non-intervention and steady maintenance of the Resident's position as that of an ambassador immune from barbaric insults".³⁶

Similarly Maud Diver, the biographer of Hanoria Lawrence—the wife of Sir Henry—writes that Hodgson "had handled, with more skill than discretion, the dangerous situation during Afghan War. He had mixed up with Court intrigues, sided with peace party and possibly averted hostilities. But in the process he had disastrously lowered English prestige."³⁷

On the contrary, the biographer of Hodgson, Sir W. W. Hunter, attributes the blood and strife in Nepal in the subsequent four years to the policy of Lord Ellenborough.³⁸ It is difficult to make conjectures in history and particularly to visualize the effects of a line of policy that could not be followed. However, it is more than definite that the Chautrias would not have lost their control on the Government, nor Jung Bahadur staged a dramatic ascendancy, but for the withdrawal of the British support from the former.

As for the charges of Morrison and Maud Diver that Hodgson lowered the prestige of the British Government, it must justly be said in favour of Hodgson that he had no way out and that he always considered the policy of interference as a temporary expedient. The account of the Indo-Nepa-

36. J. L. Morrison, n. 3, Ch. V, pp. 135-37.

37. Maud Diver, *Hanoria Lawrence—A fragment of Indian History*, London, 1936, p. 267.

38. Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 230.

lese relations in the preceding pages amply proves it. The policy of interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal was adopted in October 1840 when the Maharaja was found utterly unreliable and the British entanglement in Afghanistan had continued to increase. Before that both Hodgson and Lord Auckland were against such a step as they feared that it would combine the various contending factions against the British. Forty years afterwards, Hodgson recorded his views regarding this change of policy. "The new Governor General," he observed, "although away from his Council and in opposition to his Foreign Secretary, who was the only responsible officer with him, summarily condemned 'the tried and successful policy of his predecessor' and ordered a dangerous communication to be made to the Raja of Nepal. 'It seemed to me impossible to follow such a course, and, as his Lordship declared that his object was peace, I ventured to disobey orders which I thought would certainly imperil it.'"³⁹

Active interference in the domestic affairs of a country like Nepal was certainly fraught with danger, and it is doubtful whether it would have succeeded in peace time. It may also be added that part of the military mania in Nepal, of which Hodgson was so much apprehensive, was due to his own meddlesome policy. The policy of Lord Ellenborough was certainly worthier of the English power, but J. L. Morrison himself concedes that, "it was possible to do so in 1844 what might have proved disastrous in 1842".⁴⁰

II

Hodgson gradually tried to implement the new policy of non-interference. Many chiefs came to him for consultation, but he refused to meddle in their affairs, and even shifted to his hill-bungalow to avoid such entanglement.⁴¹ He told the Ministers that under the old circumstances the Indian Government supported them to keep away the hos-

39. Ibid.

40. Morrison, n. 3, Ch. V, p. 137.

41. S.C. September 7, 1842—No. 93. Also see *Diary of events in Nepal*—May 16, 1842.

tile faction; but now, as the times had changed, he would neither openly support them nor remonstrate against the Pandes or the Heir-Apparent.⁴² A more indifferent attitude was not possible due to the unreliable disposition of the King and the Prince, nor was it possible to break suddenly the long established alliance with the pro-British Ministers. A hasty change, Hodgson knew, would be misrepresented and would endanger the friendly relations and the lives of the pro-British chiefs.⁴³ He was thus trying to effect the change slowly while maintaining peace till the troubles in Afghanistan and China were over. In his own words, he followed a policy of "rather to let change of Ministry come if it must than to precipitate it; while watching and prepared to avail myself yet further of the course of events".⁴⁴

The changed attitude of the Resident naturally emboldened the Heir-Apparent and induced the Maharaja to make him more and more a pretext of evading his responsibility. The Maharaja's petty squabbles continued despite the British victories. He repeatedly insisted that the Governor General should reply to the letter, which the Heir-Apparent had written regarding the report of an Anglo-Indian newspaper that the late Maharani had died of poisoning.⁴⁵ With the same object the Maharaja wanted the Resident to address the Prince as Maharajadhiraj, which the latter flatly refused to do unless a formal act of abdication was undertaken.⁴⁶ The Pandes also did their utmost to incite the Maharaja and the Heir-Apparent against the British.⁴⁷

As time passed on, the Prince proved extremely unmanageable. The Pandes, who were his favourites, went to the extent of encouraging him to demand the throne from the King. In September he left for Hitounda, with a large body of soldiers, declaring that if the Maharaja did not abdicate, he would leave for Gaya even without the Resident's permission.⁴⁸ The Maharaja promptly followed to bring him back,

42. S.C. October 5, 1842—No. 148.

43. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 95.

44. S.C. October 5, 1842—No. 148.

45. S.C. September 7, 1842—No. 92.

46. S.C. September 28, 1842—No. 78.

47. NEN, para 30.

48. S.C. November 16, 1842—Nos. 84, 85 and 88.

but being interested in keeping the affairs confused, he actually exercised no control over him. The Indian Government, naturally embarrassed at this situation, authorised the Resident not to allow any one from the Prince's party to enter the Indian territory without due permission and warned the Darbar that if the Prince crossed the frontier with more than three hundred soldiers, it would be regarded as an act of hostility. Fortunately, he was induced to return to Kathmandu on November 9, but the tussle for the throne between the father and the son continued.

From October 1842 onwards some important developments materially changed the Nepalese attitude. Britain had attained the decisive victories in Afghanistan and China. Apart from the usual abatement in the hostility of the Maharaja, its unique effect was the realisation on his part that all the big promises of conquest, the anti-British propaganda and the predictions of the British downfall made by the Pandes were mere bluffs which, without achieving anything, were fraught with danger both for him and for his country.

In the Darbar ever since the death of the Senior Maharani the Junior Queen was trying to oust the Pandes. In November, accidentally some prominent leaders of their faction were found guilty of a serious charge of defaming and incriminating the Maharaja. A label was found in which they had tried to propagate that the late Maharani had died of poisoning.⁴⁹ The Maharaja realised the unscrupulousness of this faction and positively turned against it. Prominent ring leaders, viz., Kulraj Pande, Ranjang Pande and Karbeer Pande were tried. Kulraj was found guilty of attempting to incriminate the King. His right hand was mutilated, property confiscated and he was banished from the country.⁵⁰

The incessant and increasing cruelties of the Heir-Ap-parent towards all classes and the collusion of the Maharaja in it created a general discontent in the country. It became impossible for the ministers to carry out their duties successfully. Fateh Jang Sah even refused to resume his duties as long as the King did not control the Prince, because under

49. S.C. November 30, 1842—No. 34.

50. Diary of events in Nepal—November 7, 1842.

the prevailing condition of affairs he could neither have answered the foreign governments nor done anything in the domestic sphere.⁵¹ It was impossible for the ministers to follow two masters. For all the murders, maimings, beatings and insults perpetrated by the Prince, the Maharaja evaded his responsibility, and there were instances when he had not prevented his son from punishing the chiefs for the obedience of his own command. The general discontent soon assumed the form of a movement and a petition for the due protection of the legitimate rights of the people was presented to the Maharaja, who, after some evasion, ratified it on December 7, 1842.⁵² An important result of the movement was that the Junior Maharani became very popular and by January 1843 she secured for herself a definite share in the Governmental power. A new arrangement was made according to which the Government was to be run by the King with the advice of the Maharani and suggestions of the Prince.⁵³ This was by no means abdication or delegation of power in clear terms, but henceforth the Maharani certainly became a force to be reckoned with.

The relations between the two Governments, on account of the factors above stated, became more friendly than they were during the last few years. The Darbar congratulated the Indian Government on its victories in Afghanistan and China. In January 1843 the Maharaja even expressed a desire to despatch a complimentary mission to the Governor General, but due to unstable conditions of the Darbar the Resident discouraged it.⁵⁴ As a further exhibition of its strength the Indian Government installed a corps of irregular cavalry on the Nepalese frontier.⁵⁵ From the domestic affairs of Nepal the Resident, following the new policy of non-interference, kept away. With regard to activities of the Prince the general policy of the Indian Government was to neglect him. But during June 1842 the Prince started coming to the Residency and even urged the Resident to in-

51. S.C. December 27, 1842—No. 83.

52. S.C. January 4, 1843—No. 60. Also see NEN, 1842, para 31.

53. S.C. February 22, 1843—No. 73.

54. S.C. March 1, 1843—No. 53.

55. S.C. January 4, 1843—No. 52.

duce the Maharaja to abdicate in his favour. The Resident was, however, instructed to have no concern with him except with the "Open approval of the Maharaja".⁵⁶

In the factional politics of the Darbar the withdrawal of the British support from the Chautrias, coupled with the rise of the Junior Maharani Lakshmi Devi, inevitably gave rise to important changes. The Queen knew that so long as the Pandes and the Chautrias were in power, her schemes would not be successful. After the Kashinath case, which had turned the King against the Chautrias, and the fall of the Pandes, the Queen could convince her husband that only the Thapas could be relied on. The Maharaja, therefore, extended an invitation to General Mathbar Singh, who was the only prominent surviving leader of that faction. It may be recalled that the General had been living in Simla and was getting a pension from the Indian Government since 1839.⁵⁷ On receiving the invitation he proceeded for Kathmandu, but, knowing the unreliable character of the Maharaja, did not immediately enter Nepal. Hodgson also did not like that he should enter Nepal without assurance for his security.⁵⁸ He stayed on the frontier for some time and cautiously watched the attitude of the Maharaja and the strange politics of the Darbar. On April 17, 1843, after being satisfied that he would be well received and having secured an assurance from Hodgson that the Resident was not exceptionally inclined towards the Chautrias,⁵⁹ Mathbar Singh reached Kathmandu.

The period between Mathbar's entry to Nepal and his elevation to the prime ministership of the country on Decem-

56. S.C. July 15, 1843—Nos. 60 and 61.

57. In March 1838 Mathbar Singh had left Kathmandu for Lahore. In May 1838 he was arrested by the British authorities crossing the Sutlej river. By the end of 1838 he was released and allowed to proceed to Punjab, but shortly afterwards he was handed over by Ranjit Singh to the Indian authorities. Since then he had been regularly living at Simla and was getting a pension.

58. British Government considered Mathbar Singh as the last trump in case of rupture with Nepal and in August 1842 the Resident had even recommended that without guarantee of his safety he should not be allowed to enter Nepal. S.C. October 5, 1842—No. 142.

59. Diary of events in Nepal, October 15, 1844.

ber 26, 1843, was one of respite in which every party tried to consolidate its strength. The first act of Mathbar Singh, after his arrival, was to take revenge on the Pandes. With the support of the Queen and the Maharaja he could prosecute them on the charge of the murder of his uncle—Bhim Sen. Several Pandes lost their lives and some were imprisoned or banished. This proved practically the end of the political career of this faction. The Chautriyas also felt disheartened at the withdrawal of the British support to them and it was expected that their leader Fateh Jang Sah would not continue after the coming "Panjani".⁶⁰

In December 1843 Hodgson retired from the Residency and the charge was taken over by Maj. M. Lawrence.⁶¹ The Maharaja wanted Hodgson to further continue in the office, but Lord Ellenborough did not agree.⁶² His "final audience with the Darbar" was really touching. The Maharaja "burst into tears, and, referring to the exertions by which Hodgson had so often averted a war, called him 'the saviour of Nepal'."⁶³ It shows how deeply Hodgson was involved in the domestic politics of the Darbar. But it certainly goes to his credit that he worked as a master diplomat and averted a possible disaster on the northern flank of the British in India during the first Afghan war. With inexhaustible energy he worked for the development of the trans-Himalayan trade through Nepal and collected lots of information about the races of that region. Although his suggestions for the recruitment of the Gorkhas into the British Indian army on a regular regimental basis could not immediately be accepted, they certainly paved the way for it,

60. S.C. March 1, 1843—No. 58..

61. Sir Henry Montgomery Lawrence (1806-1857), brother of the Governor General Lord Lawrence, joined Bengal Artillery, February 1823; fought in Burmese War in 1826; after few years of retirement from military service again fought in the first Afghan war; was Resident in Nepal 1843-46; appointed Resident at Lahore 1847; appointed President of the Board of Administration of Punjab and A.G.G. in April 1849 after its annexation; was transferred to Rajputana in 1853; was Chief Commissioner and A.G.G. in Oudh from March 21, 1857; was killed during the Mutiny while defending Residency at Lucknow on July 4, 1857. C. E. Buckland, n. 2, Ch. V, p. 246.

62. S.C. August 19, 1843—Nos. 5 and 8.

63. Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 234.

which in course of time became one of the basic aims of the Indian Government. His contributions in the field of culture and science were no less conspicuous. He brought into light the Neware culture and has rightly been acknowledged as the discoverer of the Lamic Buddhism. His ethnological studies about the various races of the Himalayas are pride to the modern sociologists. His botanical and zoological researches in the flora and fauna of Nepal are lasting contributions.

III

When Sir Henry Lawrence took charge of the Residency the condition of the Darbar was most unstable. The Royal authority was virtually shared by a trio of the Maharaja, the Queen and the Prince. The King was trying to control the affairs, but he was challenged by his own son—the Heir-Apparent. In the beginning without exercising any control the Maharaja used him as a political tool, but, in due course, he became so unmanageable that the father had to declare repeatedly his intention to abdicate. Queen Lakshmi Devi, who wanted to change the legitimate line of succession by placing her own son on the throne, was also a serious rival of Maharaja's authority and the rights of the Heir-Apparent. This divided authority was appropriately called by Lawrence as "Mr. Nepal, Master Nepal and Mrs. Nepal".

In addition to the above, there were several factions in which the struggle for political ascendancy and family feuds had been going on from generation to generation. The Chautrias, who were no longer supported by the British, were losing strength. The Brahmans were also not very active at this time and were only moderately supporting the Thapas. The most dominant party was being organised by recently returned General Mathbar Singh—the leader of the Thapa faction. He was a man of distinction, talent, courage and vindictiveness. He came to Nepal with an ambition to rule over the country like his Great Uncle, and for achieving his

64. H. B. Edwardes, *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*, London, 1872, Vol. I, p. 470.

cherished goal he was least scrupulous in sweeping away his enemies. Neither the Maharaja, nor the Maharani, nor the Heir-Apparent counted for him "more than a pawn in his ambitious game". In the beginning he had the intention of siding with the Queen, but he soon perceived that the real power in her party was wielded by her paramour Gagan Singh. Mathbar Singh also realised that the Queen had her own aims and wanted him only as a tool in the dangerous game of setting aside the legitimate successor. Subsequently, therefore, the General decided to side with the Heir-Apparent. But the greatest challenge to his ambition was the Maharaja himself. Both of them wanted to rule over the Kingdom, but there could never exist a powerful minister and a powerful king at the same time in Nepal. Such was the prevailing political climate in Nepal when Sir Henry became the Resident.

The main task of Sir Henry was to change the British policy which had been followed towards Nepal since 1840, and in its place give effect to the new policy of non-interference as laid down by Lord Ellenborough. He was sent, in his own words, to act "as the Elchee of a great government, to observe events, refusing to take part in them and to maintain honour of the Governor General in Council, chiefly by refusing to act".⁶⁵ He was further instructed by his Government to give effect to this change "at once".⁶⁶ And, to achieve this aim Mr. T. Thompson, Lt. Governor of the North Western Provinces, had advised Lawrence that, "We profess to leave the Nepalese entirely to govern themselves; and the only cases in which it is incumbent upon us to advise, remonstrate or dictate, are when our own interests require such interposition".⁶⁷ Similarly George Clerk, the Governor of Bombay, suggested to him "to let people alone and keep aloof, but aloof with all courtesy," and to be "straightforward but courteous, unyielding in grave matters, but accommodating in minor ones".⁶⁸

65. Quoted by J. L. Morrison, n. 3, Ch. V, p. 137.

66. Maud Diver, n. 37, p. 267.

67. Letter from T. Thompson to H. Lawrence, dated November 18, 1843. Cited by H. B. Edwardes, n. 64, p. 460.

68. Letter from G. Clerk to H. Lawrence dated February 2, 1844. *Ibid.*, pp. 461-62.

Lawrence had two main initial difficulties. Before him there had been too much of one Resident. Hodgson had, in fact, become an integral part of the Nepalese politics and had an influence over the higher classes and intellectuals of Nepal. The recall of such a person and the circumstances in which it was done gave an idea of the reversal of the old policy. And this reversal was interpreted by the Nepalese as British preparation for the annexation of Nepal, for which the new Resident, who also happened to be a militaryman, was an advance guard. It was the general opinion that the new Resident had been "appointed because Hodgson had maintained peace against the wishes of the Governor General", and that it was "a prelude to a change of measures on the part of the British Government."⁶⁹ Therefore, Lawrence's difficulty was to convince the Nepalese of his friendship and good intentions of his Government.

To remove suspicion from the minds of the Nepalese, Lawrence, soon after his arrival, made a policy statement on December 11, 1843.⁷⁰ He clarified the British policy of non-interference and told the Maharaja that he should not believe that the new Resident, being a militaryman, was less disposed towards peace. He emphasised that the British policy did not depend on a particular Resident but was founded "On good faith", the sense of its own strength and the rights of its neighbours. He further specified that the Indian Government was "strong and forbearing", and it was always disposed to cultivate cordial and friendly relations. Although the statement could not immediately remove the fear complex from the Nepalese, yet to some extent it had the intended effect. Its greatest evidence was the permission granted to Honoria Lawrence, the wife of Sir Henry, to enter Nepal and reside with her husband, which was the first permission to a white woman to enter Nepal.

The second, and a more difficult, problem for Sir Henry

69. S.C. January 27, 1844—No. 49.

Even the Maharaja, Lawrence wrote on December 15, 1843, seemed to have a notion that the British Government was adopting a hostile policy. S.C. January 20, 1844—No. 1.

70. Translation of the Memorandum presented and read by the Resident to the Maharaja of Nepal dated December 11, 1843. S.C. January 20, 1844—No. 1.

was to stop immediately the practice of the British interference in the Nepalese affairs, or, in other words, to convince every party that the Resident would be neutral and would not support any group in any way.⁷¹ Here Lawrence's main difficulty arose due to his predecessor's conduct towards the Maharaja and the various factions. Hodgson was regarded either a friend of one faction or the enemy of the other. He had been Resident for ten years and had taken an active part in the politics of the Darbar during the last four years of his tenure. The Chautrias, who were in the habit of even consulting him, and Mathbar, who had enjoyed British protection in Simla, regarded him as a close friend; but the Pandes were his sworn enemies. Every faction wanted to win over the British support for itself, which, in fact, had been the greatest bogey in the Nepalese politics. Bhim Sen successfully followed this policy for two decades to maintain his position; the Pandes were dismissed under direct pressure of the Indian Government; and, lastly, the Chautrias could stay in office with the British support and went down when they lost it. Naturally, it was difficult to have any radical alteration in this system.

Mathbar Singh had been appointed the Prime Minister on December 26, 1843. He was a keen aspirant of the British support. He had lived under the British protection at Simla for more than four years and had the first hand knowledge of the British power. Therefore, it was unlikely for him to adopt an anti-British policy; instead, there was every reason for him to court the Indian Government. He returned to Nepal under the "pledge" of the Indian Government,⁷² and Maj. Lawrence was inclined to believe that his "predecessor would never have addressed Mathbar Singh at Gorakhpur or forwarded his views on his arrival. . . . had he not desired to remove from General's (Mathbar Singh's) mind the impression that he (Hodgson) had been heart and mind with the Chautrias. . . ." ⁷³ It was certainly difficult for such a person to abandon all hopes and attempts to secure Resident's support. Even Sir Henry accepted in his letter

71. S.C. March 16, 1844—No. 29.

72. S.C. March 16, 1844—No. 28.

73. *Diary of events in Nepal*—October 15, 1844.

to the Government of India of February 6, 1844 that Mathbar Singh deserved "some consideration" from the Indian Government.⁷⁴

Right from the moment of Lawrence's arrival Mathbar Singh's attempt was to win over the British support for himself and for the Heir-Apparent. He went to Thankote to welcome the new Resident and told him that he wished to renew his old friendship and depended upon him for protection. On December 11, 1843 when the Resident made his policy statement in the Darbar, Mathbar Singh deliberately absented himself and sent several messages that the Resident should not make the policy statement.⁷⁵ He either wanted to be a medium between the Resident and the Maharaja, or, it seems that he was so much committed to the Prince that he did not like the Resident to express friendly sentiments to the Maharaja. Subsequently, he was able to induce the Maharaja to ask the Resident that the policy statement of December 11, 1843 be also presented to the Heir-Apparent.⁷⁶ To win over the British support he repeatedly asseverated his friendship towards the Indian Government and tried to show what he was doing for the Resident.⁷⁷ During a mutiny of the soldiers that occurred in early January 1844, he sent troops for the protection of the Residency⁷⁸—a step which Ranjung Pande did not take in June 1840. Later on he also "tried to meet the Resident by tales of his own danger".⁷⁹

It will not be out of place to remark that Mathbar Singh's difficulties were largely due to the division of royal authority between the Maharaja and the Prince. Although, it was a fact that it suited his ambition to secure King's abdication, yet in urging the Resident to recognise the Heir-Apparent he only proposed a little more than the Maharaja had already sanctioned. It was the King who was trying to place the Prince on an equal status with himself. He procured a Kharita from Lord Ellenborough for the Prince,

74. S.C. March 16, 1844—No. 29.

75. S.C. January 20, 1844—No. 1.

76. S.C. January 20, 1844—No. 4.

77. S.C. January 20, 1844—No. 55.

78. S.C. February 17, 1844—No. 10.

79. *Dairy of events in Nepal*—October 15, 1844.

entitled him to be addressed as Maharajadhiraj on all occasions, allowed him to exercise authority over the Ministers, the chiefs and the army, permitted him to take precedence over him and even asked Lawrence to give him a copy of statement made on December 11, 1843. The Prince had, infact, a great authority. Hence Mathbar Singh's demand was only a natural effect of Maharaja's own conduct. It was strange how the King allowed his son to advance so far as to demand his father's abdication. The Prime Minister was not far from the truth when he said that he was "impelled in four directions by the Raja, Prince, Ranee and British Government; that if he acted against the Maharaja it would be called ingratitude; and if against the Prince it would draw down his wrath from which the Raja would not protect him, that the Ranee was anxious for herself and children, and that he did not know what the British Government might say at any revolution."⁸⁰

Lawrence met every overture from Mathbar Singh to draw him into alliance by frankly stating that according to the policy of his Government he could not support or encourage him. When the Prime Minister talked confidently of threatening the reigning dynasty the Resident was directed not to even listen anything against the Sovereign.⁸¹ Under such circumstances the mutual transactions and the exchange of courtesies between the Resident and the Darbar were very scarce and Lawrence feared that it might be "misinterpreted" by the Nepalese. Out of five notes that the Resident had addressed to the Maharaja only one was replied. But when Lawrence drew the attention of the latter towards it, the Indian Government considered his tone "too dictatorial" towards an 'independent Prince' and directed him to complain of irregularities "in a manner so conciliatory that it may not be felt as an intrusion on the independence of the Maharaja".⁸²

The condition of the Darbar continued most unstable on account of the contest between the Maharaja and the Prince with the former neither abdicating nor taking any

80. S.C. November 23, 1844—No. 113.

81. S.C. February 17, 1844—No. 13.

82. S.C. October 5, 1844—Nos. 266 and 270.

step to control the latter. In his attempt to secure Maharaja's abdication Mathbar Singh went to the extent of even instigating the army to revolt against the divided royal authority. On January 22, a section of the army surrounded the Palace and demanded that there should be only one ruler in the country.⁸³ The Maharaja could calm them down only on the promise that he would abdicate the next day. On January 23, a council was held, which could not be attended by Mathbar Singh, who sent a message that the troops would not allow him to come till the Maharaja did not resign. The Maharaja being quite young was not at all disposed to resign, therefore, several schemes to make a definite arrangement for regulating the royal authority were fruitlessly discussed in the council.⁸⁴ Finding it difficult to carry on his duties and with a view to reassess his strength, Mathbar Singh resigned from the prime ministership in June 1844.⁸⁵

After Mathbar Singh's resignation the situation rapidly deteriorated. The Prince continued his excesses even on the Brahmans and cows, with the Maharaja in no way checking him. On October 19, 1843 the King again promised "to give the Nation one Ruler," but this too could not be fulfilled.⁸⁶ The Prince also reacted sharply and made the Maharaja "virtually a prisoner" by "driving away any one who came nearer his father". On December 4, the matters took a dramatic turn when the Heir-Apparent, the Maharaja, the Maharani, the ministers and a large number of chiefs and troops left towards the Indian frontier. It had been earlier announced that the whole Darbar would proceed for Hitounda for elephant-hunting excursion; but it was also a known fact that the Heir-Apparent had ordered the chiefs and soldiery to follow him and had warned the Maharaja that, unless he abdicated, he would proceed for Benaras with troops.⁸⁷ The Maharaja taking the things lightly followed the Prince.

83. S.C. February 17, 1844—No. 10.

84. S.C. February 17, 1844—Nos. 30 and 31.

85. S.C. September 28, 1844—No. 161.

86. S.C. November 23, 1844—No. 113.

87. H. Lawrence's *Diary*. Quoted by Edwards, n. 64. p. 473.

The Resident protested against such a move and warned that if the British "frontier was insulted the consequences would be serious, and that whether or not, (his) Government would be displeased at the movement of half the Nepal army and all the court" near the Indian frontier.⁸⁸ He was, however, assured that not a man would pass the Cheriaghatty range. The whole party stayed at Hitounda for two days and then the Prince accompanied by Mathbar Singh and a large body of troops moved up to Cheriaghatty and threatened the King that he would proceed for Benaras if the former did not immediately abdicate. This move was, in fact, taken "to alarm" the Resident "into interference on reckoning the possibility that by Prince actually crossing the British territory, such angry remonstrance of the British Government would frighten Raja to abdicate."⁸⁹ And in this attempt the Prince partially succeeded. Even without the interference of the Resident, the Maharaja acquiesced to his demand and authorised the son "to issue all orders and share the Guddee with him".⁹⁰ On December 18, 1844 the arrangement was formalised that "except Gaddee, the mint and the direction of Chinese and foreign affairs", which the Maharaja had reserved, all authority was transferred to the Heir-Apparent.⁹¹ To manifest his authority and frighten the chiefs, the Prince, before returning from Hitounda, ordered sixteen men to be executed on the charge of conspiracy against the life of Mathbar Singh.

After a few days of his return to the capital the Maharaja realised his mistake in thus making Prince and Mathbar Singh supreme and annulled the above arrangement. On December 23, 1843 the Maharaja declared that he and the Prince had reconciled and "he was to remain as before and the Prince was to be consulted and he would issue order through him (the Prince)."⁹² But this arrangement was differently interpreted by the son, who claimed that he was to issue orders with the consultation of his father.

88. Ibid.

89. S.C. January 25, 1845—No. 115.

90. NEN, 1844—Para 42.

91. S.C. January 25, 1845—No. 116.

92. S.C. January 25, 1845—No. 118.

Meanwhile various attempts were made by the adherents of the Heir-Apparent to claim the British recognition of the new arrangement. The Resident was urged to meet the triumphal procession of the Heir-Apparent's return from Hitounda at Thankote "if not as recognition at least as friendly compliment".⁹³ Lawrence refused to do anything with it. On December 18, 1844, the Resident called on the Maharaja by appointment, but found that the Prince, instead of his father, was seated on the throne.⁹⁴

As regards the arrangement made for the regulation of the royal authority, the Indian Government considered it most "anomalous".⁹⁵ For some time it could not take a clear line of policy, and then the Resident was instructed to do whatever the Maharaja desired. The Secretary to the Government of India wrote to the Resident on January 25, 1845: "By the instrument submitted with your letter of the 26th, the Governor General in Council understands that the Raja has not divested himself of the Gaddee or of the authority of the Government, but he merely desires that the Heir-Apparent shall be in most cases the channel whereby His Lordship's orders shall be communicated".⁹⁶ This mode of carrying on the business could not be deemed objectionable. The Resident had also advised the Indian Government that the Prince had so much entered the actual administration that his opposition would be tantamount to interference; and that "no inconvenience will attend it (the new arrangement) and that affairs will be at least as well, if not better, conducted. . . . than they have been of late years". The Indian Government, however, specified that only the Maharaja would be regarded as the ruler of the State and the other subjects, including the Heir-Apparent, would be treated differently in accordance with the express wishes of the Maharaja. The Resident was even authorised to visit the Prince, if the King so desired, but with a due regard to the relative position of the both.

The proceedings of the last two months alarmed the

93. S.C. January 25, 1845—No. 115.

94. S.C. February 21, 1845—No. 106.

95. S.C. January 25, 1845—No. 117.

96. See S.C. February 21, 1845—Nos. 109 and 110.

Maharaja to the ultimate danger arising from the uncontrolled power of the Prince and particularly that of Mathbar Singh, who was actually arrogating all the authority to himself. Therefore, he decided to do away with Mathbar Singh, but with a view to take him unawares, he granted him a number of favours. At the annual **Panjani** Mathbar Singh was reappointed Prime Minister and everything continued quietly, and possibly would have continued further had he acted prudently and temperately. Daily he received some mark of honour, killuts, titles and solemn pledges of safety from the Maharaja. Contrary to all traditions he was even appointed Prime Minister for the whole life. Lawrence warned him that the King was not reliable, but in his vanity Mathbar Singh believed to have frightened all.⁹⁷ But, actually his numerous enemies were only waiting for the right moment. In the spring of 1845 he raised three regiments, which further added to the suspicions of the King. Drunk with power Mathbar Singh committed the folly of employing the soldiers as labourers to demolish their old barracks and physically carry the building material as far as one mile to build new nearer his own residence. Lawrence again warned him of the danger of so employing the troops and thereby displeasing them. The Maharaja lost no time in taking the advantage of the discontent prevailing amongst the chiefs and the soldiery. He sent for Mathbar Singh in the night of May 17, 1845 on the pretext of the Queen's serious illness and got him assassinated. Obviously it was the outcome of a conspiracy between the King and most of the factions, who had become dissatisfied with the Prime Minister.

Thus passed away the second great leader of the Thapa family. Lawrence greatly admired his energy and ability, called him a hero and a prince compared with other Gorkha chiefs and remarked that "it would be difficult to find such man in Nepal".⁹⁸ He was a staunch believer in friendly relations with the British. Though his attempts to secure British support for himself could never be complied with, yet

97. Letter from H. Lawrence to Lord Auckland dated May 25, 1845. Quoted by Edwards, n. 64, Vol. I, p. 8.

98. Diary of events in Nepal—May 18, 1845.

the responsible British authorities regarded him as the one man fit to govern Nepal, because he had an adequate idea of the British power. He was also very popular with the army. His downfall was primarily because of the fact that a strong king and a strong prime minister could not live in Nepal together.⁹⁹ The Maharaja confessed afterwards that "it is plain both could not live together".

IV

Affairs in the Darbar were quiet for some time after the death of General Mathbar Singh. For the next four months, no one accepted the prime ministership and Kazi Jung Bahadur acted on the post temporarily. In his usual attempts to keep his hold on the administration, the King tried to balance the various rival factions. On September 23, 1845 a coalition cabinet was formed under the nominal leadership of Chautria Fateh Jang Sah, in which the Queen's favourite Gagan Singh had more than his say.¹⁰⁰ The other members of the cabinet were Abhiman Rana, Dalbhanjan Pande and Kazi Jung Bahadur, who was only a "Military member". The arrangement regarding the division of the royal authority, made during December 1844, was annulled. A decree was issued according to which "the Maharaja was to give his orders to the Heir-Apparent and the latter would pass them on to the Maharani who would issue the same to Minister." Fateh Jang Sah was given the special charge of the British and the Chinese affairs.

It is quite obvious from the above arrangement that the Prince and his party had gone down and the Queen's party got an upper hand for the time. Apparently all the factions seemed satisfied but actually it was just a preparation for further revolutions and bloodshed in which each was trying to consolidate its strength. The Maharaja had by no means become supreme, and in avoiding the danger arising from the Heir-Apparent and Mathbar Singh, he ran into the other by giving way to the Queen and her adherents. Lawrence had very aptly remarked: "If Raja thought that by killing

99. S.C. June 13, 1845—No. 15.

100. S.C. November 29, 1845—No. 38.

Mathbar Singh he would recover his own authority, he has already found his mistake. His own son's partisans are for the time put down only that Queen should take their place. The murderer, Gagan Singh, a follower and supposed lover of Queen, now holds his Darbar as Mathbar Singh did ten days ago". "The Maharaja", he further adds, "is a very despicable person. So much blood has been shed in Nepal, that it must now continue to flow. There are so many sanguinary proceedings to avenge that I see no chance of domestic peace; but I do not therefore augur danger to the British Government. There is not a soldier in Nepal, scarcely a single man that has seen shot fired, not one that could head an army".¹⁰¹

The relations with the Indian Government continued to be friendly. After the murder of Mathbar Singh the Resident expressed Governor General's abhorrence at the bloodshed. The Maharaja also apologized for it and professed "unprecedented civility." By the end of 1845 Lawrence handed over the charge of Residency to Capt. T. H. Wheeler, pending the arrival of the new Resident, J. R. Calvin. The Indian Government continued its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal. As the clouds of the First Sikh War had been hovering, peace was regarded a paramount objective. The official communications were maintained only with the Maharaja and the Prime Minister Fateh Jang Sah. The Resident received and talked with other chiefs and persons, but only at the express wish of the King.¹⁰² On the whole, the prevailing dissensions in the Darbar suited the British interests, because every faction

101. Quoted by Edwards, n. 64, p. 478.

102. Lawrence gave the following advice to Capt. Wheeler for conducting the work of the Residency: "you will perceive that the object of Government is, in no way, to interfere with Nepal's domestic affairs, but simply to watch British interests. The Rajah and Minister (Fateh Jang Chowortree) are the only persons with whom (we) have official communications. You address letter and receive... talk to such persons as are sent by the Maharaja.

".....be patient and polite but firm to him (the Maharaja) for perfect coolness and unconcern as to all that is going on is perhaps the best course.

"Above all remember that at all times peace is the object of the Government, and that now especially it will be desirable".

S.C. July 25, 1846—No. 134.

wanted to win over their support and no one had any serious desire to collide with them.¹⁰³ The Nepalese chiefs were no doubt in the habit of talking arrogantly about their army and power, but it was merely to satisfy their arrogance.

The first Anglo-Sikh War (December 1845—February 1846) had a lasting effect on the Indo-Nepalese relations. Punjab being the last independent state in India to be conquered by the British, the outcome of the war was a matter of natural anxiety for the Gorkhas. It was observed that the Maharaja was highly suspicious of the British intentions on Nepal. However, with a view to maintain friendly relations a marked cordiality was manifested in the form of an offer of five thousand troops to the Indian Government.¹⁰⁴ The offer was several times repeated, but the Indian Government declined to accept it. A grand council was held in the Darbar to deliberate the issue of war and peace. Many chiefs including Fateh Jang Sah, Abhiman Rana and Dalbhanjan Pande recommended to go for war at this opportunity, but the Maharaja, Gagan Singh and Jung Bahadur were fully determined to preserve peace.¹⁰⁵ The Sikh emissaries also tried to win over the Maharaja, but the latter remained firm in his decision.

As already stated, after the death of Mathbar Singh, the real clash in the Nepalese politics was between the Queen and the Maharaja. He had long been an autocratic monarch and could not see himself being stripped off all power by the Queen or Gagan Singh. He was well aware of the real ambitions of his surviving wife and Gagan Singh's intimacy with her. The Chautrias, being legitimists, were his real supporters. On September 14, 1846, late after evening, he got Gagan Singh shot dead.

The death of Gagan Singh was, however, only a prelude to one of the greatest revolutions in the history of Nepal, which not only changed her internal history but also her relations with India. When Maharani Lakshmi Devi learnt about the death of her favourite she became most violent

103. S.C. July 25, 1846—Nos. 141 and 142.

104. S.C. July 25, 1846—Nos. 130 and 131.

105. S.C. February 28, 1846—Nos. 21 and 24.

and vowed for vengeance.¹⁰⁶ All the chiefs and the Maharaja were summoned to Kot—the meeting place of chiefs near King's palace. Every one, except Fateh Jang Sah, having arrived, she asked for the execution of Bir Kishore Pande, whom she suspected for the murder. The King, however, refused to sanction it without due enquiry and slipped off from the assembly on the pretext of fetching the Prime Minister. Having sent Fateh Jang Sah to Kot, the King himself proceeded to the Residency and called upon the Officiating Resident for important conversation. The latter, however, refused to meet on the pretext "that it was contrary to European etiquette to receive visitors at that late hour of night".¹⁰⁷ (In the "Narrative of Events in Nepal" it has been pointed out that the severe indisposition of that officer prevented his being able to comply with His Highness's request). From the Residency the King proceeded to his own Palace.

When Fateh Jang Sah reached the Kot, the Queen again demanded Bir Kishore's execution, but the Prime Minister also did not allow it without a proper trial. Thereafter, some misunderstanding occurred between the followers of Jung Bahadur and Fateh Jang Sah and shots were exchanged. Soon it developed into an open fight, in which Jung Bahadur's supporters, being well armed and numerous, overpowered their opponents. Fateh Jang Sah, Dalbhanjan Pande, Abhiman Rana, Kharak Vikram and numerous other chiefs fell at the spot. The number of the dead is not yet certain, but Pudma Jung, the biographer of Jung Bahadur, maintained that, "The names of fifty-five of the slain have been preserved.....but it is beyond doubt that the number was many times greater, as the list could not contain the names of obscure or petty men whose death was not worthy of being recorded."¹⁰⁸

106. The details of Kot-massacre have been taken from the "Narrative of Events in Nepal"—1846, para 61 to 63.

107. Pudma Jung, n. 25, Ch. I, p. 70.

108. Ibid., p. 76. The mystery of Kot-massacre is still unresolved. Dr. Wright has remarked (*History of Nepal*, p. 57): "There is no doubt that the whole affair was arranged beforehand, and that written orders were given by Rani to Jung Bahadur". On the contrary, in the "Memorandum of Political Relations", 1856,

The next day, on September 15, 1846, before dawn Jung Bahadur was appointed Prime Minister by the Queen and with that started an entirely new phase in the history of Nepal. It has generally been contended by some modern Nepalese historians that Jung Bahadur's rise to power was the "triumph of British diplomacy".¹⁰⁹ It is, however, difficult to appreciate the remark. If it means that the British Government or the Resident had a hand in the murder of Mathbar Singh, Gagan Singh or the various chiefs who had been massacred at the Kot, no evidence has been found to substantiate it. On the contrary, Mathbar Singh was greatly admired by Sir H. Lawrence and towards Gagan Singh the British were well disposed, as he had advocated friendship with the British during the first Anglo-Sikh War. During the Kot-massacre the refusal of the Officiating Resident to meet the King at the Residency was certainly improper and mysterious. The explanations given in the "Narrative of Events in Nepal" that he was seriously indisposed, and Pudma Jang's contention that this was against the European etiquette to receive visitors in the night, are most unconvincing. The refusal was deliberate on the part of the Officiating Resident and was a gross insult to the head of the State. But the main point is whether it was motivated by a desire to keep away from the domestic turmoil, or the Officiating Resident was also a party to the mass-slaughter. No documentary or otherwise authentic evidence has been found in support of the latter theory. However, if the remark implies that after his appointment as the Prime Minister Jung Bahadur was indirectly helped to overcome his rivals and set aside other obstacles to his ascendancy it undoubtedly contains a great amount of truth in it.¹¹⁰

It will be worthwhile to review at this place the British policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal.

(Contd. from page 232)

para 17, it is stated that in the course of discussion the Maharaja Kajendra Vikram Sah "as often suspected.....disclosed with reference to the bloody massacre at the Kot in 1846, viz., that that affair was premeditated one, and planned and carried out under written instructions sent from time to time by the Ex-Maharaja to Jung Bahadur....."

109. D.R. Regmi—A Century of Autocracy—Kathmandu, 1958.

110. See Sections 1 and 2 of Ch. IX.

This policy was initiated because the Indian Government wanted to get out of the false position in which it had entangled itself due to the necessities of the First Afghan War and also to assert the reserve attitude of a great power. Although it can be said that if the Resident steered clear of the parties he had to suffer the "annoyance" of all of them. Yet, it was the best policy after the Afghan War and in the context of the situation then prevailing in the Darbar. For, if the Resident joined any party, so long as that party prospered, the business of his government would be attended to promptly, but once the rival party succeeded, he was bound to incur enmity of that party. This had happened with Capt. Knox (1802-3). Moreover, amidst the various contending factions in a patriotic country the foreign interference was a dangerous game, except in abnormal circumstances. It could be easily misrepresented by the rival parties to arouse national feelings.

V

There had been few boundary disputes in this period, but the Resident took full advantage of the friendly Ministry of Mathbar Singh for a proper redemarcation of some disputed areas. It was discovered at this time that some of the rivers had been marked inaccurately in the old maps, and the condition of the boundary pillars required repair.¹¹¹ There were no boundary marks for fifteen miles on the eastern boundary of Ram Nagar, and out of ninety-six pillars in the district of Champarun only four were in good condition while twenty required immediate repair. In the district of Purnea the boundary had not been inspected for the last several years and a minor dispute had not been adjusted. Similarly, in Tirhut district, although there was no dispute, yet the necessity of inspection was felt. The Oudh boundary, in spite of Capt. Codrington's efforts in 1829-30, could not satisfactorily be demarcated.¹¹² Numerous rivers also formed Indo-Nepalese boundary, which frequently changed

111. P.C. May 16, 1845—No. 155. Also see P.C. November 9, 1844—Nos. 103 and 110.

112. See p. 97.

their course, but there was no definite principle for settling such disputes. Therefore, the necessity of another survey and demarcation was imperative.

The opportunity to review the boundary of the above districts arose as the Maharaja had been insisting on the modification of the Ram Nagar boundary (in the district of Champarun) for the last few years.¹¹³ It may be recalled that in April 1840, the Nepalese had occupied ninety-six villages of Ram Nagar state, and even before that they were in possession of the territory four to five miles south of the boundary, which had not been questioned by the British.¹¹⁴ However, as a result of strict protests from the Indian side in September 1840 they had not only to evacuate the ninety-six villages but had also to give up their claims upon the territory already under their occupation. After evacuation the Nepalese tried by various means to secure this territory. They put forth the old plea that it was given over by them to Raja Tej Pertub Sen of Ram Nagar and that their boundary commissioners were not present in the first survey of 1817-18.¹¹⁵ The Darbar also earnestly requested that as a mark of goodwill the Indian Government could give up the territory. The Indian Government, however, refused to entertain any such right or request. It was aware of the strategic importance of that tract, as it included the Someshwar fort and range, which gave the British full command of all the passes from Tirbeni to Gandak River.¹¹⁶

The Nepalese subsequently relinquished their claims and agreed for the redemarcation of the boundary. A settlement on the principles for the redemarcation was reached between the Resident and the Prime Minister on January 16, 1845.¹¹⁷ It was decided that, "in all the cases where river marked by pillars have been the boundary between Nepal and the British Territory and have changed their courses that the boundary will, henceforward, be marked by straight lines between pillars so placed as to mark as nearly

113. S.C. April 19, 1843—No. 50.

114. P.C. May 18, 1844—No. 33.

115. P.C. November 9, 1844—No. 103.

116. P.C. September 12, 1846—No. 132.

117. S.C. February 21, 1845—No. 112.

as possible what was originally intended to be the boundary and so that there shall be no loss to either Government". This rule was only to apply to cases where rivers had changed their courses. In other cases where the boundary was doubtful, pillars were to be erected at such distances from each other as would prevent future dispute. These rules were to be observed throughout the Indo-Nepalese frontier.

The local officials of Tirhut, Purnea and Champaran districts were directed to conduct the survey and redemarcation of their respective districts. From the Nepalese side, chiefs of high status had been deputed. The Indian Government adopted a strict policy of relinquishing nothing that did not belong to Nepal.¹¹⁸ The purpose of redemarcation was to discover the old boundary and mark it clearly. Only when any doubts existed about the original boundary, the Nepalese were to be given the benefit of doubt. On all the three districts the boundary could be amicably adjusted.¹¹⁹

Notwithstanding the above settlement, the Darbar again revived its claim to territories south of Someshwar. The Resident immediately protested, and, eventually, the claim was abandoned. On June 1, 1846, the Darbar agreed that "From Bikna Thoree on the East to Tirbanee Ghat on the West, the Red line along the top of Someshwar Hill and never coming South of that Hill, is the Boundary line up to the point where the Punchnad Nadee issues from hills and divides the hills on the east from the higher Ridge to the West; and from that point the Punchnad is the boundary to Tirbanee Ghat."¹²⁰

118. S.C. January 25, 1845—No. 120.

119. P.C. May 16, 1845—No. 155. Also see P.C. April 18, 1845—No. 31.

120. P.C. September 12, 1846—No. 132.

CHAPTER IX

ASCENDANCY OF JUNG BAHADUR (1846-1857)

I

In the history of the Indo-Nepalese relations a new era began with the rise of Jung Bahadur (1817-77). With the passage of time he became more and more powerful and emerged as the most important actor on the stage of Nepalese politics. The study of political relations between the two countries during his lifetime is largely a study of the actions of a single individual. Of the main factors responsible for his rise the first was the weak and unsteady character of Maharaja Rajendra Vikram, who failed to take any decisive step after the death of Gagan Singh and took refuge in his palace to shirk his responsibilities. Secondly, after the death of Gagan Singh the Queen could repose her faith only in Jung Bahadur, and cleverly enough he did everything in her name, which she gladly sanctioned. Thirdly, it was his singular good fortune that he had a long train of faithful brothers and relatives, with whom he could act with a sense of solidarity and confidence, while the other chiefs were handicapped by internal dissensions. Finally, he must also be given credit for his remarkable presence of mind and determination; one wrong step on the fateful night of the Kot-massacre could have proved the end of his entire family.

After the Kot-massacre Jung Bahadur devoted his attention exclusively to strengthen his position by all possible means. He was aware that having aroused the opposition of a large number of prominent families after the terrible slaughter, his security lay in completely extirpating his enemies. On September 18, 1846 orders were issued for the confiscation of the property of all those chiefs and the officers, who had been killed or had fled away, and for the ex-

pulsion of their families from the country. A date was fixed after which any of them if found in Nepal was liable to forfeit his life. The stray cases of murder and persecution continued for days after the Kot-massacre. The Panjani also took place just at this time, and it gave the Prime Minister an opportunity of weeding out all the officers whom he suspected of disloyalty and disaffection and of appointing and promoting all his friends and followers.

Jung Bahadur realised that the security of the Heir-Ap-parent from the Queen's wrath was also essential for him. He was aware how difficult and dangerous it would be to change the line of succession, which the Maharani had actually desired. In a country where the King was worshipped as God, it would have been suicidal. She, infact, "incessantly urged Jung to put the two princes (Prince Surendra Vikram and Upendra Vikram) to death and prepare for the coronation of her own son; but he continually evaded her request on the pretext of inauspicious days and such other false pleas."¹ After a few weeks when he found his position stronger, he flatly declined to be a party to such plots and warned the Queen of the consequences. This naturally enraged her and she began to conspire against him. A conspiracy was soon hatched with the aid of Bir Dhuj Bashinait and Wazir Singh, the son of late Gagan Singh. Jung Bahadur was to be invited to Bandar Khel Palace, where picked soldiers had been posted to kill him. However, the plot having leaked out, the Prime Minister reached the Palace with full force. Bir Dhuj was killed at the spot and the rest of the conspirators were arrested. Jung Bahadur then approached the King and, placing the turban at his feet, requested that he might either be dismissed or be vested with full powers to put to death all the enemies of the Heir-Ap-parent. The King immediately gave him authority to deal with the conspirators and Jung Bahadur lost no time in executing all of them and ordered the Queen to leave the country.²

Towards the British Jung Bahadur adopted a policy of

1. Pudma Jang, n. 25, Ch. I, p. 83.

2. S.C. July 31, 1847—No. 204.

friendship. Even before the Kot-massacre he was favourably inclined, and during the first Anglo-Sikh war he had advocated armed aid to them. His friendly attitude was, however, not because of any personal inclination towards the English. Certain interests of Nepal and his family were involved, and he could perceive that only by keeping on good terms with the Company he could further them. He realised that the geographical position of Nepal (being surrounded by two powerful neighbours) rendered not only the expansionist policy obsolete, but also the martial policy based on catering to the army, which Bhim Sen had continued after the war of 1814-16. When Jung Bahadur came to power the English position in India had become almost unchallenged and the power of the Marathas and Sikhs had also been broken. After the Sikh wars, Nepal remained the only independent State in the sub-continent. Jung Bahadur could understand that to think in terms of challenging the English was quixotic. Rather, he was afraid of their imperial designs.

The defeat of China at the hands of Britain during the Opium War convinced him all the more of the wisdom of cultivating the British friendship. Before it there had been an established opinion in the Nepalese diplomatic circles that a sort of balance of power could be maintained by keeping one power poised against the other. Although the Gorkhas could never secure the Chinese help against the British or the British help against the Chinese, yet the policy had not been barren of results. In 1816, prompted by repeated requests from the Nepalese, the Chinese had asked the Indian Government for an explanation of the war and for the withdrawal of the Resident. China was always a serious consideration for the English Government, for it never wanted to disturb its trade with her. During 1839 to 1842, again, serious efforts were made by the Pandes and the Maharaja Rajendra Vikram to solicit Chinese aid. During the Opium War, however, the Nepalese saw the defeat of the Chinese at the hands of the British. It had far-reaching importance for Nepal. The question of maintaining a balance between the two powers now ceased, because the British position had become dominant. Jung Bahadur was well aware of this fact.

Finally, the presence in India of his numerous enemies as refugees,³ who had been expelled from Nepal after the Kot-massacre, also suggested to Jung Bahadur the expediency of adopting a friendly attitude towards the British. He knew how Maharaja Ran Bahadur Sah and Mathbar Singh were used by the British Government to serve its own aims. Under these circumstances anti-British attitude would have been full of hazards for the new Prime Minister. Instead, he wanted to utilise the English friendship to strengthen his position at home. Motivated by all these factors, Jung Bahadur after the Kot-massacre hastened to assure the officiating Resident of his friendly disposition,⁴ and organised a grand reception for the new Resident, Maj. C. Thorsby, in January 1847.⁵

The Indian Government also could perceive that in Jung Bahadur was emerging a strong and dynamic leader of Nepal.⁶ The wholesale massacre of his opponents also made it clear that he will not have to face opposition, as the Pandes, the Chautrias and Thapas had to. Moreover, it was aware of his pro-British attitude, since the first Anglo-Sikh War. That was why his rise to power was in no way looked upon with dismay; rather it hoped to go on "well" with him.⁷ It could see in him a strong man in power well disposed towards the British. After the Kot-massacre, although, the Indian Government expressed its "regrets" at the bloodshed⁸ and gave shelter in its territories to the families expelled by the new Prime Minister,⁹ yet, it would not do anything further to impair his position. It adopted an attitude of neutrality and

3. The number of the refugees was estimated by the officiating Resident Otley at 6,000. S.C. December 26, 1846—No. 141.

Also see Bal Chandra Sharma, *Nepal-ko-Itihasic Rooprekha*, Banaras, 1951, p. 320.

4. S.C. October 31, 1846—No. 153.

5. S.C. January 30, 1847—No. 196.

6. Honoria Lawrence, the wife of the Resident Sir H. Lawrence, had rightly anticipated Jung Bahadur's future career: "he is active, intelligent, she wrote, "and if.....there is another slaughter in the Darbar, the struggle will probably be between Jung Bahadur and Gagan Singh". Cited by Edwardes, n. 64, Ch. VIII, p. 40.

7. S.C. October 31, 1846—No. 167.

8. S.C. December 26, 1846—No. 141.

9. S.C. October 31, 1846—No. 158.

non-interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal and was satisfied with the tranquillity and order prevailing in the new regime, as compared to the chaos and insecurity of the past.¹⁰

The Indian Government soon got an opportunity to manifest its friendship towards Jung Bahadur. Maharani Lakshmi Devi having been ordered to leave for Benaras, her two sons expressed their desire to accompany their mother. Suddenly, the Maharaja also desired to go to the Holy City for pilgrimage "to expiate the massacre of the 14th September 1846". On November 22, 1846 the royal party left for Kathmandu, and the Maharaja delegated his authority to the Heir-Apparent during his absence.

In India the King was flocked around by the Nepalese refugees and the numerous disaffected chiefs, viz., Guru Prashad Chautria, the brother of Fateh Jang Sah, Kazi Jagat Bam Pande, Guru Rang Nath Pandit, etc. After the King had visited all the shrines at Benaras and was returning to Kathmandu in March 1847 they accompanied him up to the frontier and tried to induce him to make an effort to overthrow Jung Bahadur. They influenced him particularly by citing the example of Maharaja Ran Bahadur Sah, who had successfully overthrown Damodar Pande in 1804. Eventually, convinced of the great prestige of the King in the heart of the Gorkha soldiers, the Maharaja fell into their line. Soon a small army was raised and the British border became a hot bed of intrigues against the Prime Minister.

Meanwhile the King was constantly urged by the Heir-Apparent and Jung Bahadur to return to the Capital. But when they learnt of the conspiracies and plots against the new Ministry, Jung Bahadur decided to put the Heir-Apparent on the throne, and on May 12, 1847 he was installed as the Sovereign of Nepal in a full Darbar.¹¹ The ex-King was intimated that he could, if he so desired, return to Nepal, where he would be received with every respect but he should not expect any share in the political power, and that, should he prefer to remain outside Nepal, a handsome pension would be assigned to him.

10. S.C. January 30, 1847—No. 195.

11. S.C. June 26, 1847—No. 187.

The Indian Government now faced the double problem of the refugees, who were engaged in conspiracy against the new regime, and the recognition of the new King. The Resident Thoresby was greatly impressed by Jung Bahadur and his administration. Since his arrival he had been praising the new administration, particularly as it was run during the absence of the Maharaja.¹² He assured the Indian Government that the new regime would stay permanently and justified the step taken by the Prime Minister in deposing Maharaja Rajendra Vikram.¹³ He considered it "a boon" to Nepal and expected that the new order would be favourable towards the establishment of confidence and good feelings between the two Governments. He remarked that so far he had been neutral but he would have to break his neutrality with a view of preventing plots against the life of the Prime Minister and, therefore, he advocated an early recognition of the new King, which he thought would discourage the conspirators.¹⁴ With the same object he also recommended that the intrigues of the refugees should not be tolerated in the Indian territories.¹⁵

The Indian Government took the deposition of Maharaja Rajendra Vikram Sah happily, but maintained an attitude of neutrality and the Resident did not even attend the accession ceremony of Surendra Vikram Sah.¹⁶ The question of recognition, therefore, proved a difficult one. The Heir-Apparent had been proclaimed as the King after due warning to the Maharaja.¹⁷ At the same time, it cannot be

12. S.C. January 30, 1847—No. 195. Also see S.C. March 2, 1847—No. 114.

13. S.C. July 31, 1847—No. 189. Also see S.C. July 31, 1847—No. 196.

14. S.C. July 31, 1847—No. 196.

15. S.C. September 25, 1847—No. 149.

16. S.C. June 26, 1847—No. 201.

17. The Secretary to the Government of India remarked on July 24, 1847 that. "In the present instance the Son had supplanted the Father whilst absent on a pilgrimage to Benares, escorted by British troops. The position in which the Heir-Apparent appears to have been placed, after he had been left by his Father... was such as to justify the adoption of the advice given to him by the Minister, by the chiefs and by the officers of the army to ascend the Guddee, having apprised the Ex-Maharaja to the inevit-

denied that it was an outcome of a struggle for supremacy among the various factions in which the Indian Government professed not to meddle. Moreover, it was also a consideration with the Indian Government that the new King was at the moment in the hands of Jung Bahadur, who obtained power by violent means and it was "the terror of his sanguinary proceedings which (was) the cause of the ex-Maharaja not daring to return to his Capital."¹⁸ Early recognition of the new King, whose accession was preceded by such events, was therefore avoided by the Indian Government "to afford time for father and son to come to arrangement."¹⁹ On the contrary, it was impossible for it to allow Rajendra Vikram Sah to hatch plots for the assassination of the Prime Minister. To prevent it he was warned that he would not be allowed to remain on the frontier for such activities.²⁰

Rajendra Vikram Sah stayed at the frontier for a few months. He addressed several letters to the Governor General in which he remonstrated against the unwarranted act of the Prime Minister in deposing him and wrote that Jung Bahadur had killed many chiefs without authority and had usurped the royal power.²¹ These letters were not attended to by the Indian Government. Late in July he entered Nepal with a small army, but he was taken by surprise by a force sent by Jung Bahadur under Capt. Sanak Singh. He was taken a prisoner on July 29, and his force was dispersed. After a few days he was removed to Batgaon in honourable custody. With it the power of Jung Bahadur was finally established and all the doubts regarding his dominant position were removed.

(Contd. from page 242)

able consequences of further delay. The justification rests very much in the necessity of the step taken, by which in all probability the Heir-Apparent saved his own life and preserved the tranquillity of the country". S.C. July 31, 1847—No. 204.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. The Governor General clearly remarked on May 13, 1847, that, "So long as Maharaja continues to reside in the British territory, attention will be paid to his rank. But care would be taken to prevent collection of followers around him with whose help he might try to regain his lost authority." S.C. June 26, 1847—No. 189.

21. S.C. September 25, 1847—Nos. 154 and 156.

The foregoing details show that the Indian Government to some extent definitely helped Jung Bahadur in establishing his ascendancy. It had already seen enough of the Maharaja Rajendra Vikram Sah, who was greatly responsible for the past hostile policy of the Darbar. Therefore, it was only too glad to have got rid of him. In not allowing the refugees to manoeuvre against the new Prime Minister it rendered an invaluable help to him.²² Such was the desire to favour Jung Bahadur that the Indian Government was ready to receive the ex-Maharaja in its custody if the Prime Minister so desired.²³

After the defeat of Rajendra Vikram the refugees were dispersed from the frontier, and on October 1, 1847 formal recognition was accorded by the Governor General to the new King. The Chinese Government also recognised the new King in September 1847.

II

The new regime thus firmly settled, the Indian and the Nepalese governments manifested friendship towards each other and routine business continued to be attended to with efficiency and promptness. In May 1848 there was a possibility of the Second Anglo-Sikh war and Jung Bahadur immediately came out with an offer of eight regiments under his own command to help the British.²⁴ In October the offer was repeated,²⁵ but both the times it was declined with thanks. Much has been conjectured about this offer. Dr. Oldfield held the view that in making this offer Jung Bahadur was not "influenced by any sincere or active desire to see the British power increased in the North-West. He probably thought it a good opportunity to bring his name personally before the British Government under favourable circumstances and that, in making an offer, which he must have

22. Nepalese historian Bal Chandra Sharma agrees that if the British Government had taken part of Rajendra Vikram Jung Bahadur's fall was certain. n. 3 p. 320.

23. S.C. September 25, 1847—No. 167.

24. S.C. June 24, 1848—No. 64.

25. S.C. November 25, 1848—No. 251.

known would be refused, he should get the credit with the British Government of at least friendly intentions, and naturally hoped that in this way he might win the support of the British Government and by being looked upon as their friend, he might strengthen his own position in the Nepalese Darbar. It is probable also that although the mission to England was not then talked of publicly, it was privately in contemplation at that time, and that Jung thought that the offer of his and his armies services would ensure his receiving a cordial and flattering welcome on his arrival in England".²⁶

On the contrary, the biographer of Jung Bahadur, General Pudma Jang tries to refute that Jung Bahadur had any motives behind this offer.²⁷ He praises his character and considers the offer to be sincere. Resident Thoresby also believed it to be so. However, it is difficult to agree with this view entirely. The whole life of Jung Bahadur and the nature of his relations with the British Government prove that there was hardly a step he ever took without a personal motive. It was surely in his interest to win over the British friendship.

In December 1848 Jung Bahadur took a curious step. He started for a hunting expedition with a large number of chiefs and an army of about fifteen regiments comprising five to six thousand soldiers and fortyone guns.²⁸ This was precisely the time the second Anglo-Sikh War was fought. The party did not stay in the Terai long and within a fortnight it was broken up due to sickness. As in the case of the offer of troops, this expedition has also been subjected to wild surmises. Dr. Oldfield does not think it very unlikely that Jung Bahadur tried to increase his prestige by exciting alarm in the British territory, to place himself on a vantage point in case of subsequent differences with the Indian Government and to show his power to ensure a fav-

26. Oldfield, n. 5, Ch. I, pp. 380-81.

27. Pudma Jang, n. 25, Ch. I, pp. 101-102.

28. S.C. January 27, 1849—Nos. 61 and 63.

General Pudma Jang writes that the force that had accompanied Jung Bahadur was 32,000 soldiers, 52 guns, 300 cavalry, 250 horses, 2,000 camp followers and 200 ration officers. It is difficult to believe his figures because the standing army in Nepal never exceeded 20,000.

ourable welcome in England.²⁹ Thoresby³⁰ and Pudma Jang³¹ held a different opinion and regarded it a purely hunting expedition. The large escort of troops was regarded by them a precautionary measure, as he did not like to leave such a big force at Kathmandu in the presence of the ex-Maharaja.³² It is difficult to agree with either of these views entirely. To imagine Jung Bahadur opposing the British power is certainly not in conformity with either his original attitude or the subsequent course of conduct. He was one of those Nepalese who, having understood the relative strength of the British, was determined to court their friendship. It would follow that he had no evil designs against the British either to attack or force a diversion of the British army. At the same time, it is difficult to imagine that Jung Bahadur did it without a motive. The argument that he did not like to leave such a big force at Kathmandu is not convincing, and it begs a question. Why after all did he decide to leave Kathmandu at a time when the British were fighting a war? And curiously after a year the same Jung Bahadur could go to England, for a long period, leaving the whole army behind. It seems that Jung Bahadur, being an independence loving person, wanted to show his power and independence to the British Government, as well as to his own people. Such a move would naturally have strengthened him at home. At the same time, he would have liked to show the splendour of his Court before the actual proposal to visit England.

Whatever his motives, the bare fact remains that the British Government did not take it lightly. Despite all the assurances of the Resident, it did not leave such an incomprehensible move unnoticed, as it gave rise to apprehensions in the minds of the Governor General, the Commander-in-Chief and the officers of the North-West Province.³³ The Resident was asked to be vigilant and the Governor General strongly remonstrated to the Darbar.³⁴ However, as already

29. Oldfield, n. 5, Ch. I, p. 382.

30. S.C. January 27, 1849—No. 61.

31. Pudma Jang, n. 25, Ch. I, p. 103.

32. S.C. February 24, 1849—No. 39.

33. S.C. January 27, 1849—No. 61.

34. S.C. January 27, 1849—No. 62.

stated, the hunting expedition was broken up and everything passed off quietly.

The occasion for Jung Bahadur to manifest the honour and independence of Nepal again arose in April 1849. Maharani Chand Kaur of Punjab, who was imprisoned in the Fort of Chunar, escaped from there and succeeded in coming over to Nepal.³⁵ In spite of the Resident's protest, Jung Bahadur insisted that, as a matter of honour, it would not be possible for him to deny shelter to a woman.³⁶ However, he assured that all precautions would be taken to prevent her intrigues against the British and she would be punished if she ever tried to create any misunderstanding between Nepal and the Indian Government. The Governor General also did not insist on demanding the surrender, which he was sure would have been refused.³⁷

III

The friendly relations between the two Governments continued. By the end of 1848 the Indian Government succeeded in annexing the last independent Indian State of Punjab. Jung Bahadur, convinced of the British invincibility, wanted to pay a visit to England, which he thought would strengthen his relations with the British Government in India. In 1849 there was much talk in the Darbar of a mission to Queen Victoria, and in September official permission was sought from the British Government for Jung Bahadur to proceed to England "to see and bring back intelligence respecting the greatness and prosperity of Britain and its capital, perfection to which social conditions have been raised and Art and Science have been made available to comforts of life".³⁸ He was also to convey a complimentary letter and presents from the Maharajahdiraj of Nepal to the Queen of England.

Before dealing with the actual visit it would be useful

35. S.C. May 26, 1849—No. 136.

36. S.C. June 30, 1849—No. 104.

37. S.C. May 25, 1849—No. 137.

38. S.C. October 27, 1849—No. 14.

to analyse the real motives of Jung Bahadur behind it. General Pudma Jang believes that his motive was solely to see for himself the English social and political life and to improve the Nepalese social conditions in the light of this experience.³⁹ Writers like F. Toker⁴⁰ and P. Landon⁴¹ hold the same opinion in more clear terms, that he wanted to see with his own eyes the British power at its source, its factories, people and agriculture and armed forces.

In reality Jung Bahadur undertook this visit with several motives. He was impressed by the British power and naturally wanted to see its sources. Finding the British invincible he was anxious to win over their goodwill, for which the most effective way would be to please the home authorities. This visit, he was sure, would increase the prestige of Nepal in the eyes of the Indian States, the British Government and the other European powers as well, and thus the independent status of Nepal would also be asserted. He also wanted to get some of his demands redressed from the British authorities in London as he was doubtful of the Indian authorities meeting them.

His most fundamental motive, however, was to strengthen the bonds of friendship with the British power and thus win over the imagination of his countrymen. Since his power in Nepal was based more on fear than on the consent of the people, he wanted to win over their sentiments. Capt. O. Cavenagh has rightly written that his object "was not only to pay homage to Queen, or to see British power. But it was also to strengthen friendship with British and in turn strengthen his own position from the feeling, which notwithstanding the policy of non-interference, professed by Indian Government, would persuade all classes of Nepal, that the minister who had been honoured by an audience with the Queen of England, would never want assistance in the hour of need".⁴² Similarly, Silvain Levi contends that Jung Bahadur hoped to double his prestige in Nepal by showing to his

39. Pudma Jang, n. 25, Ch. I, p. 114.

40. F. Toker, n. 19, Ch. I, p. 138.

41. Landon, n. 9 Ch. I, p. 135.

42. O. Cavenagh, *Rough Notes on the State of Nepal. Its Government Army, and Resources*, Calcutta, 1851, pp. 251-52.

people his relations with powerful States of Europe, to gain his personal interest and also wished to understand the secret of the British power." The whole history of Nepal shows how important it was for every Prime Minister to win over the British support. Damodar Pande, Bhim Sen, Fateh Jang Sah, Mathbar Singh, all had tried for it. This support had been an extremely important factor in the Nepalese politics. In case of Jung Bahadur the Indian Government was no doubt very friendly, but it was still outwardly maintaining an attitude of non-interference.

Whatever the motives, the Indian Government thought that good results would come out of the visit as it would provide the Gorkhas an opportunity to see and realise the power of the British, and thus it would help in moderating their excessive pride and enable them to see their own weakness. Moreover, the British also thought that the mission would provide an opportunity to further cultivate Jung Bahadur, whom they knew as not merely the Prime Minister but the actual dictator of Nepal and thus they might induce him to throw open Nepal for their trade and commerce.

The permission having been received from London in January 1850, Jung Bahadur left Kathmandu on January 15. He was accompanied by his two brothers, Jagat Shamsher and Dhir Shamsher, twelve chiefs of mark and twenty-six servants. His younger brother General Bam Bahadur was appointed to officiate as Prime Minister during his absence. On March 11, 1850 he was given a royal welcome by Lord Dalhousie at Calcutta. Capt. O. Cavenagh was appointed to accompany him throughout the mission. He left India on April 7, in the steamer Haddington. From Suez the mission took the land route. While passing through Egypt, Jung Bahadur visited Cairo and Alexandria where he

43. S. Levi, n. 1, Ch. I, p. 336.

Lawrence Oliphant also observed that, "The precarious nature of his high position in Nepal urged on him the good policy, if not the necessity, of a visit to England, for he doubtless felt... that the native Darbar would be inclined to respect a man who had been honoured with an interview with the Queen of so mighty a nation, and had had opportunities of securing the support of her Government, should he ever be driven to seek its aid".

Journey to Kathmandu, London, 1852, p. 3.

was received by Pasha Abbas. From Alexandria a steamer took them to England via Malta and Gibraltar, and he reached Southampton on May 25. On his way Jung Bahadur was not well and expressed a wish to shorten the route by proceeding via Marseilles. But Capt. Cavenagh dissuaded him by pointing out that "he would be wanting in the respect due to the head of French nation if he were to visit Paris without paying his respects to the President; whilst, having left India as ambassador to the Queen of England, it would be out of his power to visit any foreign court before he had been honoured with an audience by her Majesty."⁴⁴

In England he could not be received by Queen Victoria for four weeks after his arrival on account of her accouchement. On June 19, 1850 he presented the complimentary letter from the Maharajadhiraj of Nepal. In the audience hall of the Queen he took precedence after the Spanish Ambassador. Throughout the stay he was busy in attending various social functions and calling on and receiving the dignitaries of England.

It would, however, be wrong to say that everything passed off pleasantly during his stay. Jung Bahadur's dissatisfaction was primarily because the British authorities were not prepared to meet his various demands. He enquired whether any redress could be obtained from the British Parliament if the Indian Government did any injustice to Nepal. He made his point by asking whether in the event of the Darbar's dissatisfaction with the Resident, it had the power to correspond directly with the British authorities at London. His complaint was that the Resident sometimes acted in an "arbitrary manner". The Resident, infact, treated him only as a Prime Minister and not as the dictator of Nepal, which he felt "sometimes.....galling and irksome to his pride". Cavenagh told him that this demand could never be accepted.

Again, he wanted that an extradition treaty be concluded between Nepal and the Indian Government providing for the mutual surrender of all the criminals, including the poli-

44. The description of Jung Bahadur's stay in England is based on Capt. Cavenagh's accounts. O. Cavenagh. "The Nepalese Embassy". In *Reminiscences of an Indian Official*. London, 1844, pp. 108 to 181.

tical offenders and debtors irrespective of the nature of their crime. Obviously his motive was to gain the British support against his enemies. The British authorities considered it improper and did not attend to his proposal as it should have been placed before the Indian authorities only. Finally, he enquired whether the terms of the Treaty of Sagauli could be so modified as to enable him to engage European engineers to improve Nepalese irrigation system and foundry, but this, he was told, was entirely inadmissible. The indifferent attitude of the authorities in London naturally caused a good deal of chagrin to Jung Bahadur, and on the issue of extradition treaty he felt so irritated that he wanted a reply from the Queen directly and, if it were not satisfactory, a permission to go back to India."

The British attitude, on the contrary, throughout the course of his journey and stay in England was to belittle Jung Bahadur's attempts to bypass the Indian authorities. They also discouraged him from visiting any other European country. When Jung Bahadur expressed his desire to visit France he was asked to take permission from the court to which he was accredited, and in France when he tried to communicate directly with the French authorities, Capt. Cavenagh took exception to it. In fact, both Cavenagh and Sir John Hobhouse, the President of Board of Control, were against his visiting the continent, as they feared that upon witnessing the review of big armies there, especially in France, he would be inclined to undervalue the British power. The permission to visit France was, no doubt, granted, but to further impress him with the British resources and power he was shown the mining and manufacturing districts of Britain.

After paying farewell visit to Queen Victoria, Jung Bahadur left England for France on August 21, 1850. On August 30, he was welcomed by Napoleon III, the President of the French Republic, with whom he expressed a wish to witness a parade of one lakh French troops. The request having been acceded, on September 24 he had the sight of a great mass parade. On the 4th October he left France on his way back to India. At Alexandria the Pasha again wel-

comed Jung Bahadur. The mission reached Bombay on November 6, and after pilgrimage to a few religious places in India he reached Kathmandu, via Calcutta, on February 6, 1851. On February 8, the letter of the English Queen was read out a grand Darbar and a royal salute of twenty-one guns was fired.⁴⁶

Resident Thoresby thought, while recommending Jung Bahadur's mission, that so formidable a project would have no results except affording a topic for conversation for years to come.⁴⁷ Obviously, he could neither judge the real motives behind nor envisage the actual results of the mission.

The importance of Jung Bahadur's visit to England can hardly be exaggerated. In the face of extreme orthodoxy of India, and particularly of Nepal, he really took an extraordinary step as yet unaccomplished by any Indian ruler. But it brought good results to him, to his country and also to the British Government. It was for the first time that Nepal had been brought forward in the eyes of the Europeans. Before that Nepal was only a mysterious country of warlike Gorkhas.

In one respect the visit had an everlasting effect. Jung Bahadur was so much impressed by the British power that he told Capt. Cavenagh: "a cat would fly at an elephant if it were forced into a corner, but it must be very small corner into which the Nepalese would be forced before they would fly at the British or cease to be their faithful ally".⁴⁸ In fact, Jung Bahadur returned from England more convinced of the British power and determined to stick to British friendship for ever. He felt convinced that in a war with the British, Nepal might fight for a while, but eventually it would be annexed. A competent authority like the Resident Col. G. Ramsay (1852-1867) held the opinion that Jung Bahadur would have joined against the British during the Revolt of 1857 but for his visit to England.⁴⁹ His military aid at that time was the direct result of his impressions of England.

46. NEN, 1851—para 88.

47. S.C. October 27, 1849—No. 14.

48. O. Cavenagh, n. 44, p. 141.

49. See section I, Ch. X.

The visit also immensely increased the prestige and power of Jung Bahadur at home. Although the British did not guarantee any support to him, the very fact that he had been received by the Sovereign of England was enough to convince the simple Nepalese that the Minister enjoyed the support of the British Government.

After Jung Bahadur's visit, the Indian Government started treating him as the de facto ruler of Nepal; and this change in its attitude was clearly demonstrated when Lord Dalhousie agreed to keep the Nepalese political prisoners in India soon after his (Jung Bahadur's) return from England. The British now felt an interest in maintaining Jung Bahadur in power with a view to gradually induce him to agree to the recruitment of the Gorkhas in the Indian army and to throw open Nepal for trade and commerce.

Finally, the visit had the good effect of inducing Jung Bahadur to reform the penal code of Nepal. One of his first acts after his return to Nepal was to abolish capital punishment, except in murder cases, and mutilation was entirely abrogated. But still the right of injured husband to take the life of his wife's adulterer and the practice of sati could not be interfered with.

As already noted the Indian Government soon after Jung Bahadur's return got a chance to manifest its special favour towards him. A conspiracy was organised by two of his brothers—General Bam Bahadur and General Badri Nar Singh, his cousin General Jay Bahadur, the younger brother of the Maharaja Prince Upendra Vikram and Kazi Karbeer Khattri.⁵⁰ Luckily for the Prime Minister, General Bam Bahadur disclosed it to him just a night before the murder was to be committed on February 15, 1851. All the conspirators were promptly arrested, the guilt was confessed and proved. But the issue of punishment proved difficult. At first a punishment of death, and subsequently of the deprivation of sight, was decided upon. But Jung Bahadur being fresh from Europe did not like to give such barbarous punishment. Therefore, as a way out, the Indian Government was approached to take and keep the prisoners in its

50. S.C. March 28, 1851—No. 10.

custody till they reached the age of sixty. The Resident Erskine also advised the Government to accept the proposal "as it would greatly strengthen the hands of present administration which (was) most favourably disposed to the British Government."⁵¹

The Nepalese proposal put the Indian Government in a difficult position.⁵² It seemed a painful duty to Lord Dalhousie and his Council to refuse a request which involved the life of several persons. The Governor General was also aware that after his return from England Jung Bahadur was contemplating reforms in the criminal code of Nepal. It was for the first time that reform of penal law was being talked about in the fierce land, and Jung Bahadur had a fair right to expect support from the Indian Government in this. At the same time, there were serious difficulties in taking charge of these prisoners. First, it would put upon the British a burden for thirty years. Secondly, it exposed the Indian Government to the risks of misunderstanding with Nepal in the event of their escape. Thirdly, it was apprehended that such a procedure of taking charge of the foreign prisoners might give rise to inconvenient applications from other Indian States. Finally, Nepal being entirely an independent state, the Indian Government had no legal right to interfere in the Nepalese internal affairs and imprison her political prisoners. Moreover, as the British law authorised the Government to arrest an individual only with a warrant, Lord Dalhousie doubted the right of the Indian Government to arrest Nepalese nationals, for a crime committed in Nepal, even with the consent of the Darbar.

The Governor General's Council was also divided on this subject. The Advocate General at first doubted the legality of keeping the prisoners⁵³ and the President of the Council was afraid of future misunderstanding with Nepal. But the other two members, Sir F. Currie⁵⁴ and Mr. Lewis, were in favour of accepting the Nepalese request. Although the Council ultimately came to the view that legally the

51. S.C. March 28, 1851—No. 12.

52. S.C. March 28, 1851—No. 15.

53. S.C. March 28, 1851—No. 18.

54. S.C. March 28, 1851—No. 20.

prisoners could be kept in British custody and no tribunal could have questioned it, Lord Dalhousie asked the Resident to dissuade Jung Bahadur from deporting the prisoners to India. If, as an alternative, the Darbar insisted on taking the eyes of the prisoners, the Resident was authorised to accept their charge.⁵⁵

The Resident tried to convince the Prime Minister that such a course would expose Darbar's weakness and give rise to misunderstanding between the two governments. But Jung Bahadur's main argument in favour of their deportation to India was that they were high-ranked prisoners and if their "death and mutilations were to be substituted by imprisonment in Nepal, their escape cannot be checked" and the "death of Minister would be signal of their release and slaughter of most of the persons now in office".⁵⁶ But to relieve the Indian Government of long responsibility, he reduced the period of detention to five years. This was accepted by the Indian Government and the necessary arrangements were made for the prisoners at the Allahabad Fort. It, however, specified that in case of their escape it would have no responsibility.⁵⁷

This case marks an important step in the development of the Indo-Nepalese relations. It was for the first time that the Indian Government broke its avowed neutrality and openly supported Jung Bahadur. For Jung Bahadur it is really surprising that he took such an undiplomatic step as giving into the hands of Indian Government his own enemies and thus providing it with a powerful check over him. But it was his policy to win over the favour of the British, and in this aim he had now fully succeeded. The fact, that the Indian Government was taking the charge of his enemies, must have convinced the whole of Nepal that the British were actually and earnestly supporting the Prime Minister.

55. S.C. April 25, 1851—No. 12.

56. S.C. May 30, 1851—No. 25.

57. S.C. May 30, 1851—No. 28.

These prisoners could not be kept in the Fort of Allahabad for five years. In September 1853 General Jay Bahadur died. This led Jang Bahadur to request the British Government to release the remaining two prisoners, who were accordingly sent back to Nepal in November 1853. See P.C. November 11, 1853—Nos. 163 and 164.

It was a policy which Lord Ellenborough had so much deprecated and Mathbar Singh so earnestly desired. But now it was brought in by the backdoor. Of course, by now the times had also changed. In 1842 the arguments against supporting any particular faction or ministry were that the ministry of Fateh Jang Sah was not powerful enough to protect the British interest, that Hodgson's policy involved a great power like the British in petty factionalism and that if the supported party went out of office the British Government would also suffer. Now the problem of opposition was no longer there and there was no foreseeable possibility of Jung Bahadur's fall. The power of Jung Bahadur was so predominant that no revolt had any chance of success; the wholesale slaughter of the chiefs, which paved the way for Jung Bahadur's rise, had almost annihilated the race of his opponents. Thereafter all the prominent chiefs either were related to Jung Bahadur or supported him. The ex-Maharaja was confined to his palace." Even Maharaja Surendra Vikram was subjected to such surveillance that he became anxious to abdicate in July 1851 and could only be dissuaded from doing so by the Resident." Such being the powerful position of Jung Bahadur, the Indian Government had no hesitation in extending its support to him, and in return it expected him to allow free recruitment of the Gorkhas in British army and throw open Nepal for trade.

IV

During the years 1851-56 the significant events that took place were the Tibeto-Nepalese War, the recruitment

58. P.C. July 5, 1850—No. 80.

59. On July 25, 1851 Jang Bahadur came to the Resident and informed him that the Maharaja was desirous of abdicating despite his attempts to dissuade. The Prime Minister requested the Resident to induce the King to leave his intention. The Resident accordingly waited on the Maharaja and successfully induced His Highness to abandon the idea. The Maharaja attributed his desire to abdicate on account of the death of Maharani. But the Resident did not regard it as a sufficient cause. He considered that it was due to his entire exclusion from the administration, and also due to extreme surveillance of Jung Bahadur, which he considered derogatory and galling. P.C. November 19, 1852—No. 23.

of the Gorkhas on a regimental basis and the conclusions of an extradition treaty. The relations continued to be amicable. Since the 24th May 1850, a salute of twentyone guns was always fired in honour of the birthday of the British Sovereign. This mark of respect and friendship towards Great Britain was never before manifested. At the death of Duke of Wellington a gun salute of eightythree minute was given on November 5, 1852. In 1853 the King of Nepal received from Queen Victoria a present of portraits of Her Majesty and Prince Albert as a mark of special favour.

V

From 1854 to 1856 Nepal had been on none too happy terms with Tibet. The Nepalese merchants had been carrying on trans-Himalayan trade since ages and often the issue of the denial of justice to them in Tibet became a matter of controversy between the two Governments.

In 1854 the Nepalese Prime Minister was tempted to undertake a military adventure towards North.⁶⁰ In China the political situation was not very stable. The Taiping insurrection (1850-64) was raging and Jung Bahadur could have helped the Chinese Government in quelling the revolt.⁶¹ Or, as an alternative, he could also have bargained with the Tibetans by helping them to expel the Chinese from their country. Rejecting both these, he chose an entirely new course of attacking Tibet, as he knew that the Chinese could not come to the aid of the Tibetans because of their own preoccupation.

Jung Bahadur soon found an opportunity to start hostilities on the pretext that the Nepalese mission returning from China had been maltreated by the Tibetans. The Nepalese mission had left for Peking in August 1852 and could not return till the end of 1854, while normally it did not take more than eighteen months in all.⁶² The mission was report-

60. S.C. August 25, 1854—No. 50.

61. S.C. June 30, 1854—No. 42.

62. "Brief Memorandum of the Political Relations between Her Majesty's Indian Government and the State of Nepal" from
(Contd. on page 258)

ed to have been greatly harassed in Tibet and most of its members had died on the way. It is, however, difficult to accept the above explanation wholly. As regards the treatment of the Tibetans towards the Gorkha merchants, the Kashmiri traders had reported that it was fine and Jung Bahadur's account of their misbehaviour was also at variance with the version given by the Officer-Incharge of the Nepalese mission to China.⁶³ No doubt, in one way or the other, the Prime Minister had been provoked by the Tibetans, but his own designs on the rich Tibetan provinces bordering Nepal particularly the Kerong and Kuti passes weighed with him more. Pudma Jang admits that the "object of Nepalese was not merely to have their grievances redressed or to facilitate trade, but also to make conquest."⁶⁴ Moreover, it should never be overlooked that Jung Bahadur was a man of action. For the last four decades no Gorkha soldier had marched against enemy, none from the existing generation had seen a war and no general had commanded an army. He might have thought it a good opportunity to give a trial to his army in the only possible direction he could have marched.

By the end of 1854 ultimatum was sent to the Tibetans that if the Nepalese demands were not conceded their country would be invaded in the coming spring and the bordering provinces would be annexed. The Nepalese had demanded a promise that justice should be accorded to the Gorkhas residing in Tibet and had asked for payment of a large sum of money as compensation for the past wrongs and insults done to them. The Tibetans, anxious to avoid hostilities, sent their representative to Kathmandu, who promised that justice would be accorded to the Nepalese merchants in future, but warned against the Nepalese army crossing the boundary. The Darbar, however, was predetermined to have war, and, instead of coming to a compromise it in-

(Contd. from page 257)

1854 to 1861. The report was prepared by the Resident Col. G. Ramsay.

For. Pol. B., March 1875—Nos. 145 to 164. (Henceforth this document has been referred as MPR).

63. S.C. August 25, 1854—No. 50.

64. Pudma Jung, n. 25, Ch. I. p. 174.

creased its demands. Now it demanded one crore rupees and the cession of Kerong and Kuti passes. The Tibetan representative could not meet such extensive demands and returned to his country.

The negotiations having broken down, the Nepalese army advanced into Tibet. In the war that ensued fortunes varied from side to side. In the first campaign after considerable losses the Nepalese could successfully occupy the Fort of Joonga and the Kerong and Kuti passes. But it made Jung Bahadur realise the difficulties and he became sceptical of any substantial success, while the annexation of one or two districts would have been of little value.⁶⁵ The war was also not popular either with the soldiers or with the public, which had to pay abnormal taxes. The Buddhists were particularly against it. Therefore, Jung Bahadur accepted the overtures of the Tibetans to settle the mutual differences by negotiations.

In July 1855 a Chinese Official Faie Toos, a subordinate of the Chinese Amban, came to Kathmandu.⁶⁶ Jung Bahadur insisted on the cession of the Kerong and Kuti passes and the district of Tagla Koti, which the Tibetan agent flatly refused. Thereupon he demanded one crore rupees, but this was also not acceptable to the Tibetans. Consequently, negotiations broke down again and the hostilities were resumed. This time the Tibetans, taking the Gorkhas with surprise, recovered all their lost territory. It had a sobering effect on the Darbar. To review the situation, a grand council was held in which after full deliberations it was finally decided that at least with a view to retrieve honour the war should be carried on.⁶⁷ The Gorkha army again conquered what they had recently lost. But Jung Bahadur had now fully realised the hopelessness of the situation and eventually with the mediation of the Chinese he accepted a treaty of ten articles on March 24, 1856.⁶⁸

According to the treaty the Tibetans were to pay an

65. S.C. July 27, 1855—No. 65.

66. S.C. December 28, 1855—No. 81.

67. S.C. December 28, 1855—No. 88.

68. S.C. May 30, 1856—No. 25.

annual tribute of ten thousand rupees to Nepal. They agreed to discontinue the levy of transit duties on Nepalese goods entering Tibet and to abolish the taxes levied on the property of Gorkha subjects residing in Tibet. The Darbar was also permitted to establish its trade offices at Lhasa. The Nepalese on their part agreed to withdraw their troops and promised to render all assistance to Tibet "if the troops of any other Raja invade the Kingdom".⁶⁹

The Indian Government throughout the war maintained an attitude of non-interference. The Resident was instructed to observe a neutral attitude towards Nepal either supporting the Chinese Emperor or marching against him. "The Raja of Nepal is a tributary to the Emperor of China, (therefore) same neutrality should be observed towards His Highness by the Government of India". Similarly, towards the Tibet-Nepalese dispute it observed that, "if.....the Minister (Jung Bahadur) is.....to march on Tibet for purposes of national advantage or of personal aggrandisement, there still seems no reason why the Government of India should interfere.....such a movement does not appear calculated in any way to injure the interests of the British Government or unduly increase the power of Nepal".⁷⁰ The British attitude of non-interference was further manifested when Jung Bahadur was refused to purchase ammunition from the Government arsenals in India.⁷¹ When disaster fell on the Nepalese troops during the renewed fighting late in 1855, Col. Ramsay frankly told the Nepalese Prime Minister that "Whatever emergency might occur and whatever disaster happen to his troops" the British Government would not help him in any way, because "besides involving a breach of Treaty, (it) would disturb mercantile transactions annually amounting to from thirty to forty times more than the gross revenues of his kingdom".⁷²

This attitude of non-interference did not, however, imply that the Indian Government was indifferent towards the

69. MPR 1856—para 13.

70. S.C. May 26, 1854—No. 52.

71. S.C. September 29, 1854—Nos. 23 and 25.

72. S.C. December 28, 1855—No. 88.

Tibeto-Nepalese tussle.⁷³ The fact that the Nepalese adventure coincided with the Crimean War in Europe and in Nepal there were widespread rumours of a Russian invasion, led the British to instruct the Resident "to observe vigilantly the proceedings of the Darbar and report frequently the course of events".⁷⁴ But in view of Jung Bahadur's friendship no defensive measure was contemplated.

The results of the Tibetan war were not of such consequence as Jung Bahadur might have desired or even anticipated. The only substantial gains were the extra-territorial rights and exemption of the Nepalese traders from duties in Tibet. Otherwise, there were no territorial gains; nor did the Tibetans pay after the first instalment. On the other hand, the war had involved a huge expenditure and loss of life. It had never been popular, and the pronouncement of the treaty satisfied more the vanity of Jung Bahadur than it served the real interests of Nepal.

VI

In this period the whole problem of border crime was brought into light and a treaty for the extradition of the criminals was for the first time entered into between Nepal and India. As mentioned in earlier chapters, there existed no clear and satisfactory rules for the surrender of fugitives, except in the cases of dacoits and such heinous criminals who were to be surrendered irrespective of their nationality to the Government of the country where the crime had been

73. Lord Dalhousie noted on August 26, 1854: "...our friend Jang Bahadur is arming Nepal. He has officially explained that the object of it is to exact reparations from the Chinese authorities in Tibet for injuries done to Nepalese subjects. This is probably true, for he is repairing the roads into Tibet, making snow shoes and has always had designs on the provinces he is about to attack. But it is to be noted that Nepal armed in the same manner on the last occasion on which it was thought we were going to war with Russia; and the feeling in Nepal is strong that Russia seriously menaces us and that we are no match to her. So we keep an eye on our friend Jung".

J.G.A. Baird, Ed., *Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie*, London, 1911, p. 316.

74. S.C. August 25, 1854—No. 52.

committed. Ordinary criminals were not surrendered and even when extradition was allowed the criminal was given up only after prima facie evidence of his guilt had been produced and the officer concerned had satisfied himself of the guilt. The Indian authorities took special care in surrendering Nepalese criminals because there were clear instructions of the Court of Directors that "with respect of Nepal, the extreme severity of laws renders it desirable that such mutual surrender of fugitives should be subject to those restrictions which humanity would dictate".⁷⁵ Therefore, in such cases redress could only be sought in Indian courts.

The system mentioned above was far from being satisfactory to both the Governments. On December 30, 1848, the Bengal Government issued an order, which rendered it more difficult for Nepal to get her criminals surrendered. The order stipulated that: "A reference to the Government being necessary in each case before any of its subjects are given up, in order that the Government may be satisfied of the propriety of surrender".⁷⁶ This is also known as the Act I of 1849. Earlier the Indian local officers surrendered the fugitives, whether they happened to be Nepalese or British, after a summary investigation of the guilt by a magistrate; but they did not have to refer the case to their Government, and the practice was reciprocated by the Nepalese. Under the orders of December 30, 1848, there was little possibility of any accused being surrendered. And, although, the order was applicable to the British subjects only, yet it seems that even the surrender of Nepalese was delayed owing to it. The Magistrate of Purnea reported on May 27, 1851 that he had found no case in which a Nepalese subject had been surrendered by his predecessor.⁷⁷

The Nepalese Government was naturally dissatisfied with the whole system of extradition. Firstly, the lack of reciprocity in practice from the British side in surrendering the fugitive caused much soreness to the Nepalese. Jung Bahadur complained that while the Nepalese officers readily gave up criminals, the British authorities were restricted

75. P.C. November 24, 1849—No. 183.

76. Ibid.

77. P.C. July 18, 1851—No. 43.

from doing so promptly by the orders of their Government, and the Resident admitted that, though the orders for observing reciprocity were clear, the British officers did not attend to them strictly.”

Secondly, as cattle-lifting and revenue embezzlement were not considered heinous crimes by the British Government, the Nepalese could not get surrender of such criminals and had to suffer a great monetary loss. These offences were very common in the Terai. The Nepalese Government had been trying to bring this waste land under cultivation, but serious difficulty in its way was that, due to bad climate of this tract, no effective central administration could be instituted, and mostly it was left in the hands of the local inhabitants, who very often absconded into Indian territory with revenue.

Thirdly, the prevalent method for redress of such petty cases was highly cumbersome to the Nepalese. They were required to prove the guilt of the offender in the Indian courts, which was obviously a difficult task for them as they did not fully understand the Indian language and had to depend on the Indian lawyers, over whom they had no control. Such a procedure also involved a great loss of time and money due to long distance of the Indian courts from Nepal. Therefore, in such cases the Darbar invariably preferred to drop the claim rather than follow a procedure which it considered “improper, unjust and derogatory”.

The unwillingness of the Indian Government to surrender Nepalese criminals was mainly because the British regarded the Nepalese penal code too severe and wanted to protect even the Nepalese, who had taken shelter in the Indian territory.” It should, however, be noted that for the last few years the Nepalese laws, particularly in the Terai, were being gradually reformed. Jung Bahadur, fresh from England, was trying to introduce liberal measures in the Nepalese criminal code.

78. P.C. March 28, 1851—No. 125. Also see P.C. January 14, 1853—No. 119.

79. P.C. August 30, 1850—No. 99.

80. P.C. November 24, 1849—No. 183.

The Nepalese Prime Minister thus had sufficient reasons for dissatisfaction. In England he brought the issue of extradition before the authorities and wanted that the two Governments engage to surrender all the fugitives irrespective of their crime. In April 1852 he again proposed that, if the proposal for the surrender of all fugitives was unacceptable to the Governor General, a definite agreement specifying which classes of the criminals were to be surrendered and which were to be given asylum may be concluded and on that basis a strict reciprocity be observed by both the governments.⁸¹

It may be mentioned here that one of the causes for Jung Bahadur's anxiety was internal pressure. There was a strong faction in the Darbar, which was unwilling to continue the practice of surrendering Indian criminals, unless the Indian Government also observed reciprocity.⁸² The Prime Minister was accused of having sacrificed national independence and having a bias in favour of the British. Naturally, he wanted to disarm his opponents by getting his demands redressed from the Indian Government.

Lord Dalhousie was sympathetic towards the genuine difficulties of Nepal. He was ready to cancel the orders of the Bengal Government of December 30, 1848 and also to modify the rules laid down by the Court of Directors so as to include revenue defaulters in the list of extraditable crimes.⁸³ Yet, he wanted that, except in doubtful and difficult cases when a reference to the Government became unavoidable, the Indian Officers must themselves satisfy of the reality of accusation before surrendering the accused. He also agreed to recognise the principle of reciprocity in letter and spirit. The Governor General offered the following terms on December 22, 1852:⁸⁴

- (I) "That the two Governments shall act upon a principle of reciprocity.

81. P.C. January 14, 1853—No. 119.

82. P.C. January 14, 1853—No. 125.

83. P.C. April 25, 1851—No. 40. Also see P.C. January 14, 1853—No. 117.

84. P.C. January 14, 1853—No. 129.

- (II) "That except in particular cases in which it may seem expedient to do so, neither Government shall demand the surrender of the subject of the other.
- (III) "That in such excepted cases the Government to whom the requisition and the surrender may be made shall have the option of either granting or refusing to comply with the request having regard to the particular circumstances of each case.
- (IV) "That in no case shall the surrender of any but heinous offenders be demanded by either Government.
- (V) "That in no case shall either Government be bound to surrender any person accused of an offence except upon such evidence of criminality, as, according to the laws of the country in which the person accused shall be found, would justify his apprehension if the offence had been there committed.
- (VI) "That neither Government shall be bound to deliver up debtors or civil offenders.
- (VII) "That mere cultivators of the soil who may quit their own country without paying their rent to Government are not to be delivered up but that persons who may collect the revenue on account of the Government and embezzle the same are to be delivered up unless they be subject of the country in which they may be found, in which case they shall fall within the Article 2.
- (VIII) "That in any case not provided by the engagement, either Government may request the other to surrender any fugitive from justice, but that the Government to whom the request shall be made shall be at liberty to exercise its discretion under the particular circumstances of the case whether to surrender or not the person accused".

For the crimes which had not been covered by this proposal the Indian Government assured all aid to the Nepalese for seeking redress in the Indian courts.

The negotiations between the two Governments went on for a few months and in October 1853 the Darbar accepted the Indian proposal with a few alterations and additions. The second and the third articles were deleted, as they could not be literally translated in the Nepalese language, and, instead, the following article had been introduced: "Neither Government shall be bound to surrender its own subjects to the other".⁸⁵

One more article was added on the express request of Jung Bahadur, which was "superfluous", but the Resident agreed to include it to please the Darbar. It stipulated that: "British subjects who may enter the Nepalese territory and commit crimes, and who may be apprehended within the said territory, are liable to be punished by the laws of that Government, provided the punishment be in accordance with the principles of humanity; in the like manner subjects of the Nepalese Government would be punished if seized in the British territory."⁸⁶

The problem of Resident's jurisdiction over his suite and escort was also discussed. Often in the past misunderstanding had occurred between the two Governments on the issue of the right of the Nepalese courts to punish the British subjects, residing in the Residency limits, who had committed crime in the city. To eliminate such unfortunate occurrences in future an article was added: "Whenever British subjects attached to the Residency or living within the Residency boundaries, may commit offence beyond the British limits, which would render them liable to punishment by the Nepalese Courts they are to be apprehended and made over to the Resident for trial and punishment, but subjects of the Nepal state similarly situated, are in all cases to be given up for punishment by their own Government".⁸⁷

The following crimes were included in the list of offences on which both the Governments agreed to surrender the criminals reciprocally: "treason, murder, attempt to murder, rape, maiming, thuggee, highway robbery, poisoning, burglary (stealing through door, windows or walls), arson,

85. P.C. October 21, 1853—Nos. 24 and 25.

86. P.C. October 21, 1853—No. 25.

87. Ibid.

cattle-stealing, forgery, counterfeiting coin, perjury, instigation to perjury, embezzlement whether by public or private persons”.

Nothing could, however, be agreed about the right of injured Gorkha husband, because Jung Bahadur was not prepared to take any step against it and the Resident refused to recognise it as a private right. Such cases were left to be decided by the two governments as and when they occur.

The British Government accepted the Darbar's proposals with some modifications. Treason being a political crime, it was not prepared to include it in the list of the crimes.⁸⁸ It, further, wanted to specify that, “the expenses of any apprehension, detention, or surrender made in virtue of the” stipulation of the treaty “shall be borne and defrayed by the Government making the requisition”, and that the treaty would continue in force until either of the Governments “shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate it”.⁸⁹

While these negotiations were still going on, in July the Court of Directors expressed themselves against the inclusion of cattle stealing, forgery, counterfeiting coin, and embezzlement private or public in the list of the extraditable offences.⁹⁰ Accordingly, the Indian Government expressed its helplessness but assured that perfect reciprocity would be observed and every aid would be provided to prosecute such criminals in the Indian courts.⁹¹

After some discussion and some addition in the article concerning the suite of the Resident, Jung Bahadur agreed to sign the treaty as modified by the Indian Government. On February 10, 1855, the first Extradition Treaty was ratified by the Maharajadhiraj of Nepal and on February 23, 1855 by Lord Dalhousie.⁹²

88. P.C. April 21, 1854—No. 18.

89. Ibid.

90. P.C. July 28, 1854—No. 26.

91. P.C. February 23, 1855—No. 12.

92. The following lines were added to the article concerning the suite of the Resident: “Should any Hindoostani Merchant or other subjects of the Honorable Company, not attached to the
(Contd. on page 268)

Omission of cattle-lifting and embezzlement from the list of offences caused much disappointment to the Nepalese Government. It was owing to these crimes, which were most prevalent in the Terai, that the Darbar was suffering a considerable financial loss. Mode of redress of such cases caused further embarrassment to the Darbar, as in the cases of revenue embezzlement it had to produce Government documents in the Indian courts to prove its cases. The Indian Government could not yet rid itself of the feeling that the Nepalese laws were too severe and this was the main reason which weighed with the Court of Directors in omitting some serious crimes from the list of offences. However, the value of the treaty lay in the fact that for the first time a clear system of extradition came into existence.

Soon after the conclusion of the treaty many requisitions were made by the Nepalese, but they were generally disallowed by the Indian Officers either upon the ground of insufficiency or utter irrelevance of the evidence tendered to prove the guilt in question.⁹³ These refusals naturally caused much dissatisfaction to the Nepalese and the problem could not be solved till 1866 when the next extradition treaty was concluded.

VII

Recruitment of the Gorkhas in the British army forms one of the most interesting aspects of the Indo-Nepalese relations. Its origin can be traced back to the war of 1814-16, and ever since the British had been extremely keen on getting more and more recruits. Credit for the idea goes to General David Ochterlony, who had been highly impressed by the fighting qualities of the Gorkhas. He held the view that

(Contd. from page 267)

British Residency, who may be living within the Nepal territories commit any crimes, beyond the Residency, boundaries, whereby they may render themselves liable to punishment by the Nepalese Court and take refuge within the limits of the Residency, they shall not be allowed an asylum but will be given up to the Nipal Government for trial and punishment". S.C. February 23, 1855—No. 12. See Appendix VIII for the text of the treaty.

93. MPR 1854—para 2.

“the Company’s sepoys could not be brought to match Gorkhas”.⁹⁴ During the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-16 the English Officers raised three corps of the Gorkhas.⁹⁵ In the convention signed with the Nepalese Commander General Amar Singh Thapa, on May 15, 1815, a clause was added that: “All the tropps in the service of Nepal, with the exception of those granted to the personal honour to the Kazees Umar Singh and Ranjore Singh, will be at liberty to enter into the services of the British Government, if agreeable to themselves and the British Government choose to accept their services.”⁹⁶

The three contingents having been raised, the natural question of further recruitment was mooted by Sir Edward Paget, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in India in 1825. The Indian Government addressed the Resident Edward Gardner on the question of recruitment and the policy of augmenting the strength of the existing battalions.⁹⁷ The latter, doubting the loyalty of the Gorkhas to the British, remarked that, “in the event of future rupture with Nepal, they possess that feeling.of patriotism which would induce the greater with such an alternative before them to

94. PT para 64.

95. The brief history of the Gorkha battalions in the Indian Army raised till 1877 is as follows:—

“1st Gorkha Regiment—Nurseree Battalion was raised on April 24, 1815, and was in 1850 designated the 66th Gorkha Regiment of Bengal Light Infantry, taking the place of 66th Bengal Infantry, which was disbanded for meeting. This becomes the 1st Gorkha Regiment in 1861.

“2nd Gorkha Regiment—The Sirmoor Rifle Regiment was raised on April 24, 1815, and was made a Gorkha regiment in 1850. It was called the second Gorkha Regiment in 1861.

“3rd Gorkha Regiment—The Kumaon Regiment, which was raised on April 24th, 1815, was reserved for Gorkhas in 1850. It was designated the 3rd Gorkha Regiment in 1861.

“4th Gorkha Regiment—This Regiment (later on came to be known as the Prince of Wales Own Gorkha Rifles) was raised in 1857. It became the 4th Gorkha Regiment in 1861.

“5th Gorkha Regiment—The Huzara Gorkha Battalion was raised in 1858, and was designated the 5th Gorkha Regiment in 1861.”

Taken from Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, pp. 259-60.

96. HRRK, pp. 100-101.

97. S.C. January 14, 1825—No. 24.

adhere decidedly to their natural alliance"; but he suggested that a special battalion might be obtained by negotiations with the Nepalese Government.⁹⁸ The issue was, however, dropped as the Indian Government did not like Gardner's plan. The Darbar regarded it very derogatory and had been highly averse to any such enlistment of its subjects in the British army. The vacancies in the existing Gorkha battalions could, therefore, be filled with great difficulty.

After Gardner, Resident B. H. Hodgson took up this issue very seriously. Lady Canning noted in her diary on November 4, 1857 that Hodgson "has the highest opinion of Gorkhas, and consider them the best soldiers in the world in all ways, especially for discipline provided no one interferes with their domestic concerns."⁹⁹ He viewed the problem both from the British and the Nepalese points of view.¹⁰⁰

While the geographical situation of Nepal—being surrounded by two big neighbours—had rendered the maintenance of big army superfluous, most of her higher classes and martial races were employed in military. They considered it derogatory to give up their profession, and no Prime Minister could dare attempt retrenchment. In 1832 Hodgson estimated that there were thirty thousand surplus soldiers in Nepal. To rid the state of its burden he proposed to enlist a large number of them into the British ranks, and he hoped that given a good pay and pension they could be relied upon. For the English the Gorkhas would have provided a fine fighting material and also a counterpoise against the Indian soldiers in case of their combination against the Company.

No positive step could, however, be taken for a long time till 1850, when Lord Dalhousie for the first time organised the Gorkha Battalions into regiments and thought of augmenting their strength. Fortunately this move of the Governor General coincided with the visit of Jung Bahadur to England. The Nepalese Prime Minister gave an assurance that he would help the British in getting the Gorkha recruits.¹⁰¹

98. S.C. February 25, 1825—No. 25A.

99. Quoted by Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, pp. 256-57.

100. See pp. 102-103 for details.

101. P.C. August 11, 1854—No. 11.

Encouraged by this assurance the Commanding Officer of Nusseree Battalion, Major O. Brain, wrote to the Resident to exert his influence in getting recruits for his regiment.¹⁰² The Officiating Prime Minister General Bam Bahadur "cheerfully agreed" to help, and, when the recruiting party arrived in Kathmandu in November 1850, he promised to circulate notice for the volunteers to come and present themselves.¹⁰³ In reality, however, the Nepalese Government was as usual averse to recruitment of its subjects in the Indian army. Consequently, thousands of Gorkhas came for recruitment, but no one was allowed to present himself within the limits of the Residency on the pretext that if they were allowed to go there they would be forcibly enlisted. Observing such an attitude of the Darbar, the Resident asked the recruiting party to go back. However, before it could return, General Bam Bahadur again assured his co-operation, but wanted that the recruits be selected in his presence. It was finally agreed that the recruits after being selected in the presence of the Prime Minister were to be sent to the Residency for the final selection.¹⁰⁴ With this plan only fifty to sixty could be selected.

Meanwhile the opposition of the Darbar became more and more unequivocal and it tried to prevent the selected Gorkhas from leaving Nepal.¹⁰⁵ Twenty out of those finally selected absconded and only thirtytwo could set out for India. Any doubts about Darbar's unwillingness were completely dispelled when on December 19, 1850 it sent six to seven hundred Gorkhas to the Resident with a note that they had come by notice but were unwilling to leave Nepal. The Resident held the opinion that they were recently discharged Gorkha soldiers, who had been detained and tutored to play their part.

After Jung Bahadur's return the Resident hoped that genuine co-operation would be extended by the Darbar. But Jung Bahadur was no less against such recruitment. In 1854 he declared that he would not allow "a single Gorkha

102. P.C. February 7, 1851—No. 144.

103. Political A. September 1869—KW—92-93.

104. P.C. February 7, 1851—No. 144.

105. Ibid.

sipahee in the British service to enter Nepal until he had first taken discharge unless he might come on duty either to purchase weapon for his corps or on recruiting service".¹⁰⁶ The Nepalese Prime Minister gave three reasons for his objection. Firstly, he alleged that a great number of criminals had entered the British service and their return might cause bad feelings and misunderstanding between the two Governments. About this he was told that the British Government had no objection if such criminals were punished, but wanted that the soldiers of good character be allowed to return on leave with passport from the Resident. The Prime Minister, however, still declined to waive his objection. Secondly, he said that he would not allow the enlistment of the Gorkhas in the Indian army because the Europeans were not allowed to enter Nepalese service. To this the Resident answered that Jung Bahadur had never applied to the British asking for the service of Europeans. The third reason given by him was that if he waived his objection, thousands of Gorkhas would flock to India attracted by the superior advantages of pay, pension and other amenities in the British service, and thus sufficient number of soldiers would not be left in Nepal to meet the requirements of its Government. This was also more a pretext than a fact because the Indian Government never needed Gorkhas in such numbers.

The bare fact was that Jung Bahadur and other chiefs regarded enlistment of the Gorkhas in the Indian army against their national prestige. He could not flatly refuse the British request but tried to sidetrack the issue by putting indirect obstacles. Resident Maj. Ramsay remarked on June 29, 1854: "My impression is that we must expect fewer liberal measures from General Jung Bahadur, than from any of his predecessors, despite the intentions he proclaims when he is travelling in our provinces."¹⁰⁷

Subsequently, however, the Prime Minister of Nepal withdrew his objection and allowed the Gorkhas serving in the British armies to enter Nepal and visit their families. But he specified that they must come with a passport from the Resident and must behave in Nepal as Nepalese subjects.

106. P.C. August 11, 1854—No. 11.

107. P.C. August 11, 1854—No. 12.

They were to come in Nepalese dress and not in British uniform, they were to avoid the Capital and military cantonments and were not to enter Nepal by direct road from Sagauli.¹⁰⁸ It was at this stage that the matter was left and for several years the Indian Government took no steps to improve the situation, as it was certain that Jung Bahadur would not yield.

VIII

In 1856 Jung Bahadur took a strange step, which created serious complications for him and for the Indian Government. On July 31, he suddenly resigned from the posts of Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of Nepalese forces.¹⁰⁹ No disturbance followed the resignation, but there was general astonishment and even the King was taken by surprise. However, before the Resident could even be apprised of the intended step, General Bam Bahadur, the immediate younger brother of Jung Bahadur, was appointed the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, and the Indian Government was requested to grant its recognition.

The only reasons formally assigned by Jung Bahadur for this abrupt step were tiresomeness and intention to retire to private life. After a few days, however, his real intentions became clear. The Orderly Officer in attendance reported to the Resident that he had been asked to inform the reluctant acceptance by Jung Bahadur of a jagir and a high title conferred by the Maharajadhiraj in recognition of his eminent services.¹¹⁰ "It was hoped that when this communication was made to the Resident, he would tender his advice to the Maharaja or, at least, he would express his opinion upon the subject".¹¹¹ Upon Resident's refusing to interfere

108. Ibid.

109. S.C. August 29, 1856—No. 51.

Pudma Jang mentions 1st August 1856 as the date on which Jung Bahadur resigned but according to the above report of the Resident on July 31, Bam Bahadur had taken charge of Prime Ministership. Therefore, date given by Pudma Jang is wrong.

110. S.C. August 29, 1856—No. 55.

111. MPR 1856—para 17.

in the domestic concern of the Darbar, Jung Bahadur himself came to the Residency.

He told the Resident that the Maharaja had threatened to abdicate if he (Jung Bahadur) did not accept the jagir and agree to control the important affairs of the State; as such he had promised to advise the Maharaja and the Prime Minister on all important matters connected with the British Government, China and Tibet and upon all Nizmat—by which “he meant not only subjects connected with criminal administration of justice, but all matters in which Maharaja and Minister might come in collision with royat or soldiery”.¹¹² Jung Bahadur further informed that the Maharaja had in written authorised him to use force should his advice be disregarded.¹¹³ On the 6th August the Maharajadhiraj formally conferred upon him at a grand parade of troops the title of “Maharaja” and the sovereignty of the two provinces Khaski and Lamjung. The King also announced that prime ministership would henceforth go down to Jung Bahadur’s family, i.e., after him to his brothers in order of seniority by age and then to his sons in the same order.

It is difficult to understand the real motives of Jung Bahadur behind his two simultaneous steps; first he thought of retiring to contemplate in solitude and then loaded himself with heavy state responsibilities. Even his biographer Pudma Jung is not clear about his real motives.¹¹⁴ While he was wielding dictatorial powers and enjoyed the loyalty of most of his brothers and army, there seemed no apparent cause of dissatisfaction. There were rumours that financial difficulties caused by the late Tibetan War and recent extensive promotions involving an expenditure of four to five lakh rupees had prompted Jung Bahadur to resign and shift the responsibility to his brother.¹¹⁵ Silvain Levi only

112. S.C. August 29, 1856—No. 55.

113. Ibid.

114. Pudma Jang has remarked that. “Jung Bahadur himself offered no other explanation than that he could no longer bear the severe strain that the heavy duties of his office imposed upon his energies, and that it had already told upon his health. While no one doubted that the alleged reason was a mere fiction, every one failed to discover the true motive of this extraordinary step.....” n. 25, Ch. I, p. 192.

115. S.C. August 29, 1856—No. 53.

says that he played "the comedy of abdication to test his associates and attendants, and to reorganise his force...."¹¹⁶

The real motives of Jung Bahadur were, however, deeper, as his future conduct was to show that he had designs on the throne of Nepal. He had no doubt dictatorial powers, but it was not attached with the glory of a sovereign. Lord Dalhousie remarked as early as 26th August, 1854 that Jung Bahadur "will infallibly try to subvert that dynasty (the Sah dynasty) some day, and it is the toss-up of a rupee whether he will be Rajah or have his throat cut."¹¹⁷ The Resident, half inclined to believe, wrote on the 1st August, 1856: "It may be possible that Jung is indirectly aiming not only at sovereign power, that he had, but also at sovereign position."¹¹⁸ It has similarly been remarked in the "Memorandum of Political Relations" that, "it very soon became apparent that ambition was its real motive as he at once attempted to assume a position with respect to the sovereign and to the country".¹¹⁹ In fact, by securing an independent jagir, a high title and extensive powers, he was assuming an immediate place between the Maharaja and the Minister—a stepping stone for the ultimate aim. The entire future career of Jung Bahadur amply showed that he had designs on the kingship of Nepal for which he desperately wanted the support and recognition of the British Government, which, however, was determined to recognize the Maharajadhiraj as the only sovereign of Nepal. Had it not been for the resolute refusal of Resident Ramsay and the Indian Government to recognise him in any official capacity, he could have carried his designs successfully.

No sooner had the new arrangement been made, the Resident declined to recognise Jung Bahadur in any official capacity and expressed his determination to regard only the Maharajadhiraj and the Prime Minister responsible for the acts and omissions of the state. The Indian Government instructed him on May 20, 1856 that, "For the present you should accept official communications on public matters

116. S. Levi, n. 1, Ch. I, Vol. I, p. 30.

117. J.G.A. Baird, n. 73, p. 316.

118. S.C. August 29, 1856—No. 51.

119. MPR 1856—para 16.

only that come from sovereign himself or from the minister; you would reply to no one but sovereign and minister. But if any change takes place in the channel of transaction and is formally sanctioned by Maharaja, you acknowledge it and act upon it."¹²⁰ In this way, though the right of the sovereign to decide the mode of transaction was not disputed, messages from Jung Bahadur on public matters were not to be received.¹²¹ The Resident was cautioned to be "careful not to recognise any authority as taking the place of Maharaja". The two provinces given over to Jung Bahadur were regarded only as "Life Grants".

Soon the anomalous position of Jung Bahadur brought him in clash with the Resident and also exposed his real intentions. Only a few days after the new arrangements, the Resident was urged to receive a chief from Jung Bahadur, and on his refusal to recognise the ex-Prime Minister any more he was told that Jung Bahadur was equal to the Maharajadiraj now. On the 9th August a strange document with Red-Seal was given to the Resident, in which Jung Bahadur was authorised "to coerce" not only the Prime Minister but the Maharajadhiraj too.¹²² Pudma Jung even mentions that a deputation headed by Raj Guru Bijai Raj urged Jung Bahadur to assume the throne.

The course of events made the Resident realise the real situation in which the ex-Prime Minister was gradually trying to attain an independent status and secure recognition from the Indian Government. Jung Bahadur was conscious that it would be essential for his future plans to get the British recognition, without which, howsoever great his powers be, he would wield them only through the recognised chan-

120. S.C. August 29, 1856—No. 57.

121. The Political Secretary again instructed the Resident on the 26th August 1856 that, "You may declare, if you so like, not to acknowledge any sovereign power in Nepal but one that of Maharaja, to whom you are accredited, and that in following this rule you can be influenced by restriction imposed by Raja himself. Maharaja being sovereign can govern as he likes, but all that Indian Government wishes is that he shall not divest himself of responsibility of Foreign powers" S.C. August 29, 1856—No. 63.

122. S.C. August 29, 1856—No. 58.

nel. The Indian Government, therefore, adopted a more stiff attitude and the Resident made a formal complaint with the Prime Minister against the dual system under which the relations between the two governments could not be carried on smoothly.¹²³

From the foregoing description it is clear that Jung Bahadur was not motivated by any pious or altruistic motive in resigning prime ministership. The short period of General Bam Bahadur, who died on May 25, 1857, was full of bickerings between him and his elder brother, but the influence of the latter invariably enabled him to carry out his own measures. After the death of the Prime Minister, Jung Bahadur shook off his lethargy and the so-called desire to contemplate in solitude, and assumed the prime ministership without giving any chance to his other younger brothers. The only reason that could be assigned for it is, that having failed in his attempt and having realised the attitude of the Indian Government he contented himself with the old position. Even while resuming the prime ministership he sought the approval of the Governor General, but the Resident flatly declined to interfere in the domestic affair.¹²⁴

IX

During the tenure of General Bam Bahadur, contrary to apprehensions,¹²⁵ no serious difficulty arose between the

123. Ibid.

124. Ramsay informed on June 20, 1857 that the officiating Prime Minister General Krishna Bahadur told him that Jung Bahadur had refused to accept prime ministership despite persuasion from the Chiefs and Maharaja, that he would accept it only with the advice of the Governor General for which he (Jung Bahadur) sought permission to go to Calcutta. The Resident, however, did not encourage it and replied that it was a domestic concern of the Darbar in which the British Government would not interfere. S.C. November 24, 1857—No. 414.

125. On learning that General Bam Bahadur had been appointed Prime Minister, Col. Ramsay remarked: "Bam Bahadur cannot be said to be favourably disposed to British Government, indeed he has been heard making bitter remarks about British Government. . . . I have found him courteous and obliging quite reverse to Jung, who, although courteous and polite, is very selfish (Contd. on page 278)

Darbar and the Indian Government, and it was also marked with certain liberal measures. Early in 1857 Herman Schlagintweit, a member of a scientific mission "Magnetic survey of India", was permitted by the Prime Minister, against the express wishes of Jung Bahadur, to visit Kathmandu for taking angles of the snowy peaks that were visible from the top of the surrounding mountains of the Valley.¹²⁶ A few conditions were, however, attached that his observations would be purely scientific, that he would not excure beyond the Valley and that he would not make any statistical or even geographical inquiries. Similarly, the new Prime Minister also allowed the parties of the Indian police to cross the northern frontier of Oudh in pursuit of a notorious dacoit Fazal Ali.¹²⁷

Earlier in October 1856, a serious misunderstanding was averted when an order of Jung Bahadur, which was extremely injurious to the interests of the Indian merchants trading in Nepal, was repealed by the Prime Minister. On October 11, the Iraki merchants (Mohamadens) of Kathmandu, who had been carrying on trade between Nepal and the British provinces for several generations, were told that they would no longer be allowed to bring their merchandise to Kathmandu and were asked to wind up their accounts and leave the Valley along with other Indian merchants.¹²⁸ Subsequently, they were informed that Darbar would allow them to settle down at Beechee-koh, a place away from Kathmandu, and bring their merchandise there but to sell it only to the agents of the Darbar.

This order of the ex-Prime Minister would have most adversely affected hundreds of the Indian families and a floating capital of ten to twelve lakhs. The merchants naturally objected to it, as they had long standing accounts which could not have been adjusted summarily and their

(Contd. from page 277)

and disobliging. But there is something in Bam Bahadur which is crafty, underhand treachery. I do not hope our relations would improve under him, although they may not be disturbed". S.C. August 29, 1856—No. 51.

126. P.C. January 9, 1857—No. 84.

127. P.C. April 17, 1857—No. 213.

128. S.C. December 26, 1856—No. 47.

expulsion from Kathmandu would have ruined their retail business. The Resident strongly protested on behalf of the merchants, who were entitled to enjoy all privileges of a Nepalese subject according to the engagement of 1839, and warned the Prime Minister that the orders must be weighed before confirmation.¹²⁹ As a result of this protest, Jung Bahadur's orders were rescinded, the Prime Minister expressed his regrets and the merchants were allowed to carry on their trade as usual.

The motive behind the above measure of Jung Bahadur was undoubtedly selfish. Since the last few years the attempt of his family had been not only to capture all the public offices, but also the financial resources of the country. Wherever they saw a possibility of financial gain they pounced upon it recklessly, with the result that the sale of cotton, grain, salt, oil, ghee and all taxable articles was being monopolised by the military class and particularly the family of Jung Bahadur. The Iraki merchants could still bring cotton, especially English cotton worth lakhs, country soap, hardware, and immense quantity of cheap country cloth at a rate lower than the inferior Nepalese cloth. Therefore, Jung Bahadur's aim was to eject these merchants out and seize their lucrative trade.

NEPAL AND THE INDIAN REVOLT (1857-60)

I

The Nepalese military aid to the British during the Indian Revolt of 1857 laid the firm foundation of the Anglo-Nepalese friendship which continued uninterrupted since then. Whether the aid was substantial or not is not so important a question; its real significance lay in the fact that the Gorkhas did come to help the British and did not join against them to reconquer the territories which they had lost in the war of 1814-16.

The Revolt broke out in Meerut and Delhi in May 1857 and soon spread in the eastern district of the North Province and Oudh (now Uttar Pradesh). In the initial stages it created "comparatively" little sensation among the people and the soldiery of Nepal.¹ The Nepalese Prime Minister Jung Bahadur from the very beginning realised the seriousness of the crisis but always remained firm in his friendship towards the British, because he correctly estimated their power and could foresee that the revolt could never be a success. This was the result of his visit to England where he had the opportunity of having a thorough estimate of the British strength himself. The Resident Col. G. Ramsay held the view that Jung Bahadur would have fought against the British but for his visit to England.² It is true, as reported by the Resident on July 29, 1857, that the Nepalese Darbar had unanimously approved of Jung Bahadur's policy, yet several other chiefs were certainly not so favourably dis-

1. S.C. June 26, 1857—Nos. 129 and 130.

2. Letter from G. Ramsay to Sir John Login; cited by William Digby, 1857—*A friend in need and 1887—Friendship Forgotten*. London, 1909, p. 41.

posed towards them.³ "One of his brothers told me", wrote Col. Ramsay, "that every attempt was being made by influential men to induce him (Jung Bahadur) to join them (the rebels) in driving us out of the country but that no persuasion would induce him to commit such an act of suicidal folly".⁴ In 1877 similar views were expressed by General Dhir Shamsher to Resident F. Henvey that, "In Mutiny whole of the Darbar, except Jung Bahadur, was in favour of aid (to the rebels); all wanted to pay off the old scores, the national feeling was adverse to you".⁵ These chiefs, most conspicuous among whom was the Raj Guru, believed that British rule would shortly end; but Jung Bahadur was firm in his decision and said: "No, if the British are driven out of India—if all who are here are exterminated, their Government can send sufficient troops and guns from England in the course of six months to retake the country, and sweep the whole of the Native powers into the sea. We may enrich ourselves for the time being. We may prosper for two or three years, but our time will infallibly come, and we shall then lose our own country".⁶

Influenced by the above considerations, the Nepalese Government deplored the recent unhappy occurrences in the Northern India and offered an aid of six regiments to the Indian Government.⁷ Observing that the condition of the North-Western Province was fast deteriorating, Resident Ramsay decided to accept the offer. At first he only wanted two hundred Gorkha soldiers for the defence of the Gorakhpur treasury. This induced Jung Bahadur to come out with an exaggerated offer of fifty thousand troops under his own command.⁸ Ramsay, being over-confident of Governor General's approval, accepted five to six corps. Surprisingly, Jung

3. S.C. November 27, 1857—No. 424.

4. William Digby, n. 2, p. 41.

5. S.C. December 1877—No. 117.

This view is also attested by Pudma Jang. He writes that in a council held to decide the issue of aid many "spoke in favours of the proposal; many murmured dissent; many again advocated a policy of strict neutrality". n. 25, Ch. I, pp. 198-99.

6. MPR 1857, para 26.

7. S.C. September 25, 1857—Nos. 487 and 489.

8. S.C. December 18, 1857—No. 460.

Bahadur now evaded the offer, which he had probably made under the impression that it would not be accepted.⁹ Ultimately, due to the urges of the Resident, the Darbar agreed to despatch 3,000 troops, and on June 13, the first contingent even started for Gorakhpur under the command of Col. Pahalwan Singh.¹⁰

The Governor General, however, was not prepared to accept the Nepalese aid,¹¹ because it was a general belief among the British Officers that the presence of the Gorkha troops would produce a most injurious effect on the Indians and expose the British weakness.¹² Lady Canning told Mrs. Hodgson, the wife of the former Resident Brain Hodgson, that, "You praise these Gorkhas like your husband, but I can assure you that they are looked on here as being little better than the rebels".¹³ The Resident was telegraphically informed that if the Gorkha troops had not already left for India he was to stop them as they were not required, and if they had started they were to be relieved at the earliest.¹⁴ With obvious embarrassment to himself and to Jung Bahadur, Ramsay stopped the troops from proceeding to India.

The condition of Oudh, however, deteriorated steeply

9. With a view to evade the offer the Darbar's agent delivered a message to Ramsay on the 4th June that the offer was only conditional one to be honoured when the Governor General would have asked for 3,000 troops in a Kharita to the Maharajadhiraj, and that it would not be possible to send troops at such a short notice because due to marriage of King's son soldiers had gone on long leave and because there were possibilities of another war with Tibet. S.C. September 25, 1857—No. 487.

10. S.C. September 25, 1857—No. 494.

11. S.C. September 25, 1857—No. 488.

12. Such was the marked reluctance among the British officers to accept the Gorkha aid that H. C. Tucker remarked on June 13, 1857, "I would protest against any Nepalese troops being permitted to enter the country. If we cannot hold it ourselves without the aid of Nepal, it is time to leave. The appearance of the Nepalese troops would produce a most injurious effect among natives and I should be ashamed to see them in Benaras". S.C. December 18, 1857—No. 665.

Similarly Judge of Gorakhpur wrote that the Gorkhas "are very dangerous allies and will give us much trouble before we are done with them." S.C. December 18, 1857—No. 666.

13. Cited by Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, p. 256.

14. S.C. December 18, 1857—No. 664.

and, within a fortnight of rejecting the Nepalese offer, Lord Canning had to requisition the services of three thousand Gorkhas.¹⁵ The Resident immediately requested Jung Bahadur to despatch six regiments to Lucknow on the condition that the Indian Government would bear all the expenses involved in their preparation and employment in India.¹⁶ Jung Bahadur promptly complied with the request and lost no time in despatching the first contingent to the plains under Col. Pahalwan Singh. Some British Officers had also been attached to this force.

Early in July 1857 the Gorkha troops assembled at Sagauli, but, contrary to the original plan, they were not to proceed for Lucknow because, without the support of guns and unaccompanied by cavalry or even a single company of Europeans, it was not deemed advisable that they should cross the river Gogra. The Nepalese army entered India from north of Gorakhpur and occupied that station until its abandonment in early August. Subsequently the Gorkha army was divided between Azamgarh and Jaunpur, where it remained for the next four months and fought several engagements with the rebels.¹⁷

In addition to the main force, the Nepalese Government also sent troops on several occasions to the bordering Indian

15. S.C. December 18, 1857—No. 584.

16. S.C. September 25, 1857—Nos. 541-42.

17. The Gorkha force under Col. Pahalwan Singh occupied Azamgarh on the 13th August, 1857 and Jaunpur on the 15th. But in the third week of September, a large body of rebels entered Azamgarh again. On September 18, however, it was recaptured. Jaunpur force was ordered to advance to Mubarakpur, where Raja Iradat Khan was defying the British authority. The whole Jaunpur was soon cleared off the rebels. Azamgarh force, after sweeping Azamgarh, pushed to Atraolia, a strong hold of Beni Madho, who fled away at their approach. On the 19th October at Kudva a bloody battle was fought with the Oudh rebels in which the Nepalese had a victory. On the 30th October at Chanda an important battle was won. On the 26th December at Sohanpur the combined force of the Europeans and the Gorkhas defeated the rebels. By the end of December a rebel chief Nazim at Chanda and Fazal Azim at Badalpur collected their combined forces. On the 24th January 1858 Fazal Azim was defeated at Nasaratpur. At Chanda Nazim was defeated and Fazal Azim again suffered a defeat at Hamirpur. The stronghold of rebels at Sultanpur was also carried away on the 23rd February 1858. Thereafter, this force joined in the siege of Lucknow. Pudma Jang, n. 25, Ch. I, 201-5.

districts for the help of the British authorities. Three hundred Gorkhas were sent to Gorakhpur in June 1857 to strengthen Capt. F. T. Wroughten's position.¹⁸ In July the 12th Irregular Cavalry stationed at Sagauli had revolted, and the Resident requested that a force of five hundred be immediately despatched to Sagauli and Motihari. Jung Bahadur, however, sent two regiments, consisting of one thousand soldiers, as he did not like to leave a small force in such an exposed position.¹⁹ On the 14th August these regiments left Kathmandu, and were afterwards attached to Brig. Rowcraft's Sarun Field Force, with which they rendered good service and took part in several encounters. They, finally, joined Jung Bahadur's main army at Lucknow in March 1858. Again, in December 1857 a body of two hundred and ninety Gorkha soldiers was placed at the disposal of Major Henry Ramsay, the Commissioner of Kumaon, which assisted in the defence of that area.²⁰ The Nepalese Government also courteously gave shelter to fifteen Europeans in the Terai in June 1857. Jung Bahadur even instructed his local officers to advance them money, but he seriously objected to their coming over to Kathmandu or to enter the inner range of hills.²¹

II

Since the acceptance of the first offer, Jung Bahadur had been persistently pressing the British to accept further Nepalese military aid. In July 1857 he offered six thousand troops under his own command, and again in November he expressed a wish to send twelve to fifteen thousand troops and twentyseven guns.²² In fact, Jung Bahadur had by this time fully determined to help the British whole-heartedly. There was also a point of honour of the Gorkha troops, which, he apprehended, might suffer if only small contingents of troops were sent to fight against the rebels. From July to

18. S.C. September 25, 1857—No. 525.

19. S.C. November 27, 1857—No. 429.

20. S.C. January 29, 1858—No. 498.

21. S.C. September 25, 1857—No. 477.

22. S.C. November 27, 1857—No. 423.

December 1857 he repeatedly urged the Resident to be allowed to reinforce the Gorkha columns fighting in the plains and felt chagrin at not being permitted to do so.²³

By November 1857 the British condition in India had vastly improved. After the rebels had been defeated in Delhi and North-Western Province, Oudh became their stronghold. The northern territory of Oudh being contiguous to Nepal, the Governor General thought that the aid of the Nepalese troops would help in quelling the revolt soon.²⁴ The opinion of the British Officers had also changed in favour of the Nepalese, who had proved their worth and fidelity by this time. Even the former Resident B. H. Hodgson came down from Darjeeling to convince Lord Canning to accept Jung Bahadur's offer.²⁵

Induced by the above factors the Governor General accepted the services of eight thousand Gorkha troops on November 18, 1857. The Resident publicly conveyed the acceptance of the offer and clarified that the Indian Government would incur all the expenses of the preparation of the Gorkha force and its stay in the plains.²⁶ Although Jung Bahadur was to be treated as the Commander of an independent state, yet it was specified to him that he would work according to the plans and advice of the British Commander-in-Chief.

Jung Bahadur started from Kathmandu on December 10, 1857 with a force of nine thousand troops.²⁷ It assembled at Sagauli where Brigadier-General G. H. Macgregor joined it as the Military Commissioner and large number of European Officers were also attached to its various brigades and regiments. At one point, however, Jung Bahadur was adamant that, as far as possible, his force should not be divided, because he thought that with his divided force he would

23. S.C. December 18, 1857—Nos. 269 and 270.

24. S.C. November 27, 1857—No. 425.

25. Hunter, n. 40, Ch. I, pp. 256-57.

26. S.C. November 27, 1857—Nos. 425 and 286.

27. S.C. January 29, 1858—No. 377.

In the *Memorandum of Political Relations* it has been remarked that Jung Bahadur's army later on "swelled to about 14,000". 1857—para 30.

be able to accomplish nothing and thus would be put to shame in the eyes of the world. "It is as though", he said, "you take from a man his gun. . . . and ask him to fight".²⁸

Before dealing with the details of his operations it would be useful to examine the motives which induced Jung Bahadur to come out to the aid of the British. The Indian revolt of 1857 offered him a unique opportunity to manifest his fidelity and win over the British favour. As has been earlier stated, it was Jung Bahadur's ambition to assume the Kingship of Nepal or at least to secure a status equal to that of the King. In 1856 he had made unsuccessful efforts in this direction, but instead of winning over the British support for his designs he had rather alienated it. Now in 1857 he had the opportunity of winning over a personal favour from the British by submitting a practical proof of his friendship.²⁹ When in July the offer was made, the name of Maharaja Gulab Singh of Kashmir and the aid he had given to the British during the Sikh War were frequently mentioned.³⁰ On Ramsay's persuasion Orderly Officer Karbeer Khattri disclosed that Jung Bahadur expected that either he should be recognised as an independent Prince in Nepal or be bestowed upon some territory as a reward of his services.³¹ This view is supported by no less experienced a person than Lord Dalhousie, who believed that in course of time the Nepalese ruling dynasty would be usurped by Jung Bahadur and "the British Government will be expected to show its gratitude for aid in Oudh by recognising, if not by

28. S.C. March 26, 1858—No. 90. Also S.C. December 18, 1857—No. 286.

29. Jung Bahadur told the Resident on December 10, 1857 that, "If you or your Government had suspected me and had shown me that you did so, I would not have lent you a single regiment and could easily have told you that I distrusted my own Sipahes and was afraid of their joining the mutineers. . . . but you have placed the most perfect confidence in my fidelity and I will now repay. I shall be indebted to yourself for my new character and for all the Izzat that I shall henceforth possess in world. People generally call me a tyrant and a murderer and your newspapers abuse me as such, but I am not what they represent me and the world will soon see and admit". S.C. January 29, 1858—No. 377.

30. S.C. November 27, 1857—No. 123.

31. Ibid.

aiding in turn, the new dynasty in Nepal”.

Jung Bahadur's farewell speech before leaving Kathmandu on December 10, 1857 testified to all his motives. He declared:

“I have three motives for acting as I am now doing. 1st to show that Gorkhas possess fidelity and will pour out their blood in defence of those who treat them with honour and repose confidence in them. 2nd that I knew the power of British Government and were I to take part against, although I might have temporary success for a time, my country would afterward have been ruined and Gorkha dynasty annihilated. 3rd that I knew that upon the success of British arms and re-establishment of British power in India, its Government will be stronger, than ever, and that I and my brother and my country will all then benefit by our alliance with you as your remembrance of our past sacrifices will render our present friendship lasting and will prevent your ever molesting us”.

Jung Bahadur divided his force into three parts. The first, consisting of the “Rifle Body Guards” and other eight regiments, was under his personal command; the second was

32. Lord Dalhousie remarked on the 15th April 1858: “Laterly the Government have accepted the aid of the Gorkhas, and in the extremity in which they were, the Government were quite right to do so. But the measure is not without its inconveniences. In first place, if the Government suppose that Jung Bahadur is doing all that he is doing “for love” they are mightily mistaken. Jung is drawing a bill upon them at long date, perhaps—but one which they will be called upon to pay in return for value received, some day or other, as sure as fate. The Jung has long been obviously working his way to the musnud of Nepal. One Rajah—the father—has already been deposed; another Rajah—the son—has long been a phantom. Jung Bahadur was the ruler himself. He has married his daughter to the Rajah's son; he has married his son to Raja's daughter. He has thus worked himself, in a way, into the precincts of the Royal family; and when the time and the opportunity come, the Rajah will have an accident of some kind, Jung will appear as Rajah, and the British Government will be expected to show its gratitude for aid in Oudh by recognising, if not by aiding in turn, the new dynasty in Nepal. If this were all, I should think but little of it”. J. G. A. Baird, n. 73, Ch. IX, pp. 414-15.

33. S.C. January 29, 1853—No. 377.

headed by General Kharag Bahadur; and the third was under General Bakht Jang. General Randip Singh and General Dhir Shamsher acted as assistants of Jung Bahadur. The Nepalese Prime Minister entered the Indian territory on December 23, 1857, and after crossing the river Gandak on December 30, he attacked Gorakhpur on January 6, 1858 and occupied it with little resistance.³⁴ It was an important victory, which not only broke down the morale of the rebels but also blocked their way towards north-east. In fact, abandonment of Gorakhpur would have left the whole India up to Assam, if not up to sea, open to the rebels.³⁵ After fighting several minor battles in the neighbourhood of Gorakhpur, the Gorkha army was unfortunately detained for some weeks on account of Jung Bahadur's insistence "to change carriage".³⁶ Leaving two regiments for its defence, Jung Bahadur left Gorakhpur on February 14, but the movements of his army were very slow and dilatory. He again crossed the River Gandak and marched towards Amberpur where he sacked the Fort of Berozpur. On February 20, two more forts, guarding approach to Faizabad, were captured by him. In the first week of March he fought a minor battle at Kandu river and, then, after crossing the Gogra river near Burrarea, straightaway marched towards Lucknow, where Sir Colin Campbell was awaiting his arrival.

Immediately after his arrival at Lucknow on March 11, 1858, his force and that of Col. Pahalwan Singh were moved into their allotted position for the siege of that city. Here the Gorkha troops co-operated in capturing Begum's Kothi, Alambagh, Gomti bridge, Imambara, Chhattra Manzil, Moti Bagh, Tara Kothi, Kaisergarh and Musa Bagh. By the 13th March, practically whole of Lucknow was cleared off the rebels.

On the 23rd March Jung Bahadur went to Allahabad to meet Lord Canning, where he brought out some charges against Resident Ramsay and requested the Governor Gene-

34. Melleeson, *Indian Mutiny*, Vol. III, p. 226.

35. S.C. November 27, 1857—No. 428.

36. MPR 1858—para 35.

ral to appoint some other officer in his place.³⁷ He reached Kathmandu on the 4th May via Benaras. The rest of the Nepalese force also reached home soon afterwards.

On the whole the presence of the Gorkha army "had a fine moral effect" on the British as it helped in breaking the morale of the rebels.³⁸ As for the Nepalese, it offered an opportunity for a large body of soldiers to witness the British strength and their scientific methods of fighting, as a result of which the British prestige was greatly enhanced throughout Nepal and the Gorkhas came to have a much higher appreciation of the British power than they ever entertained before. The British were also now convinced of the fidelity of Jung Bahadur and the Gorkhas, and thus the foundation of the Anglo-Nepalese friendship, which was to last for nearly a century, was laid down. In future whenever an occasion arose the Nepalese Government promptly came out to offer its help to the British. During the First and the Second World Wars the Gorkha army rendered very useful service to the Allied Powers. In turn the British also supported the Ranas and helped in preserving their rule in Nepal for a century.

From the military point of view the aid was not so substantial as is generally assumed or as was expected from the Gorkhas. Pudma Jang writes about Jung Bahadur's military aid as though the Indian Revolt could not have been quelled without it.³⁹ But in reality only the three regiments under Col. Pahalwan Singh had rendered some useful service, otherwise Jung Bahadur's force of more than nine thousand strong did comparatively little. The Nepalese Prime Minister did not fight any major battle, and, being very touchy and vain, did not allow slightest degree of interference or check over his army. His insistence on keeping it united resulted in lot of botheration to the British Generals. He was also very slack and slow in his movements and insisted on unnecessary things like the change of carriage.

37. See pp. 291-293 for details.

38. MPR 1858—para 39.

39. Pudma Jang remarks that, "In a short space of hundred days, he had achieved the stupendous task of quelling rebellion that shook the British Indian Empire to its very foundation", n. 25, Ch. I, p. 215.

The discipline of Jung Bahadur's force was at its worst. From the moment he reached Gorakhpur and onwards his march towards Lucknow, he was, by his own account, "in constant communication with the rebel leaders, who offered to make him King of Lucknow if he would join their cause and turn upon the British Army."⁴⁰ A dacoit leader Daman Khan, whom Jung Bahadur had employed as spy against the rebels, was in reality trying to infuse disbelief among the Gorkhas about the British success.⁴¹ These temperings had some effect upon the Nepalese soldiers, many of whom openly gave out that they would return to the plains during the next winters to annex certain Indian districts. The march of the Gorkha troops back to Nepal, loaded with plunder, was more like that of a rabble than a disciplined army.

As a matter of fact, Jung Bahadur came down to India with a sincere desire to help the British and earn a name for himself, but in the plains he found himself powerless to control his army. It should never be overlooked that Jung Bahadur's actual power depended on humouring the army, which had a natural soft corner for rebels, if not for their cause.⁴² Similarly, as has been stated, there was an opposition party in Nepal with identical feelings. Therefore, it was impossible for Jung Bahadur to disregard the general opinion absolutely. All these factors had a considerable effect on the Gorkha army, which could not do as much, or as well, as was expected of it. There is no doubt that the Indian Revolt could have been crushed even without the Nepalese military aid. The real military importance of the aid, therefore, was negative. Had the Gorkhas joined the rebels the British would have been placed in a very awkward situation. The Secretary of States remarked, "We are unwilling to imagine the position without this aid and still less had the Maharaja taken the advantage of our distress and employed the troops against."⁴³

40. MPR 1858—para 41.

41. S.C. February 25, 1859—No. 11.

42. S.C. March 26, 1858—No. 120.

43. Secret despatch from the Secretary of States—March 17, 1858—No. 1933.

III

As has already been stated, at Allahbad Jung Bahadur brought out a number of ridiculous charges against the British Resident Col. G. Ramsay and requested the Governor General to remove him. The Nepalese Prime Minister was displeased with the Resident because the latter had steadfastly refused to recognize the former in any official capacity, after he had resigned from prime ministership in July 1856. There is no doubt he was trying to secure an independent status for himself, while it was the basic policy of the British to recognise the King as the only sovereign in Nepal.

Having failed in his first attempt, Jung Bahadur had again revived his schemes after the death of General Bam Bahadur. He had refused to accept prime ministership without the advice of the Governor General and proposed to leave for Calcutta to meet him. Ramsay again, adopting strict neutrality in such domestic concerns, had discouraged the move.⁴⁴ Having thus failed, Jung Bahadur accepted the prime ministership, but this grudge was nursed by him in his heart of hearts.

The Nepalese aid to the British in quelling Indian Revolt presented another opportunity to Jung Bahadur. This time he aimed at getting Col. Ramsay removed from Nepal and took recourse to duplicity. Before leaving for plains in December 1857, he had praised Ramsay both publicly and in private in a most solemn manner.⁴⁵ But after reaching Allahabad in March 1858, he attempted to get rid of the Resident by bringing out frivolous charges and by personally requesting the Governor General to remove him.⁴⁶ Jung Bahadur thought that at this moment Lord Canning, under heavy obligation of Nepalese military aid, would feel embarrassed in turning down his request. The Indian Govern-

44. S.C. November 24, 1857—No. 414.

45. S.C. February 25, 1859—No. 15.

46. The charges levied against Col. Ramsay were most ridiculous. For instance, it was complained that the Resident refused to pay the money due to the coolies; that a grocer was falsely accused by Ramsay for adulteration; that he insisted on the punishment of an innocent tenner, that the carriage of the Resident passed over the bridge against the rules. In this way sixteen charges were made. S.C. July 30, 1858—No. 121.

ment, however, was not prepared to summarily dismiss its representative. It conveyed to Jung Bahadur that the charges would be enquired into and should the explanation of Ramsay be unsatisfactory he would be removed and in his place Brigadier Mackenzie would be appointed.

Colonel Ramsay was summoned to the presence of the Governor General. He refuted all the charges,⁴⁷ and Lord Canning, being satisfied of his innocence, informed the Darbar that "having fully satisfied himself, that no blame attached to Colonel Ramsay's official conduct as Resident, that officer would shortly resume his functions.....supported.....by the full and unshaken confidence of the..... Governor General."⁴⁸ Jung Bahadur did not expect such a reply and, taking a serious view of it, warned the Asstt. Resident against Ramsay's return. Even the King personally wrote to Lord Canning for the removal of the Resident.⁴⁹ The Nepalese Prime Minister went to the extent of saying that in giving help to the British he expected a "boon"—the removal of Ramsay, which was now denied and that the return of that officer was "the first" step towards usurpation of Nepal.⁵⁰ The Governor General, assuming a strict tone, again specified that he would never consent to the removal of an innocent officer which involved "the sacrifice of justice and honour of the British Government....."⁵¹ At the same time, he did not like to impose a particular Resident on an unwilling State. He, therefore, agreed to recall Col. Ramsay provided he had been first cordially received with full honours by the Darbar.

Eventually the Nepalese Government regretted the misunderstanding, agreed to receive the Resident with full honours and expressed the hope that he would be recalled afterwards.⁵² In February 1859 Col. Ramsay returned to Kathmandu and took over the charge of the Residency on February 23. He was given a cordial reception by the

47. S.C. July 30, 1858—Nos. 122 and 123.

48. MPR 1858—para 43.

49. S.C. July 30, 1858—No. 129.

50. S.C. July 30, 1858—No. 127.

51. S.C. July 30, 1858—No. 130.

52. S.C. August 27, 1858—No. 92.

Darbar and Jung Bahadur personally paid a visit to him to apologise for the manner in which he had been recently treated and desired that the past be forgotten. Even the Maharaja formally asked the Governor General not to recall Col. Ramsay.⁵³ This change in the attitude of Jung Bahadur was perhaps on account of the strict attitude of the Governor General, which convinced him that the British Government would not easily fall in his trap.

Despite the above misunderstanding, the Indian Government acknowledged the recent Nepalese military aid. The Secretary of States acknowledged it in a public despatch⁵⁴ and Lord Ellenborough, the President of Commissioners for the affairs of India, wrote a letter to Jung Bahadur expressing thanks of Her Majesty the Queen of England.⁵⁵ The British Government was also aware that Jung Bahadur was expecting some reward for his services; therefore, without giving him any chance to express his wish, it decided to restore the Oudh Terai to Nepal.⁵⁶ The restoration of this tract was thought expedient, as its sacrifice had been a source of irritation and soreness to the Nepalese at the time of the Treaty of Sagauli. On May 17, 1858, Lord Canning conveyed to the Maharajadhiraj his intention "to restore to the Nepal State the whole of the former Gorkha possessions below the Hills extending from the river Gogra on the West to the British Territory of Gorakhpur on the East and bounded on the South by Khyragarh and the Districts of Baraitch and the North by the Hills".⁵⁷ As a personal favour to Jung Bahadur, he was made a medium to communicate this message to the Maharajadhiraj. After a proper survey and demarcation of the boundary, these territories were transferred to Nepal in November 1860.⁵⁸

53. P.C. December 30, 1858—Nos. 603 and 605.

54. Sec. despatch from the Secretary of States, dated March 17, 1858—No. 1933.

55. Sec. despatch from the Secretary of States—dated March 23, 1858—No. 1935.

56. Sec. despatch from the Secretary of States, dated March 17, 1858—No. 1933.

57. S.C. August 27, 1858—Nos. 124 and 125.

58. See pp. 304-5 for details.

Besides the restoration of the Oudh Terai, the Indian Government also gave a handsome monetary remuneration to the Gorkha soldiers. It may be recalled that the British Government had already assumed the responsibility of defraying the expenses of the preparation and employment of the Nepalese troops in India, which had amounted to Rs. 2,30,615-8-4. Four and half lakhs rupees were paid as "Donation Bhatta" to all the Gorkha soldiers engaged in suppressing the Revolt and as gratuities in lieu of pensions to the families of all the officers and soldiers who had been killed or wounded in action.⁵⁹ "Indian Mutiny" medals were also awarded to all the soldiers who took part in the siege of Lucknow. Above all these, the "Insignia of a Knight Grand Cross, Military Division of the Order of Bath" was conferred upon Jung Bahadur. At a Grand Darbar the Resident conferred the title to the Nepalese Prime Minister, on behalf of the British Government and presented him a letter from Prince Albert.⁶⁰ This was the first European title ever conferred upon, and accepted by, a Nepalese chief. It may, however, be remarked that with the conferring of this title although the Indian Government did not give to the Nepalese Prime Minister any independent position nor changed its attitude of looking to the Maharajadhiraj as the only Sovereign of Nepal, yet the unique position of Jung Bahadur certainly came to be recognised openly. Never before was it contemplated by the Indian Government to write to Jung Bahadur directly or to confer upon him a title.

All this handsome monetary remuneration and territorial gains failed to please Jung Bahadur. He generally compared his services with those of the other Rajas of India and the reward they had been given by the Indian Govern-

59. S.C. November 26, 1858—No. 62. Also see S.C. November 26, 1858—No. 62.

As regards the 'Bhatta' it is worth a remark that in the beginning Jung Bahadur showed impatience to receive it, then wished its payment to be deferred till the rebels, who had taken shelter in the Terai, had been cleared off. However, the British Government, being afraid that delay would discredit it, did not detain it long. It was distributed in September 1859.

60. P.C. November 25, 1859—No. 142.

ment.⁶¹ In fact, Jung Bahadur regarded the Oudh Terai a petty reward and often expressed a desire for more territorial gains, which could not, however, be entertained by the Indian Government.

It is alleged by some Nepalese scholars that after the announcement of the restoration of the Oudh Terai, Jung Bahadur's friendly attitude had considerably changed. Prof. G. C. Shastri holds the view that, "After the restoration of peace in 1858, Jung Bahadur was shocked at the British restoration of only a small strip of Nepal's former territory and not the whole as promised, which had been taken away by the British in 1816.....Now Jung Bahadur began to harbour evil designs against the British."⁶² There were certain ill-timed measures of the Darbar that engendered this belief even among the British frontier authorities of that time. The Nepalese Government had issued two orders that adversely affected the interests of the Gorkhas living in Darjeeling and of those serving in the Indian army. In the first place a proclamation was issued that the lands of the Gorkhas, who had left Nepal without paying revenue, were to be transferred to others.⁶³ According to another order, all the trade routes from Nepal to Darjeeling were sealed, with a view to check any undetected escape of criminals and to remove the scarcity of provisions felt by the troops on that frontier.⁶⁴ The orders concerned only the Nepalese subjects, but they caused serious alarm among the Nepalese settled in India. The Superintendent of Darjeeling strongly held the view that the Darbar had hostile designs on Darjeeling.⁶⁵ Reports were rife on the western and northern frontier that Jung Bahadur, dissatisfied at the reward given by the British for his services, was preparing to invade India after Dashehra.⁶⁶ Some members of Governor's General council

61. P.C. January 20, 1860—No. 143.

62. Prof. K.C. Shastri—*Freedom Loving Nepal*, Kathmandu, 1957, p. 10.

63. S.C. November 26, 1858—No. 115.

64. S.C. November 26, 1858—No. 111.

65. P.C. December 31, 1858—No. 4302.

66. S.C. November 26, 1858—No. 74.

also doubted the Nepalese intentions.⁶⁷

It appears that neither the British Officers of that time nor Prof. Shastri could understand the real attitude of Jung Bahadur. It can be asserted, even at the risk of repetition, that he never had any serious designs against the British and the Officiating Resident C. H. Byers had repeatedly discounted the truth of the prevailing rumours, which he held were diligently spread by the disaffected faction in Nepal to discredit Jung Bahadur.⁶⁸ Moreover, when he had already read in the papers about the title of the Order of Bath to be conferred upon him, he would not have discredited himself in the eyes of authorities at London by taking such inexpedient measures. It is a fact that he was not satisfied with the restoration of Oudh Terai, but to suggest that just for that he took deliberate steps and risked friendship with the British was neither feasible nor acceptable. Rather, in the face of opposition from the chiefs and the army, who were sympathetic towards the rebels, he stood firm in his support to the British.

The Officiating Resident, however, referred the matter to Jung Bahadur and requested him to repeal the orders, which, whatever the intentions of the Darbar, had been proving injurious to the British interests. The Nepalese Prime Minister immediately agreed to rescind both the orders of his Government.⁶⁹

IV

In the beginning of the year 1859 an important development took place, that not only caused anxiety to both the Governments for the whole year, but also created serious misunderstanding between the two. The rebel forces, having been driven away by Lord Clyde's division, entered the

67. Lt. General J. Outram, remarked that, "Having so recently whetted their appetite for plunder by their fray in Lucknow, it is possible that Nepalese might be tempted to venture plundering incursions in our neighbouring districts, in the supposition that we are too occupied elsewhere."

68. See MPR 1858.

69. S.C. November 26, 1858—No. 115.

Nepalese Terai and made it their ground for operations. Begum Hazrat Mahal, her son Prince Birijis Kadra, Peshwa Nana Sahib Dhondu Pant, his brother Bala Rao, Devy Bux, Beni Madho, Jwala Prashad, Devy Din of Nassearabad Brigade, Khan Bahadur Khan of Bareilly, Mohammed Hus-sain—the Nizam of Gorakhpur, Raja Dig Vijay Singh, Maulvee Mohammed Sirfiraz Ali and numerous others took shelter in the Terai to reunite their despirited followers and also made desperate attempts to win over the support of Jung Bahadur. Prince Birijis Kadra and Maulvee Sirfiraz Ali urged the Nepalese Prime Minister in the name of Hindus and Muslims to espouse their cause against the English, who had destroyed the faith of both the sects.⁷⁰ Begum Hazrat Mahal, soon after entering the Terai, solicited an interview with Jung Bahadur with a view to throw herself on his protection and induce him to uphold her cause. Raja Ganga Dhar Rao and Bala Rao gave him temptations of large amount of money if he helped them in recovering their lost ground.⁷¹

The British attitude towards the rebels and Nepal was quite clear.⁷² Lord Canning did not like the British troops to cross the Nepalese frontier but hoped that the rebels taking shelter therein would be prevented by the Nepalese Government from making any aggression on the Indian territory. If the British troops were to cross the frontier without Nepalese permission, it would have created dangerous precedent, because the Nepalese political refugees often took shelter in India. Nor did the Governor General desire that every rebel should be delivered over to the British authorities. Amnesty was open to all of them except those who had murdered the British subjects. Moreover, the Governor General was aware that the sympathy of the Nepalese living on the border lay

70. S.C. August 27, 1858—No. 97.

71. Raja Ganga Dhar Rao and Bala Rao wrote to Jung Bahadur on the 22nd January 1859: "We have taken refuge in Nepal, and are satisfied with what you intend to do with us—cause us to live or arrest. We give at present to Nepal one crore rupees and five crores when Lucknow and Gorakhpur are taken possession of. Except yourself no one can save religion now. We are cows, do as you please". P.C. September 30, 1859—No. 532.

72. P.C. July 15, 1859—Nos. 413C and 413E.

with the rebels. As such, in spite of all the precautions, the operations of the British troops across the border would have created irritation and alarm and would have given rise to all sorts of complaints and misunderstandings. Therefore, only in case of aggression from the Nepalese territory, the aggressors were to be punished and pursued across the frontier. In this way the responsibility of clearing off the rebels was shifted over to Nepal.

Jung Bahadur faced a serious difficulty while dealing with the rebels. He realised that the responsibility of either expelling them from Nepal or preventing them from attacking the Indian territory lay with him. But the chiefs and the soldiery had a natural sympathy towards the rebels. He told Dr. Oldfield, the Residency surgeon, that he was not certain whether his troops would obey him were he to order them to expel the rebels.⁷³ This was undoubtedly an exaggeration, but the Nepalese certainly did not like to deal with the rebels in a manner as the British did.⁷⁴ Nor, was it possible for Jung Bahadur to expel all the rebels outright, since they had entered Nepal suddenly in large number and could have retaliated by plundering the Nepalese villages.

In the beginning when the rebel leaders urged him to espouse their cause, Jung Bahadur asked them to surrender to the British.⁷⁵ As for Begum Hazrat Mahal, she being a woman, it was not possible for him to refuse shelter, yet he advised her to accept the British terms. To Lord Canning he frankly told that it was beyond his power to prevent the rebels from making incursions into the British territory and that he would consequently have no objection to the British forces entering Nepal in pursuit of the rebel forces.⁷⁶ He offered to defend the northern routes and passes if the British were to press them from the remaining three sides. However, following the good old Gorkha policy, he wanted that the British forces should not cross the inner range of hills. He also wished that in course of such operations the Nepalese subjects should not be harassed and that cows and

73. P.C. December 30, 1859—No. 558.

74. S.C. April 22, 1859—No. 200.

75. S.C. August 27, 1858—No. 103.

76. P.C. July 15, 1859—No. 413 J.

the Brahmans should not be killed in the Nepalese territory."

In accordance with Jung Bahadur's wishes, the Governor General ordered the British forces to enter Nepal and clear it off the rebels.⁷⁹ The British troops fought several engagements and the rebels were pushed back till they had reached well within the second range of hills. Jung Bahadur's own plans to co-operate in expelling them could not be carried out successfully. There were exaggerated reports about the number of the rebels, and much time was wasted in waiting for the reply of Jung Bahadur's letter from Begum Hazrat Mahal, in which he had asked her to come to terms with the British. By the beginning of the March an answer was received in which she and her followers refused to lay down arms.⁸⁰ Jung Bahadur had also an interest in detaining the rebels in the Terai for some time. He had heard that Nana Sahib and other rebel leaders had brought huge treasure with them. It is alleged that Jung Bahadur got immense wealth from them and his headgear was adorned by the famous Naulakha-Har of Nana Sahib. The Resident wrote on March 21, 1859 about Jung Bahadur's visit to the Terai: "I have strong grounds to believe that the real motive of trip was some business connected with rebels, from whom he is said to have received some 5,000 muskets, spears, shields, Talwars. I have known that he is supplying them Rasad (food provisions), which they are buying at enormous price".⁸¹ In this way time passed on till the bad season commenced and operations from the Nepalese side had to be postponed.

The British operations across the frontier continued for many months, but, as expected, they gave rise to frequent complaints and misunderstandings. In the beginning there were certain reports that General Kelly's troops had plundered and maltreated the Nepalese subjects. The Resident, knowing that such rumours would put the Prime Minister in an awkward position, immediately repudiated them and satisfied Jung Bahadur for the moment.⁸² There can be no

77. P.C. July 22, 1859—No. 199.

78. P.C. July 22, 1859—No. 200.

79. P.C. December 30, 1859—No. 536.

80. P.C. April 22, 1859—No. 197.

81. S.C. April 22, 1859—No. 207.

doubt that these reports were exaggerated, but there were certain factors that impelled the Prime Minister to listen to them.⁸² As already stated, the border authorities and a large number of the chiefs in Nepal had sympathies with the rebels. Instead of extending their co-operation to the British authorities, they provided ready shelter to the rebels and gave exaggerated reports of minor incidents or excesses committed by the British troops.⁸³ Badri Nar Singh, who was Governor of Palpa at this time, accused the Prime Minister of leniency towards the English and of selling off the national independence.⁸⁴ Naturally, the latter had to give attention to these reports in order to conciliate the disaffected element. Moreover, encouraged by the liberal monetary remuneration given by the Indian Government in lieu of the Gorkha military help, Jung Bahadur wanted to make these reports a basis of his future demand for compensation. "I have several times expressed the view", remarked Ramsay, "that these charges have been encouraged with the view of some future preposterous claims for compensation from the Indian Government and I am convinced that it is the chief motive of the Prime Minister for his repeated urges."⁸⁵

Reports of plunder and outrages, committed by the British troops on the Nepalese subjects, continued to reach Jung Bahadur to his extreme annoyance, and the publication of the reports in the Indian press regarding anti-British attitude of the Nepalese authorities added fuel to his irritation.⁸⁶ On April 11, 1859 he simply lost temper with the Resident. He complained that the Gorkha messengers had been ill-treated and villages had been plundered. Col. Ramsay tried to explain that it must have been the mischief of the rebels themselves, but the Prime Minister was in no mood to listen and insisted on the truth of his information. Soon afterwards he even declared that he would never again allow the British troops to cross the frontier. On September 23, 1859, however, he formally requested the Indian

82. P.C. May 13, 1858—No. 319.

83. S.C. April 22, 1859—No. 200.

84. P.C. May 13, 1859—No. 323.

85. P.C. December 30, 1859—No. 548.

86. P.C. July 1, 1859—No. 205.

Government to prohibit the troops from crossing the frontier."⁸⁷

The Indian Government also assumed a strict attitude this time. The Resident reminded Jung Bahadur that it was precisely at his request and much against the wishes of the Governor General that the British troops had been ordered to enter the Nepalese territory. He specified that his Government would comply with his wishes, but would not relinquish its right of pursuing the aggressors even within the Nepalese territory and expected Nepal to prevent the rebels from committing aggression on the Indian territory."⁸⁸ Thereupon the Prime Minister withdrew his objection but requested that the complaints must be inquired into."⁸⁹

Throughout the summer and the rains of 1859 the rebels were in most wretched condition. They were not only harassed by the bullets of the British troops, the climate of the Terai and mountains was also adverse to them, with the result that thousands of them died of dysentery, owal (the Terai fever) and such other diseases. Jung Bahadur also deluded the rebels with the hope that he would espouse their cause. In fact, when he went to the Terai with his troops in December 1859 to expel them, they flocked together to welcome the Gorkhas."⁹⁰

Having abandoned his expedition against the rebels in March 1859 due to unhealthy season, Jung Bahadur determined to expel them in the winter of 1859-60. He had highly exaggerated ideas about the number of the rebels and chalked out elaborate plans of employing a big force against them. His real motive behind it was to claim the cost of expedition from the Indian Government."⁹¹ That was why from the very beginning he had been trying to secure the

87. P.C. December 30, 1859—No. 541.

88. P.C. December 30, 1859—No. 544.

89. P.C. December 30, 1859—Nos. 546 and 548.

The Commissioner of Gorakhpur instituted an inquiry into the complaints of Jung Bahadur. He came to the conclusion that in course of such military operations some cases of excesses were quite possible, but the Nepalese version of them was quite exaggerated. P.C. Dec. 30, 1859—No. 540.

90. For. Const. January 2, 1860—No. 150.

91. P.C. July 22, 1859—No. 208.

British approval for his schemes. At first he wanted that the British artillery should accompany his troops or some guns might be given on loan, to which the Resident replied that it would be contrary to the traditions of the British army. Then he made several indirect references to the expenses of the proposed operations. In October 1859 he even proposed to pay a visit to the Governor General with an intention to consult him on the expedition against the rebels and to open the issue of compensation for the alleged outrages committed by the British troops on the Nepalese population. The proposal, however, could not be accepted by Lord Canning on account of his other engagements.⁹²

According to the plan of campaign the British army was to block the southward movement of the rebels, while the Nepalese were to press them from other directions. Considering the whole thing a minor affair the Resident tried to dissuade Jung Bahadur from employing a large force, and clarified that the British intention was not to annihilate the whole mass of the rebels and that amnesty was available to all, except to the leaders and the murderers.⁹³ The Indian Government expected him to clear Nepal off the rebels with his own men and measures.⁹⁴ The Resident was afraid that any interference on the part of the British Government would be resented and be made a pretext for evading the responsibility by the Darbar.

In the fourth week of November 1859 about ten thousand Gorkha troops took field in the Butwal Terai under the personal command of Jung Bahadur. From the British side Brigadier E. A. Holdich was placed in command of a large force to supplement the plans of the Nepalese and Lt. G. E. Hill was appointed to communicate between the two commanders. Within a fortnight the Nepalese forces cleared off the rebels. The operation never assumed serious dimensions and no major battle was fought. In fact, the rebels were in a most wretched condition, incapable of any resistance and their number was much less than the Nepalese had estimated.

92. P.C. November 18, 1859—Nos. 120 and 121.

93. P.C. August 19, 1859—No. 187. Also see P.C. December 30, 1859—No. 996, Supp. Gr.

94. P.C. December 30, 1859—No. 464.

Most of them surrendered and, except a few, all the leaders were either handed over to the British authorities or had already perished.⁹⁵ By December 17, Jung Bahadur returned to Kathmandu, and by December 21, Brigadier Holdich also reported complete clearance of the rebels.⁹⁶ Nearly three thousand of them were handed over by the Nepalese; a few others voluntarily surrendered and nearly 1,000 to 1,500 made way for their homes.⁹⁷ Only about three hundred were left in Nepal, majority of whom took to cultivation in that country. In addition to these men, during the course of operations against a rebel leader Beni Madho, Col. Pahalwan Singh also recovered eighteen Europeans. The total number of the rebels must have been 25,000, out of whom 3,000 to 4,000 perished or had been arrested in April 1859. During the rainy season mortality was horrible due to unhealthy climate of the Terai and their number had also been constantly dwindling due to desertions. Deaths of Bala Rao and Azimulla were confirmed,⁹⁸ but there was no definite information about the whereabouts of Maulvee Sirfiraz Ali and Nana Sahib.⁹⁹ Jung Bahadur informed Lord Canning that Nana Sahib had died and it seems that Indian Government thought it wise to accept this information. Begum Hazrat Mahal, her son Birijis Kadra, families of Nana Sahib (including his wife Kashi Bai) and Bala Rao got permanent asylum in Nepal and were allowed to come over to Kathmandu, but written undertaking had been taken from them on April 7, 1860, that they would neither indulge in intrigues nor engage any servant without the Darbar's permission.⁹⁹ In case of default they were liable to punishment.

By January 10, 1860 orders were issued to the British troops against crossing the Nepalese frontier, and thus ended a very tedious problem, which on many occasions gave rise to serious misunderstandings between the two governments.

95. F.C. January 20, 1860—Nos. 136 and 150.

96. F.C. January 20, 1860—No. 149.

97. F.C. February 24, 1860—No. 184.

98. F.C. January 30, 1860—Nos. 149 and 150.

99. Part A—July 1860—No. 266 (Foreign Political Deptt.)

V

As mentioned earlier, in recognition of her services Nepal was to be given back the western Terai which had been annexed by the British in 1816. But Jung Bahadur was dissatisfied and wanted the Elaka of Khyreegarh to be added to the present restoration.¹⁰⁰ The Nepalese Prime Minister put forward the plea that it would provide a healthy spot free from the menace of malaria where he would establish a military cantonment to prevent the dacoits from ravaging his new province. The Resident was apprehensive that if a policy of appeasement was followed and a concession was given, it shall only be a prelude to further demands. He characterised the Gorkha policy as "whatever you may give, please give us a little more".¹⁰¹ Therefore, with a view to nip in the bud any hope of concession, he adopted a very firm attitude and told the Prime Minister that his Government was desirous of restoring only the western Terai, i.e., as much as had been ceded in 1816 and that Khyreegarh never belonged to Nepal.

No sooner were the operations against the rebels over, the Indian Government appointed surveyors to demarcate the new frontier. It had been specified to the Darbar that the boundary would be demarcated in the presence of Nepalese representatives, who would not, however, interfere in the proceedings.¹⁰² The Indian commissioners were to ascertain the boundary as it existed in 1816 and satisfy both the parties that all the old possessions had been restored. In case the Gorkha agents put objections, they were to enter into discussion and adjust the claims on the spot, failing which the matter was to be referred to the Governor General for final decision. If the boundary line passed through cultivated lands it was to be avoided by mutual exchange of territory, while in forests the line was to be demarcated as and where it lay. In principle the survey conducted by Lt. Grant in 1819 was regarded substantially correct, and it was taken

100. At first Jang Bahadur wanted that the district of Raipur be added to the restoration, but looking at the map and realising that it was a very extensive demand, he changed his idea and expressed a wish for Khyreegarh only. For. Part A. April 1860—No. 469.

101. See MPR 1860.

102. For. Part A. April 1860—No. 485.

for granted that the Gorkhas never had any territory below the hills east of Bhagaura Tal. In this way, the restoration was clearly put above all discussions and was treated as gift admitting no negotiations.

In February 1860 the boundary commissioners of the two Governments met in Northern Oudh at Bhagaura Tal to start their work. The whole survey and demarcation were conducted amicably and, except few disputes, the Gorkha representatives declared themselves satisfied.¹⁰³

In all 174 miles frontier was demarcated, while the rest of the boundary was naturally demarcated by rivers. In settling the frontier along the Rapti river, the commissioners assumed that "the river at its height in the rains" was to be regarded as the boundary.¹⁰⁴ As regards the river Sharda and river Mohan, the deep stream was boundary only in a limited sense. "If the river was to quit its bed suddenly and cut for itself entirely a new bed, it would cease to be boundary and the Government which ruled over the territory cut off would continue to rule it. But the deep stream would remain boundary if its deviations were only gradual and in the ordinary process of alluvian and diluvian."¹⁰⁵

The survey and demarcation being completed, the territory was transferred to Nepal after a few months, and on November 1, 1860, a formal treaty, embracing the above arrangement, was signed by the Maharajadhiraj and the Resident.¹⁰⁶ The new treaty consisted of three articles and mentioned in clear terms the reasons and circumstances for the cession of the territory concerned. The first article confirmed all the former treaties, the second defined the limits of the territory restored to Nepal and in the third the newly demarcated boundary line was accepted by both the countries.

VI

It is conspicuous that in spite of such cordial attitude of Jung Bahadur towards the English in this period, the basic

103. For. Part A. April 1860—Nos. 472 and 518.

104. For. Pol. A. November 1860—No. 563.

105. Ibid.

106. For. Part A. November 1860—No. 596. See Appendix IX.

Gorkha policy of isolation remained unchanged and every obstacle was put by the Darbar to prevent the growth of trade. During the spring of 1858 some negotiations were held for the establishment of timber agency on the frontier. Lord Canning had spoken in favour of a Railway Contractor (Mr. Norris) and the Nepalese Prime Minister assured to help him.¹⁰⁷ It was, however, only a false gesture, which Jung Bahadur often displayed while in India. The negotiations could not succeed due to his evasions and lame excuses. In spite of the fact that this contractor was ready to pay a price higher than the market rate, he was told that it was not sufficient.

Another instance of Jung Bahadur's attitude can also be mentioned. On August 21, 1858 an order, which was highly injurious to the Indian merchants, had been issued by the Nepalese Government. All the Indian merchants, except the Kashmiris, had been ordered to confine their business to cash dealings and any debts incurred after August 21, had been declared non-claimable.¹⁰⁸ Earlier Jung Bahadur had apprised the Resident of his intention but had assured to give a due notice before taking any positive step.¹⁰⁹ But now he suddenly issued the orders, which he professed were not aimed at expelling the Indian merchants. Yet, those orders would have virtually ruined them as no one would have purchased anything from them in cash while it was available at credit from other merchants. It was, in fact, the old attempt of Jung Bahadur and his family to monopolize all trade and push out the Indian merchants from their way.¹¹⁰

In the beginning the Indian Government could not take any step to oppose this measure of the Darbar and only expressed a hope that the orders would not be carried out. But on August 26, 1859 the Resident was authorised to remonstrate in a temperate tone against these orders.¹¹¹ Ramsay, expressing surprise at the inconsistency between the amity lately manifested by rendering military aid and the

107. M.P.R. 1858—para 47.

108. P.C. May 20, 1859—No. 60.

109. P.C. August 13, 1858—No. 99.

110. P.C. August 26, 1859—No. 211.

111. P.C. August 26, 1859—214.

policy of discrimination against the Indian traders, addressed a memorandum to the Prime Minister of September 12, 1859 and ironically inquired about the other measures in contemplation against the foreigners.¹¹² This had the intended effect and Jung Bahadur, explaining that the orders were directed only against the Iraki merchants, who were in league with the rebels in the plains, withdrew the orders, and all the Indian traders were allowed to continue their business as usual.

112. P.C. October 14, 1859—No. 168.

JUNG BAHADUR'S SPLENDID ISOLATION (1861-1877)

The Indo-Nepalese relations presented no complicated problem during the remaining years of Jung Bahadur's life. His position was as much undisputed in Nepal as that of the British in India. In October 1860 there was an attempt on his life, which was put down severely, and thereafter so long as he lived no such attempt was made. His brothers were genuinely attached to him and his old enemy Badri Nar Singh was always kept away from Kathmandu. In the administration of Nepal Jung Bahadur's word was law and there was not a chief in the country who could have challenged his authority. In fact, his government was a "perfect autocracy".¹

Prime Minister's control over the royal family was also complete. The King did not have a shadow of actual power in his hands. He was kept under strict surveillance as a dignified prisoner, all his movements were watched and he was not even allowed to talk to the chiefs, except in the presence of the Prime Minister or his trusted followers.² The younger brother of the King, Prince Upendra Vikram Sah, after his return from the fort of Allahabad in 1853, lived in such degraded position that he passed most of his time as a fakir and was at last driven to leave for Benaras in December 1860 for good. The Prime Minister also continued to have his designs

1. For. Political A. August 1864—No. 51.

2. In 1864, with a view to slight him (the King) in the eyes of the British Government, Jang Bahadur sought the mediation of the Resident in an alleged misconduct of the King. The Resident readily offered his good offices on the condition that no third person would be present during his talks with the King. This led the Prime Minister to drop the idea of seeking Resident's mediation entirely. For. Political A. May 1865—Nos. 181-182.

on the kingship of Nepal.³ It was from this point of view that he got his two daughters married to the Heir-Apparent and his own son to the daughter of the King.

II

In April 1862 Jung Bahadur unofficially expressed a wish to visit England a second time avowedly with a view to pay his respects and thanks to the British Queen for the honour she had conferred upon him by appointing a Knight and to make arrangements in England and France for the education of some of his sons and nephews.⁴ He also expressed a desire to meet the Pasha of Egypt and the Emperors of France and Austria as the Prime Minister and ambassador of an independent state, and not under the auspices and through the introduction of the British Government.⁵

Subsequently, Jung Bahadur gave vent to his real motives. He intimated to the Resident that he would not only visit England on the above stated personal grounds, but also as an ambassador from the Maharajadhiraj, who wanted to introduce his (Jung Bahadur's) brothers and children to the British Queen's favourable notice, particularly one of his sons, who was married to the King's daughter. It was further proposed that all of them might be given Queen's protection and suitable arrangements be made for their education under the guardianship of persons whom Her Majesty might appoint. For the education of the children an awkward condition was attached that the European teachers should teach them under the watch of a Gorkha Chief, so that the rules of caste might not be broken. For himself Jung Bahadur wanted more substantial recognition of his

3. On June 9, the editor of the "Friends of India" wrote an article "The Maharaja Jung Bahadur G.C.B. and Our Relations with Nepal", in which he remarked about the designs of Jung Bahadur on the throne of Nepal. For. Political A. August 1863—No. 73.

4. See the Resident's letter, For. Political A. May 1862—No. 23.

5. The Nepalese Prime Minister did not say anything about Russia while proposing to visit some European States, but the Resident feared that during the tour he would have done so. For. Political A. May 1862—No. 23.

services rendered in 1857.⁶ And, finally, plans were in contemplation for getting an engagement signed by the Queen declaring that so long as the Gorkhas kept friendship towards the British, there would be perpetual peace between the two countries and no Governor General would be allowed to interfere in the domestic affairs of Nepal. Jung Bahadur was, perhaps, prompted to seek this assurance due to an article published lately in the "Friends of India", in which he was urged to put down Sati, to throw open the forests of Nepal for the British enterprise and to make satisfactory arrangements for the sale of timber.

From the above description it is obvious that in proposing his second visit to England Jung Bahadur was partly motivated by his personal ambitions and partly by a desire to seek assurance for the security and independence of his country, which was quite a genuine feeling with the Nepalese after their country remained the only independent state in the sub-continent.

The Indian Government realised that the whole scheme of Jung Bahadur was just another bid to secure British support for himself and his family. Therefore, it was not at all inclined to encourage him in his project. As regards the proposal for a guarantee for peace and non-interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal, the Resident frankly told that no such engagement could be concluded directly with the Queen. He specified that since 1858 the Queen of England had accepted all the treaties and engagements concluded by the East India Company, but the conduct of the relations had been entrusted to the Viceroy.⁷ Nor, was it customary for Her Majesty to receive any prince under her special protection. The Governor General was ready to provide facilities for the education of the children of Jung Bahadur, but no guarantee could be given for the observance of caste regulations. Still less the Indian Government was disposed to encourage or approve of the Nepalese Prime Minister entering into relations with the courts of Europe. He was in-

6. Jang Bahadur often enquired about the various ranks of order, and compared his services with Holkar and Dilip Singh of Punjab, who were also conferred the Order of Bath. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

formed that such novel relations would give rise to complications and endanger the existing good relations between the two countries.⁸ The Indian Government thought that Jung Bahadur's visit to England would not be productive of any useful result; rather it was afraid that he might return with mortification. Because, last time (1850-51) when he visited England he felt highly flattered, and now, being more conscious of his powers, he would feel slighted on the issue of ranks and honours. The Governor General, therefore, expressed his appreciation of Jung Bahadur's intention to visit England and express his gratitude to Queen Victoria, but advised him not to leave Nepal as his absence might prove detrimental to the welfare of his country.⁹ This had the desired effect and the idea was, for the time being, dropped.

In 1865 the proposal to visit Europe was revived. Apart from the object of paying respects to the Queen and arranging for the education of his children, as in 1862, a hope was expressed that the Queen would take the son-in-law of the Maharajadhiraj under her protection.¹⁰ The Resident flatly refused to convey any such request to his Government and the Governor General also advised Jung Bahadur to abandon the idea in the interest of his country where his presence was essential.¹¹

In 1875, however, when Jung Bahadur again expressed his desire, the Indian Government agreed. The Nepalese Prime Minister disclosed to Resident C. E. R. Girdleston in August 1874 that he was very eager to pay a short visit to England with an object to present a complimentary letter from the Maharajadhiraj of Nepal to the British Queen. The visit was to be confined to this purpose and none of the personal motives, which he had in mind in 1862 and 1865, were entertained this time. The idea of leaving the children behind for education in Europe or seeking special protection from the British Queen was entirely abandoned this time.

8. For. Political A. May 1862—No. 24.

9. Ibid.

10. For. Political A. October 1865—No. 79.

11. For. Political A. October 1865—No. 80.

He also dropped the intention of visiting other European countries.

It seems that Jung Bahadur wanted to break the boredom of his routine by once more visiting England. The Resident believed that he had no ulterior motive behind and was only desirous of personally extending his thanks to the Queen for the Order of Bath.¹² Girdleston strongly recommended in favour of the visit and hoped that the contact with the European world would be extremely useful for the younger generation (the sons and nephews of Jung Bahadur), who had exaggerated ideas about the strength of Nepal. It would provide them an opportunity of witnessing the might of England and thus induce them in future to follow a policy consistent with their experience.

The request being complied with, Jung Bahadur, accompanied by several of his sons, nephews, relatives, chiefs and a big suite, left Kathmandu on December 19, 1874 on way to England. He was to embark on a ship from Bombay in the first week of February, but, unfortunately, on February 3, 1875, he fell down from a horse and was severely wounded. This accident was regarded highly inauspicious and he was induced to abandon his visit.¹³

III

The Nepalese military aid to the Company during the Indian Revolt of 1857 was a high watermark of the Anglo-Nepalese friendship. Undoubtedly the two powers acquired greater confidence in each other's intentions. Among the English authorities high hopes had been raised that now Jung Bahadur will take further steps to liberalize the political system of Nepal and even throw open his country for the European travellers and traders.

At least in one direction it can be said that he did moderate the Gorkha system. Military mania, which had been so deep-seated and had assumed such aggravated form during and after the regime of Bhim Sen, had now been

12. For. Political B. October 1874—No. 85.

13. For. Political B. March 1875—Nos. 145 and 155.

considerably moderated. More than Bhim Sen, Jung Bahadur had realised that the geographical position of Nepal rendered it impossible for her to continue the old martial and aggressive policy. Only by keeping on friendly terms with the British, independence of Nepal could be preserved. While most of the earlier prime ministers pandered the anti-British sentiments to maintain their power, Jung Bahadur had succeeded in doing away with anti-British bogey. The Resident reported on August 20, 1864 that: "At no period in the history of Nepal has there been so little doing in the shape of military organization as now. For the past few cold seasons parades have been almost entirely neglected, and fully four-fifths of the army has been employed in civil duties, in Shikar, in making roads, etc., etc. Last cold weather six regiments were occupied (and they will be so again this year), from early November until the beginning of the warm season, in making a road along the valley at Chota Raptree between Bhimpedee and Hitounda".¹⁴ In fact, the work on one more road could not be started as the Darbar wanted to employ only soldiers after the completion of an earlier project.

But this was the maximum Jung Bahadur did, or could do. While keeping on good terms with the English, he took every step to restrict free contacts between the two countries and strictly followed the good old Gorkha policy of keeping away the Europeans from Nepal as far as possible. He had witnessed the strength, the resources and the final consolidation of the British Empire in India. Face to face with such a great power he had realised that the independence of Nepal could only be maintained by keeping up friendly terms with the British. At the same time, he knew that this friendship, if not observed at an arms length, would in no time precipitate the end of his country's independence. Jung Bahadur often pointed out the case of Sikkim where the Europeans had free access and this ultimately resulted in the annexation of the Sikkim Terai in 1850. Upon being reminded that the Raja of Sikkim had wantonly seized and illtreated Dr. Campbell and Dr. Hooker, who had gone there for zoological researches, Jung Bahadur said: "Well! but if they

14. For. Political A. September 1864—No. 88.

had not gone there to gather Rhododendrons that would not have happened and the Raja of Sikkim would not have lost his country. How do I know that some of our officials through ignorance or, perhaps, through enmity to myself, might not illtreat some of the British subjects and then you would take half, if not whole of the country. All other native states have either fallen entirely under your rule, or you interfere with their management....."¹⁵ He was, therefore, determined to close the doors of his country and put all obstacles in the way of free contacts. The Indian Government did not seriously object to it, nor did it put pressure on the Prime Minister to modify this policy. It knew that in Jung Bahadur there was a strongman well disposed towards the British Government and only hoped that eventually things would improve. Jung Bahadur was, however, not a man to relax the traditional policy of the Gorkhas.

The roads of the country, particularly from the Indian side, were deliberately kept in a most wretched condition with a view to discourage any Englishman from coming over to Nepal. The Indian officers were expressly debarred from entering the Terai even for shooting.¹⁶ The Resident and his suite were not allowed to move about in the Valley freely, nor could a Nepalese subject enter the Residency without Prime Minister's permission and unaccompanied by a representative of the Darbar.¹⁷ Every single European was followed if he happened to move out of the Residency. On one occasion, as Col. Ramsay informed, Jung Bahadur told him that no relaxation would be made in the restrictions on Resident's movements "unless I (the Resident) consented to give him an official declaration on the part of my Government that he and his heirs should be guaranteed as the perpetual ministers of the country".¹⁸ In 1868 the Indian Govern-

15. For. Political A. August 1864—No. 51.

16. For. Political A. May 1862—No. 231.

17. Ramsay reported on July 6, 1864, "We cannot now go one yard further from the Residency in any direction than we could (in 1832) and it is solely due to Jung Bahadur's suspicious distrust that these senseless restrictions are now kept up".

For. Political A. August 1864—No. 51.

18. S.C. February 25, 1859—No. 17. A very interesting and useful document was forwarded by Resident F. Hanvey in June 1877.

ment earnestly requested Jung Bahadur to let Col. Walker's team complete the geographical survey and explorations of the Himalayan ranges. Resident R. C. Lawrence had a long conversation with the Prime Minister on the exclusive policy of the Darbar and he strongly remonstrated. But Jung Bahadur, expressing his regrets, told in firm and decided tone that he would not, indeed dared not, permit Col. Walker's team to enter Nepal. He admitted that he had power to abandon the exclusive policy of Nepal and his influence could also avert any evil consequence during his lifetime, but such a distasteful measure would leave a scar on him and would be used by his enemies to excite the jealousy of the soldiery against his family after his death.¹⁹

This was, however, only a following up of the old tradition, otherwise in all other ways Jung Bahadur left no occasion to express his friendship. The salute of twentyone guns was regularly fired to celebrate the birthday of the British Queen and every new Governor General was congratulated and presented with Nepalese curiosities on assuming his charge. In January 1869 a mission headed by General Dhir Shamsher, including many members of Jung Bahadur's family, waited on the Governor General Lord Lawrence.²⁰ The Indian Government also reciprocated such friendly gesture. In June 1874, a severe famine occurred in Nepal, and the Indian Government immediately supplied 24,233 maunds of rice, amounting to Rs. 80,777.²¹ The work of the Residency had been continuing so smoothly that in April 1868 the Government of India abolished the office of the assistant resident.²²

IV

It is interesting to mention that in this period the trade relations of the two countries often became a subject of talks

(Contd. from page 314)

'Note on the position of the Resident in Nipal, with special reference to the limits within which he is free to travel in the hills, the watch kept upon his movements'. For. Sec. Dec. 1877—No. 119.

19. For. Gen. A. March 1868—No. 69.

20. For. Political A. January 1869—No. 262.

21. For. Gen. B. October 1874—Nos. 156-157.

22. For. Gen. A. April 1868—No. 43.

and even acrimonious discussion. It goes without saying that these relations were far from being satisfactory from the British point of view. But the Nepalese also had their national interests and fears, and, therefore, it would be useful to study the problem in a total perspective.

In the later half of the eighteenth century the Directors of the East India Company had turned their attention towards the Himalayan and the trans-Himalayan states due to the pressing needs of large-scale production in England and since then a hectic search for markets was made in this region. By the mid-nineteenth century the balance of trade had also started shifting in favour of the Europeans. In case of Nepal, the Indian Government expected after 1816 that by force of circumstances, being shut up from three sides by the Indian territory and on the fourth by Tibet, it would abandon its policy of isolation and the trade between the two countries would automatically increase. This hope was sadly belied due to the policy of Bhim Sen. During the 1830s Hodgson devoted his singular attention towards this issue and even succeeded in securing better status and security for the Indian traders by the engagement of 1839. The subsequent period was dominated by political turmoil, internal as well as external, and till the rise of Jung Bahadur this problem remained in the background.

The major difficulty in the way of this trade was certain restrictions which the Nepalese Government had imposed but these were against the contemporary European ideas of free trade and commerce. From Jung Bahadur, after his visit to England and his unprecedented friendly gesture of rendering military aid in 1857-58, the Indian Government expected that he will also introduce certain liberal measures in promoting the Indo-Nepalese trade. His manner of talking in India about the ignorance of his countrymen and what he intended to do on his return to Nepal confirmed this impression. He also tried to create a belief among the British officers that Nepal was a backward country, whose people were highly averse to any extension of trade, and that he, being enlightened, was desirous but helpless to mend their ways. In reality, however, he was himself against any such improvement. But so long as the illusion about his good

intentions continued, it was possible for him to throw all obstacles in the way of the development of trade.

Twice in 1856 and 1858 he tried to expel the Indian merchants from Kathmandu and due to his opposition none of the attempts to establish timber agencies on the Nepalese border could succeed.²³ Frequently it was observed that he imposed extraordinary taxes and restrictions on the Indian merchants. In 1862 the Indian goat merchants, who used to come over to Kathmandu annually during the winters, were asked to pay a special tax "Chamounee" in addition to the usual transit duties levied on the frontier and at other places.²⁴

Jung Bahadur's restrictive measures were by no means confined to the Indian merchants alone. In 1864 the Darbar had prohibited its subjects living on the Oudh border from bringing their goods into the Indian territory with a view to compel the Indian traders to come to Nepalganj (a Nepalese border town) to purchase Nepalese products and sell their own.²⁵ With the same view the Nepalese Government levied very light import duty on the Indian goods and very high export duty on the Nepalese goods.²⁶ In thus forcing the trade into a particular channel, Jung Bahadur wanted to inhabit the recently ceded Terai. But it entailed a serious loss of income to the Indian border districts as a result of which the Indian border markets, that had been centres of flourishing trade with Nepal before the Indian revolt of 1857, were now "nearly ruined". Upon Resident's remonstrance, the Nepalese Prime Minister took the plea that he was perfectly within his own rights in establishing the new markets and levying light import duties and heavy export duties.²⁷

Jung Bahadur and his family members had been also trying to acquire monopoly of various important articles of

23. For. Political A. June 1868—No. 196.

24. Upon the Resident's protest this tax was ultimately dropped. For. Political A. November 1862—Nos. 103 and 104.

25. For. Rev. A. May 1864—No. 50.

26. For. Political A. August 1864—No. 51.

27. Ibid.

trade.²⁸ This was obviously injurious to the Indian as well as Nepalese traders. The currency problem was another obstacle in the way of free trade. It had attracted the attention of Resident B. H. Hodgson in 1830, but no effective step could be taken to improve the situation. Ramsay reported on April 5, 1866 that there was no tax on the Indian coins brought into Nepal, but on all the Indian silver or gold coins when taken out of Nepal 2½ per cent tax was levied. Thus a considerable amount of the Indian currency was retained, which was melted and then recoined into the Nepalese currency amounting to lakhs of rupees. It naturally created a serious scarcity of the Indian coins in Nepal while the Nepalese currency was not acceptable to the Indian merchants due to its lower intrinsic value.²⁹ It was obvious that no appreciable benefit could result from this, as the exchange rates were decided at Calcutta after examining the real value of the Nepalese coin, but the Nepalese never listened to this logic.

Finally, there was practically no document that fully regulated the trade between the two countries. The commercial treaty of 1792 was formally declared unacceptable by the Darbar in 1836.³⁰ Since then, and even before that, the Nepalese had been habitually levying more than double of the stipulated (as given in the treaty of 1792) import duties while the Indian Government had exempted the Nepalese goods completely from any import duty. In 1839 some improvement had been made in this direction when Hodgson succeeded in concluding an engagement, according to which Indian traders were to be treated as Nepalese subjects and could seek justice in the Nepalese courts. Besides the engagement, a statement of the duties and the tax posts was also forwarded by the Darbar. However, since its conclusion the Nepalese had never been firmly pressed for its compliance and, unfortunately for the Indian Government, the original

28. Jung Bahadur had even gone to the extent of opening a retail shop on the plea that the European articles were charged exorbitantly in the Valley. In 1863 an order had actually been issued for the monopoly of rice, which was the staple of ninetyfive per cent of the population, and it could only be rescinded at the remonstrance of General Krishna Bahadur and the Maharajadhiraj. *Ibid.*

29. *For.* Political A. April 1866—No. 169.

30. See p. 126.

Gorkhali documents connected with it had been lost in the times of Sir Henry Lawrence's residentship.³¹ The engagement was never practically executed and Col. Ramsay considered it almost a dead letter.

The Indian Government was, however, not prepared to abandon its rights. Its contention was that in 1856 and 1859 the Darbar had rescinded the orders of expulsion against the Indian merchants on Resident's protests that they constituted a violation of the engagement of 1839. This was a direct assertion of that engagement. Moreover the fact that the engagement had not been followed during a certain period also did not imply that it was a dead letter. For this reason Ramsay was asked in December 1862 to draw the attention of the Darbar towards the engagement and reopen the negotiations for a less restricted trade.³²

In 1863 Ramsay got an opportunity to press the issue of the engagement of 1839, but in the absence of original documents nothing could be done. Jung Bahadur professed an entire ignorance about it and, stating that Nepalese copies of it had been destroyed in a fire, demanded its copies from the Indian Government.³³ At a closer examination it was also found that the engagement was quite imperfect. Several commodities had either been entirely omitted or there were many etceteras, which rendered it impossible to determine under which head an unspecified article should be classified. Nor, was the tariff (the statement of duties) applicable to whole of Nepal. It only embraced the goods coming to and going from Kathmandu.³⁴

The Resident felt convinced that all negotiations to conclude a new commercial treaty, specifying duties, would be fruitless, because the Indian Government had no corresponding advantage to offer to Nepal in exchange of a new treaty. Every overture of the Resident for a less restricted trade was met by the Nepalese Prime Minister first by referring to his isolated and helpless position vis-a-vis the chiefs and soldiery

31. For. Political A. December 1862—No. 401.

32. For. Political A. December 1862—Nos. 398 and 402.

33. For. Political A. January 1863—Nos. 202 and 203.

34. For. Political A. August 1864—No. 51.

and then by repeating his favourite lion and cat story, implying that Nepal was at the mercy of the British but would not change her policy unless compelled to do so.³⁵ The Indian Government was also not ready to sanction a retaliatory policy.

It is true that an unrestricted Indo-Nepalese trade would have benefited the British. Nepal had, however, her own fears and national prejudices. For a small and poor country like Nepal to throw herself open to an imperialistic power, which had conquered the whole of India within a century, was a matter of national concern. Perhaps the best and the most revealing sentiment on his policy are the few statements made by Jung Bahadur himself. During 1856-58, when the Resident pressed him urgently to allow Mr. Cameron, a merchant in whom Lord Clarendon was interested, to come over to Nepal, the Nepalese Prime Minister warmly exclaimed: "You say we are independent; the British Government tells us that it had no desire to interfere. . . . with our internal affairs and not even to advise us respecting them. We desire to preserve our independence. We attribute that independence solely to our own peculiar policy (you may call it selfish if you like but we cannot alter it to please you): We know you are the stronger power, you are like a lion, we are like a cat. The cat will scratch, if it is driven into a corner; but the lion would soon kill the cat. You can force us to change our policy, you can take our country if it pleases you to do so; but we will make no change in that policy, by the strict observance of which, we have preserved our independence as a nation to the present time, unless you compel us to do so. We will not allow Mr. Cameron to come into the country, except as a private gentleman and your guest and upon your assurance that he will not attempt to engage in trade or make any enquiries into the resources of the country".³⁶

At the time of the annexation of Oudh he speaks in the same strain: "What fools the Kings of Oudh have always been! If they had only acted as we have done and had refused to mix themselves up with you in any way, you would not have had any excuse for taking their country. . . .

35. For. Political A. August 1864—Nos. 51 and 52.

36. For. Political A. August 1864—No. 51.

I know very well that advantages would accrue to Nepal for a few years if we were to open the country to British officers and to British merchants, but even supposing that we were to double our revenue for ten or twenty years, what good that would do to us? At the end of that time you would probably take the country".³⁷

While refusing to alter the trade relations Jung Bahadur explained to Col. Ramsay that, "the two countries cannot be compared; their governments are quite different; you have a thousand sources of wealth which we do not have, you are wiser and can understand that, by making apparent present sacrifices, you will be gainers in the end; our people are ignorant and unenlightened; and if I were to make any such change as you desire from time to time, I would lose my prime-ministership".

It was quite natural for a Prime Minister like Jung Bahadur, whose power rested primarily on the support of the army and feudal chiefs, to close his country against foreign trade and capital. There had been instances during the Indian revolt of 1857 and afterwards when he was vehemently accused by a section of the chiefs for surrendering the independence of their country to the British. In fact, in a nation where the people were so xenophobic it was expecting too much from the Prime Minister to throw open the country. Ramsay himself noted on July 6, 1864: "So weary he is, so suspicious that we are merely biding our time, waiting for an opportunity to insert the point of the wedge, that we may gradually obtain a firm footing in the country, that I think, he would rather counsel the cession to us of a considerable slice of it, than consent to a system of free trade and permit English merchants to have transaction in Nepal".³⁸ It is plain that the whole career of the British in India showed that behind their demands for immediate justice for their traders there was the policy of imperialism and every Indian state got entangled in that net. Jung Bahadur was not blind to this fact and his restrictions on free trade were not so much for the protection of a certain industry than to save

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

the independence of his country. Hodgson, Lawrence and Ramsay might have felt irritated at the restrictions, but they simply could not have realised the feelings of a weak, poor and ignorant country, which had a strong sense of independence and where political power rested in the hands of the feudal element.

Apart from the above feeling on the part of the Nepalese that justified for them a restrictive system of trade, the various charges levied by Col. Ramsay and other British officials cannot be substantiated except in a very few cases. As regards the engagement of 1839 it must at the outset be understood that nowhere was it mentioned in it that the rate of the duties could not be revised. Nepal only engaged to forward a statement of authorised duties and that the unauthorised duties not entered into the list will not be levied upon the Indian traders. That was why Jung Bahadur often declared that he had the right to alter the duties.³⁹ Moreover, in 1859 the Political Secretary had written on behalf of Lord Canning that the Governor General "assumes no right to interfere with or even advise upon commercial policy of Nepal". The Nepalese Prime Minister had taken it in its literal sense. Resident Girdleston remarked on June 9, 1874: "I venture to say that there is no native state in alliance with us which lays greater stress on declarations of British Government than Nepal. In all its communications Daibar shows intense fondness for precedent and treaties and an inclination to interpret treaties in strict sense. When once the precedent has been broken by her, she is ready to yield. Same she expects from us".⁴⁰

It is true that in some cases the Nepalese charged import duties more than 2½ per cent. In 1856 Col. Ramsay reported that the Indian merchants paid yearly "upon 10 lakhs worth of merchandise on ad valorem duty averaging about 2½ per cent, according to an old understanding (the treaty of 1792) between Governments; besides submitting to extra imposition and taxes amounting to 1½ or 2 per cent more." On this basis he concluded that the duties

39. For. Rev. A. August 1875—No. 22.

40. Ibid.

levied between Kathmandu and the plains of India were much in excess of the statement furnished by the Darbar in 1839. Resident Girdleston, however, remarked on the 9th June 1874 that during his two years of tenure there was no complaint about the irregularity of duties and the prevailing prices convinced him that not more than the published duties were charged.⁴¹ The reports of the magistrates of the Indian border districts also showed that some sort of authorised rates of duty were well known.⁴² If some instances of excessively high duties existed, they were only for the commodities of comfort and luxury. And they were justified on the same grounds as those which justified the British Imperial duties on the merchandise of India, which were the same for Nepal. The truth was that the system of tariff in Nepal was "complicated only from the European point of view, because it was made up of several items of demands on one and the same thing".⁴³ Moreover, whatever irregularity that existed was largely due to the bad climate of the Terai, where for six months out of the year the central administration was quite ineffective. The remedy for it could be better publicity of the rates and the posts of the duties.

On the western frontier along the lately ceded Terai the situation was peculiar. Here the Nepalese Government had been competing with the Indians for the presence of traders. It could induce them partly by protective policy and partly by superior attractions to assemble more frequently on its side of the border. It imposed high export duties on its subjects trading in the Indian territories and tried to attract the Indian traders by making arrangements for their board and lodge and by levying very light import duties. The object of the Nepalese Government was to inhabit and promote trade in the new region, which was underdeveloped and sparsely populated. It did not, however, lead to the decline of trade. Moreover, such restrictions existed only in the Western Nepal. In the eastern part, which was better populated and prosperous, there was no such restriction and the Nepalese were quite frequently seen in the Indian bazars.⁴⁴

41. For. Political A. February 1875—No. 30.

42. For. Rev. A. August 1877—No. 22.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

As regards the contention that Nepal should provide a free passage to the goods bound for Tibet in exchange of the free access given to them in India, it may be remarked that the Nepalese had to purchase her European imports subject to Imperial duties. By free passage if the British meant the abolition of the intermediate duties in Nepal, they were demanding greater concession than the Darbar enjoyed in exchange. The utmost the Nepalese could have done was to abolish the additional duties from Kathmandu to Tibet and not its regular transit duties levied at the border. Even for this the Resident was not hopeful due to the meagre finances of the Nepalese Government.

It was an erroneous belief that the Indian traders got no justice in Nepal. The Assistant Collector of Pilibhit remarked that payment of debts could be easily enforced in the Nepalese courts.⁴⁵ If the plaintiff could successfully prove his case, the amount was realised from the defendant even by selling his goods or he was imprisoned, and if the case could not be proved the plaintiff had to pay twice the amount of his claim. The Collector of Gorakhpur certainly complained of difficulties that the Indian traders faced in settling their outstanding claims, but the Magistrates of Champaran and Muzaffarpur replied favourably to the Resident's enquiries and so did the Collector of Darbhanga.⁴⁶ Girdleston's own experience of four and half years' residence convinced him that there were no evasions in the Nepalese courts for the obligations stipulated in the engagement of 1839, nor did the British Magistrates ever approach him to protest against any delay or denial of justice done to the Indian traders.⁴⁷ Only once he had to interfere and the matter was amicably settled. Girdleston recorded in September 1876 that the complaints of the traders were always amicably settled if reasonably referred to and in the end the Darbar was always amenable to diplomatic pressure if wisely exercised. It was mainly due to the untiring exertions of Hodgson and Ramsay, which convinced the Darbar that every irregularity would be dealt with greater pressure, that fair treatment to the traders became a matter of course.

45. For. Rev. A. August 1877—No. 22.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

The system of monopolies was indeed detrimental to the interest of the traders. The Gorkha officials, particularly Jung Bahadur and his relations, carried on a vast silent investment by giving capital to the Newar merchants. This naturally resulted in a keen competition between these Newar traders backed by the authorities and the Indian merchants, in which the former could easily line their goods cheaply than the foreigners. However, in many parts of the country the Nepalese officers did not engage in trade, and even in the parts they did, the Resident did not suspect that they made an improper use of their position.⁴⁸

The above analysis of the situation points to the fact that the failure to develop Indo-Nepalese and Tibetan trade (from the British point of view) was not entirely due to the aversion and restrictive policy of the Nepalese rulers. In the trade of Manchester and Burmingham made textile and woollen fabric the Europeans could not compete with the Newares, because the latter had smaller personal expense, could arrange carriage at a lower rate and were satisfied with retail business, for which the Europeans were disinclined.⁴⁹ On their part the English traders had tried to introduce European goods, but the Nepalese merchants combined to undersell them and this was wholly of their own accord and not due to any encouragement from the Darbar.⁵⁰

The real question was whether the circumstances of any given country admit of such extension of trade? Nepal and Tibet were poor countries and the European goods had hardly a market there. Girdleston remarked: "So far as my knowledge of Himalayan ranges goes, I cannot but think that with respect to countries in and beyond it, sufficient consideration has not been shown for difficulties of over-land transport and to simple habits of people".⁵¹ The inclemency of weather was most serious for the most part of the year and the passes from the Terai to Nepal and then to Tibet were, no doubt, lower than those of Kashmir, Lahul and Karakorum, but they were so difficult that men, not animals, were

48. For. Political A. February 1875—No. 30.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

necessary carriers of the load. The remedy was a change to better routes, which was ultimately to be found through Darjeeling and Chumbi Valley.

However, even if the routes had been smoothened, could there be an increased demand for European goods? The bulk of the population in Nepal as well as in Tibet had moderate tastes and mostly the barter system was prevalent. Prices in the hills being higher than in the plains, the general public did not like to spend money. If the schedule of imports as given in the statement of tariff of the engagement of 1839 were looked at, it would be found that most of its articles, viz., chewing, oil, coarse sugar, indigo, sheep, raw cotton, tobacco, were Indian products not European. Moreover, cotton woven of Nepal was cheaper than that of Manchester.⁵² As regards raw cotton and tobacco, as in case of salt, opium, grain and Ghee, there were monopolies of the Government, and the farmers made their profit by higher prices and not by bigger sales. There was hardly any chance of Nepal abandoning its policy of monopolies, for she did not expect their custom revenue to increase by doing so. The European wares, which the English manufacturers wanted to introduce, were too expensive to be purchased by the general population. In fact, as Girdleston remarked, unless an entire change had occurred in the character and the income of the people at large, there was no possibility for the consumption of the European goods. The higher classes, who might have purchased them, were very small. Dr. Daniel Wright, the Residency Surgeon, writing in January 1877, also remarked that: "As regards trade, I am aware that it is very generally believed that there is a great field for European enterprise in Nepal, and through it with Tibet. I suspect, however, that this is an erroneous idea. The people are poor, and have few wants that are not supplied by their own country. The export trade from Nepal is very small, and it is difficult to imagine that it could be much increased, as the country is a poor, rugged mountainous land, producing enough for the support of its population. The imports consist chiefly of cloth, and a few European articles used by the highest classes. The lower orders infinitely prefer their

52. Ibid.

home made cloth, both cotton and woollen, which is far more lasting than that which is imported".⁵³

B. H. Hodgson had officially stated in 1831 that Tibet had a good market for the European products. But Girdleston was never very enthusiastic about it for the reasons above explained and due to scanty knowledge about the country.

Such were the attitudes and condition with regard to trade between the two countries. The difficulties were partly genuine and partly due to the desire of the Nepalese Government to increase its revenue and maintain the independence of the country, which it thought would certainly be jeopardised if it allowed free flow of trade. This does not, however, mean that the trade did not increase in this period. In 1879 Girdleston reported that the total value of the Nepalese export and import trade was 98,34,832 rupees,⁵⁴ while in 1831 Hodgson had estimated it only at Rs. 26,75,833.

V

A free trade and the recruitment of the Gorkhas in the Indian army were the two major objectives that the British had been trying to achieve with Nepal. As in case of the former, the latter objective also could not successfully be achieved throughout this period. During the Indian revolt of 1857 Jung Bahadur allowed enlistment of the Gorkhas for two more regiments of the Indian army. This led W. B. Northey to remark that, "this time onwards Nepal not only recognised the existence of the Gorkha regiments in the British army but actively assisted in their recruitment."⁵⁵ It is, however, difficult to agree with him, since the fundamental attitude of the Nepalese remained as ever against their subjects entering into foreign service which they considered degrading. This sense of degradation was aggravated by unpleasantness, galling to the dignity of the chiefs, when these recruits returned home and behaved with a sense of

53. *History of Nepal*, Cambridge, 1877, p. 69.

54. *For. Political A.* October 1879—No. 134.

55. W.B. Northey, *Land of Gorkhas*, Cambridge, 1937, p. 77.

superiority. There had been numerous instances of their behaving most discourteously with the chiefs and even with the Prime Minister.⁵⁶ Moreover, a large number of them were criminals who had fled away from their villages and had assumed fictitious names.⁵⁷

For the Indian Government, since the number of Gorkha regiments had increased, the problem of finding new recruits had become more serious. The orders to the Nepalese Government had long existed to prevent subjects of Nepal entering the Indian army without the express permission of the Prime Minister and in September 1859 Jung Bahadur had protested against the recruiting parties coming surreptitiously to Nepal.⁵⁸ The Indian Government had to stop sending such recruiting parties and depend on individual exertions in order to fill up the vacancies.

These circumstances also gave rise to occasional misunderstandings between the two Governments. In 1866 the practice of the Indian Government of calling upon the Darbar to search for the heir of the deceased Gorkha soldiers gave rise to objections from the Nepalese Government. As the addresses and the names of the recruits were not always correct, the Darbar encountered difficulties in searching out the rightful heir. Nor, did Jung Bahadur want to be a medium of conferring such benefits upon the families of such Gorkhas, and in June 1866 he wanted the practice to be discontinued.⁵⁹ The Governor General could not agree with the Nepalese Prime Minister's wish, but directed the military,

56. On one occasion a recruiting party came up to Kathmandu, and after swaggering about the place for a few days and talking somewhat offensively about the British power and making comparisons between it and the power of Nepal, the individuals comprising it were taken before Maharaja Jung Bahadur. Upon being questioned by him, one of them "a Neware" a class that is not admitted into the Nepalese Army, professed to be a Gorkha, said that his name was Jung Bahadur, and spoke.....disrespectfully to the Minister.....". Resident of Nepal to the Commissioner of Patna dated July 4, 1864. For. Political A. September 1864—No. 88.

57. It was a fact that numerous Gorkhas fled to India and joined the Indian Army. Absconding with public money was quite common and their surrender could not have been claimed, according to the treaty of extradition. Ibid.

58. P.C. December 31, 1858—No. 1216.

59. For. Political A. July 1866—No. 64.

department to be more careful in taking down the particulars of names, addresses and castes of the recruits.⁶⁰

In July one more case arose. A Subedar Major of the Indian army sent two retired Gorkha soldiers to Kathmandu to recover his stolen property. When these men were only fifty miles from Kathmandu they were stopped from proceeding further on the plea that the Gorkha soldiers of the Indian army could not come or depart by the main road from Sagauli.⁶¹ The Resident remonstrated and stressed the peculiarity of the case that those persons were retired soldiers and not in the active service, but Jung Bahadur did not allow them and wanted a written guarantee that the present permission would not be a precedent for the future, which the Resident, in turn, refused to undertake. At last those men were allowed to come over to Kathmandu, but the case was typical to depict Jung Bahadur's attitude.

The problem, in this way, continued with no solution. The Indian Government was, indeed, not in a position to take any effective step. The Gorkha was regarded such a good soldier that the British could not afford to displease Nepal and only waited for suitable opportunity to insist their point. However, so long as Jung Bahadur lived the problem of the Gorkha recruitment could not successfully be solved. He put every indirect obstacle in the way, and after him his successor Randip Singh followed the same policy. It was only in the times of Prime Minister Bir Shamsher that the Nepalese Government freely allowed the enlistment of its subjects and Nepal came to be termed as the "recruiting ground for the British army".

VI

The mutual surrender of the fugitive criminals had been one of the most baffling problems of the Indo-Nepalese relations. The treaty of 1855 had improved the situation but the omission of cattle-lifting and embezzlement from the list of extraditable crimes took the heart out of that engagement.

60. For. Political A. July 1866—No. 66.

61. For. Political A. September 1869—Nos. 92 and 93.

Even in this limited list the practical difficulties and little technicalities so operated that since the conclusion of the treaty "not one" criminal could be surrendered by the Indian authorities to Nepal.⁶² Invariably, either on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence or, as it had more than once happened, that the accused escaped from the British custody, the Nepalese could not get their criminals. On the contrary, the Gorkha local officials invariably complied with the Indian requisitions and there were even instances of irregular applications from the Indian officials for the surrender of the Nepalese subjects who had committed only petty crimes in the Indian territory. Some of the Indian Officers, while applying for surrender only stated that the accused had been found guilty of one of the crimes mentioned in the list of the extraditable offences without giving sufficient evidence of the crime.⁶³ Such a working of the treaty had caused extreme dissatisfaction to Jung Bahadur and a feeling to regard it only one-sided.

The Indian Government was conscious of the irregularities committed by its officers and therefore, with a view to check it, directed them to observe three rules while applying for surrender.⁶⁴ First, that they should submit their applications for surrender through the chief civilian functionary of their districts, who had been authorised to transmit it either to the Resident or the Government. Secondly, that leaving the exceptional cases, which were to be referred to the Government, they should apply for the surrender of only the British subjects guilty of crimes specified in the treaty. Lastly, that their applications should be accompanied, if possible, by a description of the accused parties and information of their whereabouts, and that they should be prepared to furnish full documentary evidence of the guilt to the Resident or to send the witnesses to the Nepalese courts.

This was, however, not the real cause of Jung Bahadur's dissatisfaction, which was mainly due to his failure to get the surrender of his own subjects from the Indian authori-

62. For. Political A. September 1864—No. 88.

63. For. Political A. May 1863—No. 113.

64. Ibid.

ties. Without fully realising the insufficiency of the evidence tendered by the Nepalese authorities, what the Nepalese Prime Minister wanted was to somehow get his criminals. This the Resident refused to comply. It led the former to deliberately refuse the surrender of the Indian criminals in spite of sufficient evidence of guilt. In 1863 Jung Bahadur refused to extradite Rama Nandee Pandit and Kunhye Ram Chowkidar, who had been charged for committing murder in Tirhut district. The Prime Minister, after being satisfied with the documentary evidence, demanded the attendance of witnesses declaring that, as the Indian "magistrates always refuse to receive documentary evidence and insist on personal attendance of witnesses in all cases., he will (also) not dispense with their attendance in the Nepalese courts," unless the Resident would guarantee strict reciprocity.⁶⁵ The Indian Government clarified that the treaty of 1855 stipulated that an accused should be surrendered "upon such evidence of criminality as according to the laws of that country in which the person shall be found, which justified his apprehension and sustain the charge if the offence having been there committed", and that before this treaty came into force, according to Act VII of 1854, the personal attendance of the witnesses had become essential in the Indian courts, while in Nepal only documentary evidence was deemed enough to prove the guilt.⁶⁶ Therefore, reciprocity according to the treaty implied a recognition of the different criminal procedures of both the countries. Jung Bahadur, although in agreement with this interpretation of the treaty, continued to obstruct the surrender of the Indian criminals with a view to insist on his own contention.⁶⁷

The Nepalese Prime Minister also alleged that bands of marauders had been making frequent aggressions on the Nepalese villages contiguous to the Indian border, and protested that the Indian Officers had invariably failed to afford redress even when such cases had been brought to their no-

65. Ibid.

66. For. Political A. July 1863—No. 111.

67. For. Political A. August 1863—No. 146. Also see. For Political A. July 1864—No. 62.

tice with sufficient proof.⁶⁸ He complained that due to such outrages his country had suffered a great deal and only within a year 1,500 to 2,000 heads of cattle had been forcibly carried away.

The Indian Government soon appointed J. D. Gordon as Special Magistrate to investigate into Jung Bahadur's charges and from the Nepalese side Col. Delhi Singh and General Jagat Shamsheer were appointed to accompany him. Gordon's inquiry was thorough indeed.⁶⁹ In all he covered 225 miles from the river Mechi on the east to Motihari on the west and brought into light some very useful facts.

Gordon's inquiry revealed that the whole tract he had investigated was highly rugged with easy means of escape; it was extremely crime-ridden and cattle-lifting was most common there. This crime was generally committed in the Nepalese border towns but the criminals normally resided on the Indian side of the border.

The police arrangements on both the sides were so defective that the people could rarely recover their stolen cattle with the help of police, therefore, they invariably suffered their loss or paid off the ransom to recover their cattle. Gordon remarked that the frontier had "no police arrangements on the one side (the Nepalese side) of it and bad police arrangements on the other". In Nepal there was no separate force for the police administration of the Terai. Only at local treasuries few soldiers were posted, whose main work was to raise maximum amount of revenue, and rarely the police was called upon to suppress the penal offences. On the other hand, the Indian police arrangements on the frontier were feeble than anywhere else. Ordinarily the police outposts existed at a distance of twenty miles, but in some instances even thirty miles apart. At each post four to eight constables were kept, but the higher officers were seldom deputed. On the entire frontier of Lower Bengal, there was not a single officer above the rank of head constable. And this small guard did not have the exclusive work of watching the frontier, but multifarious duties in a vast area.

68. For. Political A. December 1864—No. 41.

69. See J.D. Gordon's Report, For. Political A. August 1855—No. 83.

The defective procedure of handling complaints and strained relations between the Indian and the Nepalese frontier officers were also prone to give rise to delay and difficulties. For instance, if a robbery occurred in the Nepalese territory and some of the offenders, who happened to be British subjects, could be recognised, the next day or usually after a few days the Nepalese subject who had been robbed would give information to the Nepalese Subah; the latter would give the complainant, or to some other person, a letter addressed to the Indian Magistrate of the corresponding district, who would possibly be at a great distance from the frontier. After his return the Magistrate would usually reply that the complainant be sent as soon as possible in order to be present at the police enquiry. In this way a delay of several days and weeks was quite usual before the police could be put on the track of the offenders. Naturally, the chances of detection and arrest were quite remote. Moreover, the police posted on the frontier was not authorised to take cognizance of the offences committed in Nepal when brought to their notice, except on receipt of the orders from their officers. This was quite inevitable so long as the head constable was the highest officer at the frontier.

The Indian Officers had adopted an attitude of avoiding dealings with the Nepalese. Gordon remarked that, "not only that we now profess such a policy, but practically we adopt it by maintaining a system on the border so obviously unsuited to its wants. I have heard officers in high and responsible positions, not unacquainted with the former circumstances of the Nepal frontier, defend the policy of avoiding official communication with the Nepalese Authorities as much as possible. The ground on which this policy is defended seems to be ill-defined dread of all sorts of difficulties and complications which are predicted as sure to arise from a free inter-official intercourse". Twenty years ago such a dread could have been justified, because the condition of the frontier was such as to render the communications meaningless. But now after the restoration of the Oudh Terai the population on both the sides of the frontier had increased, much of the waste land had been brought under cultivation and the judicial administration of the Terai had become more enlightened. Considerable number of Indians

had also settled in the Nepal Terai and mutual contacts for trade and other purposes had increased a great deal. In view of this situation the attitude of the British Officials was hardly defensible.

The extradition treaty of 1855 had also some unsatisfactory features. Theft and cattle-lifting, which were the most prevalent crimes on the frontier, had not been included in it. Moreover, the treaty stipulated that the subjects of the demanding state could be surrendered. But the Indian Government was disinclined to surrender the petty Nepalese criminals. It was of course within its rights to refuse to surrender the Indian subjects, as the Nepalese courts could not impart justice according to international norms, but not to surrender a subject of another nation, on the plea that he would not get fair justice from his own courts, was not justified. In the Indian courts the procedure of punishing the Nepalese criminals was very troublesome and dilatory. According to it an application was to be submitted by the Nepalese Government through the Resident upon which an order would be passed by a Secretary of the Indian Government and only then the magistrate could proceed against the offender. This was an unnecessary distinction between the British and the Nepalese subjects.

As regards the special complaints of Jung Bahadur, Gordon came to the conclusion that his charges were highly exaggerated. In the past two years only seven hundred and thirtyone heads of cattle had been stolen, while the Nepalese Prime Minister alleged that only in one year 1,500 to 2,000 cattle had been lifted. The second complaint, that the Indian Magistrates often failed to give redress when such cases were brought to their notice with sufficient proof, was found baseless. On the contrary, Gordon revealed that the Indian Magistrates were always ready to punish the Nepalese criminals against whom sufficient proofs could be supplied. However, the thing that irritated Jung Bahadur was the concept of "sufficient proof". He could not understand the liberal standards. In Nepal it often happened that sole statement and allegation of a Nepalese subject was regarded as sufficient proof.

With a view of improving the whole situation, Gordon

recommended that theft and cattle-lifting should be included in the list of the extraditable crimes. To expedite the surrender of criminals, he suggested that the Resident should be permitted to forward the requisition of the Darbar direct to the Commissioners, and the Commissioners of Patna and Bhagalpur should be delegated the authority to deal with such cases. Finally, he proposed that whole of the frontier police should be re-organised, more outposts should be introduced and Indian Officers should try to cultivate better relations with the Nepalese authorities. Gordon concluded: "I find the charges made by the Nepal Minister not proved by the evidence submitted in support of them. I find, nevertheless, that crime prevails to a very great extent on the frontier; that a weak police system is in force there unable to cope with crime; that a tendency to abandon the frontier to itself has heretofore existed and still exists; and lastly, that some inequality and some unnecessary intricacy of procedure obtain in our law. To remove these defects, I recommend the reorganisation of an efficient separate Frontier Police, the departure from the non-interference policy and the adoption in its stead of a directly opposite course, a reconsideration of treaty and a rightly simplified procedure".

The Governor General fully concurred with the views and the recommendations of J. D. Gordon.⁷⁰ The Resident was instructed to negotiate with the Darbar to arrange for efficient police arrangements, particularly for the permission to the police to continue hot pursuit after the criminals beyond the frontier. He also proposed that both the Governments should reciprocally surrender even its own subjects.

Jung Bahadur agreed with the Gordon report,⁷¹ but the negotiations of Resident Ramsay to improve frontier arrangements proved largely unsuccessful. The Prime Minister, though realised the necessity of a strong police force, was highly averse to the idea of the Indian Police crossing the frontier in hot pursuit, nor was he ready to surrender the Nepalese subjects.⁷² The main cause of his aversion was the disinclination of the chiefs, who regarded the former proposal as likely to be abused and dangerous to the security of

70. For. Political A. August, 1865—No. 84.

71. For. Political A. July 1865—No. 68.

72. For. Political A. August 1865—No. 80.

their country and the second one as highly degrading. However, Jung Bahadur agreed to establish five more out-posts, consisting of a havaladar and four sepoy, just opposite to the Indian out-posts. The Governor General could not have questioned the Nepalese right not to surrender their subjects but he warned that the proposed police arrangements of Jung Bahadur were not enough.⁷³

The Resident again tried to convince the Nepalese Prime Minister of the necessity of closer co-operation between the police of both the sides, but the latter, following the old policy of isolation, was against the Indian police crossing the frontier. Jung Bahadur also explained the genuine difficulties of climate, which made it difficult to induce good officers to go to the Terai. Ultimately the Resident and the Darbar agreed upon the following three points:⁷⁴

Firstly, the reorganisation and strengthening of the Nepalese police in the Terai.

Secondly, it was decided that the chief officers of the Nepalese border districts would lose no time in communicating the occurrence of any case of murder, theft, dacoity and such heinous crimes to the Magistrates of the Indian districts and in his absence to the subordinate officers.

Thirdly, it was agreed upon that theft and cattle-lifting would be added to the schedule of extraditable crimes of the treaty of 1855.

Jung Bahadur was very keen on adding embezzlement, public or private, to the list of crimes. The Governor General agreed to the suggestions but clarified that only public embezzlement, not the private, would be included and its inclusion would have no retrospective effect.⁷⁵ With regard to theft also, he specified that to make a criminal liable to be surrendered the amount involved must be considerable or a personal violence must have occurred.⁷⁶

Both the Governments having agreed, a treaty was con-

73. For. Political A. August 1865—No. 81.

74. For. Political A. June 1866—No. 35.

75. For. Political A. February 1866—No. 90.

76. For. Political A. August 1866—No. 100. See Appendix No. X.

cluded on the 23rd July 1866. The new treaty was regarded as supplemental to the treaty of 10th February 1855. According to it the crimes of theft, cattle-lifting and embezzlement by public officers had been added to the list of crimes as given in the Art. 4, of the treaty of 1855

The Supplemental Extradition Treaty of 1866 certainly marked an improvement over the past conditions, but there were certain problems of the Indo-Nepalese border which even it could not solve. The climate of this tract was so deadly that for six months out of the year no police or judicial system could have operated successfully and administration on the Nepalese side was actually in the hands of the Tharus—the inhabitants of this tract. The Central Government Officials, even when sent with good pay, could not work due to sickness. Jung Bahadur expressed his helplessness and only hoped that the Indian police might prevent the criminals from crossing the border.⁷⁷ The Indian Government, however, insisted that the Nepalese must strengthen their border police.

Another problem, that made it difficult to arrest criminals, was that there were persons on the border who at different times assumed Indian and Nepalese nationality. The Governor General suggested that such persons should be surrendered, irrespective of their nationality, to the country where crimes had been committed, and a belt of ten miles wide territory be made neutral for the operation of the police of both the sides to apprehend them effectively.⁷⁸ The Indian Government also wanted that culpable homicide be included in the list of the extraditable crimes and authorised the Resident to negotiate for a second supplemental treaty. Jung Bahadur was, however, disinclined to accept either of the above proposals. He was afraid of complications arising out of such an arrangement, and, consequently, the negotiations were dropped.⁷⁹

There was then the problem of reciprocity of surrender and of sufficient proof of crime, which was necessary while demanding extradition of criminal, that could not be solved.

77. For. Political A. October 1866—No. 130.

78. Ibid.

79. For. Political A. April 1867—No. 64.

Nepal was justified in demanding surrender of her subjects on the basis of the evidence that was considered sufficient in Nepal. The special Magistrate J. D. Gordon and Lord Lawrence both concurred with the view that the Nepalese subjects must be surrendered except in very few cases.⁸⁰ At the same time, it cannot be denied that the existence of crime on the frontier was partly due to defective Nepalese system of police and inefficiency of the officers.

VII

In this period several border disputes occurred. The Nepalese attitude towards border had generally been somewhat grabbing. The Indian Government was always conscious how before the war of 1814-16 the Gorkhas had silently encroached upon the undefined tracts of the Terai. Therefore, it adopted a policy of maintaining its rights and demarcating the border clearly even by giving minor concessions. During the transfer and demarcation of the western Terai in 1860, Jung Bahadur laid claims over the left bank of the river Sharda, which to his irritation could not be entertained by the Indian Government.⁸¹ However, Mr. Probyn was appointed in 1861 to decide the dispute. On May 22, 1861 he decided that from Moondia Ghat to Bunbussa the middle stream of the river Sharda was boundary, while according to the terms of the restoration the Indian Government had the full possession of the river.⁸² Thereafter a serious mistake was discovered in the map. The draughtsman, by inadvertence, had drawn the boundary southward to the river which gave Nepal not only the whole river but also a long strip of land on the right bank.⁸³

The Darbar had never laid its claim over the right bank of the Sharda till the mistake was detected in the map in July 1862. But Jung Bahadur, with a view to exploit the situation, now advanced various arguments that before 1816

80. See For. Political A. August 1865—No. 83 and For. Political A. April 1869—KW of Nos. 73-90.

81. For. Part A. November 1860—No. 570.

82. For. Political A. December, 1864—No. 225.

83. For. Political A. June 1864—No. 85.

the Gorkhas had always possessed the left bank of the river, levied tolls on the Ghats of this side and also enjoyed the privileges on the right one. The Governor General refused to entertain the Nepalese claim and only ordered the map to be corrected."

These Ghats had some importance to the Nepalese. Strategically their transfer would have given them complete command over Sharda." Moreover, if ever a canal were to be cut from Sharda, the best point would be just below Bunbussa, which would have been under the Nepalese according to the map. Therefore, Jung Bahadur protested strongly against the Governor General's decision which, he alleged, would deprive Nepal of Rs. 3,000 per annum of tolls.

The Nepalese Prime Minister had undoubtedly caught the Indian Government in a wrong position, and the Governor General also realised that Jung Bahadur would not easily yield. Therefore, with a view to reach an amicable settlement, he decided that the Nepalese would be allowed to collect the whole income derivable from ferry tolls all along that portion of the river—from Moondia Ghat to Bunbussa Ghat—, but they would collect the tolls of both the sides from the left bank and would keep no establishments on the right one." The boundary was to remain as decided by Probyn, i.e., the mid stream of the Sharda, with left bank with the Nepalese and the right bank with the Indians. Jung Bahadur gladly accepted this arrangement.

A number of rivers that formed the Indo-Nepalese boundary had always proved headache to the boundary commissioners. Out of 276 miles of the Oudh-Nepalese boundary alone 137 miles portion was demarcated by rivers." Since no river kept the same course, this boundary was very uncertain. It was difficult to apply a single principle to the whole of this uncertain frontier. In 1861, before the wes-

84. For. Political A. September 1862—Nos. 37 and 41.

85. It may be remarked that during Lord Clydes operations against the rebels in the Terai in 1858, the Ghats were carefully watched by the English forces. For. Political A. December 1864—No. 225.

86. For. Political A. December 1864—No. 257.

87. For. Political A. November 1879—KW of 443-444.

tern Terai had been restored, river Rapti suddenly changed its course and reverted to its old bed leaving 970 bighas on the Indian side. This land was dry all the year and its identity was not lost. Therefore, according to the principle laid down in July 1860, the whole river and this tract belonged to Nepal. But the real question was, which part of the deserted bed should be the boundary. The Chief Commissioner of Oudh held the view that the bank on the Indian side being high and well defined, while on the Nepalese side being silted and undefined, the former should be the boundary. On the contrary, the Officiating Commissioner of Khyrabad, disagreeing with the above opinion, suggested that the centre of the abandoned river should be the frontier. This was certainly an issue of importance. If the opinion of the Chief Commissioner had been accepted not only the whole abandoned bed would have gone to the Nepalese, but they would also have laid claims over the whole river if it were to revert to its recently abandoned bed. The Governor General, therefore, decided that mid-stream of the abandoned bed should be the boundary and the Darbar also accepted it.*

During the last years of Jung Bahadur an important boundary dispute—Doondwa Range Dispute—arose which led to long protracted negotiations and could only be settled by direct talks between him and the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook. In the course of survey in 1869 a question arose about the position of the boundary line between east of Bhagoura Tal and “Arra Nalla” (stream).⁸⁸ It was then decided that between these two points boundary line ran along the watershed of the Doondwa Range and the two phrases “Doondwa Range” and “watershed” were supposed to be identical. This decision was conveyed to Jung Bahadur. He neither then nor in 1873, when the arrangement was finalised, took any objection to it. In 1874, however,

88. For. Political A. September 1863—No. 76.

Another case of just the similar nature arose in 1868 when river Daush suddenly changed its course, in the Tolah of Burumpuree Tirhut, leaving eight to ten bighas on the Indian side. The Governor General decided that the old abandoned bed would continue as boundary. For. Political A. January 1869—Nos. 190 and 191.

89. See For. Political A. April 1874—KW of 257-265.

he laid claims over all the slopes of Doondwa Range and contended that the boundary lay along the foot of the hills.

The Nepalese claims were based on the right of prescription that they had an uninterrupted possession of that territory since last seventy years. They also argued that south of the watershed there were some hamlets of the Nepalese, who paid their revenue to Nepal.

The Indian claims over the slopes up to the watershed were based on the following grounds: the Raja of Berhampur, who was under the British protection, had contracts of grazing grounds up to 1872 and collected forest dues on the lands up to the watershed, and since then the Forest Department of the Indian Government realised them. Moreover, the Raja of Tulseepur had forts on those hills.

However, as the term 'watershed' could be interpreted differently, the Governor General ordered on 2nd April 1874 for a new investigation by Joint Commissioners, who were to decide the issue by majority vote. Before any inquiry could be conducted some boundary pillars had been erected by the Indian surveyors, which led the Darbar to think that the Indian Government was determined to fix the boundary along the watershed and Jung Bahadur strongly protested against it.

The whole issue was taken up afresh in October 1874 when Jung Bahadur visited Calcutta. It was decided between him and Lord Northbrook that a commission of officers, one Nepalese and the other the British, would investigate into the dispute; and in case of difference between them, the verdict of a third officer would be final. With mutual consent Sir T. D. Forsyth was appointed the third officer; the other two were Lt. Col. I. F. MacAndrew and Col. Sidhman Singh. The Governor General instructed the British investigator to give the Nepalese all the territory down to the foot of the hills as far as they could prove within their possession since 1815 provided its transfer would not affect the interests of a third party.⁹⁰

Both the investigators came to the conclusion that this part of the boundary was never before demarcated. After

90. For. Political A. October 1874—No. 119.

taking into account the claims and the evidences of both the sides, Col. MacAndrew inferred that boundary lay along the watershed. The Nepalese could not establish their claim and a few hamlets could give them no right over the slopes. But, following the instructions of his Government, he agreed to fix the boundary along the "foot of the lower spurs" of the hills on the following two conditions with a view to protect the interests of the Indian subjects:"

(1) "That the subjects of the British Government who came to the hills for bankas (a type of grass) shall have it at the rate of payment they have been used to make to Tulsipoor".

(2) "That the Nepal Government shall accept the boundary laid down by the surveyor at the foot of hills as a final settlement of the question".

This agreement, being accepted by the two Governments, was ratified on June 7, 1875.⁹¹

The work of demarcation was soon started by Capt. E. W. Samuells and Col. Sidhman Singh. During the course of demarcation both the Officers disagreed with each other and no settlement could be reached till the next good season. On February 16, 1876, Capt. Samuells and Subah Padam Nath again started the work. They succeeded in demarcating boundary line from Bhagoura Tal to Arrah Nalla to the satisfaction of the two Governments.⁹²

VIII

There was only one more interesting event in the life of Jung Bahadur after he had dropped his visit to England in 1875. During the winter of 1875-76 Prince of Wales (later the Emperor Edward VII) visited India and the Nepalese Prime Minister decided to invite him for hunting in the Terai. General Randip Singh was appointed as ambassador by the Maharajadhiraj to convey compliments and extend

91. For. Political A. May 1875—No. 262.

92. Aitchison, n. 22, Ch. I, p. 124.

93. For. Political A. October 1877—No. 383.

his invitation to the Prince. Randip Singh waited on the Prince, who gladly accepted the invitation."

On February 19, 1876, the Prince of Wales was received by the Nepalese Prime Minister in the Terai with full honours. For more than a fortnight the Prince was entertained with all sorts of big games. On March 6, he returned to India.

During rest of his life Jung Bahadur continued to live with his usual routine. On February 25, 1877 he passed away at Pattar Ghat on Baghmati.⁹⁴ Queen Victoria and the Prince of Wales conveyed their condolence on the death of their staunch ally.⁹⁵ There were some fears of disturbance for the struggle of succession,⁹⁶ but Randip Singh, the next surviving younger brother of Jung Bahadur, was peacefully appointed the Prime Minister and was conferred with all the titles and honours of his predecessor.⁹⁷

Thus passed away a really powerful Gorkha statesman, who had ruled over the Kingdom as dictator. Power of Jung Bahadur, as that of Bhim Sen, was mainly based on the support of the soldiery. But as compared to the latter, the former was undoubtedly more powerful. When Bhim Sen came to power he did not have to face those difficulties and unpromising circumstances which Jung Bahadur had to. Even after his ascendancy Bhim Sen had always his enemies to reckon with. Jung Bahadur, on the other hand, had completely extirpated his opponents and even the King was successfully reduced to the position of a dignified prisoner.

Jung Bahadur gave to Nepal a long period of peace and tranquillity after a most turbulent decade. Whatever his means or personal ambitions, he must at least be given credit of taking out the Kingdom from the clutches of Rajendra Vikram Sah, with whom no one was safe. As regards the British, he realised the relatively weak position of his country and had the practical wisdom of abandoning the old Gorkha

94. For. Political B. March 1877—No. 68.

95. For. Political A. May 1877—No. 42.

96. For. Political A. May 1877—No. 44.

97. For. Political A. May 1877—No. 42.

98. For. Political A. May 1877—No. 60.

policy based on militarism. He followed a policy of friendship with the British, which was needed by the actual circumstances to preserve the independence of Nepal. During his time the relations between the two countries improved as never before. He also realised that dealing with an imperialistic power the best way would be to keep friendship from a distance. The British might disparage his policy of splendid isolation, but it can be said without a fear of contradiction, that his policy saved the independence of his country. At the same time, Jung Bahadur cannot be blamed like Bir Shamsheer and Chandra Shamsheer, who practically reduced Nepal to a status of a subordinate state of the British. So long as Jung Bahadur lived he not only maintained the independence of his country, but also did not allow the British to recruit the Gorkhas freely.

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CONCLUSIONS

I

Modern International Law has evolved in the peculiar setting of the Western Europe, and, therefore, there are always cases which do not fit in the generally accepted international legal framework. The political status of Nepal was perhaps one of them. As Nepal had her permanent political relations only with her two neighbours, India and China, the study of this subject can be conveniently divided into two parts: (i) The Sino-Nepalese relations and, (ii) the Anglo-Nepalese relations.

* * * * *

Nepal had long standing social, cultural and religious ties with China. In 1792, during the Tibeto-Nepalese war, the two powers came into direct military clash with each other.¹ The Gorkhas having invaded Tibet, the Chinese Emperor despatched a big force to chastise them. Nepal was compelled to sue for peace and in the peace treaty she agreed to send a mission with presents to the Court of Peking every fifth year.

To the Chinese any foreign relationship implied a recognition of China's supremacy, and in that sense since 1792, Nepal came to acquire the status of a tributary state.² Not only Nepal, all other states situated along the southern slopes

1. See pp. 8-12.

2. See A. Lamb, "Indo-Tibetan Border". *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*. 6(1): May: 28-40. Another treatment of this subject is found in a paper by Leo E. Rose, "Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan Border States", *Orbis*. (5)(2): Oct.

of the Himalayas were looked by the Chinese within the broad framework of their Empire.

A study of the relations between the two powers, however, reveals that Nepal was not a vassal state under the Chinese suzerainty in the accepted sense of the term.³ She was an independent state, and the presents she sent to the Chinese Emperor did not imply her dependence. Never did the Chinese, directly or indirectly, interfere in the domestic affairs of Nepal, nor was there a permanent Chinese representative ever at Kathmandu to advise the Maharaja. The Nepalese foreign policy was also never influenced by China, and often it ran counter to the Chinese imperial interests. For instance, the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-16 was fought, and the subsequent peace treaty was concluded, with the East India Company without the permission of the Chinese. Again, in 1854-56 Jung Bahadur waged a war with Tibet against the wishes of the Chinese Emperor. With other foreign states Nepal had her independent relations. She freely sent her representatives to Calcutta, Lahore and other foreign courts. It can, therefore, be stated that Nepal had always conducted her foreign relations independent of the Chinese influence.

The practice of sending the five yearly mission with presents to Peking had no positive content of Nepal's dependence on China. The mission was discontinued by the Government of Nepal after 1852 and it was resumed in 1867, and then stopped for ever after 1908 without any permission or understanding of the Chinese Government. There was, therefore, no vassal-lord relationship between the two powers entailing certain rigid rights and duties. In practice, it was a very convenient type of relationship, which the Nepalese preserved in the beginning as a support to be invoked against the

3. A state under the suzerainty of another is "confessedly part of another state (and) has rights only which have been expressly granted to it, and the assumption of larger powers to it is an act of rebellion against the sovereign".

W.E. Hall, *A Treatise on International Law*, 1924, p. 32. Another authority on International Law defines suzerainty as a kind of "international guardianship, since the vassal is either absolutely or mainly represented internationally by the suzerain state".

L. Oppenheim, *International Law—A Treatise*, 1955, Vol. I, p. 189.

British and later on Jung Bahadur continued it because of his cupidity.⁴ During the last quarter of the nineteenth century even the Chinese considered Nepal away from their sphere of influence and a "subject to the English".⁵

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Referring to the political status of Nepal the editor of the *Imperial Gazetteer* remarked that, it was "somewhat difficult to define. It may be said to stand intermediate between Afghanistan and the Native States of India. The point of resemblance to Afghanistan is the complete freedom which Nepal enjoys in the management of its internal affairs, while in both countries foreign relations are controlled by the Indian Government. The analogy to the Native States is that by treaty Nepal is obliged to receive a British Resident at Kathmandu, and cannot take Europeans into service without the sanction of the Indian Government".⁶ This official statement of the British Government not only overlooked the actual facts, but also certain legal issues.

The British relations with Nepal were regulated by the Treaty of Sagauli, which Nepal had to sign after the war of 1814-16. The treaty was, however, a contract between two sovereign states. This is indicated by the manner the treaty was concluded. Several clauses of the original terms put forward by the British had to be modified because they were unacceptable to the Nepalese. The terms of the treaty also do not give an impression that Nepal had ceased to be an independent state after its conclusion. Neither in this treaty nor in any subsequent one did Nepal accept direct or

4. The presents sent from Nepal were of trifling value, but those received in return consisted of valuable bales of silk, satin, porcelain, ivory, jade, tortoise shell and other such curiosities. It also provided the Nepalese an opportunity to take a lot of opium duty free. For. Pol. A. June 1866—No. 163.

5. The Chinese Emperor wrote to the Russians in 1874 that, "Nepal is subject to the English barbarians. Were we to propose that it should place its resources at our disposal for an attack upon India it would be certain to decline giving offence to the English and the only result would be to open door to their demands and reclamations".

For. Pol. S.C. September 1876—No. 129-33 (K.W.).

6. *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, 1908. Vol. XIX, p. 38.

indirect control of the British over her internal or external affairs.

Two articles of the treaty have, however, been generally misunderstood. The Article 8 stipulated that, "In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two states, it is agreed that accredited Ministers from each shall reside at the Court of each other". Obviously it was a mutual obligation and did not impair the independent status of Nepal. Use of the term "Minister", instead of "Ambassador", also did not imply lower status of Nepal, because differences in the ranks of the envoys are related to the personnels accredited and not to the states.⁷ Nor, did the fact that in 1823 the status of the British Resident was raised to that of an "Envoy Extraordinary" make any difference in this regard. After all in 1802, when there was not the least doubt about the sovereign status of Nepal, the first British representative at the Court of Kathmandu, Capt. W. D. Knox, was designated as a Resident.

The position and functions of the British representative at Kathmandu were different from the Residents in the Indian States. In the latter case, the Residents were not merely advisers of the rulers, they also had a decisive influence in the affairs of the state. In Nepal the functions of the Resident were those of an ambassador accredited to an independent state. During the period under study, except for a brief time from 1840 to 1842, never did the advice of the Resident carry a decisive weight. In 1834, B. H. Hodgson remarked that, "Advice can readily amount to command, to many Darbars of the plains, by Resident. But this state (Nepal) exhibits no single link of dependence upon our power, and the records of the residency afford abundant testimony that it has always felt and arrested its independency with more than sufficient energy, in communication with the Resident, of that power".⁸ Sixteen years later, another British Resident to Nepal, J. C. Erskine, observed about the peculiar position of the British representative in Nepal, "who is never called upon to interfere in the slightest degree with

7. See Oppenheim, n. 3. Vol. I, pp. 777-778.

8. P.C. January 23, 1835—No. 51.

the internal administration of the country.....” The Political Secretary to the Government of India also expressed the same opinion in December 1858: “Resident in Nepal is in very different position from that of Residents in other native states. He has none of the duties of control and supervision which, in one way or another, belong to the latter; he is agent between Governments, which however unequal in power are equal in independence, even though one of them be.....semi-savage court”.⁹

Therefore, the position and functions of the Resident were only to look after the British interests in Nepal and to act as a channel of communication between the two Governments.

* * * * *

Article 7 of the Treaty of Sagauli stipulated that, “The Raja of Nepal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European and American State without the consent of the British Government”. It was clearly a restriction on the external freedom of Nepal. Such conditions were generally imposed by the East India Company on the protected Indian States as a means to exclude the French and other imperial powers from the British sphere of influence. There is no doubt that the British always regarded Nepal within the framework of their imperial interests and never relished that she should have diplomatic relations with other European states.

To cite an instance, in April 1862, Jung Bahadur proposed to visit “the Pasha of Egypt and the Emperors of France and Austria, not under the auspices or through the introduction of the English Government, but as the Prime Minister and as ambassador from a foreign independent state”.¹¹ The Indian Government, though could not object to the proposal on legal grounds, was highly averse to it. The Political Secretary informed the Resident that, “Still less can Governor General approve of the Maharaja entering into

9. P.C. December 20, 1850—No. 230.

10. S.C. February 25, 1859—No. 26.

11. For. Pol. A. May 1862—No. 23.

relations with Foreign courts as the Ambassador of Nepal. Complications might arise from such novel relations which might endanger the good understanding which now exists between Nepalese Government, and could not, in the smallest degree, profit the latter".¹²

The most crucial question, however, arises whether Article 7 of the treaty impaired Nepalese rights to conduct her foreign relations freely, and whether, having accepted this article, Nepal was reduced to the status of a protected state. The history of the Indo-Nepalese relations shows that Nepal was not a protectorate of the British. It is true that such conditions, as given in this article, were imposed on the protected Indian States, but they were actually under the British protection either because of some other express agreement or because habitually they delegated their power to conduct foreign relations to the British. No such agreement was signed in 1816 or subsequently with Nepal. Even the paramountcy of the British, as the successor of the Moghal Emperors, did not extend over Nepal, because she was never under the Moghals.

In 1839 Nepal had agreed not to have any contacts with Indian States under the British protection.¹³ The East India Company had, however, a perfect right to control the foreign relations of these states and Nepal could legally have approached them only through the Indian Government.¹⁴

The fact that the British relations with Nepal were maintained through the Government of India, and not directly by London, did not make any difference in the political status of Nepal. A sovereign state is free to conduct its foreign relations in any manner and through any media it likes. Even in Nepal the British could not have approached the Maharajadhiraj directly. The only means of communication was the Prime Minister or his agent. This practice was never

12. For. Pol. A. May 1862—No. 24

13. See Appendix No. VI.

14. J. Westlake has clearly stated that the foreign states can approach a protectorate only through the protecting power and "any contrary attempt at such treaty or intercourse is regarded by the protecting state as hostile act against it on the part of the outside state....."

relaxed despite express wishes of the British Government. As for the right of the Nepalese Sovereign to correspond directly with the British Monarch, it was never challenged. In May 1853, the Maharaja wanted to acknowledge directly some presents from Queen Victoria. The Resident objected that it was not customary for the Queen to correspond directly with Indian States. But he was informed by the Governor General that the "Maharaja was at perfect liberty to write a complimentary letter to the Queen".¹⁵

The Nepalese never allowed the British to interfere in their domestic affairs and the British Government itself regarded Nepal an independent state.¹⁶ In May 1842, Lord Ellenborough rebuked the Resident, B. H. Hodgson, for having evinced "a want of personal consideration for a friendly and independent sovereign"—the Maharaja of Nepal.¹⁷ Similarly, in April 1851, Lord Dalhousie called Nepal "a foreign state, which is entirely independent of us, neither tributary to us, nor subordinate in any way"¹⁸ The Political Secretary to the Government of India also remarked in December 1859 that, "Nepal is an independent country under no subordination to the British paramount power in India".¹⁹

In the external affairs as well Nepal was not under British subordination and followed her independent foreign policy. She had independent relations with the Courts of Peking, Lhasa, Lahore. Similarly, with Burma, Herat and

15. P.C. May 20, 1853—No. 39.

16. The Assistant Resident A. Campbell observed in his report that. "Her (Nepal's) armies have not been subsidized by us, nor have we borrowed her money, or had counter claims upon her. To assist her against foreign aggression we are not bound, nor are we pledged to that misery bringing of all the measures, the guaranteeing a throne to a certain prince against the will or advantage of the mass of the people. Her chiefs are not dependent on us, nor is she bound to ask or give counsel and advice on any subject whatever. In short, Nepal is a free independent state, not according to the spirit of the treaties, which in India had only an existence in name, but she is virtually and morally independent of British power".

PT—para 55.

17. S.C. August 3, 1842—No. 67.

18. Lord Dalhousie's minute dated 9th April 1851. S.C. April 25, 1851—No. 11.

19. S.C. Feb., 1859—No. 26.

Afghanistan the Nepalese maintained their contacts without direct or indirect consent of the British Government. In 1854-56, they had fought a war with the Tibetans and concluded a peace treaty without any approval of the Indian Government.

Nepal did not have any diplomatic relations with European and American states. It was, however, because she never felt any such need. With the rise of Jung Bahadur the Nepalese foreign policy had been so much centred on winning over British friendship that the Nepalese did not like to cultivate such relations, particularly when they knew that the English would never appreciate such a move. Sardar K. M. Panikkar also contended that, "The (British) policy of assuming sovereign rights over the states and the conversion of their rulers from semi-independent allies to feudatories definitely failed in case of Nepal and Afghanistan. . . . Ever since the Treaty of Sagauli, 1816, a Resident lived at Kathmandu, but sagacious policy of the Prime Ministerial family steadily resisted the attempted inclusion of Nepal in the British Political system, so that now she has been recognised as a completely independent sovereign state and the Resident has been transformed into the British envoy at the court of His Majesty the King of Nepal".²⁰ He also maintained that Nepal had the right to conduct her foreign relations: "The mere delegation of authority would not, however, mark the disappearance of international sovereignty when the right was not expressly abandoned as in case of Nepal and Afghanistan. The right of Nepal was never questioned".²¹

From the above analysis and the evidence it is clear that Nepal was not under the British protection. The chief characteristic of a protectorate is that it "shall enter into no treaty or have any diplomatic intercourse with the outside states without the consent of the (protecting state), expressed or inferred".²² Such a kind of state emerges when a weak State "has placed itself under the protection of

20. K. M. Panikkar, *Relations of the Indian States with the Government of India*, London 1927, p. 40.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Westlake, n. 14, p. 22.

another power on defined conditions, or has been so placed under an arrangement between powers interest of which are involved in the disposition of its territory".²³ A protectorate, however, must not be confused with simple protection, which one state may bind itself to give to another without impairing the latter's capacity for action in foreign affairs.²⁴ Only if a state "permanently hands over the control of its foreign, or any material part thereof, to another state, it will then cease to be fully sovereign", and will be termed as a protectorate.²⁵

The international status of Nepal after the Treaty of Sagauli was, therefore, peculiar and did not fit in any of the generally recognised categories of the Western International Law. She was not a fully sovereign state. Article 7 of the treaty was a clear restriction on her freedom of action. Even in practice, though the Nepalese had rights to conduct her foreign relations independently, she never had diplomatic ties with European and American states. At the same time, Nepal could also not be called a protectorate or vassal in the recognised sense of the terms. It was a special situation which had been created by the political compulsions of that time.

During the times of the later Ranas (from 1885 onwards) the position of Nepal underwent a further change. Legally no alteration was made; rather the formal independent status of Nepal was always recognised. But in actual practice, the Shamshers had no foreign policy of their own. They only followed the line of foreign policy as suggested by the British. Opinions and suggestions of the British Government and Residents were accepted as friendly advice. The economy of Nepal also depended largely on the British. After the First World War, she even received a subsidy—an unconditional present of one million rupees annually, which was raised to two million rupees after the Second World War. The Gorkhas served in the Indian army in constantly increasing number and received their pay and pension from the

23. Hall, n. 3, p. 29.

24. Westlake, n. 14, p. 23.

25. Pitt Cobbet, *Leading Cases on International Law*, 1922, Vol. I, p. 60.

British. Such a state of affairs naturally led the nationalists in Nepal to think that the Ranas were mere stooges of the British imperialists and Nepal was for all practical purposes within the outer frame of the British Empire in Asia.

II

The history of the Indo-Nepalese relations during the British rule in India is one of clash and tension, which, having reached its climax during the war of 1814-16, gradually declined giving way to adjustment and cautious friendship. The very process of the simultaneous consolidation of the British and Gorkha powers in India and Nepal respectively created a stir in the Central Himalayas and made that region alive. The East India Company was highly interested in keeping the northern frontiers of India quiet and develop its trade with the trans-Himalayan States and China through the Himalayas. Later from the nineteenth century onwards, as the political goals of the British became more important, they wanted to create a chain of influenced and stable buffer states in order to avoid clashes with the Chinese and the Russians. Conquest of Nepal by the martial and xenophobic Gorkhas was felt by them with distress; it almost stopped the trade, which the British and Indian merchants had been carrying on with the hill areas. With the passage of time, as the Gorkha Empire extended along the Gangetic Valley and beyond, the imperial interests of the British dictated that their inconvenient neighbour must be brought under some sort of political influence.

By the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-16 the Company succeeded in circumvallating Nepal on three sides and thus putting a check on the martial Gorkhas to thrive at the cost of their weak neighbours. Having secured their first foothold, the British Government pursued three basic objectives vis-a-vis Nepal. With a view of keeping her quiet, it wanted to moderate the martial and expansionist propensities of the Gorkhas, and ultimately aimed at securing the Gorkha recruits for the Indian army and promote trade with Nepal and through her with the trans-Himalayan areas.

The Nepalese Prime Minister Bhim Sen Thapa failed

to fully grasp the importance of the new set of circumstances. His foreign policy was based on a conviction that Nepal and the British could not co-exist in amity. He was convinced of the British power and understood that the era of conquest was over. But for him the only defence of Nepal lay in constant military preparation and closing his country for the Europeans (including the Resident). The results of this state of affairs were most unfortunate for the British. In spite of long peace that followed the war, no cordiality could develop between the two countries. Bhim Sen deliberately fostered war psychosis and anti-British sentiments among his people.

In 1833 occurred a change in the British policy under the dynamic influence of B. H. Hodgson. Non-interference having failed, the British tried to gain influence in the counsels of the Darbar so as to effect a change in the martial policy and institutions of Nepal. Later when they were awkwardly placed against Afghanistan and Russia in the north-west, Hodgson had to actively interfere in the domestic affairs to prevent Nepal from taking any advantage of the British difficulties. He, no doubt, succeeded in preventing a war with Nepal at a critical time, but his policy was fraught with grave consequences. Interference in the domestic affairs was dangerous, because it accentuated the same aggressiveness and anti-British sentiments, which it sought to check.

The results of this brief period of foreign interference were far-reaching and both the countries took salutary lessons. It convinced the Nepalese that the Resident could be used as a political tool and their jingoism could provide a pretext to the British for active interference. The British also realised that foreign interference would not succeed in a country like Nepal and she could prove a troublesome neighbour in difficult times.

With the rise of Jung Bahadur to power a new era began in the Indo-Nepalese relations and the process of understanding and friendly adjustment between the two countries ensued. The main plank of his foreign policy was a belief that a workable friendship could exist between Nepal and the British in India. He discarded the old idea that the two

powers could not co-exist in amity. He could clearly see the hard fact that the British had not only become dominant in the sub-continent, but had also humbled the Chinese power. He realised that the geographical position of Nepal had rendered the martial policy out-of-date and no amount of military preparedness could give his country security against the British. This was certainly a victory of geography—Nepal being surrounded by the Indian territories on three sides—over the martial propensities of the Gorkhas. Jung Bahadur and his successors were fully convinced that only by keeping friendship with the British their own position in Nepal, as well as the independence of their country, could be preserved.

At the same time, Jung Bahadur took it almost as a faith that he should in no way encourage close contact with the British. Every Gorkha Prime Minister was convinced that if the British were allowed to move freely in their country or their merchants were permitted to carry on trade, it would ultimately lead to the subjugation of Nepal. The Ranas particularly understood that throwing open their country to foreign capital would in no time end their feudal system and would eventually lead to their decline. By this time, the British mercantile interests in Nepal also lost their earlier significance and Darjeeling and Chumbi Valley routes had been developed for the trans-Himalayan trade.

After the fall of Randip Singh (1885), during the rule of the later Ranas, the Nepalese foreign policy was modified. They maintained the traditions of keeping away the foreigners, but allowed the British Government to recruit the Gorkhas freely. This was indeed a blow to their national pride. The very fact that the Gorkhas were serving in the English army and getting their pay and pension from a foreign government had an inevitable effect on the psychology of the people.

This was, however, not a mere coincidence. It was deliberate and suited the interests of the ruling class in Nepal and the English in India. The Ranas wanted the British support to keep their hold on the Darbar against their rival factions and perpetuate their feudal system of exploiting the people of Nepal. And in this direction they received a ready

support from the English Government in exchange of pro-British policy and the Gorkha recruits. The integrity and the seemingly independent status of Nepal could also be preserved, but, in reality, Nepal was well within the broad framework of the English imperial interests and always followed the line of foreign policy as suggested by the Indian Government. In fact, the feudal system, which existed during the Rana regime in Nepal, could be maintained only with the support of a foreign power. For Jung Bahadur, of course, it may be stated, that he was in no way under the direct or indirect subordination of the English and during his lifetime the independence of Nepal could be preserved in real sense.

* * * * *

Even today Nepal skirts along the most vital and undefended frontiers of India. With the rise of an expansionist Government in China the entire northern frontier is again alive. The existence of a racial admixture of the Mongoloid and Indian blood, the fusion of Buddhist and Hindu religions and the simultaneous impact of the Tibetan and Indian cultures, make Nepal one of the most delicate spots along the Indian border. Days of "forward strategy" being over, the defence of India needs a very careful and delicate handling of Nepal. Interference and pressure have been traditionally resented by the highlanders. Only a hope can be expressed that the leadership of Nepal would realise that geographically, economically and culturally Nepal is a part of the sub-continent, and the Indian leadership must take wholesome lessons from history that only with understanding and sympathy friendship of Nepal can be won over.

TREATY OF COMMERCE WITH NEPAL
March 1, 1792

"Treaty authenticated under the seal of Maha Rajah Run Behauder Shah Behauder Shumshere Jung; being according to the Treaty transmitted by Mr. Jonathan Duncan, the Resident at Benares, on the part of Right Honourable Charles, Earl Cornwallis, K. G., Governor-General in Council, and empowered by the said authority to conclude a Treaty of Commerce with the said Maha Rajah, and to settle and fix the duties payable by the subjects of the respective States of the Honourable English Company and those of Nepaul, the said gentleman charging himself with whatever relates to the duties thus to be payable by the subjects of the Nepaul Government to that of the Company; in like manner as hath the aforesaid Maha Rajah, with whatever regards the duties thus to be payable by the subjects of the Company's Government to that of Nepaul; and the said Treaty having been delivered to me (the said Maha Rajah) by Mowlavy Abdul Kadir Khan, the aforesaid gentleman's vakeel, or agent; this counterpart thereof having been by the Nepaul Government, hath been committed to the said Khan, as hereunder detailed:—

ARTICLE 1

In as much as an attention to the general welfare, and to ease and satisfaction of the merchants and traders, tends equally to the reputation of the administrators of both Governments of the Company and of Nepaul; it is therefore agreed and stipulated, that $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. shall reciprocally be taken, as duty, on the imports from both countries; such duties to be levied on the amount of the invoices of the goods which the merchants shall have along with them; and to deter the said traders from exhibiting false invoices, the seal of the customs houses of both countries shall be impressed on the back of the said invoices, and copy thereof being kept, the original shall be restored to the merchants; and in cases where the merchant shall not have along with him his original invoice, the custom house officers shall, in such instance, lay down the duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on a valuation according to the market price.

ARTICLE 2

The opposite stations hereunder specified, within the frontiers of each country, are fixed for the duties to be levied, at which place the traders are to pay the same; and after having once paid duties

and receiving a rowannah thereon, no other or further duty shall be payable throughout each country or dominion respectively.

ARTICLE 3

Whoever among the officers on either side shall exceed in his demands for, or exaction of duty, the rate here specified, shall be exemplarily punished by the government to which he belongs, so as effectually to deter others from like offences.

ARTICLE 4

In the case of theft or robberies happening on the goods of the merchants, the Foujedar, or officer of the place, shall, advising his superiors or Government thereof speedily, cause the zamindars and proprietors of the spot to make good the value, which is in all cases, without fail, to be so made good to the merchant.

ARTICLE 5

In cases where in either country any oppression or violence be committed on any merchant, the officers of country wherein this may happen shall, without delay, hear and inquire into the complaints of the persons thus aggrieved, and doing them justice, bring the offenders to punishment.

ARTICLE 6

When the merchants of either country, having paid the established duty, shall have transported their goods into the dominions of one or the other state if such goods be sold within such State, it is well; but if such goods not meeting with sale, and that the said merchants be desirous to transport their said goods to any other country beyond the limits of either of the respective States included in the Treaty, the subjects and officers of these latter shall not take thereon any other or further duty than the fixed one levied at the first entry; and are not to exact double duties, but are to allow such goods to depart in all safety without opposition.

ARTICLE 7

This Treaty shall be of full force and validity in respect to the present and future rulers of both Governments, and, being considered on both sides as a Commercial Treaty and a basis of concord between the two States, is to be, at all times, observed and acted upon in times to come, for the public advantage and the increase of friendship.

On the 5th of Rajeb, 1205 of the Hegira, and 1199 of the Fusseslee style, agreeing with the 1st of March 1792 of the Christian, and with 22nd of Phagun 1848 of the Sumbut era, two Treaties, to one tenor, were written for both the contracting parties, who have mutually engaged that from the 3rd Bysack 1849 of the Sumbut era, the officers of both States shall, in pursuance of the strictest orders of both Governments, immediately carry into effect and observe the stipulations aforesaid, and not wait for any further or new direction".

THE TREATY OF "COMMERCE AND ALLIANCE WITH NEPAL

October 26, 1801

"Whereas it is evident as the noonday sun to the enlightened understanding of exalted nobles and of powerful Chiefs and Rulers, that Almighty God has entrusted the protection and government of the universe to the authority of Princes, who make justice their principle, and that by the establishment of a friendly connection between them universal happiness and prosperity is secured, and that the more intimate the relation of amity and union the greater is the general tranquillity; in consideration of these circumstances, His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, Marquis Wellesley; &c. &c., and the Maha Rajah have established a system of friendship between the respective Governments of the Company and the Raja of Nepaul, and have agreed to the following Articles:—

ARTICLE 1

It is necessary and incumbent upon the principals and officers of the two Governments constantly to exert themselves to improve the friendship subsisting between the two States, and to be zealously and sincerely desirous of the prosperity and success of the Government and subjects of both.

ARTICLE 2

The incendiary and turbulent representations of the disaffected, who are the disturbers of our mutual friendship, shall not be attended to without investigation and proof.

ARTICLE 3

The principals and officers of both Governments will cordially consider the friends and enemies of either State to be the friends and enemies of the other; and this consideration must ever remain permanent and in force from generation to generation.

ARTICLE 4

If any one of the neighbouring powers of either State should commence any altercation or dispute, and design, without provocation, unjustly to possess himself of the territories of either country, and should entertain hostile intentions with the view of taking that country, the vakeels on the part of our respective Governments at either Court will fully report all particulars to the head of the

State, who, according to the obligations of friendship subsisting between the two States, after having heard the said particulars, will give whatever answer and advice may be proper.

ARTICLE 5

Whenever any dispute of boundary and territory between the two countries may arise, such dispute shall be decided, through our respective vakeels or our officers, according to the principles of justice and right; and a landmark shall be placed upon the said boundary, and which shall constantly remain, that the officers both now and hereafter may consider it as a guide, and not make any encroachment.

ARTICLE 6

Such places as are upon the Frontiers of the dominions of the Nabob Vizier and of Nepaul, and respecting which any dispute may arise, such dispute shall be settled by the mediation of the vakeel on the part of the Company, in the presence of one from the Nepaul Government, and one from His Excellency the Vizier.

ARTICLE 7

So many elephants, on account of Muckwanpoor, are annually sent to the Company by the Raja of Nepaul, and therefore the Governor-General with a view of promoting the satisfaction of the Raja of Nepaul, and in consideration of the improved friendly connection, and of this new Treaty, relinquishes and forgoes the tribute above-mentioned, and directs that the officers of the Company, both now and hereafter from generation to generation, shall never, during the continuance of the engagement contracted by this Treaty (so long as the conditions of this treaty shall be in force), exact the elephants from the Raja.

ARTICLE 8

If any of the dependents or inhabitants of either country should fly and take refuge in the other, and a requisition should be made for such persons on the part of the Nepaul Government by its constituted Vakeel in attendance on the Governor-General, or on the part of the Company's Government by its representative residing at Nepaul, it is in this case mutually agreed that if such person should have fled after transgressing the laws of his Government, it is incumbent upon the principals of both Governments immediately to deliver him up to the Vakeel at their respective courts, that he may be sent in perfect security to the Frontier of their respective territories.

ARTICLE 9

The Maha Rajah of Nepaul agrees, that a pergunnah, with all the lands attached to it, excepting privileged lands and those appropriated to religious purposes, and to jaghires &c., which are specified separately in the account of collections, shall be given up to Samee Jeo for his expenses, as a present. The conditions with res-

pect to Samee Jeo are, that if he should remain at Benares, or at any other place within the Company's provinces, and should spontaneously farm his jaghire to the officers of Nepaul, in that event the amount of collections shall be punctually paid to him, agreeably to certain kists which may be hereafter settled; that he may appropriate the same to his necessary expenses, and that he may continue in religious abstraction, according to his agreement, which he had engraved on brass, at the time of his abdication of the Raj, and of his resigning it in my favour. Again, in the event of his establishing his residence in his jaghire, and of his realizing the collections through his own officers, it is proper that he should not keep such a one and other disaffected persons in his service, and besides one hundred men and maid servants, &c., he must not entertain any persons as soldiers, with a view to the collection of the revenue of the pergunnah; and to the protection of his person he may take two hundred soldiers of the forces of the Nepaul Government, the allowances of whom shall be paid by the Rajah of Nepaul. He must be cautious, also of commencing altercation, either by speech or writing; neither must he give protection to the rebellious and fugitives of the Nepaul country, nor must he commit plunder and devastation upon the subjects of Nepaul. In the event of such delinquency being proved to the satisfaction of the two Governments, the aid and protection of the Company shall be withdrawn from him; and in that event, also, it shall be at the option of the Rajah of Nepaul whether or not he will confiscate his jaghire.

The Maha Rajah also agrees, on his part, that if Samee Jeo should take up his residence within the Company's provinces and should farm out his land to the officers of Nepaul, and that the kists should not be paid according to agreement, or that he should fix his residence on his jaghire, and any of the inhabitants of Nepaul should give him or the ryots of his pergunnah any molestation, a requisition shall be made by the Governor-General of the Company, on this subject, to the Rajah. The Governor-General is security for the Rajah's performance of this condition, and the Maha Rajah will immediately acquit himself of the requisition of the Governor-General, agreeably to what is above written. If any profits should arise in the collection of the said pergunnah, in consequence of the activity of the officers, or any defalcation occurs from their inattention, in either case the Rajah of Nepaul will be totally unconcerned.

ARTICLE 10

With the view of carrying into effect the different objects contained in this Treaty, and of promoting other verbal negotiation, the Governor-General and the Rajah of Nepaul, under the impulse of their will and pleasure, depute a confidential person to each other as vakeel, that remaining in attendance upon their respective Governments, they may effect the objects above specified, and promote whatever may tend to the daily improvement of the friendship subsisting between the two States.

ARTICLE 11

It is incumbent upon the principals and officers of the two

States that they should manifest the regard and respect to the vakeel of each others' Government, which is due to their rank, and is prescribed by the laws of nations; and that they should endeavour, to the utmost of their power, to advance any object which they may propose, and to promote their ease, comfort, and satisfaction, by extending protection to them, which circumstances are calculated to improve the friendship subsisting between the two Governments, and to illustrate the good name of both States throughout the universe.

ARTICLE 12

It is incumbent upon the vakeels of both States that they should hold no intercourse whatever with any of the subjects or inhabitants of the country, excepting with the officers of Government, without the permission of those officers; neither should they carry on any correspondence with any of them; and if they should receive any letter or writing from any such people, they should not answer it, without the knowledge of the heads of the State, and acquainting him of the particulars, which will dispel all apprehension or doubt between us, and manifest the sincerity of our friendship.

ARTICLE 13

It is incumbent upon the principals and officers mutually to abide by the spirit of this Treaty, which is now drawn out according to their faith and religion, and deeming it in force from generation to generation that they should not deviate from it; and any person who may transgress against it will be punished by Almighty God, both in this world and in a future state."

APPENDIX III

ORIGINAL TERMS INTENDED BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE PACIFICATION OF THE WAR OF 1814-16 WITH NEPAL

“TREATY OF PEACE between the Honourable East India Company and Maharajah Bikram Sah (insert titles) Rajah of Nepaul settled between Major Parts Bradshaw on the part of the Honourable Company, in virtue of the full powers vested in him by His Excellency the Right Honourable Francis Earl of Moira, Knight of the Most Noble of the Garter, one of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council appointed by the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and by.....on the part of Maharajah & c.a. (insert titles) in virtue of powers to that effect vested in them by the said Rajah of Nepaul.

Whereas War has arisen between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nepaul and Whereas the parties are mutually disposed to restore the relations of peace and amity which previously to the occurrence of the late differences have long subsisted between the two states the following terms of peace have been agreed upon.

ARTICLE 1

Peace and Friendship between the Honourable East India Company and the Government of Nepaul, and hostilities shall cease in all quarters immediately on the receipt of information of the conclusion of this treaty intelligence of which shall be expedited by every practicable means.

ARTICLE 2

The Rajah of Nepaul hereby renounces for himself and his heirs and successors for ever all claims to the disputed lands which have for some time past been the subject of discussion between the two states, and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the Sovereignty of the whole of those lands.

ARTICLE 3

Whereas Munraj Foujdar, an officer in the service of the Nepaulese Government, stands charged with the atrocious murder in cold blood of the Police officers of the British Government in Bootwal, an act which by precluding further amicable discussion between the two states was the immediate cause of the War, the Rajah of Nepaul hereby agrees to surrender Munraj Foujdar into the hands

of the British Commanding officer withindays from this date. In order that the said Munraj shall be subjected to trial for the alleged offence and to commensurate punishment if the charge be proved against him.

ARTICLE 4

The Rajah of Nepal hereby cedes to the Hon'ble Company in perpetuity the whole of the territory recently in the occupation of the Government of Nepal, situated below the first range of Hills from the eastern border of Morung to the Ganges, and renounces all claim or pretension of every description on that territory.

ARTICLE 5

The Rajah of Nepal for himself, his heirs and successors hereby renounces all claims and pretensions whatsoever over the countries situated to the West of the River Gogra formerly conquered by the Gorkha arms and engages to withdraw from those countries within the space ofdays from this date any Nepalese troops which may be still in those countries, and the Rajah hereby binds himself and his heirs and successors never to revive his claims or pretensions on those countries.

ARTICLE 6

Whereas the British Government has entered into engagements of protection and guarantee against the Gorkha power with the chief of several Hill Principalities lying to the eastward of the Gogra and has encouraged the inhabitants to assist in restoring the authority of their ancient chiefs the Rajah of Nepal hereby recognises and acknowledges the validity of those engagements and renounces all claim or pretension over the territories of such Hill chiefs as may have entered into engagements to the above effect with the Hon'ble Company, or may have risen against the Gorkha power up to the period when hostilities shall have ceased. A list of all the chiefs coming within the foregoing description shall be delivered to the Rajah of Nepal at the earliest practicable period of time. The Rajah engages never to molest or wage war against those Chiefs who may receive the benefit of this article and who are under the guarantee of the Hon'ble Company, nor to interfere in any manner in their disputes either spontaneously or by molestation, and the Rajah further agrees that all differences arising between the State of Nepal and any of those principalities shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government which will decide according to justice and right after due examination and the Rajah further engages to abide by its award.

ARTICLE 7

The Rajah of Nepal hereby engages never to injure or molest nor to suffer the officers of his Government to injure or molest any persons residing within the territory which may remain to him for any part which they may have taken in the present War.

ARTICLE 8

Whereas the Hon'ble Company has been exposed to a great expense by the preparations which it has been compelled to make for the war now happily concluded the Raja of Nepaul engages to pay to the British Government the sum of.....according to the following instalments.....The following persons shall be surrendered into the hands of the British Government as hostages for the liquidation of the above sum and shall not be liberated until the whole is paid.

ARTICLE 9

The Rajah engages never to take or retain in his service the subject of any European or American State, nor any subject of the British Government European or native of India without the permission of the British Government.

ARTICLE 10

In order to secure and improve the relations of Amity and Peace hereby established between the two states, it is agreed that accredited Ministers from each shall reside at the Court of the other.

ARTICLE 11

The Treaty of Commerce concluded between the two states in 1792 is hereby declared to be renewed in full force and the contracting parties engage to concert together for the purpose of introducing into that Treaty such alterations and improvements as may appear to be expedient.

ARTICLE 12

The treaty shall be ratified by the Rajah of Nepaul within... days from this date and the ratification delivered to Major Bradshaw who engages to procure and deliver to the Rajah the ratification of the Governor General in.....days or sooner if practicable.

APPENDIX IV

THE TREATY OF SAGAU

“TREATY OF PEACE between the HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY and MAHA RAJAH BIKRAM SAH, Rajah of Nepaul, settled between LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BRADSHAW on the part of the HONOURABLE COMPANY, in virtue of the full powers vested in him by HIS EXCELLENCY the RIGHT HONOURABLE FRANCIS, EARL OF MOIRA, KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER of the GARTER, one of HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL, appointed by the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all the affairs in the East Indies, and by SREE GOOROO GUJRAJ MISSER and CHUNDER SEEKUR OPEDEEA on the part of MAHA RAJAH GIRMAUN JODE BIKRAM SAH BHAUDER, SHUMSHEER JUNG, in virtue of the powers to that effect vested in them by the said Rajah of Nipal,—2nd December 1815.

Whereas war has arisen between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal, and whereas the parties are mutually disposed to restore the relations of peace and amity, which, previously to the occurrence of the late differences, had long subsisted between the two States, the following terms of peace have been agreed upon.

ARTICLE 1

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal.

ARTICLE 2

The Rajah of Nipal renounces all claim to the lands which were the subject of discussion between the two States before the war; and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the sovereignty of those lands.

ARTICLE 3

The Rajah of Nipal hereby cedes to the Honourable the East India Company in perpetuity all the undermentioned territories, viz.—

First—The whole of the low lands between the Rivers Kali and Rapti.

Secondly—The whole of the low lands (with the exception of Footwul Khass) lying between the Rapti and the Gunduck.

Thirdly—The whole of the low lands between the Gunduck and Goosah, in which the authority of the British Government has been introduced, or is in actual course of introduction.

Fourthly—All the low lands between the Rivers Mitchee and the Teestah.

Fifthly—All the territories within the hills eastward of the River Mitchee, including the fort and lands of Nagree and the Pass of Nagarocote, leading from Morung into the hills, together with the territory lying between that Pass and Nagree. The aforesaid territory shall be evacuated by the Gurkha troops within forty days from this date.

ARTICLE 4

With a view to indemnify the Chiefs and Barahdars of the State of Nipal, whose interests will suffer by the alienation of the lands ceded by the foregoing Article, the British Government agrees to settle pensions to the aggregate amount of two lakhs of rupees per annum on such chiefs as may be selected by the Rajah of Nipal, and in the proportions which the Rajah may fix. As soon as the selection is made, Sunnuds shall be granted under the seal and signature of the Governor-General for the pensions respectively.

ARTICLE 5

The Rajah of Nipal renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connexion with the countries lying to the west of the River Kali, and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.

ARTICLE 6

The Rajah of Nipal engages never to molest or disturb the Rajah of Sikkim in the possession of his territories; but agrees, if any differences shall arise between the State of Nipal and the Rajah of Sikkim, or the subjects of either, that such differences shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, by whose award the Rajah of Nipal engages to abide.

ARTICLE 7

The Rajah of Nipal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European and American State, without the consent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 8

In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two States, it is agreed that accredited Ministers from each shall reside at the Court of the other.

ARTICLE 9

This treaty, consisting of nine Articles, shall be ratified by the Rajah of Nipal within fifteen days from this date, and the ratification shall be delivered to Lieut-Colonel Bradshaw, who engages to obtain and deliver to the Raja the ratification of the Governor-General within twenty days, or sooner, if practicable.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE RESTORATION OF THE EASTERN TERAI

8th December 1816

“Adverting to the amity and confidence subsisting with the Rajah of Nipal, the British Government proposes to suppress, as much as is possible the execution of certain Articles in the Treaty of Segowlee, which bear hard upon the Rajah, as follows:—

2. With a view to gratify the Rajah in a point which he has much at heart, the British Government is willing to restore the Terai ceded to it by the Rajah in the Treaty, to wit, the whole Terai lands lying between the Rivers Coosa and Gunduck, such as appertained to the Rajah before the late disagreement; excepting the disputed lands in the Zillahs of Tirhoot and Sarun, and excepting such portions of territory as may occur on both sides for the purpose of settling a frontier upon investigation by the respective Commissioners; and excepting, such lands as may have been given in possession to any one by the British Government upon ascertainment of his rights subsequent to the cession of Terai to that Government. In case the Rajah is desirous of retaining the lands of such ascertained proprietors, they may be exchanged for others, and let it be clearly understood that, notwithstanding the considerable extent of the lands in the Zillah of Tirhoot, which have for a long time been a subject of dispute, the settlement made in the year 1812 of Christ, corresponding with the year 1869 of Bikramjeet, shall be taken and everything else relinquished, that is to say, that the settlement and negotiations, such as occurred at that period, shall in the present case hold good and be established.

3. The British Government is willing likewise to restore the Terai lying between the Rivers Gunduk and Rapti, that is to say, from the River Gunduk to the western limits of the Zillah of Goruckpore, together with Bootwul and Sheeraj, such as appertained to Nipal previous to the disagreements, complete, with the exception of the disputed places in the Terai, and such quantity of ground as may be considered mutually to be requisite for the new boundary.

4. As it is impossible to establish desirable limits between the two States without survey, it will be expedient that Commissioners be appointed on both sides for the purpose of arranging in concert a well defined boundary on the basis of the preceding terms, and of establishing a straight line of frontier, with a view to the distinct separation of the respective territories of the British Government to the south and of Nipal to the north; and in case any

indentations occur to destroy the even tenor of the line, the Commissioners should effect an exchange of lands so interfering on principles of clear reciprocity.

5. And should it occur that the proprietors of lands situated on the mutual frontier, as it may be rectified, whether holding of the British Government or of the Rajah of Nipal, should be placed in the condition of subjects to both Governments, with a view to prevent continual dispute and discussion between the two Governments, the respective Commissioners should effect in mutual concurrence and co-operation the exchange of such lands, so as to render them subject to one dominion alone.

6. Whensoever the Terai should be restored, the Rajah of Nipal will cease to require the sum of two lakhs of Rupees per annum, which the British Government agreed the advance for the maintenance of certain Barahdars of his Government.

7. Moreover, the Rajah of Nipal agrees to refrain from prosecuting any inhabitants of the Terai, after its reversion to his rule, on account of having favoured the cause of the British Government during the war, and should any of those persons, excepting the cultivators of the soil, be desirous of quitting their estates, and of retiring within the Company's territories, he shall not be liable to hindrance.

8. In the event of the Rajah's approving the foregoing terms, the proposed arrangement for the survey and establishment of boundary marks shall be carried into execution, and after the determination in concert of the boundary line, Sunnuds conformable to the foregoing stipulations, drawn out and sealed by the two States, shall be delivered and accepted on both sides".

**TRANSLATION OF AN ENGAGEMENT UNDER THE
RED SEAL, IN THE FORM OF A LETTER, FROM
MAHARAJAH OF NIPAL TO RESIDENT**

Dated 6th November 1839

“According to your (Resident’s) request and for the purpose of perpetuating the friendship of the two States as well as to promote the effectual discharge of current business the following items are fixed.

1st. All secret intrigues whatever, by messengers or letter, shall totally cease.

2nd. The Nipal Government engages to have no further intercourse with the dependent allies of the Company beyond the Ganges, who are by Treaty precluded from such intercourse, except with the Resident’s sanction and under his passports.

3rd. With the Zamindars and baboos on this side of the Ganges who are connected by marriage with the Royal family of Nipal, intercourse of letters and persons shall remain open to the Nipal Government as heretofore.

4th. It is agreed to as a rule for the guidance of both Sircars, that in judicial matters where civil causes arise there they shall be heard and decided; and the Nipal Government engages that for the future British subjects shall not be compelled to plead in the court of Nipal to civil actions, having exclusive reference to their dealings in the plains.

5th. The Nipal Government engages that British subjects shall hereafter be regarded as her own subjects in regard to access to the Court of Law, and that the causes of the former shall be heard and decided without denial or delay, according to the usages of Nipal.

6th. The Nipal Government engages that an authentic statement of all duties leviable in Nipal shall be delivered to the Resident, and that hereafter unauthorised imposts not entered in this list shall not be levied on British subjects.”

APPENDIX VII

**TRANSLATION OF AN ICKRAR NAMEH SIGNED BY
THE GOOROOS, CHOUNTRAS, CHIEFS, &C., &C.,
OF NIPAL**

Dated Saturday, Poos Soodi 9th, 1897, or 2nd January 1841

“We the undersigned Gooroos, Chountras, Chiefs, &c., &c., of Nipal, fully agree to uphold the sentiments as written below, viz:—

That it is most desirable and proper that a firm and steady friendship should exist and be daily increased between the British and Nipal Government; that to this end every means should be taken to increase the friendly relations with the Company, and the welfare of the Nipal Government; that the Resident should ever and always be treated in an honourable and friendly manner; that if, nevertheless, any unforeseen circumstance or unjust or senseless proceeding should at any time arise to shake the friendly understanding which ought to exist between the two Sirkars, or to cause uproar and mischief at Khatmandoo, we should be responsible for it”.

APPENDIX VIII

TREATY BETWEEN THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJA DHERAJ SOORINDER VIKRAM SAH BAHADOOR, RAJAH OF NIPAL

10th February 1855

“Treaty between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Maharaja Dheraj Soorinder Vikram Sah Bahadoor Shumshere Jung, Rajah of Nipal, settled and concluded on the one part by Major George Ramsay, Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by the Most Noble James Andrew, Marquis of Dalhousie, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council and Governor General, appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and on the other part by General Jung Bahadoor Koonwar Ranajee, Prime Minister of Nipal, in the name and on behalf of Maharaja Dheraj Soorinder Vikram Sah Bahadoor Shumshere Jung, Rajah of Nipal, in virtue of the powers to that effect vested in him by the said Rajah of Nipal.

ARTICLE 1

The two Governments hereby agree to act upon a system of strict reciprocity as hereinafter mentioned.

ARTICLE 2

Neither Government shall be bound in any case to surrender any person not being a subject of the Government making the requisition.

ARTICLE 3

Neither Government shall be bound to deliver up debtors, or civil offenders or any person charged with any offence not specified in Article 4.

ARTICLE 4

Subject to the above limitations, any person who shall be charged with having committed, within the territories of the Government making the requisition, any of the under-mentioned offences, and who shall be found within the territories of the other, shall be surrendered, the offences are murder, attempt to murder, rape, maim-

ing, thuggee, dacoity, high-way robbery, poisoning, burglary and arson.

ARTICLE 5

In no case shall either Government be bound to surrender any person accused of an offence, except upon requisition duly made by, or by the authority of, the Government within whose territories the offence shall be charged to have been committed and also upon such evidence of criminality, as according to the laws of the country in which the person accused shall be found, would justify his apprehension, and sustain the charge if the offence had been there committed.

ARTICLE 6

If any person attached to the British Residency, or living within the Residency boundaries, not being a subject of the Nepalese Government, commit in any part of the Nipalese territories, beyond the Residency boundaries, an offence which would render him liable to punishment by the Nipalese Courts, he shall be apprehended and made over to the British Resident for trial and punishment; but subjects of the Nipal State under similar circumstances are not to be given up by the Nipalese Government for punishment. Should any Hindustanee Merchants, or other subjects of the Honourable Company, not attached to the British Residency, who may be living within the Nipal territories, commit any crimes beyond the Residency boundaries, whereby they may render themselves liable to punishment by the Nipalese Courts, and take refuge within the limits of the Residency, they shall not be allowed any asylum but will be given up to the Nipal Government for trial and punishment.

ARTICLE 7

The expenses of any apprehension, detention, or surrender made in virtue of the foregoing stipulations, shall be borne and defrayed by the Government making the requisition.

ARTICLE 8

The above Treaty shall continue in force until either one or the other of the High Contracting Parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate it, and no longer.

ARTICLE 9

Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to effect any Treaty now existing between the High Contracting Parties, except so far as any such Treaty may be repugnant hereto.

This Treaty, consisting of nine Articles, being this day concluded and settled by Major George Ramsay, on behalf of the Honourable East India Company with Maharaja Dheraj Soorinder Vikram Sah Bahadur Shumshere Jung, Major Ramsay has delivered one version thereof in English, Purbutteah, and Oordoo, signed and sealed by himself, to the Maharajah, who on his part, has also delivered one copy of the same to Major Ramsay, duly executed by His Highness, and Major Ramsay hereby engages to deliver a copy of the same to His Highness the Maharajah, duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council, within sixty days from this date."

APPENDIX IX

TREATY WITH NIPAL REGARDING THE RESTORATION OF THE WESTERN TERAI

1st November 1860

“During the disturbances which followed the mutiny of the Native army of Bengal in 1857, the Maharajah of Nipal not only faithfully maintained the relations of peace and friendship established between the British Government and the State of Nipal by the Treaty of Segowlee, but freely placed troops at the disposal of the British authorities for the preservation of order in the Frontier Districts, and subsequently sent a force to cooperate with the British Army in the re-capture of Lucknow and the final defeat of the rebels. On the conclusion of these operations, the Viceroy and Governor-General in recognition of the eminent services rendered to the British Government by the State of Nipal, declared his intention to restore to the Maharajah the whole of the lowlands lying between the River Kali and the District of Goruckpore, which belonged to the State of Nipal in 1815, and were ceded to the British Government in that year by the aforesaid Treaty. These lands have now been identified by Commissioners appointed for the purpose by the British Government, in the presence of Commissioners deputed by the Nipal Darbar; masonry pillars have been erected to mark the future boundary of the two States, and the territory has been formally delivered over to the Nipalese Authorities. In order the more firmly to secure the State of Nipal in the perpetual possession of this territory, and to mark in a solemn way the occasion of its restoration, the following Treaty has been concluded between the two States:—

ARTICLE 1

All Treaties and Engagements now in force between the British Government and the Maharajah of Nipal, except in so far as they may be altered by the Treaty, are hereby confirmed.

ARTICLE 2

The British Government hereby bestows on the Maharajah of Nipal in full sovereignty, the whole of the lowlands between the Rivers Kali and Raptée, and the lowlands lying between the River Raptée and the District of Goruckpore, which were in the possession of the Nipal State in the year 1815, and were ceded to the British Government by Article III of the Treaty concluded at Segowlee on the 2nd December in that year.

ARTICLE 3

The boundary line surveyed by the British Commissioners appointed for the purpose extending eastward from the River Kali or Sardah to the foot of the hills north of Bagowra Tal, and marked by pillars, shall henceforth be the boundary between the British Province of Oudh and the Territories of the Maharajah of Nipal.

This Treaty, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel George Ramsay, on the part of His Excellency the Right Honourable Charles John, Earl Canning, G.C.B., Viceroy and Governor General of India, and by Maharajah Jung Bahadur Rana, G.C.B., on the part of Maharajah Dheraj Soorinder Vikram Sah Bahadoor Shumshere Jung, shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Khatmandoo within thirty days of the date of signature."

APPENDIX X

MEMORANDUM DATED THE 23RD OF JULY 1866, SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE TREATY WITH THE STATE OF NIPAL, OF THE 10TH OF FEBRUARY 1855, FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF HEINOUS CRIMINALS ADDING TO THE 4TH ARTICLES OF THE SAID TREATY THE OFFENCES OF CATTLE STEALING, OF EMBEZZLEMENT BY PUBLIC OFFICERS, AND SERIOUS THEFT—23RD JULY 1866.

“It is hereby settled and concluded by Colonel George Ramsay, Resident at the Court of Nipal, by virtue of full powers vested in him by his Excellency the Right Hon'ble Sir John Laird Mair Lawrence, Baronet, G.C.B. and K.C.S.I., Her Majesty's Viceroy and Governor-General of British India, and by Maharajah Jung Bahadoor Rana, G.C.B., Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of Nipal, in virtue of powers to that effect granted to him by his Sovereign the Maharajah Dheraj of Nipal.

That, subject to all the other conditions of the Treaty which was executed at Khatmandoo by the same parties on the tenth day of February one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, corresponding to the eighth day of Fagoon, Sumbut nineteen hundred and eleven, and with the view to the prevention of frontier disputes, and the more speedy and effectual repression of crime upon the border, the offences of cattle-stealing, of embezzlement by public officers, and of serious theft, that is to say, cases of theft in which the amount stolen may be considerable, or personal violence may have been used, shall be included in the list of crimes for which surrenders shall be demanded by either Government. In fact, they are hereby formally added to the list of crimes specified in the 4th Article of the said Treaty.

Executed at Khatmandoo this twenty-third day of July A.D. one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six, corresponding to the twenty-sixth day of Asarh, Sumbut nineteen hundred and twenty-three.”

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